

BRITISH TRADE WITH SPANISH AMERICA UNDER THE ASIENIO

1713 - 1740

by

Victoria Gardner Sorsby

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Department of History,

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ABSTRACT

In 1713 England acquired the asiento contract to supply Spain's American colonies with 4,800 slaves annually, and assigned the privilege to the South Sea Company. In compensation for expected losses in the slave trade, the Company was permitted to carry on an extensive trade in merchandise which competed with the traditional outlets for British trade to America. This need to rely on foreign contractors to supply slaves to the American colonies offered a threat to Spain's trading monopoly; it was further eroded by the presence of British merchants residing at strategic ports throughout America trading in large quantities of contraband slaves and merchandise in addition to Company trade.

Although the Spanish government took numerous steps to impede the Company's trade including the seizure of all Company property during the wars of 1718, 1727 and 1739, they were never able to convince the Company to relinquish the asiento for an agreed compensation. When the Company finally ceased trading at the beginning of the War of Jenkins' Ear, it was mainly because of dwindling returns and a new political environment in England. Although the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which ended the war, provided for the Company to continue trading for another four years, it was in no position to resume the trade. Company agents had all returned to England at the beginning of the war, and after a severe financial loss the directors concentrated on obtaining compensation. In 1750 the asiento contract was terminated and the South Sea Company paid £100,000 to cover their losses in the trade.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the formation and development of the South Sea Company as it relates to the acquisition and operation of the asiento contract to supply slaves to Spanish colonies in America. The institutional structure developed for the purchase, transport and sale of slaves will be discussed. The additional concessions granted to the Company to send licensed and annual merchant ships to the colonies will also be analysed.

The banking activities of the Company in Britain and the diplomatic impact it had on Anglo-Spanish relations have been studied elsewhere, and therefore will be discussed only in reference to the American trade. The social and economic impact the Company had on Spain's colonies is also outside the scope of this paper.

Because the quantification of slave introductions is a major aspect of this paper, statistics that have been compiled are included in the paper rather than as appendices.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Add.	Additional Manuscripts, British Museum.
Adm.	Admiralty Papers, Public Record Office.
AGI	Archivo General de Indias (Seville).
AGS	Archivo General de Simancas.
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid).
BM	British Museum (London).
C.L.	William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor).
C.O.	Colonial Office, Public Record Office (London).
Eg.	Egerton Papers, British Museum.
HMC	Historical Manuscripts Commission.
Ind. Gen.	Indiferente General, Archivo General de Indias (Seville).
PRO	Public Record Office (London)
Shel.	Shelburne Papers, William L. Clements Library (Ann Arbor).
S.P.	State Papers, Public Record Office (London).
T.	Treasury Papers, Public Record Office (London).

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Chapter I

The Asiento and British Opinion

It was the contention of many British statesmen and merchants in the eighteenth century that the balance of power in Europe was dependent on the balance of trade. Prior to the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) they believed that this balance favoured the French, one of the reasons being that the French had acquired in 1701 the asiento¹ to supply slaves to the Spanish colonies in America. However the aspect of French trade that most agitated the British was the illicit merchandise which was sent to the far reaches of Spain's empire in America, much of it on French Guinea Company slave ships. They also accused the French of destroying British forts and settlements in Africa, and of plundering British slave ships in the struggle for slaves to supply markets throughout America.

The French took advantage of their asiento to send great quantities of contraband to America, including the less accessible Pacific Coast of South America. Prior to their acquisition of the asiento contract, the coasts of Peru and Chile were visited infrequently by merchant ships; local traders purchased most of their merchandise at the fairs in Portobelo and Cartagena, or from the occasional contrabandista. They encouraged this illicit trade, albeit with some risk, because French goods were relatively inexpensive, and because of the arduous nature of the overland journey to Portobelo and Cartagena. Rumours soon reached England that French merchants had warehouses in Peru from which they carried goods inland, and forts and settlements in Chile for the protection and repair of merchant ships. This trade was estimated to bring £200,000 in bullion into France annually. The English feared that such large sums would further upset the balance of power by quickly replenishing the French treasury, which had been severely drained during the prolonged European

1. Although the term asiento has a much broader meaning, in this paper it is used to refer only to the contract for the slave trade.

wars, and by increasing Spain's dependence on France.

British merchants and politicians were eager to tap the exaggerated wealth of Spain's colonies in America, and in the process to sap France's economic strength. As one observer concluded,

The French must be remov'd from their Settlements in the Spanish West-Indies, as the most effectual Means, both to procure a lasting Peace, and to settle the Grand Trade and Wealth of Europe on a due Ballance.²

At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht the Spanish colonies were, in fact, saturated with French and other foreign goods. Furthermore, British merchants in Jamaica reported that vigilant Spanish guardacostas also hurt trade. They prophesized a sombre future, as did British merchants in Spain whose trade had been erratic throughout the War of the Spanish Succession (and only slightly improved afterwards), due to the scarcity of ships available to transport goods to America.

These lugubrious predictions were modified by the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Utrecht. The English believed that the most practical way to infiltrate Spain's trading monopoly in America was to obtain legal entry, as the French had done, by procuring the asiento de negros. The British government submitted an unsuccessful bid for the contract in 1707, and then demanded that it be considered in the peace discussions in 1711. These

2. Directors to Stanhope, 25 May 1715, BM, Add. 25,555, ff. 22-23; Anon., A True Account of the Design, and Advantages of the South-Sea Trade: with Answers to all the Objections rais'd against it (London, 1711), pp. 6-8; Anon., Some Considerations upon Trade (London, 1715), p. 1; Anon., The Considerable Advantages of a South-Sea Trade to our English Nation (London, c. 1711), p. 5; Anon., An Essay on the Nature and Methods for carrying on a Trade to the South Sea, n.d., BM, Add. 28,140, pp. 25-26; Hubert Aimes, A History of Slavery in Cuba 1511 to 1868 (New York, 1967), p. 20.

Spanish officials in Chilean and Peruvian coastal towns were tolerant to visiting French merchants. They were frequently permitted to sell their illegal merchandise if duties were paid, and in exchange for chasing British pirates from the area. The Spanish did not have the ships to do it alone. During the War of the Spanish Succession the fleets could not sail regularly, so the French merchants served a useful purpose in supplying necessary goods. Sergio Villalobos R., "Contrabando Francés en el Pacífico, 1700-1724", Revista de Historia de América número 51 (1961), pp. 55, 66.

negotiations led to the signing of the asiento contract between England and Spain on 26 March 1713.³

For 185 years prior to 1713 Spain had granted licenses to numerous individuals and companies to supply her colonies with negro slaves. The first license was given in 1528; from then until 1601 all contracts were with Spanish subjects. After 1601 foreigners were allowed to participate in the trade. Several Portuguese merchants held asiento contracts prior to 1640, traders of various nationalities until 1685, and the Dutch from 1685 to 1687. The Portuguese Guinea Company had a monopoly on the trade between 1687 and 1701, as did the French Guinea Company from 1701 until 1713.⁴

The British had a large stake in the trade even before their acquisition of the contract. In 1667 two Genoese merchants who had the asiento granted sub-contracts to the English Royal Adventurers and to the Dutch India Company to supply them with slaves, and several years later, in 1684, they hired an agent to represent them in Jamaica and to purchase slaves there.

The British government encouraged British merchants to participate in this lucrative trade. In February 1663 they decreed that Spanish merchants could buy slaves in Jamaica and Barbados upon payment of a duty of ten pesos

3. To Thomas Onslow, August 1716, PRO, C.O. 137/12, part i, f. 35; Daily Courant, 21 April and 7 June 1714; Anon. letter, 27 March 1714, PRO, S.P. 94/82; L. F. Horsfall, "British Relations with the Spanish Colonies in the Caribbean 1713-1739", Unpublished M.A. dissertation, 1935, London University, Institute of Historical Research, pp. 50-51; Elizabeth Donnan, "The Early Days of the South Sea Company, 1711-1718", Journal of Economic and Business History, ii (1930), p. 421; L. Batcheler, "The South Sea Company and the Assiento", Unpublished M.A. dissertation, 1925, London University, Institute of Historical Research. Horsfall and Batcheler analyse the negotiations which led to the British acquisition of the asiento contract in 1713. Considerable research has also been done on the chronology of the asiento contracts, and the variations in the treaty stipulations. See Georges Scelle, La Traité Négrière aux Indes de Castille (2 vols., Paris, 1906).
4. Elena F.S. de Studer, La Trata de Negros en el Río de la Plata durante el Siglo XVIII (Buenos Aires, 1958), pp. 58-59; For another work quantifying the early asiento trade see Enriqueta Vila Vilar, "Algunos datos sobre la navegación y los navios negreros en el siglo xvii", reprint from Historiografía y Bibliografía Americanistas, vol. xvii (December 1973).

per slave. Spaniards who took advantage of this privilege seldom travelled personally to the British colonies. They usually had resident agents purchase the slaves, or requested that cargoes be brought to them. For the British slave dealer it was more profitable by about 25% to deliver slaves to the Spanish colonies than to sell them to resident Spanish agents; the greater profit was worth the risks of shipwreck, seizure by guardacostas, mortality, and bad debts, and little chance of redress.⁵

Private British slave traders were further encouraged in 1698 by the suspension of the monopoly which the Royal African Company had maintained in the African trade. Upon payment of 10% of the value of their cargoes to help with the maintenance of Company forts, private traders received permission to trade on the African coast. One person who was involved in this trade, and who later worked for the South Sea Company, was Nathaniel Uring, well-known in the contemporary literature of the period. Uring commanded a sloop that took 150 slaves and manufactured goods to New Spain in 1711, and later described the devious means used by both Spanish and English merchants to avoid contact with royal officials. He anchored near Portobelo, with Spanish merchants visiting his ship to select and bargain for goods and slaves. They made their purchases on the first visit, and collected them on a second, often travelling as poor peasants accompanying mule trains. Most of the cargo purchased in Portobelo was destined for resale across the isthmus. Except for the slaves, for whom the merchants needed false documentation, or who had to be taken by hidden routes at night, everything was packed in small parcels that were easy to hide. Besides slaves and merchandise, Uring also supplied provisions used in the journey across the isthmus.⁶

5. Curtis Pitman Nettels, The Money Supply of the American Colonies before 1720 (Madison, 1934), p. 18; J. F. Osborne, "James Castillo--Asiento Agent", The Jamaican Historical Review, viii (1971), p. 9; A. P. Thornton, "Spanish Slave-Ships in the English West Indies, 1660-85", Hispanic American Historical Review, no. 3 (1955), p. 379.

6. Account of ports on the Spanish Main John Fengass traded to, n.d., PRO, C.O. 5/12, ff. 8-10.

There were several places on the Spanish coast favoured by British traders for making rendezvous with Spanish merchants. Naturally they preferred secluded spots to principal ports. A small uninhabited island named Bastimentos near Portobelo was one such place. Another was the bay near the river leading to Santa Marta. They met the merchants of Cartagena at a place known as Fellow, a small fishing village about 35 leagues southwest of the city. The Mosquito Coast was also favoured for the introduction of slaves and goods because of the presence of British settlers and the protection afforded by the Mosquito Indians. ⁷⁶

During the negotiations which led to the asiento contract the English requested the right to occupy and fortify four Spanish ports in America to protect the trade. Chile was considered to be an ideal site for one such community because of its reasonable climate and remoteness from other Spanish colonies. They said that a force of 4,000 men, 20 war ships, and 40 transport ships would be necessary to establish each community. Spanish negotiators refused even to consider the request. Instead they offered the British the equivalent of a 15% reduction on duties on British goods imported at Cadiz, a Swiss garrison there under British control--and, by far the most important--the asiento contract for 10 years (later extended to 30) if they would agree to drop their demand for fortified ports. The 15% duty preferential was eventually exchanged for the privilege of sending a British ship annually, containing 500 tons of merchandise duty free, to accompany the galleons or flotas to America.⁸

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7. The Voyages and Travels of Captain Nathaniel Uring (London, 1928), pp. 22, 47; D. A. G. Waddell, "Queen Anne's Government and the Slave Trade", Caribbean Quarterly, vi (1960), p. 7.
8. Monteleon to Grimaldo, 1 March 1713, AGS, Estado 6822; Résumé of a proposition by Lexington concerning the treaties of 1713, n.d., AGS, Estado 6820; Bateman and Ongley to Robert, Earl of Oxford, 31 January 1711, BM, Add. 25,559, f. 8; George H. Healey, ed., The Letters of Daniel Defoe (Oxford, 1955), pp. 339-346; Batchelor, "The South Sea Company", p. 76; Rumours that the British hoped to settle on the Spanish coast of America greatly disturbed other trading nations, especially the Dutch. From John Bristol, 3 June 1712, PRO, S.P. 105/271.

According to the terms of the Anglo-Spanish asiento treaty as ratified by both nations, England was authorized to introduce into the Spanish colonies 4,800 negroes, or piezas de indias, per year for thirty years from 1 May 1713. The treaty did not differentiate between a slave and a pieza de indias, although technically the term pieza de indias indicated a measurement of seven palmas, or cuartas, each palmo equivalent to only about eight inches.⁹

A duty of 33 1/3 pesos was to be levied on each of the first 4,000 piezas (the duty was paid on the number of piezas and not on the number of slaves) introduced each year, with the remaining 800 to be duty free. During the first 25 years of the contract permission could be obtained to import more than 4,800 slaves if there was a need for them on projects such as public works. In the last five years 4,800 was the maximum that could be introduced yearly. The duty on slaves in excess of 4,800 was 16 2/3 pesos per pieza, and was due at the time of disembarcation, except for slaves who were ill during the visita de sanidad (a health inspection performed on all slave ships). Duty was not levied on them if they died within the 15 day period after the visita. However slaves not certified as ill who died before they were sold were liable for duty. Slaves too ill to be measured on the first visita were rescheduled for measurement two weeks' later, and again two weeks after that if necessary. Duties were calculated by royal officials at the ports of landing, but paid by the Company from London.¹⁰ The contract did not specify the sale price of

9. The term was introduced in the middle of the seventeenth century, and referred to a prime male slave in good physical condition between 14 and 30 years of age and about 4'8" tall. By the time the British asiento contract was signed this measurement was the standard used to enumerate a cargo of slaves. It was rare for the number of piezas to equal the number of slaves on a ship's manifest. Deductions were made for physical defects, such as filed teeth, missing limbs and tribal scars, as well as for women, children and old people. The fluctuation in measurement between ports was the result of this rather vague system of computation. James King, "Descriptive Data on Negro Slaves in Spanish Importation Records and Bills of Sale", The Journal of Negro History, xxviii (1943), pp. 209-210; David L. Chandler, "Health Conditions in the Slave Trade of Colonial New Granada", in Robert Brent Toplin, ed., Slavery and Race Relations in Latin America (Westport, 1974), pp. 62-63, 67.

10. The king of Spain used the revenue from the asiento contract to pay the salaries of his ministers and ambassadors in Europe, and to honour juros (annuities or pensions) granted to various creditors. See below p. 168.

slaves except at Santa Marta, Cumaná and Maracaibo on the windward coast ("Spanish Main") of South America, where it was not to exceed 300 pesos because of the general poverty of the area.¹¹ Slaves introduced illegally during the period of the contract were subject to seizure and resale by the asiento company for its own benefit after payment of 33 1/3 pesos per pieza in duty to the Spanish crown and 110 pesos per pieza in payment to the owner of the slave.

The asiento contractor was permitted to send clothing, provisions, naval stores and medicine to the various factories on slave ships. A special stipulation provided that the Buenos Aires factory could receive from England special provision ships of 150 tons each when need dictated because of the difficulties of supplying this distant outpost. None of these supplies were to be resold, and an inventory of each cargo was to be sent to the Council of the Indies.

There were several other articles that referred only to Buenos Aires. No more than 1,200 slaves could be introduced there annually, of which no more than 400 could be sold in the provinces outside the city; and a plot of publicly-owned land suitable for cultivation or grazing near the city was to be donated to the asiento contractor. Philip V ordered the governor of Buenos Aires to give them the land that had been used by the French Guinea Company which was within "a rifle shot" of the city. However the two houses built by the French company on the property were to be purchased by the new asentistas.

The proceeds from the slave trade, in bullion or local products, could be remitted on English or Spanish ships duty free. Profits were calculated quinquennially and the king of Spain's percentage paid in Europe. In the event of war between the two crowns the asentistas were given 18 months without hindrance to remove their effects from the Spanish colonies. However the asiento contract was suspended immediately. When the contract expired they were to have three years to adjust accounts and remit effects.

11. In any case the sale price of slaves seldom exceeded 300 pesos.

In addition to the slave trade the treaty granted a limited commerce in merchandise. The contractor was authorized to send a ship of 300 tons to the Canary Islands one time during the 30 year contract to acquire a cargo of wine, rum and madeira to be sold in the Spanish colonies. This bonus had been granted to two previous asentistas: the Portuguese Guinea Company and Bernardo Francisco Marin. By far the most controversial article was one allowing a ship to be sent to America annually with 500 tons of merchandise for sale duty free at the fairs in Cartagena, Portobelo and Vera Cruz. It was given in consideration of losses sustained by past contractors, to avoid illicit trade on the slave ships, and to demonstrate Spain's good intentions. Lastly, the contractors were granted all privileges and concessions given to past asentistas, and the retiring French Guinea Company were ordered to cease trading.

King Philip V's share in the asiento trade consisted of a duty of 33 1/3 pesos for each pieza sold, and 25% of the profit of the annual ships plus 5% of the remaining profit. In exchange he was required to advance a quarter of the amount of money needed to begin the trade. If, however, he declined to do this, the asentistas would advance his share.

The English contractor was required to advance 200,000 pesos (£45,000) to Philip for their share in the trade, to be paid in two equal installments, the first two months after the contract was signed, the second two months after the first. Repayment was not due to begin until 20 years of the contract had expired, then it was to consist of ten annual payments of 20,000 pesos to be deducted from the duties on slaves introduced. Philip was to pay 8% interest¹² annually on the money advanced to him. As this money was used to purchase cargoes for the annual ships it meant in practice that he was charged from the date of the purchase of the cargo until the proceeds were disposed of in Europe.

12. Interest rates in the 18th century varied considerably from country to country. In France the interest was about 7%, in Italy and Holland 3%, in Spain and Barbados 10%, and in England interest could not exceed 5% after September 1714. Edward Hatton, The Merchant's Magazine: or, Trades-man's Treasury (London, 1726), p. 145.

If there happened to be a loss on this investment the king was liable at the same percentage as he was to receive in case of profit, i.e., 25% plus 5%.

These articles did not apply to the purchase of slaves.

The asiento trade was monitored in America by governors and royal officials at the various ports of entry, in England by a Spanish official who had instructions to attend all meetings of the contractor and to collect as much information on the trade as he could, and in Spain by a Junta del Asiento de Negros composed of the fiscal, the secretary of the Council of the Indies, and three ministers. The Junta, which was first established when the French Guinea Company had the contract, advised the king on all petitions or disputes concerning the slave trade and the annual ships.¹³

Soon after the asiento trade began (with the contract having been given to the South Sea Company, see below, p. 15) it became obvious that several aspects of the trade were unclear: particularly relating to the annual ships and negro duties. In May 1716 the treaty was amended by the "Convention for Explaining the Articles of the Assiento". Because no annual ships had sailed prior to 1716, the asentistas were permitted by the Convention to add the 1,500 tons of merchandise that they had accumulated to subsequent voyages in ten equal allotments of 150 tons each. Thus the next ten annual ships were to be allowed to carry 650 tons of merchandise.

The Spanish also agreed in the Convention that a fair would be held annually in America and that merchandise from the annual ship could be sold four months after its arrival if the Spanish fleet had not arrived. This precaution was inserted in the treaty to prevent the destruction of cargoes because of poor storage conditions and the humid climate. Finally, the revised

13. Asiento contract adjusted between Spain and England, 26 March 1713, AGS, Estado 6896; Philip V to the viceroys of Peru and New Spain, 22 April 1713, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Real cédula, 16 May 1713, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Secret instructions to the governor of Buenos Aires, 29 July 1715, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800; Philip V to governor of Buenos Aires, 9 October 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Georges Scelle, "The Slave-Trade in the Spanish Colonies of America: The Assiento", The American Journal of International Law, iv (1910), pp. 653-654.

treaty clarified the date when the English became responsible for paying duties on slaves. Because none had been introduced during the first year of the contract, the contractor was exempted from paying duties that year. Effectively, therefore, the contract began in May 1714.¹⁴

The South Sea Company was established by an Act of Parliament in May 1711 as negotiations were being held which led to England's acquisition of the asiento contract. Originally the Company was founded to resolve an acute financial problem. The public debt (which was about £9,000,000) was considered by the Whig ministry to be a political threat to them, and a diplomatic threat to peace negotiations in Utrecht. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) had taxed British resources, and Parliament had made no provisions for the payment of interest on the debt. The Company, which was composed of the most powerful businessmen in England,¹⁵ issued stock and took over short term public debts. Government established a fund to pay the Company a tax-free annuity, thus allowing them to pay 5% interest on the issued stock. As an added inducement to investors to purchase stock, the Company was given a monopoly of all trade to the South Seas.¹⁶

As early as June 1711 the Company began preparations to open trade to the Spanish Indies, anticipating that the asiento contract would be assigned to them. However not all stock holders favoured accepting an invitation to manage the trade. No statistics were available to them, but many opponents

14. Treaty signed by Bubb and the Marquis of Piedmar, 26 May 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769.

15. As an indication of the wealth and power of some persons involved in the Company, the first deputy director, Samuel Shephard, was reputed to be worth £400,000. Even Sir Robert Walpole, who originally withheld his support, invested a small sum in the asiento trade. The Original Weekly Journal, 5-12 April 1718; J. H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole (London, 1956), p. 304.

16. The term "South Seas" was misleading. Company ships were not permitted to sail to any Pacific port in the Spanish colonies, and the only factory on the Pacific Coast was in Panama. Slaves were delivered there across the isthmus. Company representatives also took slaves from Buenos Aires to Santiago in Chile, but they never established a permanent outpost there.

of the contract believed that previous companies holding the asiento had sustained considerable losses. They felt that it would be unwise to subject the Company to similar dangers. Nonetheless at a general meeting on 26 February 1714 the proprietors voted 878 to 358 to accept the asiento contract.¹⁷

Numerous problems were encountered relating to the distribution of profits under the terms of the contract. During the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the British government sent Manuel Manasses Gilligan¹⁸ to Madrid to discuss several commercial questions between the two crowns, including the terms of the asiento treaty. Patricio de Laules, a Spanish negotiator, recommended that Gilligan be well treated because he was Catholic and reputable--and it was rumoured that he would be named director of the British asiento company and general director of all Anglo-Spanish commercial relations. Gilligan gained neither post, but he was well rewarded by Queen Anne. She made him a virtual partner in the trade by giving him 7½% in it--without the responsibility for any financial investment. Anne reserved 22½% for herself, and Philip V received 25%. Thus the company that was to acquire the asiento contract would receive only 45% interest in the trade, but have 100% responsibility for its

17. Anon. paper, n.d., BM, Stowe 354; Monteleón to Grimaldo, 5 February 1713, AGS, Estado 6822; Eric Wagstaff, "The Political Aspects of the South Sea Bubble", Unpublished M.A. dissertation, 1934, London University, Institute of Historical Research, pp. 7-14, 28-30. For an account of the financial activities of the Company see John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (London, 1960).
18. Gilligan, a naturalized Dane, has been much maligned by historians. Parry calls him "an adventurer of shifting nationality with a long record of smuggling, trading with the enemy in war, and general sharp practice." Others suggested that such a person representing England in international negotiations was detrimental to the nation. Although he did engage in smuggling to Spanish America during the wars of the Spanish Succession, such trade was never condemned by the British. Furthermore, both the British and Spanish governments were sufficiently pleased with his services to award him an annual pension pension of 2,000 pesos for life to be paid from duties on the slave trade. Real cédula, 17 July 1713, AGS, Libro 482; Note from Gilligan, n.d., AGS, Estado 6820; John G. Sperling, The South Sea Company: an Historical Essay and Bibliographical Finding List (Boston, 1962), p. 13; J. H. Parry, Trade and Dominion (London, 1971), p. 103; William G. Wood, "The Annual Ships of the South Sea Company 1711-1736", Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1936, University of Illinois at Urbana, p. 21.

administration and 75% responsibility for the financial investment.

As negotiations progressed it became apparent that the Spanish intended the English contractor to finance the entire asiento trade, including even the share that Philip V had the option of contributing. The South Sea Company directors considered 45% of the profits to be insufficient to warrant the expenses and troubles involved. They asked Queen Anne either to surrender to the Company her share in the trade or to give it to investors who would be willing to supply capital investment in proportion to the percentage of the trade they received. If they could not have the additional 22½% (30% if they could acquire Gilligan's share), then they wanted someone else to finance the 22½% of the initial investment. The directors also threatened to reduce the Company to a banking institution only unless the queen surrender her share. These difficulties led to rumours that a new company would be formed to manage the slave trade.¹⁹

Anne did finally surrender her share of the trade, but Gilligan refused to give up his until the Lords Justices ruled that he had no right to it unless he paid £8,000 to the Company, the amount they said would be his proportional share of the initial investment. He declined to pay and his percentage also reverted to the Company, which by November 1714 had acquired the right to 75% of the profit derived from the asiento contract. The remaining 25%, plus the duties on slaves introduced into America went to Philip V. Having acquired the share of the expected profits that they wished, the Company agreed to put up all the necessary capital.²⁰

19. Bateman to Lords Justices, 17 August 1714, BM, King's 73, f. 136; Directors to Robert, Earl of Oxford, 2 December 1713, BM, King's 73, f. 106; Minute court of directors, 23 December 1713, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 112; Directors to Robert, Earl of Oxford, 8 June 1714, BM, King's 73, f. 122; From Laules, 28 February 1713, AGS, Estado 6825; Laules to Grimaldo, 14 May 1714, AGS, Estado 6825; Laules to Grimaldo, 28, 30 and 31 December 1713, and 7 January 1714, AGS, Estado 6825.

20. Bateman to Lords Justices, 17 August and 1 September 1714, BM, King's 73, ff. 136-137; Bolingbroke to Bateman, 17 June 1714, BM, King's 73, f. 124; Wagstaff, "The Political Aspect", p. 30.

During the general negotiations leading to the asiento contract the British acquired permission to send two licensed merchant ships each with a maximum of 600 tons of merchandise (based on 166 $\frac{3}{8}$ palmas per ton) to the Spanish West Indies. These two ships were in addition to the annual ships, but were not part of the asiento contract. Yet they had the same function as far as the British were concerned, i.e. to open a market for British manufactured goods. However Anne also granted this privilege to the South Sea Company, although the assignment was left to her discretion and need not have gone to them.

Initially Philip V was to receive 10% of the profit from the licensed ships, but he agreed in the Spring of 1713 to surrender it to Anne, as well as the 5% of the three-fourths profit of the annual ships. Unfortunately Anne died in 1714 and the question developed into a dispute between the Company, George I and Philip V. In March 1724, at the request of the directors, George I gave the Company the 10% and 5% in question. His right to dispose of the shares was contested by the Spanish king. He had given them to Anne alone for her advantage during her lifetime, he said; they were not part of George I's inheritance. Legal advisers to the British king argued that the privilege had been granted to the crown and therefore was inheritable; George could dispose of it as he wished.

The British government placed both George I's and Philip V's honour at stake in the dispute. George I had promised the percentage publicly to the Company, and certainly Philip V did not want all of Europe to think that he had greater regard for Anne than for him. While no direct documentation has been found to explain how the dispute was resolved, it does appear to have been settled in Philip V's favour. The accounts indicate that he received 10% of the profits from the licensed ships and 5% of the three-fourths profits from the annual ships.²¹

21. Legal opinion in Madrid, 14 July 1724, AGS, Estado 6873; Stanhope to Grimaldo, 27 October 1724, AGS, Estado 6873; From Stanhope, 7 June 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Philip V to royal officials of Cartagena, Portobelo and Vera Cruz, 26 July 1715, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Reales Órdenes, 11 April

The assignment of the asiento to the South Sea Company had an immediate effect on trade in America, in spite of growing hostility from private interests in England and Jamaica to large monopolistic corporations.²² This hostility had developed primarily out of the struggle of the Royal African Company to retain control of the African slave trade against the encroachments of private interlopers.²³ The monopolists were accused of maintaining unjustifiably high prices by artificially keeping markets understocked and of having excessive overheads which allowed private merchants to compete favourably. The Royal African Company almost bankrupted itself by maintaining numerous settlements with large, overpaid staffs. The possible advantages or disadvantages to British trade resulting from the contract were discussed exhaustively in London newspapers, journals and broadsides. Journals in opposition to government were prolific, and devoted considerable space to criticizing the Company's activities.

Apologists for the South Sea Company justified its monopoly by citing its

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21. (continued from previous page) and 17 June 1713, AGS, Estado 6861; Wescomb to La Fay, 6 May 1724, BM, Add. 32,738, f. 358; Walpole et al to the king's attorney and solicitor general, 18 October 1723, BM, Add. 25,582, ff. 7-9; Carteret to Stanhope, 1 March 1724, PRO, S.P. 104/139; Marquis of Lede to Stanhope, 3 July 1724, BM, Add. 32,739, f. 225; Stanhope to Newcastle, 10 August 1724, BM, Add. 32,739, ff. 424-425; Stanhope to Newcastle, 16 November 1724, BM, Add. 32,741, f. 225.
22. Michael Harris, "The London Newspaper Press, c. 1725-1746", Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1973, London University, Institute of Historical Research, pp. 188-189.
23. After the revolution in 1688 the Royal African Company faced a decrease in trade, the same overheads, and considerable financial strain, since much of their capital was tied up by credit advanced to planters who had purchased slaves. At the same time public sentiment against monopolies increased. While the Company had several prosperous years when it supplied the South Sea Company with slaves, its viability had been threatened. By 1719 it had to ask for public assistance to maintain the forts, and in 1750 it was dissolved after many years of declining trade. Waddell, op. cit., pp. 7, 9, 10.

unique nature. They argued that the monopoly was only in slaves to be sold in Spain's American colonies, and thus could not effect the trade in English manufactured goods or the private merchants trading to Africa. Englishmen engaged in the Guinea slave trade could trade as before if they restricted their sales to British and foreign colonies other than Spanish.²⁴ Nevertheless Jamaican merchants were affected because they ran a lucrative illicit trade in slaves and merchandise to Spanish colonies, and were naturally apprehensive about their future. Once the South Sea Company began to trade, this source of untaxed income would be greatly curtailed; they feared that Jamaica's population would decline, its people become impoverished and the island's strength sapped.

Whether in fact there was a basis for a quarrel between the Company and private traders is open to question. One observer suggested that an "imaginary Competition was artfully given out to blind the Company" against the traders "by creating Jealousies between them". Nevertheless when the Company announced plans to place a depot on the island to receive slaves for purposes of resting them from the rigours of the voyage, and to sort and select those most appropriate for the Spanish, a very real dispute did arise which lasted the duration of the asiento contract. The Company postulated that in exchange for the privilege of settling this depot they would employ local people, hire sloops to transport slaves to the various ports in America, and purchase and sell provisions and negroes locally.²⁵

These apparent advantages did not assuage the islanders, who continued their attempts to discredit the Company. Claiming that previous asentistas had all lost money, they argued that private trade prior to the contract had

24. Anon., An Answer to a Calumny....(London, 1728), p. 59; K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London, 1957), pp. 120-121; Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London, 1812, p. 62; Donnan, "The Early Days", p. 421.

25. There were disadvantages to selling slaves in Jamaica. Planters and merchants purchased them from the Company and then shipped them to the Spanish Main and elsewhere in Spanish America in competition with the Company. Directors to Panama factors, 26 October 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 72.

been three times greater than the Company's. Even worse, they complained, the Company supplied slaves to Cuba, thereby assisting the Spanish to open new sugar plantations which competed with British ones. Their most damaging accusations were against Company personnel, who were accused of immoral and even treasonous activities. Company agents were accused of "a scandalous Violation of Old English Honour, Fidelity, and Humanity...scarce to be parallel'd in History" by alerting the Spanish whenever private traders set out from Jamaica. This was done, according to the Jamaicans, to protect their own illicit trade. Whether by Company agents or Jamaican merchants, except for the occasional annual or register ships, trade to Spanish colonies was against Spanish law: but the merchants had not breached English law, while the asiento contract expressly forbade Company agents from trading privately with the Spanish.²⁶

To determine accurate profit figures for the South Sea Company's trade, it was suggested that resulting losses suffered by Jamaican merchants should be considered. The difficulty in making these comparisons is the lack of available statistics. According to one report, between 1715 and 1739 (approximately the duration of the British asiento contract) 722 slave ships brought 168,324 slaves to Jamaica, of which 74,925, or 44½%, were reexported. Because records for Company slave ships arriving in Jamaica and the number of their slaves purchased locally, are not available, it is impossible to determine what percentage of these slaves belonged to the Company.²⁷

Resident British merchants in Cadiz and Seville were also vulnerable

26. R. B. Le Page, Jamaican Creole (London, 1960), p. 66; Anon., The Assiento Contract Consider'd (London, 1714), pp. 6-16; Anon., The Trade Granted to the South-Sea Company: Considered with Relation to Jamaica (London, 1714), pp. 3, 7, 9; Anon., Some Observations on the Assiento Trade, As it has been Exercised by the South-Sea Company....(London, 1728), p. 21; Anon., Considerations on the American Trade, Before and Since the Establishment of the South-Sea Company (London, 1739), pp. 9, 27; Anon., A Defence of the Observations on the Assiento Trade, As it hath been Exercised by the South-Sea Company (London, 1728), p. 11.

27. Orlando Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery (London, 1967), p. 289.

to changes brought about by the asiento contract. British manufactured goods which they sent to America on the fleets competed directly, and unfavourably, with the licensed and annual ships. These merchants had to pay duties on goods brought to Spain for sale in America, commissions and duties on exports, commissions on various American and freight costs, and then commissions and duties on returns. The Company sent their goods duty free, and in the case of the licensed ships, without even paying transportation costs.²⁸

Many Englishmen were sceptical for other reasons about the concessions granted under the asiento. One critic considered the South Sea Company "as an Institution for carrying on a Trade to the Spanish Indies,...a romantick and chimerical Project, and ruinous to our present Commerce". Echoing these thoughts, another suggested that "The Project and the People are unhappily ill sorted, by putting the Trade as an Appendix to the Debt." Such a combination was

like Two Men in the Water, who are but Young Swimmers, alone they might make shift to get on well enough, and People at Hand would help them; but clasping together they sink out of reach, and drown one another.

Yet another argued that from the beginning "The Design of your South Sea

28. Petition from merchants and consul in Seville and St. Lucas to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 14 July 1715, PRO, C.O. 388/20; Anon., The particular Advantages that may arise to Great Britain by the Assiento for Negroes, n.d., Cambridge, Cholmondeley Papers, Section 88/139; G. J. Walker, "The Galeones and Flotas in Spain's American Trade with special reference to the period 1700-1735", Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1964, Cambridge University, Fitzwilliam House, p. 129.

McLachlan claims that the amount of goods shipped in the annual ships was inconsequential compared to British manufactures sold privately to Spanish merchants, part of which were destined for the American market. She argues that the annual ships were too irregular to meet the needs of the Spanish colonists, and thus failed to create a demand for their goods. The Spanish, she claims, preferred to pay higher prices to insure a regular supply on the fleets. In fact, the question of supply was irrelevant as the fleets almost never sailed without an annual ship during the period of the British asiento. Furthermore, the annual ships had an excellent sales record because of the cheaper prices of their cargoes, and in spite of the availability of illicit goods from Britain, France and the Netherlands. J. O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain 1667-1750 (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 22-24.

Company was undertook upon a wrong notion, it was undertook in imitation of what Riches France has got from thence since the War begun". The contract was "clogg'd with so many invincible Obstacles, that, in my humble Sense, the Wit of Man cannot find a Method to surmount them." It was even distrusted by a number of British government officials. James Stanhope remarked that neither the country, nor the king, nor the South Sea Company could gain any advantage from it. George I would have given it up

if he did not apprehend that this must open a door to the French coming into it, which They would readily catch at, not from any profit they could propose from the Contract itself, but from the opportunity it would give them to colour a forbidden Trade in the West Indies, which collusive Trade is certainly far more destructive to Spain itself than to Great Britain.²⁹

On the other hand many people believed that the contract would salvage the British economy and employ numerous idle and undesirable men. Trade would expand the market for British cloth and bolster the lagging fortunes of the Royal African Company through sub-contracts. Those who supported the asiento concluded that the

Establishment of a South-Sea Trade, must tend exceedingly to the good of all Degrees and Ranks of Men amongst us: The Poor will be more employ'd in Manufactures, the Product of the Estates of our landed Men will become more valuable, and the Trading part of the Nation will be greatly encourag'd:³⁰

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29. C. King, The British Merchant; or, Commerce Preserv'd (3 vols., London, 1721), iii, 254-258; Anon., A Letter from a Merchant in Amsterdam to a Friend in London about the South Sea Trade (London, 1712), p. 13; Anon., An Essay on the South-Sea Trade (London, 1712), pp. 10, 33; J. Pullen, Memoirs of the Maritime Affairs of Great-Britain (London, 1732), pp. 14-15; Stanhope to Bubb, 29 December 1715, BM, Eg. 2170, f. 368.
30. The contract was supported by a variety of eccentrics. One Samuel Weale, while confined in Fleet prison, proposed a scheme to raise £20,000,000 based on the value of real estate in England. The asiento trade which would be financed by this fund would help to spread the gospel and somehow make sufficient profit to discharge the public debt. Another gentleman suggested that it was only just that England was granted the asiento in compensation for the loss of lives and funds she had sustained by assisting Spain in previous wars. T. S. Ashton, An Economic History of England: The 18th Century (London, 1955), p. 91; Anon., A True Account, pp. 19, 20; Anon., A Letter to a Member of Parliament on the Settling a Trade to the South-Sea of America (London, 1711), pp. 4-5; Anon., A Proposall for the Raising of Twenty Millions Sterling for the Carrying on, and promoting of the Trade to the South Seas..., n.d., Bodleian, Rawl. D 808; Anon., Remarks upon the act nono Anne R. for carrying on a trade to the South Seas, n.d., BM, Harley 6393, p. 20.

Spain's reliance on contracts with private entrepreneurs and foreign companies to supply slaves to her American colonies was a serious flaw in her trading monopoly, yet the need for labour was so great that slaves were the only commodity allowed to pass through the Casa de Contratación without registration or taxation.³¹ The asiento privilege carried the inherent potential of destroying Spain's mercantile system.

31. Walker, "Galeones and Flotas", pp. 18-20.

Chapter II

Derivations of Spanish Economic Reforms in the Eighteenth Century

The failure of Spain to supply the basic needs of its colonies in America, and the resulting increase in contraband by the French, Dutch and English, contributed to a crisis in the transatlantic trade in the middle of the seventeenth century.¹ The lack of industrialization in Spain was not the only cause of her failure to control the trade to the Indies. Other reasons were the shift of demand in the colonies, the decline of mining output, and the absorption of imperial profits by defence costs. Moreover the decline of Spanish merchant shipping increased the opportunities for foreign traders. Finally, the theory that trade to the colonies must be in the hands of a few monopolists in Seville and Cadiz, and conducted for the benefit of the metropolis, was also at fault.

When England acquired the asiento contract Spain was basically an agricultural country that failed to supply its own industrial needs, let alone those of its colonies.² It has been estimated that by the end of the seventeenth century Spain supplied only 5% of the merchandise that was sent on the fleets

1. The Casa de Contratación was established in 1503 to oversee trade between Spain and her American colonies. It controlled the issuance of licenses to privateers, regulated departures, controlled tonnage, inspected cargoes, collected duties and attended to other legal matters. Trade was limited to two fleets annually; the flota which left for Vera Cruz in April, and the galleons, which departed for Cartagena and Portobelo in August. Trade was centralized in America by the boards of merchants who met at the beginning of each fair and regulated the prices with the fleet merchants to adjust the available bullion to the stock. However by the seventeenth century the fleet trade had become disorganized and was highly irregular. A fleet sailed to tierra firme in 1695, and then during the War of the Spanish Succession only five merchant fleets sailed: in 1706, 1708, 1710, 1712 and 1715. Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America (New York, 1970), pp. 48-49; Sergio Villalobos R., Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata y Chile 1700-1811 (Buenos Aires, 1965), pp. 9, 14; Henry Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain, 1700-15 (London, 1969), pp. 177-178.
2. During the seventeenth century agricultural output had decreased through natural causes as well as heavy taxation. This in turn led to food shortages which was one of the causes of Spain's population decline; the other reasons were epidemics, wars, taxation and the problems of maintaining the overseas colonies. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Spain's population was approximately 7,500,000: the same as it had been 175 years earlier. Stein, op. cit., p. 13; Kamen, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

to America, with the remaining 95% of the cargo consisting of European manufactured goods and luxury items from the Far East. In effect she had become an intermediary between the raw materials and bullion from her colonies in America and the export trade of the rest of Europe. This situation was aggravated by the War of the Spanish Succession, when America was particularly vulnerable to illicit trade. However contraband trade was not limited to foreigners. Exorbitant duties on merchandise imported to or exported from America, in addition to taxes for the maintenance of convoys to protect the merchant fleets, created a climate leading also to smuggling by Spanish merchants. The Canary Islands were a centre for the trade because of their ideal location, but it was endemic throughout America. The Spanish historian, Jaime Vicens Vives, suggests that by 1686 at least two-thirds of all colonial trade was in contraband. By the second half of the seventeenth century it was estimated to have reached 10,000,000 pesos annually on the fleets, in spite of numerous regulations to control it. Cargoes were falsely measured, tonnage misrepresented, and invoices distorted, to mention only a few of the many ingenious methods developed to defraud the royal treasury of duties.³

Particularly vulnerable to incursions of illicit traders was the Spanish Main, extending from the Isthmus of Panama to the Orinoco. In fact, it was suggested that contraband in the provinces of New Granada and Cartagena was greater than in any other place in America because of the numerous rivers, bays and inlets which provided convenient hiding places for traders. Contraband

3. Patiño to Corobarrutia y Zúpide, 22 July 1722, AGI, Mexico 857; John Lynch, Spain Under the Hapsburgs (Oxford, 1969), p. 193; McLachlan, Trade and Peace, p. 9; Walker, "Galeones and Flotas", pp. 26, 41, 107; Clarence Haring, Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies (Harvard, 1918), p. 62; Jaime Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain (Princeton, 1969), pp. 405-407; Vicenta Cortes Alonso, "Una memoria de los mercaderes de Cadiz del siglo XVIII", reprint from Revista de Archivos Bibliotecas y Museos, lxx (1962), p. 24; Manuel Nuñez Dias, "Venezuela en las reformas estructurales del sistema colonial española", in Memoria del Primer Congreso Venezolano de Historia, ii (Caracas, 1972), p. 120; Valentín Vazquez de Prada, "Las rutas comerciales entre España y América en el siglo XVIII", in Las Rutas del Atlántico (Sevilla, 1969), pp. 6, 211, 214.

through Buenos Aires was also extensive and equally difficult to control because of the proximity of the Portuguese colony of Sacramento. The behaviour of Spanish colonial officials did little to impede the trade, and many of them participated in it. Merchandise in considerable quantities was also introduced by Spanish officials on the register and aviso ships, and even on the azogues. This relaxed attitude caused the viceroy of Peru, the Marquis of Castelfuerte, to suggest that viceroys be given an inducement to stop the trade. But it was almost impossible to curtail this trade, according to the governor of the consejo, the Bishop of Sigüenza, because of the ingenuity of foreign merchants and the susceptibility to bribery of Spanish colonial officials.⁴

When the first fleet sailed after the War of the Spanish Succession the result was disastrous for Spanish merchants. During the war merchants in Mexico had been supplied low cost merchandise by French, Dutch and English traders based in the Caribbean, and by an increasing trade from the Far East through Acapulco; they were not anxious to pay the higher prices of the flotistas. In fact in 1713 the Mexican merchants had suggested that the fleet system be suspended on the spurious grounds that they had been eliminated from a share in the trade because provincial merchants purchased goods directly from the flotistas to avoid the costs of a middle-man. When the suggestion was ignored and a flota was sent under Manuel López Pintado in 1715 they employed another tactic. They forced the flotistas to cut prices, sometimes to below cost, by refusing to make purchases until they did so. Spanish merchants also suffered a loss of trade at the fairs on tierra firme.⁵

The economic development of the Spanish American colonies at the beginning

4. Sigüenza to Guerra, 18 June 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Hoyo to Montijo, 27 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Castelfuerte to Philip V, 18 October 1722, AGI, Lima 411; Anon. letter about illicit trade, n.d., c. 1722, AGI, Santa Fé 374; Castelfuerte to Philip V, 4 June 1732, AGI, Lima 414; Baloco Leygrave to Philip V, 30 May 1721, AGI, Santa Fé 374; Note, 2 June 1722, AGI, Contratación 5144; Resumen de los acuerdos de los comercios de Sevilla y Cádiz, n.d., c. 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2726.

5. Walker, op. cit., pp. 106, 108, 110, 137; Eduardo Arcila Farías, Economía colonial de Venezuela (México, 1946), p. 166.

of the eighteenth century was extremely limited. Growth of industry had been hampered, although not stifled, by the mercantile theory and the accompanying restrictive legislation, by the accessibility of contraband merchandise at competitive prices, and by the absence of any industrial tradition. Capital and labour also presented obstacles to its growth. Although it was reported that mining increased after 1740, and that considerable silver had been available earlier in the century, most of it was spent on foreign goods or hoarded, rather than being used for capital investment. One contemporary observer, Andrea del Hoyo, wrote in 1734 that the lack of silver through insufficient production, hoarding, or remittance abroad was the main cause of economic problems in Peru. Although there was some investment in industry, particularly ceramics in Mexico and consumer goods such as textiles for the lower class domestic market and hides throughout the colonies, the main products America had to offer for export aside from precious metals and stones were tropical agricultural crops such as cacao, tobacco, sugar, various hard and dye woods, indigo and sarsaparilla, which were harvested by servile Indian or slave labour. As a result only a small group of landowners, miners, merchants, crown officials and clergymen were in a position to accumulate capital or generate economic growth. This small group also formed the bulk of the consumer market for goods imported on the fleets and by contraband merchants. The great mass of labourers produced their own subsistence needs and remained basically outside the colonial market. This is well illustrated by the economy of New Granada prior to its becoming a viceroyalty in 1739. The main commercial activities were mining and agriculture, both of which were dependent on slave labour because of the depletion of the native population. Except for some basic staples, most of the consumer supplies at the mines and plantations had to be delivered by merchants. If the mines ceased to produce, which was often a danger because of the high prices of slaves and merchandise, then the entire market economy could collapse. In other words, the restrictions placed on colonial economic activities by the mercantile theory were only part of the problem. The structure of production and the

concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, while most labourers remained marginally self-sufficient were basic obstacles to colonial economic development. In addition the labour shortage was aggravated by epidemics among the native population (such as the terrible plague in Peru in 1719), the inability to conquer some Indian tribes, and the return of Spaniards to Europe after they became wealthy.

In spite of these handicaps a small inter-colonial trade had developed, although most of the goods produced were exchanged for foreign or Spanish merchandise. A summary of colonial products and trading patterns was made by an anonymous merchant in the first part of the eighteenth century and included the following items:

Table I

<u>Region</u>	<u>Estimated Annual Production</u>	<u>Area of Trade</u>
Buenos Aires	50-60,000 skins	Unspecified, mainly foreign
Trinidad	600,000 pounds cacao 12,500 pounds tobacco	Foreign
Margarita and Cumana La Guaira	pearls, hides, tobacco, 1,600,000 to 2,000,000 pounds cacao, 6-8,000 hides, 2-3,000 <u>petacas</u> tobacco	Foreign New Spain and Holland
Santa Marta and Río de la Hacha	-	
Cartagena	25,000 hides	Fair
Maracaibo	4,800,000 to 6,400,000 pounds of tobacco, 6-8,000 hides	New Spain, foreign
Puerto de Coro	4-500,000 pounds Brazilwood, 3-4,000 hides	mainly foreign
Campeche	2,500,000 pounds logwood	About 1/5 to Havana, the remainder foreign
Santo Domingo	-	Necessities purchased from foreigners
Havana	Tobacco, sugar, hides	Spain
Cuba	8-10,000 hides, 800,000 pounds tobacco	Mainly foreign
Puerto Rico	5,000 hides, 400,000 pounds cacao	Mainly foreign

Another estimate of trade, written in 1731, suggested that 7,920,000 pounds of cacao, 150,000 pounds of tobacco and 1-2,000 hides and some silver were exported

from Caracas annually. Approximately 385,000 pounds of cacao (4.86% of the total, went to the South Sea Company, the remainder to New Spain, the metropolis and foreign parts.⁶ Although the figures above are probably far from accurate, they do indicate generally the volume and direction of trade, and the pervasive nature of the illicit foreign involvement.

Spain felt the impact of colonial depression in two respects. First, public and private remittances from the colonies to the metropolis remained low. Second, economic stagnation in the colonies resulted in a chronic deficiency of funds available for public works. Fortifications were badly in need of repair, garrisons were unpaid and under supplied, arms and ammunition were lacking, and guardacostas were scarce; those defenses necessary to combat contraband trade and prevent foreign intrusions were hindered. In July 1720 Governor Badillo of Panama reported that he was unable to comply with orders to repair the forts or to resist enemy forces because of the lack of funds in the local treasury and in that of Peru. In Venezuela, La Guaira was the only fortified port in the early 1720s, and it was in such a bad state of repair as to be virtually worthless.⁷

6. López Pintado to Duran, 15 February 1716, AGI, México 854; Hoyo to Montijo, 27 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Castelfuerte to the crown, 13 November 1724, AGI, Lima 411; Olavarriaga to Patiño, 28 October 1731, AGI, Caracas 56; Aldo Ferrer, The Argentine Economy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), p. 20; Robert C. West, Colonial Placer Mining in Colombia (Baton Rouge, 1952), pp. 112, 122-123; Norman A. Meiklejohn, "The Implementation of Slave Legislation in Eighteenth-Century New Granada", in Robert Brent Toplin, ed., Slave and Race Relations in Latin America (Westport, 1974), pp. 180-181; H. J. Parry, Trade and Dominion (London, 1971), p. 29; Harold Johnson, "A Preliminary Inquiry into Money, Prices and Wages in Rio de Janeiro, 1763-1823", in Dauri Alden, Colonial Roots of Modern Brazil (Berkeley, 1973), p. 262; Cortes Alonso, op. cit., pp. 29, 40.

7. Badillo to Philip V, 30 July 1720, AGI, Panama 128; Santo Bueno to Philip V, 30 January 1717, AGI, Lima 410; Testimony of Gómez Triegeso, 27 January 1716, AGI, Panama 127.

Pedro José de Olavarriaga toured the province of Venezuela in 1720 and 1721 and reported to the viceroy of New Granada, Jorge de Villalonga, that many more ports in the province should be fortified, that merchants who traded in contraband be sentenced to death, and that corsairs be armed to fight the introduction of foreign goods. All the decrees issued in Madrid forbidding residents to trade with foreigners, he said, were useless. They were ignored by government officials and residents alike because that was the only way to acquire needed supplies. Pedro José de Olavarriaga, Instrucción general y particular del estado presente de la provincia de Venezuela en los años de 1720 y 1721 (Caracas, 1965), pp. 217-219, 300, 325-326.

These problems led to a series of reforms initiated by the Bourbon ministers. They sought to enhance Spain's political and military might and to improve the nation's economy by acquiring greater profit from empire. Socially, they emphasized a liberation from conformism, inertia, ignorance and superstition. Within the framework of mercantilism emphasis was placed on modernizing the fleet system, improving the labour force, increasing capital investment in industry and commerce, and impeding contraband.

A major thrust to diminish the economic dependence of Spain and its colonies on the rest of Europe came just after the war of 1718. Perhaps the minister most responsible for initiating these reforms was Joseph Patiño, a Galician born in Milan. Patiño became president of the Casa de Contratación in Cádiz, with jurisdiction over all commerce and navigation in the Indies, then minister of Marina, Indias y Hacienda, and finally, in 1734, first minister. With the intention of reforming the entire fleet system and restoring Spanish commerce to its former glory he published his "Proyecto para Galeones y Flotas del Perú y Nueva España, y para Navíos de Registros y Avisos" on 5 April 1720. It regulated the sailings of the fleets. The flotas were to depart for New Spain on 1 June stopping for a maximum of six days in Puerto Rico for water, remaining for 15 days at Vera Cruz for the fair, and stopping for 15 days in Havana on the return voyage before sailing directly to Cadiz. The departure of the galeones was scheduled for 1 September, stopping either in Cartagena for 50 days or in Portobelo for 60 days for the fair. On the return trip they were to remain in Havana 15 days. These regulations simply modified the existing structure, and neither solved the question of foreign and Spanish contraband, nor increased profits from the fairs. Spanish merchants in the colonies still had no inexpensive, regular and legal source of merchandise. More fundamental reforms were still needed.⁸

8. Diccionario de Historia de España (2 vols., Madrid, 1952), ii, 779; Walker, op. cit., p. 90; Vázquez de Prada, op. cit., p. 216; Nuñez Dias, op. cit., pp. 126-127, 144; Marcelo Bitar Letayf, Economistas españoles del siglo XVIII (Madrid, 1968), p. 44; Vicens Vives, op. cit., pp. 473, 542.

The revision of the fleet system was accompanied by steps to improve the defence of the colonies. In June 1720 all foreign trade in America was forbidden and any goods belonging to foreign merchants were to be confiscated. Six months later Philip V ordered that all foreigners be expelled from the viceroyalty of Peru unless they had special licenses permitting them to remain. Restrictions against foreigners trading or residing in the Indies were strengthened in March 1721.⁹

The most serious efforts to protect Spanish commerce on the Spanish Main revolved around plans to establish a monopoly company such as those which had been so successful in England, France and Holland. When Philip V first became king he received proposals to establish commercial companies. The first such request came from the French, who in 1703 proposed the formation of a joint Franco-Spanish company to trade to the Indies. While the proposal was supported by the king, the Council of the Indies refused to agree to its formation. Not only were they concerned about French influence, they had traditionally opposed opening the American market to foreigners, or for that matter, to anyone except a small clique of merchants. Several years later, in 1707, Diego Murga, the Marquis of Montesacro, proposed the formation of a company to trade with Caracas and Honduras. While it, too, was opposed by the Council, he did actually form the company in 1714. It was received with hostility by American officials who considered it illegal and lasted only three years. The first commercial company to be formed with a solid basis was the Real Compañía Guipuscoana de Caracas (the Caracas Company). On 25 September 1728 it was authorized to send two ships of 40 to 50 guns to Caracas annually with no restrictions on the taxable cargo carried from Spain, and to use its vessels as guardacostas along the windward coast. Foreign vessels that they seized between the Orinoco and the Río de la Hacha were to be sold, with the proceeds divided two-thirds to the

9. Baloco Leygrave to Philip V, 24 August 1721, AGI, Santa Fé 374; Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 30 November 1721, AGI, México 858; Santa Fé royal officials and governor to Philip V, 27 June 1722, AGI, Santa Fé 297.

Company and one-third to the officers and crew. Captured crews were to be sent to Spain. Spaniards were not eager to invest in such a commercial guardacosta enterprise, thus the crown turned to foreign capital to stimulate interest. It was not until late July 1730 that sufficient capital had been accumulated to begin trade.

The activities of the Caracas Company were resented by Venezuelan merchants who accused them of bribery, inefficiency, cruelty, price controlling, hindering trade, inadequately supplying the region, and creating artificial shortages of Venezuelan cacao and tobacco. Some of these criticisms were justified, but the Company did help to create a general improvement in economic conditions in Venezuela, and was partially successful against contraband trade.¹⁰ During the War of Jenkins' Ear the Company loaned money to the government and outfitted eight warships.¹¹

At the time the Caracas Company began operations the state of the trade in Venezuela was summarized as follows:

Table II

Cacao production in <u>fanegas</u> (of approximately <u>116 pounds</u>)	<u>Market</u>
12,000	Consumed internally
15-16,000	New Spain
5-6,000	Canary Islands
3,000	South Sea Company and other British ships
1,000	Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico
19-20,000	Spain

The province absorbed approximately two ship-loads of foreign merchandise annually valued at around 600,000, according to Arcila Farias.¹²

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10. It has been argued that the Caracas Company was not resented because it hindered contraband trade, but because the concession was granted without consulting the cabildo of Caracas. Arcila Farias, Economía colonial, p. 188.
11. Roland Hussey, The Caracas Company (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 60-66, 74, 77, 89-90, 99; Vázquez de Prada, op. cit., p. 212; Bitar Letayf, op. cit., p. 71; Eduardo Arcila Farias, Reformas económicas del siglo XVIII en Nueva España (2 vols., Caracas, 1955), 1, 29-31.
12. Arcila Farias, Economía colonial, pp. 195-196.

These were some of the main innovations made during the period when the South Sea Company had the asiento contract. They were part of the existing general climate of reform, and were accompanied by a variety of suggestions for improving Spain's economy. These came from private individuals, merchants trading to America, military and naval personnel, diplomats, economists and historians. Reform proposals made by three individuals are of particular interest: those by Guillermo Eon, because he was Philip V's envoy to the South Sea Company; those by Bernardo Wood, because of their humanitarian emphasis; and those by Jeronimo de Uztariz, because of the influence he had on later reforms. Eon believed that the behaviour of Spanish officials in America made contraband introductions possible.¹³ Governors and royal officials should be made personally accountable for illicit imports, he said, and their salaries and promotions made dependent on their ability to curb them. Their activities should be checked secretly by deputies on the fleets, and one religious and one secular official appointed at each port to assist them. Secret agents should be employed in Jamaica and Curaçao to report on the activities of resident merchants, and the number of guardacostas in service should be increased. While Eon's suggestions were not implemented, his references to the susceptibility of Spanish officials to bribery was echoed by subsequent critics.¹⁴

Bernardo Wood postulated that the American colonies should be entitled to the same benefits of growth and development as Spain. While upholding the mercantile theory that colonial production and consumption should be primarily for the benefit of the metropolis, he resolved these contradictory concepts by envisaging a colonial development that was complementary to rather than competitive with Spain's. He contended that the development of Spain was

13. This was the view postulated by many British in justifying their own illegal activities. In discussing the possible future involvements of the British in the slave trade to the Spanish colonies in the 1740s, Malachy Postlethwayt commented that only the Spanish could effectively control foreign contraband. Malachy Postlethwayt, Considerations on a future Treaty of Navigation and Commerce with Spain... (London, 1746), p. 5.

14. Guillermo Eon proposal, 7 February 1726, AGS, Estado 6832.

dependent on three essential items which were not being used effectively: labour, land and capital. In countries such as England and Holland, he argued, there was no unemployment, no unused land, and no uninvested capital. In many ways the question of man-power was responsible for the other two problems. The work force was depleted by the social structure. Land and its management was the only acceptable vocation open to the first born of most land-owning and aristocratic families. And young men out of the line of inheritance considered it beneath their social position to engage in the trades or commerce; they had few career alternatives except perhaps emigration and service in the colonies, and particularly the Church. This not only took many able men out of the work force, it limited population by taking many women out of the marriage market, thereby inflicting a considerable financial burden on society.

With the difficult economic situation in Spain in the eighteenth century, and the declining number of privileges granted to noblemen, the crown initiated a program to increase the economic role of the aristocracy in society. It was a difficult task. Most aristocrats had their capital invested in land, and the safe consistent returns on the investment made them loath to divert their capital. Those who did yield to state pressure invested mainly in mining, armaments, munitions, paper and glass industries and some maritime and wholesale commerce, but the investments were never as much as hoped. Efforts were also initiated to reduce the number of people dependent on charity. Before the established patterns could be changed in favour of a better work ethic, however, the entire social structure would have had to be revised. And this took time. It was not until March 1783 that major changes occurred after Charles III signed a law allowing traders and craftsmen the privileges of holding public offices and acquiring the rights of noblemen, thus withdrawing the stigma of inferiority from the trades.

As mentioned above the question of labour was also acute in the colonies. To solve labour shortages Ward suggested that the Indians should be mobilized and organized. Arguing against numerous critics who opined that the Indians

were stupid and lazy, Ward felt that they were the capable descendants of advanced societies who should be encouraged. One way to accomplish this, he said, was to distribute land equitably. Moreover if the Indian population were allowed to develop their natural talents the need for the "cruel" slave trade would be eliminated and the contraband trade considerably reduced.¹⁵

On the question of capital Ward stressed the desirability of improving the mining industry. In 1747 a visitador to the mines at Potosi reported that mining methods there were antiquated, being based on a book written in 1637 by the cura of Potosi, Alvaro Alonso Barba. Technical development of the past century in the fields of mechanics, hydraulics and chemistry were unknown. Furthermore, the mining directors were inept, in some cases even unable to read or write. More than 20 years earlier the poor production record of the mines in Pamplona, Margarita and Muso were blamed on the labour problem, not on the depletion of gold, silver or emeralds. Other mining areas had similar problems. In New Granada slaves became the predominant labour force in the seventeenth century and from then on the mines were plagued by labour shortages.

To encourage trade Ward suggested that the fleet system be dissolved, taxes reduced, fortifications reconstructed and guardacosta patrols intensified in America. While granting that the fleets might be necessary in wartime, he said that otherwise they served only as an unsuccessful government monopoly with the added disadvantage of alerting foreign traders of the activities of Spanish merchants.¹⁶

15. Ward did not analyse in detail the question of whether slave or Indian labour was more profitable. In the case of Mexico in the 1740s it has been suggested that the impoverished mulattos and mestizos provided a cheaper labour force than slaves. Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, La población negra de México (México, 1972), p. 85.

16. Bernardo Ward, Proyecto Económica (Madrid, 1754), pp. xvi, 227-228, 233-234, 245, 251, 258-259, 261, 264-265, 274, 278, 305; William Callahan, Honor, Commerce and Industry in Eighteenth Century Spain (Boston, 1972), pp. 8-9, 27, 44, 52, 56; Nuñez Dias, op. cit., p. 124; Manso to the crown, 20 July 1724, AGI, Santa Fé 299.

It has been argued by some historians that the only reason New Granada fell behind Peru and New Spain in mining production was because of the labour shortages and high costs. West, op. cit., pp. 78, 83.

The critic who probably had the greatest influence on economic reform in the early part of the eighteenth century was Jeronimo Uztariz. The depletion of the nation's bullion reserves--and therefore the failure of the mercantile theory, he argued, could only be rectified by improving Spain's economy so that her merchants could sell more than foreigners in America. Improving fortifications and increasing coastal surveillance were only temporary measures that failed to alter the source of the problem: the inadequacy of Spanish industry. Spain lost about 15,000,000 pesos a year, Uztariz calculated, through the purchase of foreign merchandise, mainly luxury items such as fine cloths, watches, rugs, furniture and porcelain. But before a native industry could be developed the labour force had to be expanded and its health improved. Because of exorbitant prices on meats, oils, wines and other nutritious foods, and the low income of the working class, most people lived off little more than bread and water, and therefore did not have the energy to increase their work output. Duties, he argued, must be reduced to lead to the improved diet of the people and thereby stimulate their production.

Uztariz also stressed the need to study the commercial techniques of the most successful trading nations: England, Holland and France. Academies should be established to study navigation, cosmography, astronomy and related fields; shipping and port facilities should be improved; and Spanish commercial agents stationed all over Europe to manage trade and report on local commercial developments.¹⁷

The question of shipping was crucial. There had been a deplorable decline in the ship-building industry in Spain in the seventeenth century. Contracts to build ships were seldom fulfilled, and the industry itself was disorganized. At the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession Spain had just 28 galleys in the Mediterranean, and only 20 ships in the Caribbean and Atlantic. She

17. Geronymo de Uztariz, Theórica, y práctica de comercio, y de marina (Madrid, 1742), pp. 5, 9, 18, 22-23, 89-90, 108-109, 174, 231, 248, 263-264, 268, 271, 299, 320, 404; Bitar Letauf, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

was a negligible naval force and completely dependent on French protection. The commercial traffic was so scarce that in many parts of Spanish America the only available merchandise was contraband. The average yearly tonnage from Spain to America in 1600 was 19,800; by 1680 it had dropped to around 4,650. By the 1720s Buenos Aires was visited only once every four years by register ships; Venezuela received only one register and one Canary ship a year at about the same time.

The first tentative steps to improve the shipping industry and reorganize the navy were taken in 1710. Several years later, in February 1714, Philip V unified the naval officers' corps and abolished all the old titles; it is unknown how effective these early reforms were. The real changes began under the guidance of Joseph Patiño, who greatly increased the amount of money spent on the navy. Much of it was in ship construction. Between 1705 and 1707 the total naval expenditure was 52,876 pesos 2½ reales; it rose to 2,733,146 pesos 2½ reales (a 52 fold increase) for 1717-1718.¹⁸

In summary, the economic reforms proposed during the early years of the eighteenth century did not seriously dispute the viability of mercantilism; rather they were designed to prop up the existing structure, and to this extent they were inadequate. Those reforms which were implemented emphasized the regularity of commercial supplies and the control of contraband. Improvements in mining techniques, expansion of labour and capital, and the development of industry, while strongly recommended, were changes that occurred mainly in the decades after the War of Jenkins' Ear when the South Sea Company had ceased trading. Therefore the effect of Spanish reforms on the British asiento and on contraband trade in general was negligible. In April 1735 the royal officials in Havana complained that reforms that had been initiated were ineffective, and that the local economy was in ruins. The fleets did not sail regularly, and

18. Kamen, op. cit., pp. 30, 58-59, 140, 229, 379-380; Olavarriaga, op. cit., p. 141; Manuel José de Lavarden, Nuevo aspecto del comercio en el río de la plata (Buenos Aires, 1955), p. 15.

when they did come the merchants did not purchase sufficient quantities of sugar and tobacco to support the economy. Consequently local plantation owners were forced to sell to foreign merchants, although it was an outlet that had been greatly curtailed by increased guardacosta activity. Thus the relatively successful Spanish campaign against illicit imports in America, which was not accompanied by improved trading conditions, led paradoxically to depression in the colonies. Royal officials in Panama pleaded with government either to send ships to trade or to allow inter-colonial trade. Although Spain was evolving towards a more liberal interpretation of the mercantile theory, the merchants guilds opposed granting wider participation in the colonial economy. They had no desire to lose their monopolistic control over the colonial society.¹⁹

As Uztariz pointed out, and as events proved, measures aimed at controlling contraband failed to change the economic dependence of Spain and her colonies on the industry and commerce of northern Europe, and thus failed to improve, or even change, economic conditions in America. Thus the same conditions that allowed England to acquire the asiento de negros in 1713, and so challenge the effectiveness of the mercantile theory as it had developed in Spain, were still existent when the Company ceased trading.²⁰

19. Havana royal officials to Philip V, 28 April 1738, AGI, Santo Domingo 488; Arcila Farias, Reformas económicas, i, 183.

20. For a detailed analysis of why Spain did not monopolize the slave trade herself see Georges Scelle, "The Slave-Trade", pp. 612-661.

Chapter III

The First Trading Period, 1714-1718

The South Sea Company was a joint stock company organized in a fashion similar to government licensed monopolies in the seventeenth century. It consisted of a governor (an honorary office held by the British monarch); sub and deputy governors who directed Company activities with a court of directors (a majority of whom were members of Parliament); a secretary and an accountant; and stockholders who were known as proprietors. The asiento trade and that of the licensed and annual ships were regulated and monitored by six committees composed of Company directors. The committees and their responsibilities were 1) Buying and Warehouses: the purchase of merchandise for the licensed and annual ships and provisions for the factories; 2) Shipping: the acquisition and transport of slaves and the transport of the license, annual and provision ships; 3) Treasury: the provision of funds for the trade; 4) Accounts: which kept factory records and calculated duties owed to the Spanish; 5) Correspondence: which sent instructions and corresponded generally with Company agents; and 6) House and Servants: which hired employees.¹

The procedures developed by the Company to deliver slaves to Spanish colonies varied little from the beginning of the contract in 1713 to its effective demise at the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1739. After studying the techniques employed by previous asentistas and obtaining advice from British merchants who had traded to the West Indies, the directors established six branch offices or factories. In the viceroyalty of Peru they were located in Buenos Aires, which was to supply slaves to the Río de la Plata, Chile and Potosi; in Cartagena, for the mining areas of northern South America; and in Panama and Portobelo (which were considered as one

1. Minutes court of directors, 14 and 28 November 1711, BM, Add. 25,494, ff. 34, 37; Arthur Aiton, "The Assiento Treaty as reflected in the Papers of Lord Shelburne", The Hispanic American Historical Review, 1928, pp. 169-170.

factory, primarily for the Lima market. In New Spain they were established in Vera Cruz for the Mexican market and in Havana and Santiago de Cuba, where there was a demand for slaves on the sugar and tobacco plantations. Company entrepôts were established in Jamaica and Barbados, where slaves were rested and sorted after the long "middle passage" from Africa. Agents there supervised the distribution of slaves to all factories except Buenos Aires. The latter received them directly from Africa because of the cost of establishing an entrepôt for a single factory, and because no practical site was available.

From agency warehouses slaves could be supplied to factories to coincide with the harvest periods of products which the Company wished to acquire either by barter or from the proceeds of sales. Furthermore, slaves inappropriate for the Spanish market could be sold to local buyers. Although contracts between the Company and those who supplied their slaves stipulated that the slaves be young, of those delivered to Jamaica about one-third were old or crippled or had other physical defects such as tribal scars and filed teeth. The Spanish were reluctant to buy such slaves; the "Beauty and Skin of the Slave...[was] much regarded", especially in women. Interest in attractive black women was noted in numerous seventeenth century reports from Peru, and the South Sea Company sale results indicate the same.²

The agency in Jamaica was always the most important entrepôt because communication was easier with the factories, and the local demand for slaves was greater than in Barbados. However Barbados gained in importance during disputes between the Company and the Jamaica assembly over duties imposed locally on slaves, and it was important in its own right for private British traders who had licenses from the Company to supply slaves to Santo Domingo

2. Anon., The Trade Granted to the South-Sea Company: Considered with Relation to Jamaica (London, 1714), pp. 10-14; Frederick Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 1524-1650 (Stanford, 1974), p. 80.

and along the coast between Caracas and the Río de la Hacha.³

The depot in Jamaica normally had two or three agents; that in Barbados one or two. They were chosen by a ballot of the directors. Candidates were recruited through newspaper advertisements and by names supplied by the directors themselves. They were supposed to be Protestant and honest, men who would not engage in illicit trade or otherwise abuse the Company's trust. But a personal recommendation from a director was the fundamental factor in the selection process. For example, one Richard Rigby was chosen as an agent for Jamaica although the directors had been warned to be on their "Guard against the Danger of having anything to do with Such a wolf in Sheep's Cloathing as this oily tongued Gentleman is very well known to be."

Agents were unsalaried but received a commission of 4% on the sale of slaves and on the sale of return cargoes, as well as on debts they collected for the Company. Their duties were 1) to verify that slaves delivered from Africa conformed to Company specifications; 2) to arrange for the hire of sloops to transport slaves to the factories; 3) to confirm that the money and products remitted from the factories corresponded to the amount received for the sale of slaves; and 4) to prevent private trade by factors and by the crews of hired vessels. It was originally suggested that sloops hired by the Company carry supercargoes responsible for the sale of cargoes and the return of proceeds. Unfortunately the idea was not implemented; it would almost certainly have reduced the endemic illicit activities and frauds.⁴

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3. Directors to Panama factors, 15 January 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, ff. 111-112; Morris and Pratter to Jamaica assembly, 1 December 1715, PRO, C.O. 137/11; Directors to Jamaica agents, 31 October 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 82; Directors to Panama factors, 2 January 1718, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 96.
 4. Minutes court of directors, 22 January 1713, BM, Add. 25,495, ff. 121-122; To Dudley Woodbridge, 26 January 1714, Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America (4 vols., Washington, D.C., 1930-1935), ii, 176-177; Minutes court of directors, 3 September 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 201; Anon., Trade Granted to the South-Sea Company, p. 17; Unsigned letter from Garraway's Coffee House to the South Sea Company, n.d., Bodleian, Rawl. D908, ff. 88-89.

The number of factors who served at each post varied as needs changed, although technically each factory was to have six (selected in the same fashion as the agents), except Havana and Santiago, which were to have only three each. They were the president, secretary, accountant, warehouse keeper, surgeon, and slave supervisor. In Havana and Santiago these responsibilities were shared by the three employees. The president was responsible for the general well-being of the factory, the transmission of accounts biannually to London, and the petty cash records; the accountant for keeping cash and "want" books, a journal and a ledger; and the warehouse keeper for merchandise and provisions brought by license, annual and supply ships. The latter kept records of the sale of merchandise and slaves, including the method of sale, dates, quantities and prices, and of goods purchased with the proceeds of negro sales. The secretary recorded the minutes of council meetings and kept factory correspondence up to date, and sent copies of all documents to London. The slave supervisor registered the details of arriving cargoes and organized the sale of slaves. The surgeon attended to the health of the slaves and factors, and remitted regular accounts of his practice to London. The factors met once a week in council, except for the surgeon, who could only attend if a quorum of three was wanting. All decisions relating to the sale of slaves and acquisition of return cargoes were made by a majority vote of the council, with the president having the tie-breaking vote.

Initially factors received salaries rather than commissions; salaries varied considerably from factory to factory and did not necessarily depend on the relative importance of each factory. While the president of the Panama factory was the highest paid factor, those at the almost equally important ones in Portobelo, Vera Cruz and Buenos Aires were the lowest paid. The explanation for the variation in salaries can only be conjectured. They may have reflected differences in the cost of living, since factors received nothing towards their expenses except house rent, or have been the result either of contractual negotiations or personal influence with the directors.

The salaries, which totalled 57,300 pesos (£12,892/10 at 54 pence to a peso) at all the factories at the beginning of trade, were as follows:

Table I

<u>Panama</u>		<u>Cartagena</u>	
head factor	5,000 pesos	head factor	4,000 pesos
second	2,500	second	2,000
third	1,666 2/3	third	1,333 1/3
fourth, fifth	1,250 each	fourth, fifth	1,000 each
sixth	1,000	sixth	800
Total: 12,666 2/3		Total: 10,133 2/3	
<u>Havana and Santiago</u>		<u>Portobelo, Vera Cruz and Buenos Aires</u>	
head factor	2,500 pesos	head factor	2,000 pesos
second	1,250	second	1,000
third	833 1/3	third	666 2/3
		fourth, fifth	500 each
		sixth	400
Total: 4,583 1/3		Total: 5,066 2/3	

Each factor was required to post a security to the Company but was given an advance on his salary prior to leaving England because of the expense involved in preparing for the journey.⁵

On the arrival of a slave ship the factors were to accompany Spanish officials--usually including the president, fiscal, escribano de cámara and others--during the health inspection and measurement of the slaves.⁶

They had orders from the Company

to Obtain as Much Indulgence of the Royal Officers in the Measurement of our Negros as you Can, the Usual Measurement is 3 for 4 But we Would not here be Understood that you Should buy their Favour, beleiving it will not Answer to the Company, For We Doubt the Introduction each Year of even 4000 Negros in to the Spanish West Indies, & until We Exceed that Number it cannot be of any Advantage to the Company.

Nevertheless the factors were instructed "to Ingratiate" themselves with

5. Minutes court of directors, 28 October 1713, BM, Add. 25,595, ff. 95-96; Bubb to directors, 3 June 1716, BM, Eg. 2172, f. 43; Minutes court of directors, 7 August 1717, BM, Add. 25,497, f. 58; Directors' instructions to Vera Cruz factors, c. 12 July 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, ff. 55-59.
6. Slaves were measured in groups rather than individually during this official visita by a tape divided into seven quarter varas. A vara is equal to about 33 inches, so a quarter vara is 8.25 inches. Seven quarters, which is equal to one pieza de indias, is 57.75 inches, or just 4'8". Auto in Guatemala, 6 February 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Jorge Palacios, La Trata de Negros por Cartagena de Indias (Tunja, 1973), p. 375.

royal officials so that "in Case of any violence or Injustice Done us [they could obtain and] Transmit the proper Notarial proofs to Enable us to get redress at the Court of Madrid".

When the visita was concluded the slaves were to be sold as quickly as practicable, and for gold or silver if possible, although local products which could be sold for a profit in Europe were acceptable. Credit was to be extended only to merchants of proven probity. Despite these regulations the nature of local economies was such that factors often had no choice but to barter slaves for produce, regardless of its quality or desirability. At the three factories where the annual and two licensed ships were to arrive, Cartagena, Portobelo and Vera Cruz, the factors were also to assist in the sale of their merchandise.

Instructions to the factors included a guide to the conduct of their private lives. They were forbidden to convert to Catholicism or to marry Spanish women. The latter was a precaution intended to avoid legal disputes over property which might be used as an excuse to seize Company property in case of hostilities between the crowns. They were also advised to learn Spanish and not to antagonize local inhabitants.⁷

The Company and the Spanish government each appointed agents to represent their interests in Spain and England respectively. The first Company appointee, Thomas Bowles, was directed to keep the Company informed of Spanish policy as it might effect trade, and to represent them in any dispute that might arise over the asiento treaty. He was given a salary of 3,000 pesos a year, with an additional 1,000 pesos for expenses. Bowles was well thought of by the Spanish. The Marquis of Monteleón, the Spanish ambassador in London, said that he was "an esteemed man of unsullied reputation".

7. Directors to Panama factors, 22 February 1716, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 20; Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 8 February 1716, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 7.

Spain's first agent, an Englishman by the name of Arthur Moor, was appointed on 17 April 1714. The appointment was made for several reasons. The Company had begun to purchase merchandise for the licensed ships and the directors had expressed surprise that no Spanish representative was present to examine the purchases, or to discuss other questions such as the payment of negro duties and other money owed to Philip V. Also, someone was needed to restrict the Company from putting more capital than was absolutely necessary into the trade on the account of the Spanish king. An advance of one million pesos had already been made by the Company on the King's behalf as his quarter share in the trade at an annual rate of 8% interest; and the interest payments were likely to eat up much or even all of Philip V's profits. Monteleon, who recommended Moor, pointed out that he was honest and experienced in questions of trade--and intimate with Queen Anne and several ministers. Furthermore, he agreed to work for a commission based on Philip V's profits from the trade, and would therefore be interested personally to see that there was a maximum return.⁸

Moor was not Spain's representative to the South Sea Company for long, probably because of a scheme, in which he was involved only indirectly, to send contraband goods on the Anglesea when it took the first factors to Cartagena, Panama and Portobelo. Shortly after his appointment Moor called on Robert Johnson, captain of the Anglesea, to discuss the voyage, and supposedly to insure that no contraband would be taken. This visit was followed by a meeting at Moor's home during which one John Decosta suggested

8. Moor was given duties in addition to those involved with the asiento trade. Together with Patricio Laules and Monasses Gilligan he negotiated the purchase of ten English ships for Philip V. A similar commission was given to the Marquis of Monteleón later. He negotiated the purchase of six war ships from the proceeds of the asiento trade. However the best of these belonged to the crown, and British ministers refused to sell them. The only other available ships belonged to the East India Company, and Monteleón rejected them as inappropriate in size and condition. Monteleón to Alberoni, 27 September 1717, AGS, Estado 6839.

that 60 tons of contraband merchandise worth between £12,000 and £15,000 be shipped on the Anglesea. Decosta offered to finance half the cargo if Johnson and Moor would take the other half. The goods would be entered in the custom's books as intended for sale in Holland, sent to the Downs and loaded on the Anglesea just prior to sailing.

Somehow the directors learned of this scheme and held an investigation. Johnson and Decosta admitted their involvement but agreed that Moor had not been involved, although he had arranged the meeting at Decosta's request. Moor was "guilty", though, of calling the directors at this time "insolent Fellowes" with "no Scheme or any thing".

The enquiry was inconclusive, but Johnson was actually declared innocent of any scheme to defraud the Company and reinstated as captain of the Anglesea. Arthur Moor had no further official business with the Company as Philip V's representative, the Spanish rescinding his appointment soon afterwards.⁹

The first Spaniard to serve as agent to the Company, Guillermo Eon, did not arrive in London until 22 September 1717, thus having left the asiento without any Spanish supervisor there during its formative years. When he finally did arrive it was discovered that he spoke no English. Broadly, Eon's instructions were to see that the provisions of the treaty were enforced. He was to attend all meetings of the Company directors and to transmit accounts of the trade to Spain, to measure and to supervise the loading of cargoes on the annual ships and to insure that no contraband goods were sent to or

9. Laules to Grimaldo, 5 and 17 July 1713, AGS, Estado 6825; Memoire touchant les interests du Roy, 17 July 1713, AGS, Estado 6825; Minutes court of directors, 29 July 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, ff. 175-178; Minutes court of directors, 1 July 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, ff. 180-182; Johnson to Bateman, 22 June 1714, BM, Add. 25,562, f. 12; Minutes court of directors, 22 September 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 206; Minutes court of directors, 17 June 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, ff. 167-168; From Robert Johnson, 15 June 1714, BM, Add. 25,562, f. 11.

When the Anglesea returned from America Captain Johnson was given the exorbitant sum of £500 as a gratuity. Another £254 was distributed among his officers and crew. Minutes court of directors, 22 December 1715, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 90.

Monteleón to Grimaldo, 15 December 1714, AGS, Estado 6827; Minute court of directors, 22 September 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 206; Moor's appointment, 17 April 1714, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769.

remitted from America by Company personnel. He was also instructed to report if any Spanish subjects, or money and effects belonging to them, were transported in Company ships. This was prohibited by article xxvi of the asiento treaty, and it was intended to prevent Spaniards from avoiding the payment of taxes and duties. Nevertheless many Spaniards remitted money and goods to England from America and travelled in Company ships.

Philip V did occasionally permit Spanish officials to travel on Company vessels, but then only as passengers when no Spanish ship was available, and with stringent orders to carry nothing but personal belongings.¹⁰ The Prince of Santa Bueno, viceroy of Peru, and the Marquis of Villarocha, president of the audiencia of Tierra Firme, sailed on the Anglesea. Villarocha was permitted to take only two servants and eight coffers of clothing and books, all of which had to be registered in Cadiz as a precaution against the temptations of illicit trade. Company ships also regularly carried Spanish mail and even official government documents because Spanish ships often were unavailable.¹¹

The governors and royal officials of ports where the Company had factories or sent licensed slave ships had the greatest responsibility for controlling illegal activities by Company employees. They carried out fondeos (anchorage inspections on Company vessels to insure that they carried no contraband), and

10. Spanish officials also travelled in private British merchant ships. One unfortunate case concerned the Marquis of Navarrez, a provincial governor, who sailed to Santa Marta on the Lark, Captain John Lewis, and was robbed of a considerable amount of money by the crew. The Company urged the British government to punish the offenders and to return the money in order to "perserve the Hon:r of the Nation & the Interest of this Comp.a in the Spa Wt Indies". Directors to Stanhope, 28 October 1715, BM, Add. 25,555, f. 33.
11. Pozobueno to Grimaldo, 28 August 1721, AGS, Estado 6849; Portales Meneses to Philip V, 16 July 1726, AGI, Caracas 63; Consejo pleno de Indias, 23 July 1714, AGI, Panama 111; Garcia Ros to Philip V, 31 May 1715, AGI, Charcas 213; License of Joseph de la Rocha Carranza, 6 May 1714, AGI, Panama 115; Minutes court of directors, 20 May 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 159; Pym to Monteleón, 28 October 1714, AGS, Estado 6827; Real orden, 29 July 1713, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Instructions to Guillermo Eon, 19 July 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801; The Daily Courant, 10 October 1717.

visitas de sanidad. Only then could slaves be disembarked and measured, a function also performed by royal officials. Annual ships were inspected for contraband goods in London before departure by Spanish agents there, and in America by royal officials and the commanders of the galleons and flotas.

A number of Spaniards were legally on the Company's payroll in America and Madrid. The most important at each factory was the juez conservador, who the Company intended to be its protector, although the post normally went to the highest ranking member of the audiencia. He resolved disputes between the factors, royal officials and local merchants, and advised the factors on other aspects of the trade. If he could not resolve questions relating to Company activities he referred them to the junta del asiento de negros in Madrid, who were the last arbiter before the king in asiento affairs. Spanish lawyers, counselors, scribes, surgeons, and guards were also employed. Royal officials were not officially paid by the Company, although they often received money to expedite the landing of both legal and illegal cargoes, and for other illegal transactions. Spaniards employed by the Company during the first trading period included the following:

Table II

<u>Madrid</u>		<u>Salary per year (in pesos)</u>
An assistant agent		2,000
President of the Council of the Indies (as protector of the asiento)		2,000
Three councillors to the <u>fiscal</u> and three to the secretary, @600 each (The <u>fiscal</u> and the secretary were in the <u>junta del asiento</u> .)		3,600
A <u>fiscal</u> (who dispatched all law suits relating to the Company)		100
Chief clerk of the secretary's office (who arranged to send all <u>cédulas</u> and despatches)		300
The president's secretary		100
	Total:	8,100
<u>Vera Cruz</u>		
<u>juez conservador</u>	1,500	
	Total:	1,500
<u>Santiago</u>		
<u>juez conservador</u> (governor)		800
surgeon		80
slave attendant		100
	Total:	980

<u>Buenos Aires</u>		<u>Cartagena</u>	
<u>juez conservador</u> (governor)	2,000	<u>juez conservador</u> (governor)	2,000
lawyer	500	lawyer	300
house steward	400	porter	365
second <u>mayordomo</u>	144	<u>mayordomo</u>	730
first carter	96	notary public	300
second carter	72	second porter	100
slave attendant	180	secretary	100
carpenter	144		
cooper	104		
master of embarcations	104		
house servant	72		
<u>mayordomo</u> of the storehouse	144		
Total:	4,160	Total:	3,895
 <u>Havana</u>		 <u>Panama and Portobelo</u>	
<u>juez conservador</u> (governor)	2,000	<u>juez conservador</u> (president)	3,000
lawyer	500	councillor of the <u>audiencia</u>	1,000
marshall	300	lawyer	800
notary public	500	notary public	600
solicitor	250	barber-surgeon	300
doctor	500	guard	600
		<u>juez conservador</u> (governor)	1,000
		notary public	700
		surgeon	600
Total:	4,050	Total:	8,600

Thus total salaries paid to Spanish officials to assist in the trade amounted to 31,285 pesos per year.¹²

The South Sea Company acquired slaves from the Royal African Company, from private merchants, and by their own ships throughout the period of the British asiento contract. None of these methods proved entirely satisfactory. The Company contracted with the Royal African Company to supply it with slaves even before the signing of the asiento treaty. By the terms of the contract all slaves were to be purchased in Africa; 1,900 in Whidah, 1,500 from the Cape coast and adjacent areas, 500 from the windward coast, 700 from Gambia,

12. Minutes committee of correspondence, 13 June 1716, BM, Add. 25,550, ff. 53-54; Philip V to Serrano, 24 May 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Minutes committee of correspondence, 5 September 1721, BM, Add. 25,551, ff. 51-52; Cartagena royal officials to Philip V, 31 March 1719, AGI, Santa Fé 451; James King, "Description Data on Negro Slaves in Spanish Importation Records and Bills of Sale", The Journal of Negro History, 1943, pp. 208-212; Aiton, The Asiento Treaty, p. 171.

and 200 from Sierra Leone. Of the total 3,200 were to be males and 1,600 females, all between 10 and 40 years old. All ships used in the trade were to be owned or hired by the South Sea Company, which would also supply all provisions for the slaves except corn, palm oil and malaguetta grain. The Royal African Company was responsible for the selection of ships' officers and crews, and for financing the trade, although it received an advance of 520,000 pesos (about £10,000) from the South Sea Company to cover the expenses of opening the trade. The money was to be deducted from the amount owed to the Royal African Company for the slaves delivered to America (£6 for each slave under 16 years of age, and £10 for those between 16 and 40).

Company ships carried cargoes of English and Dutch merchandise to exchange for slaves in Africa, and sufficient provisions to last crews and slaves until their arrival in America. For example the Windsor left Whidah for America with 201 slaves and the following provisions for them:

Table III

2 large baskets of potatoes
 2 casks of salt
 2 half hogsheads of palm oil
 1 parcel each of pepper and wild rice
 32 chests of corn

Any merchandise remaining after the purchase of the slaves was normally invested in gold and "elephant's teeth", which was returned to Europe. However some goods were passed to the factors in America and sold illegally.

Upon arriving at one of the Royal African Company forts in Africa a ship captain bought necessary supplies and was required to purchase his cargo of slaves within 70 days, Sundays excepted. Slaves were registered by age and sex when loaded aboard ship. During the voyage roll calls were held fortnightly to record births and deaths. Ships were overloaded, but efforts were made to maintain primitive sanitary conditions. Decks were washed regularly and swabbed with vinegar. Captain's journals were kept for each voyage and private trade by crew members banned. Crews were cautioned against

embezzling slaves' provisions, an indication that their own provisions were insufficient.

The successful voyage of a slave ship depended primarily on the price and availability of slaves, their management on board ship, keeping as many alive and healthy as possible, and—according to one contemporary source, a slave merchant—"in dramming well with English Spirits, and conforming to the Humours of the Negroes". Negroes were acquired in various ways in Africa. Most were prisoners of war or taken in slave raiding expeditions by other negroes or Arabs, while some were debtors or law breakers lacking money to pay their fines. Children were often purchased from parents. The captives were usually told why they had been purchased prior to their departure for America to calm their nerves, because many of them feared that they were to be eaten. They were given instructions on how to act on board ship, and warned that they would be punished if they created disturbances or struck any white men. However if they were mistreated they were told to complain to the ship's linguist. Adult male slaves were shackled prior to departure but released afterwards, with men, women and children allowed to roam freely together during the day, although they slept separately. They were fed twice a day and given pipes of tobacco once a week. Ships stopped as often as possible during the trip for water and provisions.¹³

13. John Atkins, A Voyage to Guinea, Brasil, and the West-Indies (London, 1737), pp. 156-157; Pery to Ury, 11 January 1715, PRO, T. 70/38; Instructions to Nathaniel Smith, 17 January 1723, BM, Add. 25,567, ff. 2-4; Standing orders, 30 April 1724, BM, Add. 25,581, f. 14; Pery proposal to the South Sea Company, 1 July 1713, PRO, T. 70/38; Pym to Pery, 8 July 1713, PRO, T. 70/38; Batchelor, The South Sea Company, p. 129; William Snelgrave, A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-trade, pp. 107, 158, 162, 164.

The South Sea Company had second thoughts about their contract with the Royal African Company even before the first ship sailed. They insisted that the number of slaves to be supplied be reduced to 2,370 annually, and decided to purchase the other 2,430 from private merchants, or acquire them on their own. The directors altered the contract probably because they believed that they could acquire slaves cheaper themselves or from private merchants; it was generally believed at this time that the Royal African Company was spending large sums of money unnecessarily on salaries and to maintain their forts in Africa. Officers of the Royal African Company said that they agreed, although reluctantly, to alter the contract for the benefit of British trade in general, but protested that it was disadvantageous to them.¹⁴

Company directors were even more concerned at this time, as they had been during negotiations leading to the asiento contract, with the question of the termination of the activities of the French Guinea Company. By the terms of the treaty the French company was given from 1 May 1713 (the date

14. Pym to Pery, 14 April 1714, PRO, T. 70/38; Directors to Robert, Earl of Oxford, 23 September 1713, BM, King's 73, ff. 96-97; Minutes court of assistants, Royal African Company, 11 September 1713, PRO, T. 70/38; Minutes court of directors, 3 and 9 September 1713, BM, Add. 25,495, ff. 80, 83; K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London, 1957), p. 121.

of the signing of the English asiento contract) to 1 May 1716 to pay bills, collect debts, sell property and remit proceeds. No slaves could be introduced during this period.

Secretary of State Lord Bolingbroke anticipated numerous problems under this arrangement. The French company, he said, could not be expected to send empty ships to the Indies to collect their effects. Undoubtedly merchandise or slaves would be sent out to pay for voyages. To prevent this, he suggested that the French, British and Spanish governments jointly pay the French company a sum equal to the value of its property and effects in the Indies.

Bolingbroke's suggestion was not taken, nor was any other easy solution found.¹⁵

As feared, the French Guinea Company did continue trading. Some slave ships were already en route to America when the English asiento contract was signed, while others sailed afterwards. In June 1713 the Conte de Pontchartrain asked that a Company ship en route to Vera Cruz and Havana be allowed to sell its cargo without hindrance. Permission was denied by Philip V, who suggested that they arrange this question with the British. He then effectively opened the door to continued illicit entry of French slaves by instructing royal officials to allow French asiento ships to enter, and for their cargoes to be sold, if the British factors had not yet arrived, the proceeds to be distributed later "according to the arrangement between the two companies". In fact no such arrangement was ever made, and while many of their slaves were seized by royal officials for the benefit of the new asentistas, even more were introduced successfully.¹⁶

Since the demand for slaves did not automatically cease with the conclusion of the French contract, and because the South Sea Company did not

15. Gilbert Parke, Letters and Correspondence, Public and Private, of the Right Honourable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke (4 vols., London, 1798), iii, 481-482; General order, 15 April 1713, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769.

16. Real cédula to royal officials of Vera Cruz and Havana, 8 October 1713, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2784; Pontchartrain to Bonal, 26 June 1713, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2784.

begin to trade immediately, Spanish merchants and colonists were willing to purchase slaves from any available source. Concern developed in Madrid that it would become impossible to stop the illicit introduction of slaves by the French company if the British long delayed in beginning to trade. The first British slaves did not arrive until long after the contract was signed, and introductions in considerable numbers did not begin until 1715.¹⁷

The French Guinea Company introduced 148 slaves (113 1/3 piezas de indias at Buenos Aires in 1713 and 1714, . . . 570 (419 piezas) into Havana between May 1713 and October 1717, and unknown numbers at other factories. To stop these introductions the South Sea Company initiated legal proceedings, demanding that the slaves be seized and turned over to them. As a result the French agent in Havana, Jean Jonchee, was imprisoned and 16,000 pesos in proceeds from the sale of negroes confiscated. This represented about 10% of the total received there from the illegal sale of negroes. At Buenos Aires a cargo of merchandise and slaves of unknown value were seized from one ship, while seizures of goods worth 16,141 pesos were made in Cartagena, and 76,158 at Panama and Portobelo, making a total of 108,299 pesos known to have been seized.

Based on the likelihood that only 10% of the total illegal French introductions at Havana were seized, then the French company would have received over one million pesos from the sale of slaves there between May 1713 and the end of 1717. At 250 pesos per slave this represents the introduction of 4,000 slaves during that period. And yet even that figure may be conservative. In 1717 the French ambassador in Madrid, the Duque de St. Aignan, said that the French company made handsome profits indeed during 1713 and 1714, perhaps as much as two million pounds sterling. This would

17. Uzardi to Bolingbroke, 10 September 1714, BM, Add. 25,562, f. 17; Scelle, La traité négrière, vol. ii, pp. 169, 663; Consejo de las Indias to Philip V, 31 May 1714, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2784; Garcia Ros to Philip V, 5 October 1715, AGI, Charcas 213.

seem to suggest that the French company continued its business with the approval of Spanish royal officials.

The French contested the South Sea Company's right to the money seized in Havana. Further sums belonging to them were also placed in the royal treasuries in Havana and Santo Domingo, and for years afterwards South Sea Company officials petitioned Philip V for this money. The French appointed Guillermo Eon's secretary, Robert Shea, to negotiate with the English on their behalf for the release of the money to them. However the Company could not have satisfied the French even if they had wanted to do so; the seizure was made by royal officials on the orders of the governor of Havana, and the disposal of the money was entirely up to the Spanish.¹⁸

On 15 May 1718 Philip issued a real cédula in which he said that there were still French factors of the French Guinea Company in America "under the pretext of recovering company effects while introducing negroes fraudulently". He ordered that these men all be ejected from Spanish colonies. Curiously, one François Beloquin, who was empowered by the French company to represent it, remained in Cuba even after the termination of the British asiento under the pretence that he was closing the accounts of the Company. Nevertheless the cédula of 15 May 1718 effectively ended the trade of the French Guinea Company.¹⁹

The South Sea Company received none of the money embargoed from the

18. Petition to Spanish government, c. 3 February 1715, AGI, Ind Gen. 2784; State of French asiento by Consejo de Indias, 25 February 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2784; Directors to French Guinea Company directors, 9 April 1718, BM, Add. 25,563, ff. 152-3; Scelle, op. cit., p. 664; Consejo de Indias to Philip V, 31 May 1714, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2784; Committee of correspondence to Bowles, 3 October 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 68; Nicholson petition to Philip V, 21 July 1721, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; An Account of what Remains Due from His Catholic Majesty to the South Sea Company, 20 February 1727, BM, Add. 25,560, f. 69.

19. Auto from Güemes y Horcasitas, 2 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2850; Junta del asiento paper on the background of the French agent in Havana, François Beloquin, 16 November 1740, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2784; Real cédula, 15 May 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769. For a discussion of the negotiations between the French Guinea Company and the Spanish over the final accounts of the company, see Scelle, La traité négrière, vol. ii, pp. 648-681.

French Guinea Company. When they requested their agent in Madrid, Thomas Bowles, to ask for it as compensation for the damages done to their trade by the French company, the Junta del Asiento de Negros denied the request, explaining that the money was for slaves introduced prior to the first introduction of slaves by the English company. Because the South Sea Company was exempted from paying duties prior to May 1714, the Junta argued that they had thus lost all claims that might have been made for 1713. The Company later claimed, but again unsuccessfully, the 108,299 pesos as compensation for the represalia of 1718. They did not press the claim, however. It was included primarily to inflate their total claim rather than from any serious hope of obtaining the money.²⁰

The South Sea Company had numerous expenses to consider other than those for the acquisition and transportation of slaves to America. By treaty it paid a tax to the Spanish monarch for each slave introduced into the Indies. Unexpectedly it was also charged a tax by the Jamaica assembly. The assembly had tapped this immense source of revenue as early as 1681 when they levied an export duty of £5 per slave. Although the tax was subsequently reduced to £1 because of complaints by plantation owners who said that this regulation caused the export of the best slaves leaving only those of inferior quality on the island, the assembly doubled this amount for South Sea Company slaves when the Company acquired the asiento contract. Private traders had to pay only 20 Jamaican shillings (less than £1 sterling). The assembly argued

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20. Junta del Asiento, 11 May 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2774; Grimaldo to Stanhope, 7 August 1723, PRO, S.P. 94/233; Fiscal opinion, 4 May 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801; Account of what Remains due from His Catholic Majesty to the South Sea Company, 20 February 1727, BM. Add. 25,560, f. 69.
21. Jamaica agents to directors, 19 October 1717, PRO, C.O. 137/12 part 11, f. 331; Bateman and Shephard to Stanhope, 28 February 1715, PRO, C.O. 137/11; R. B. Le Page, Jamaican Creole (London, 1960), p. 60; Anon., Some Observations on the Assiento Trade, As it has been Exercised by the South-Sea Company (London, 1728), p. 17; Lillian Penson, "The West Indies and the Spanish-American Trade, 1713-1748", The Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. 1, p. 337.

that the higher duty imposed on the Company was fair because they received better prices for their slaves and passed the cost on to the Spanish.²¹

Company and private traders all protested vociferously against these duties. The Company called it a crippling burden on a trade that was unprofitable in any form. They threatened to deprive Jamaica of the profits of their agency there by removing it to another island, or by carrying slaves directly to the Spanish colonies from Africa. The threat made little impression on the assembly; if the trade was unprofitable that was no reason for them to subsidize it.²²

The Company petitioned the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations to revoke this tax on the grounds that most of the slaves were in transit and would be reexported after recuperating from the voyage, and were thus not liable for taxation. The commissioners agreed, and repealed the duty, but the Jamaicans imposed a new duty and resolved to do so each time London repealed the old. Nonetheless the Company obtained an order from the Board of Trade to be reimbursed by the Jamaica assembly for £1,000 already paid in taxes.²³

The Company also took steps to avoid paying similar taxes in the future. They moved their depot to Barbados for a brief period, but found it unsatisfactory because the prevailing winds made it more difficult to transport slaves not shipped to the Spanish. The Company also tried sending slave ships directly to the factories, but that too failed for the same reasons that moved

22. Bateman and Shephard to Stanhope, 28 February 1715, PRO, C.O. 137/11; Francis March et al to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 8 March 1715, PRO, C.O. 137/11; Directors to Thompson, Pratter and Hazelwood, 6 February 1716, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 6; Anon., An Answer to a Calumny (London, 1728), pp. 29, 31; Anon., Some Observations on the Asiento Trade, pp. 18-19.

23. Case of the South Sea Company concerning duties in Jamaica, October, 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/3, part ii, f. 176; Minute Lords of the Privy Council, 9 January 1718, PRO, C.O. 137/12, part iii, f. 488; Thompson et al to directors, 20 August 1717, PRO, C.O. 137/12, part ii, f. 316.

them initially to establish an agency in Jamaica. A more successful technique was to land slaves on the cays off Jamaica. The Jamaica agents sent 1,597 slaves to Spanish communities during the year ending in October 1717; of these 1,248 were from the cays and only 349 from Jamaica.²⁴

The duty that was reimposed in Jamaica prior to the end of the first trading period was 10 shillings on negroes imported for sale there, and 20 shillings for those exported to other British or Spanish colonies. Negroes landed for recuperation were exempted. The average price of a slave in Jamaica rose after the South Sea Company began trading there, reaching £35-40 (156-178 pesos) by 1720. The duty was thus about 1½% on slaves sold there, and 3% on those exported. While the duty was hardly excessive, private traders believed that it raised the retail price of slaves sufficiently to harm their export trade, and local planters insisted that the tax made it uneconomical for them to buy slaves. Both groups felt themselves to be at a disadvantage to the Company, which could recover the duty by raising the price to the Spanish. The Company was hardly effected by the new tax, which it paid only on slaves sold in Jamaica and on those purchased on the island from private Guinea traders.²⁵

Documentation on the actual operation of the British asiento trade during the first period (1714-1718) is somewhat fragmentary. One of the most thorough accounts available (concerning the licensed slave trade) was compiled by Dudley Woodbridge, the agent in Barbados. It was at Woodbridge's suggestion

24. Extract, Thompson et al to directors, 7 February 1717, PRO, C.O. 137/12, part ii, f. 315; Undated account enclosed in Wescomb's letter of 15 November 1717, PRO, C.O. 137/12, part ii, f. 317; Directors to Grimes et al, 2 January 1718, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 96; Elizabeth Donnan, "The Early Days of the South Sea Company, 1711-1718", Journal of Economic and Business History (May, 1930), p. 442.

25. Lawes to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 6 December 1719, PRO, C.O. 137/13, part i, f. 190; Harriss to Poppel, 20 March 1725, PRO, C.O. 137/16, ff. 34-35; Directors to Jamaica agents, 26 February 1718, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 125; Lawes to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 13 November 1720, PRO, CO 137/13, part ii, f. 289; Horsfall, "British Relations", p. 77.

that private merchants were granted Company licenses to supply the windward coast of South America and the Caribbean islands with Company slaves from Barbados. Licenses were issued for single voyages. Licensees paid the Company 110 pesos per pieza de indias for each slave they sold in the Spanish colonies, based on an indulto, or privilege first granted in 1704 to the French Guinea Company. They were required to pay for the slaves in advance or provide a security in exchange for the license. All slaves were to be marked with the Company's brand; licensees were fined £110 for each unmarked slave discovered in their possession. Slaves who died before shipment to the Spanish Main were replaced by the Company free of charge. Those imported in this manner were measured by the royal officials in the same way as at the factories. The accounts were presented to the Company agents in Barbados as a check against the fraudulent introduction of slaves, and so that duties owed to the Spanish king could be calculated.

The financial return to the Company was less than that from direct trade, but by granting licenses they eliminated certain financial risks such as the responsibility for purchasing slaves and for maintaining factories in ports where the volume of sales was low. The licensees gained even more, besides the profits from the sale of slaves, including legal protection for their trade and the opportunity to introduce contraband merchandise and provisions.

Woodbridge advised the Company to use this method of trade because of the poverty of Spanish colonies served by the agency in Barbados. When he was the agent there he sent 521 slaves to the windward coast over a period of 19 months and sold only 166. This was a region on the economic margin of the Spanish empire. Spanish inhabitants between Cumana and the Río Orinoco were too poor to buy slaves, while the inhabitants of Trinidad could only afford to buy children or adolescents; their maximum purchase was only five or six piezas de indias a year (two to four young slaves). He saw little prospect for selling slaves in the Isla de las Margaritas or Puerto Rico; the inhabitants had nothing to barter, he said, because they were too lazy

to work. Sales were also poor in Hispaniola, but mainly because the market was glutted with contraband French merchandise.²⁶

British merchants had traded with the Spanish colonies for 200 years. Some of this traffic was a re-export trade from Spain itself: British goods imported legally into Spain were often consigned to the Indies fleets by Spanish commission agents. Alternatively British merchants had practised direct contraband trade with Spanish America; in this case they landed their goods directly in Spanish American ports--in almost every case illegally. Each method carried some risks, the former from confiscation of returns, the latter from confiscation of goods. With the acquisition of the asiento contract the South Sea Company and its employees were given a virtual "license to smuggle". Company personnel were guilty of innumerable breaches of the asiento contract, and as often abused the trust of the Company, despite the directors' dogmatic statement that "We are Resolved not to Suffer the Company to be Abused by their Factors either by Neglect Dishonesty or Want of Skill in the Managem.t of our Affairs".²⁷

A special privilege granted to the Company by article 37 of the asiento treaty, and confirmed by a cédula on 9 October 1717, was the right to indult slaves illegally introduced into Spanish colonies on the payment of 110 pesos per pieza de indias to the owner of the illicitly introduced slave, and 33 1/3 pesos per pieza in duties to the royal treasury. The privilege was to offer numerous temptations to Company employees to engage in illicit activities.

One such seizure during the last trading period helps to explain how the indulto functioned. In April 1732, Wargent Nicholson, Company factor in

26. Minutes committee of correspondence, 17 22 and 29 October 1717, BM, Add. 25,550, ff. 85-89, 92.

27. Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 8 February 1716, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 12; Rudolph Robert, Chartered Companies (London, 1969), p. 120; J. H. Parry, Trade and Dominion (London, 1971), p. 103; Allan Cristolow, "Contraband Trade Between Jamaica and the Spanish Main, and the Free Port Act of 1766", Hispanic American Historical Review (May, 1942), p. 312.

Havana, informed Governor Martínez de la Vega that a negro boy named Sebastian Casta Congo had been acquired illegally by the convent of Our Lady of Bethlehem in Havana. Nicholson seized the child on behalf of the Company and measured him to determine the duty owed to the Spanish crown. The seizure was contested by the convent's solicitor, who said that the boy was purchased legally and branded in 1729. He made the unlikely claim that the mark must have been erased with the passage of time. Governor Martínez submitted the case to the junta del asiento in Madrid for a verdict. In February 1736 the junta ruled in favour of the Company. The boy or an equivalent value was to be given to the Company, which in turn would pay 110 pesos to the convent and 33 1/3 in duties.²⁸

The most interesting incident during the first trading period concerning the indulto occurred in Florida. A Company factor in Havana, Richard Farrel, authorized one Manuel Fernandez del Campo to travel to Florida to indult slaves illegally introduced there since the beginning of the asiento contract. However the governor of Florida, Juan de Ayala Escoban, refused to permit the indulto because he said that it threatened the security of the province. Most of the slaves in question had been seized from English colonists in Carolina by Indians who sold some of them and gave others away on whim. If these Indians were forced to sell their slaves, Ayala forecast terribly repercussions. At worst the Indians would withdraw their support from the Spanish and ally themselves with the French settlers in Mobile. The Company petitioned the junta de asiento to have the governor's decision rescinded, but not wishing to disturb Spain's fragile control of the province, the request was denied.²⁹

28. Autos, 22 April 1732, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 60A; junta del asiento, 21 February 1736, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 60A; Minutes junta del asiento, 30 September 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2773; Real cédula, 9 October 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776; Real cédula, December 1717, Ind. Gen. 2800; general cédula, 14 January 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769.

29. Juan de Ayala Escoban to Philip V, 19 January 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801; Fiscal opinion, 11 September 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801; Power from Farrel to Fernández del Campo, 20 November 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801.

Throughout the asiento contract the indulto concession caused difficulties; it was disliked and abused by English and Spanish alike. Contraband slave traders bribed royal officials to avoid seizure of their cargoes by Company factors; some slaves illegally introduced were confiscated by royal officials who then sold them in their own interest, instead of giving them to the Company. Some factors, on the other hand, introduced slaves illegally, seized their own slaves, and then paid themselves the indulted price of 110 pesos, sold the slaves for the Company, and then earned both the commission and sale price.³⁰

The factors used a variety of other means to introduce illicit merchandise. They sold large quantities of flour to local merchants on the windward coast of South America under the pretext that it was for factory consumption. One ship, the Royal George, made trips from Curaçao to Caracas in September and October 1716, importing 42 and 690 barrels of flour. Local Spanish officials remarked that this seemed an excessive amount of flour to feed the only Company factor there, Jonathan Sisson, and a few slaves—who were, in any case, fed corn. The flour was seized and sold by royal officials.³¹

In Buenos Aires the factors obtained a promise from the governor to inform them before orders were issued to seize suspected contraband goods. However the agreement dissolved when the governor turned "Judas like" and betrayed the factors by confiscating contraband goods belonging to them without prior notification. The factors said that the arrival in September 1718 of some Spanish register ships, whose illegal merchandise competed with theirs, explained the

30. Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 12 July 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, ff. 45-46.

The suggestion by some historians that "There were no illicit sales of negroes" during the British asiento "because this would have meant taking a lower price..!" (Sperling, The South Sea Company, p. 20), is obviously incorrect.

31. Betancourt to Philip V, 30 August 1718, AGI, Santo Domingo 698; From Jonathan Sisson, 30 October 1716, AGI, Caracas 63; Petition from Sisson, 30 October 1716, AGI, Caracas 63; Betancourt to Philip V, 7 February 1717, AGI, Caracas 63.

change in the governor's attitude.³²

In any case they advised the directors that "this clandestine trade makes our lives burthensome". This is the only known example during the period of the British asiento where Company employees seemed diffident about participating in illicit trade, and their complaints concerned the method of operating, not the morality of the activity.³³

An effort to eliminate the illicit trade of private merchants competing against the Company was made by the factors in Panama and Portobelo. On the basis of a real cédula of 15 April 1713 they claimed the right to inspect every ship arriving on the Spanish Main which they suspected might be carrying illegal slaves. Gilbert Grimes, president of the factory in Panama, issued a license to Francisco Laya--which was approved by the viceroy of Peru--authorizing him to inspect ships in Callao on the Company's behalf. On 15 February 1716 Laya published an indulto on all slaves introduced since 16 May 1713. The indulto and inspection privileges were almost immediately suspended by royal officials before any slaves had been seized, pending the arrival of the new viceroy, the Prince of Santo Bueno. On the grounds that inspection of arriving vessels would duplicate the work of the royal officials who inspected every ship for contraband on arrival and departure, the Company was never permitted to inspect ships separately.³⁴

Evidence and rumours of the extensive participation in contraband trade by Company personnel, from the lowest factor to the directors, made the Spanish suspicious of all aspects of the trade. Disputes over ambiguous or ill-defined stipulations of the asiento treaty developed soon after its

32. Even the officers of Spanish azogues were involved in illicit trade. There is evidence that the azogue Guadalupe, commanded by Lieutenant General Fernando Chacón, carried unregistered pepper, silk, rum and other merchandise in 1722. From Madrid, 2 June 1722, AGI, Contratación 5144.
33. Buenos Aires factors to directors, 2 July and 21 September 1718, AGS, Estado 7017; La Quadra to Montigo, 10 May 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1602.
34. From the audiencia of Lima, 6 November 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807.

ratification. The three most serious controversies during the first trading period involved the 200,000 pesos in "anticipation money" the Company had agreed to pay Philip V within four months after the signing of the treaty, the payment of duties on slaves, and the annual ships. The Company refused to pay anything to the king until they received permits to send the two licensed ships to America which Philip V had given to Queen Anne as a gift, and which she in turn had given to the Company. The Company badly needed this permission; the cargoes for the two ships had long since been purchased and were in danger of rotting.

The cédulas were granted, but the Company still refused to pay the 200,000 pesos, hoping to gain even further concessions. Lord Bolingbroke had assured them that they would not need to pay the money, even that they could keep it as compensation for not having received the quarter investment in the trade which Philip V was supposed to have paid. The Company then claimed that no duties were due on the slave trade for 1713; they said that no slaves had been introduced that year because the treaty of peace was not published until 1 March 1714, and its publication was a prerequisite to trade. Some Company slaves did in fact arrive in America in 1713; a few were refused permission to land because the peace had not yet been published, but others were landed and sold during this period without hindrance from local officials. Lastly, the Company wanted a guarantee that the annual ships could sail to America and their cargoes sold even in years when no fair was held.

The Spanish considered these demands, particular the ones concerning the annual ships, "extravagant, unjust and prejudicial"; if carried out it was feared that they could destroy Spain's economy. Monteleón reportedly said that the directors were intransigent and that if the issues were not soon resolved the Company might give up the asiento, or England even go to war. In February 1715 Monteleón recommended that the Spanish accept any proposal from the English that might lead to the relinquishment of the asiento. Thirty years, he said, was a long time to allow a foreign power to send ships

annually to Spanish colonies in America loaded with inexpensive British merchandise; furthermore, the inevitable problems arising from such a privilege could seriously disturb the good relations between the two crowns. He suggested that Spain offer 125,000 pesos to the Company to relinquish the asiento contract. Monteleón's suggestion was not heeded, but the question was discussed frequently in the years that followed. After viewing the trade as the king's representative in London to the South Sea Company, ^{Eon} he arrived at a conclusion very similar to Monteleón's. He proposed that the Company be given money in return for the relinquishment of the annual ship contract. The Spanish government again rejected the suggestion.³⁵

The disputes between Philip V and the Company were supposed to be negotiated in 1715 when the new British ambassador, Paul Methuen, arrived at his post in Madrid. But Methuen was taken ill shortly after his arrival and ordered home. His replacement, George Bubb, was instructed by William Stanhope to try to satisfy Company demands; Company directors offered their assistance by authorizing him "to employ two or three, or even four thousand Pistoles for this End". Stanhope reminded Bubb that the Spanish

cannot be ignorant what a number of Persons a Company must consist of which has Ten Millions Stock. It will become the Interest of all these Proprietors, when once the assiento is Setled, to be Advocates, & Sollicitors for the Interest of Spain, one would therefore hope they [the Spanish] can not be So blind as wantonly to lose the hold they have upon England by this Contract.

Bubb was concerned that England would never benefit from this contract. He called it "one of the worst I ever saw, & the most effectually calculated for Captiousness & Chicane". Although he remarked that "The Assiento Business puts me entirely beyond all Temper", he negotiated and signed a treaty with

35. Monteleón to Grimaldo, 29 November 1714, AGS, Estado 6827; From Monteleón, received January 1715, AGS, Estado 6827; Monteleón to Grimaldo, 7 March 1715, AGS, Estado 6827; From Monteleón, 11 April 1715, AGS, Estado 6829; Eon to Alberoni, 4 April 1718, AGS, Estado 6840; To Monteleón, 25 May 1716, AGS, Estado 6829; Monteleón to Grimaldo, 14 and 21 February 1715, AGS, Estado 6827; From Monteleón, 19 September 1715, AGS, Estado 6830; To Grimaldo, 6 October 1715, AGS, Estado 6830.

Spanish negotiators on 26 May 1716 which amended the asiento treaty of 1713. The convention absolved the Company from paying duties on slaves during the first year of the contract, and guaranteed regular sailings of the annual ships, and permission to sell their cargoes if the fleets failed to arrive within four months after they did.³⁶

After the Treaty of 1716 was signed the Company still refused to pay negro duties for slaves introduced in 1714, and in 1715 as well. Their excuse now was the seizure of one of their license ships, the Bedford, by royal officials in Cartagena (See below p. 79). This reluctance to pay these duties was seriously damaging their relations with the Spanish crown. If they had no intention of paying the duties, Bubb said, they should not have remitted any profits from sales in the Indies in the first place; they should not engage in the trade without fulfilling all legal commitments. Furthermore, he added that the affair of the Bedford had nothing to do with the asiento trade.

Several of Philip V's ambassadors' salaries were paid from duties collected from the asiento trade; some of them were experiencing acute financial embarrassment and urged the king to remedy the situation. Monteleón was unpaid for eighteen months during Company-Spanish negotiations. The ambassadors were eventually paid, but then another problem surfaced. The Company paid the salaries according to the exchange rate that was given for the doblón and real in London, and not according to the "just" value of the

36. On concluding the treaty Bubb commented sarcastically to the directors. "I hope you will not like it worse, because it cost nothing". Monteleón reported that it was indeed well received in England. for more details of the treaty.

Monteleón to Grimaldo, 25 June 1716, AGS, Estado 6834; Bubb to Bateman and Shepherd, 2 June 1716, BM, Eg. 2172, f. 1; Stanhope to Bubb, 2 February 1716, BM, Eg. 2171, f. 89; From Monteleón, 18 April, 13 and 27 June 1715, AGS, Estado 6829; Methuen to Stanhope, 15 July 1715, PRO, S.P. 94/84; Wood, "The Annual Ships", pp. 92-93; Monteleón to directors, 26 November 1714, PRO, S.P. 35/1, part 11, f. 235; Monteleón to Grimaldo, 31 October 1715, AGS, Estado 6831; Bubb to Stanhope, 10 February and 20 April 1716, BM, Eg. 2171, ff. 101, 292; Bateman and Shepherd to Stanhope, 28 September 1715, BM, Add. 25,559, f. 54; Stanhope to Bubb, 29 December 1715, BM, Eg. 2170, ff. 368-370.

money in Spain. Monteleón calculated that he would lose £300 a year in this fashion. The issue of exchange rates was not resolved and menaced relations between the Company and the Spanish crown throughout the contract.³⁷

Other salaries and payments assigned to the king's proceeds from the asiento trade included the following:

Table IV

Juan Manasses Gilligan, from 17 July 1713	500 pesos per year
Prince of Chelamar (Paris)	5,250
Luys de Nurabal (Holland)	3,880
Thobias de el Burgo (Hamburg)	2,060
Marquis of Villamayor, from 1 April 1715	3,750
Gabriel Ponce, from 6 January 1716	2,000
Monteleón's son, from 13 October 1715	125
Anabal Scoti	500

In addition to these regular payments there were numerous individual grants.³⁸

Anglo-Spanish relations also deteriorated at this time. Each country accused the other of seizing ships on the high seas and of breaking commercial treaties. Spanish guardacosta activity increased steadily during 1716, effectively stopping the clandestine trade of Jamaican merchants to the Main. In retaliation Governor Sir Archibald Hamilton issued letters of reprisal to those who had received injury from the Spanish. The situation became even more strained when the galleons were wrecked in the Bahama channel, and much of the cargo was plundered by Jamaican merchants who had received reprisal commissions to suppress piracy. The demands of the South Sea Company further increased the tension in the West Indies. Suspecting that war was about to erupt, Company directors ordered their agents in Jamaica and Barbados to stop

37. Monteleón to Grimaldo, 2 and 16 July 1716, AGS, Estado 6835; Monteleón to Grimaldo, 9 May 1715, AGS, Estado 6829; To Grimaldo, 6 June 1715, AGS, Estado 6824; From Monteleón, 22 August and 19 September 1715, AGS, Estado 6830; Bateman and Shepheard to Stanhope, 28 September 1715, BM, Add. 25,559, f. 54; Bubb to Methuen, 9 November 1716, BM, Eg. 2173, f. 114; Bubb to directors, 21 September 1716, BM, Eg. 2172, f. 352.

38. Memoria de lo consignado y librado en el asiento de negros, c. 1715, AGS, Estado 6831.

39. The dispute in Europe between Spain and the Emperor over Italy, the formation and involvement of the Quadruple Alliance, and the relationship between Spain and Britain in the West Indies is analysed by Horsfall, op. cit., pp. 76, 80, 90-136.

shipping slaves to the factories and to sell the ones in their possession to British planters. Although the treaty stipulated that the Company had eighteen months to remit its effects without penalty in case of war, the factors were instructed to send immediately all money and effects to British territory.⁴⁰

The Company also asked England's ambassador to Spain to bring their books and records to London if war should break out, but war had been declared in September 1718, and he left Spain prior to the receipt of the Company's letter. The Company agent there, Thomas Bowles, gave the books to another Company employee, Juan Bautista Hardi Uzardi, for safekeeping, but they were seized by Spanish officials.⁴¹

Upon learning of the Spanish declaration of war the British impounded Guillermo Eon's papers and personal effects and denied him permission to leave the country. He and his family were held hostage until government should learn of Thomas Bowles' fate. When it was learned that Bowles had sailed for England, they departed for France, followed soon afterwards by Ambassador Monteleón when Britain declared war.⁴²

40. Committee of correspondence to Cartagena factors, 30 July 1718, BM, Add. 25,563, ff. 202-203; Directors to Woodbridge, 25 September 1718, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 212; Thomas to Duke of Mar, 12 September 1718, Calendar Stuart Papers, vol. vii, p. 276.

41. Extract Bowles to Directors, 22 November 1717, BM, Add. 25,555, f. 79; Bateman and Shephard to Addison, 5 December 1717, BM, Add. 25,555, ff. 78-79; Committee of correspondence to Bowles, 4 September and 6 November 1718, BM, Add. 25,563, ff. 208, 214; Minutes committee of correspondence, 16 April 1719, BM, Add. 25,551, f. 28; Craggs to Monteleón, 4 September 1718, Historical Register, 1718, vol. iii, p. 308.

Thomas Bowles was seriously ill at this time, and dreaded the possible outbreak of war. If he died,

"contrary to all the Priviledges the English formerly enjoyed, an alcaldi the corte will enter my house, Seize all the goods as well belonging to the Company as to me, and turn my Poor Family and Servants into the Streets upon Pretence there is no Legal Heir of their Religion Present."

The only Protestants exempted from the "Harpys" of the Inquisition, he said, were government officials. Extract Bowles to Directors, 22 November 1717, cited above.

42. Monteleón to Grimaldo, 10 October 1718, AGS, Estado 6841.

Chapter IV

The Licensed Ships

During the first trading period the South Sea Company sent to the Spanish colonies in America two licensed merchant ships with cargoes that by agreement could not be less than 500 tons nor more than 600. The privilege had been granted to Queen Anne by Philip V in 1712, and then assigned by Anne to the Company. The licensed ships offered a legitimate outlet for British manufactured goods in the Spanish colonies, where previously they could only be introduced on the fleets or illegally as contraband by West Indian merchants. Two large British men-of-war of approximately 1,000 tons each, the Bedford and the Elizabeth, were loaned to the Company for this purpose. Lord Bolingbroke explained that providing these ships was

a precedent not to be follow'd but necessary to be made the first time that nothing may be wanting which can contribute to Countenance and Encourage the Opening of so beneficial a Trade.

Furthermore it was uncertain if the Company could find ships capable of carrying 600 tons of cargo because the construction of merchant ships in England had been neglected during the War of the Spanish Succession. The British government feared that the licenses might be lost to Britain if the ships were not made available.

Initially, in August 1712, the Company was informed that H.M.S. Anglesea and H.M.S. Warwick had been selected, but the directors rejected them because they were of insufficient burthen. The Anglesea (Captain Robert Johnson) and the Warwick (Captain Henry Partington) were consigned to the lesser task of transporting Company factors to the Indies, the first to Panama and Cartagena and the second to Buenos Aires. Factors assigned to Vera Cruz were to travel on the Elizabeth. The crews of all four ships were to be under the authority of the Company rather than the Admiralty. It was also decided that government

1. Minute court of directors, 15 August 1712, BM, King's 73, f. 6; Minute court of directors, 29 September 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 208; Extract directors to Monteleón, 16 December 1714, PRO, S.P. 35/1, part ii, f. 69;

(continued on next page)

would fit out, supply, man and convoy the four ships (Originally the Company was to have been responsible for paying the wages of the men and for their victuals.)

because ye Expence, Would go a great way towards eating out the Proffits and that which Her Majesty designs as a Favour and Encouragement to Her Subjects would in this Manner prove of little or no advantage

Philippe V granted permits on 17 January 1713 for the Elizabeth to sail to Vera Cruz and the Bedford to Portobelo or Cartagena. On the same day he informed Spanish officials in the Indies of the termination of the French Guinea Company's asiento contract, and of its acquisition by the British. The Company acquired cargoes for both ships (purchased with money acquired from the issuance of bonds), and prepared a smaller storeship to accompany the license ships and their convoys to Jamaica.¹

The Admiralty was not informed until July 1713 that the men-of-war and convoys should be prepared for their new duty, but the ships were ready to sail by later summer that year. However Anne did not confirm these assignments until 15 April 1714, and the ships did not sail until late in 1715. In the meantime interest accrued on the original investment, and some of the goods deteriorated. These were problems that plagued the Company throughout the term of the asiento contract. There were several reasons for the delay, the most important being a dispute between Anne and the Company over the terms of the latter's acquisition of the asiento contract and of the licensed ships. The directors did not officially accept the contract and the two license ships until 17 February 1714, in spite of having made extensive preparations for the voyages of the ships and for the establishment of the slave trade.²

1. (continued from previous page)

Anne's decree to Admiralty, 15 April 1714, BM, King's 73, f. 112-113; To the Count of Frigiliana, 14 January 1715, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2772.

2. Minute court of directors, 22 July 1713, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 69; Bolingbroke to Bateman, 5 February 1714, BM, King's 73, f. 108; Directors to Robert, Earl of Oxford, 2 December 1713, BM, King's 73, f. 105; Minute court of directors, 17 February 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, ff. 130-131; Decree by Queen Anne to the Admiralty, 15 April 1714, BM, King's 73, ff. 112-113.

The Company's plan to send a storeship with the license ships also caused a long delay while the Spanish considered--and eventually denied--their request to do so. The Spanish were also concerned that because of their great size and cargo capacity the licensed ships would result in considerable contraband and hurt Spanish trade. Nevertheless the two huge men-of-war were granted permission to sail, and efforts that might have been effective in controlling contraband, such as the careful inspection of the ships in England and again in the Indies, were slipshod, not made at all, or suppressed, such as in the case of the Bedford. (See below, p. 79) A further delay was occasioned by an investigation into the scheme by Captain Johnson and others to send 60 tons of contraband merchandise on the Anglesea. Although guilty of the charges, Johnson was exonerated and the ship allowed to sail. (For further details of this case see above, p. 46).³

Because Anne furnished the ships and crews, the Company had few expenses other than the purchase, packaging and loading of cargoes to and from America, and the hire of vessels to help carry produce home. However they did prepare 200 tons of negro provisions, clothing, medicines, furniture for the factories, and gifts for Spanish officials in the Indies. The viceroy of Mexico was to receive a gift worth £200; the governor and royal officials of Vera Cruz ones worth a total of £150; those in Panama and Cartagena £120; and in Buenos Aires £100.

The Elizabeth (Captain Samuel Vincent) finally sailed in August 1715 and the Bedford (Captain Thomas Lyell) the following November. Neither ship was required to sail with the flotas or galleons, nor did their merchandise have to be sold at the fairs, as was the case with the annual ships, although the

3. Monteleón to Grimaldo, 3 January 1715, AGS, Estado 6827; Extract directors to Monteleón, 16 December 1714, PRO, S.P. 35/1, part ii, f. 69; Petition council and merchants of Seville, 14 July 1715, PRO, C.O. 388/20; Stanhope to Methuen, 22 March 1715, PRO, S.P. 104/35, f. 135; Translation of a letter from the president of Panama to Monteleón, 28 October 1715, BM, Add. 25,562, f. 28; Minute court of directors, 17 June 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 167; From Robert Johnson, 15 June 1714, BM, Add. 25,562, f. 11.

goods on the Elizabeth were in fact sold during that year's fair in New Spain.⁴ The cargoes of both ships were very similar, consisting of good quality consumer goods that the Company hoped would be sold for bullion. They included various textiles, including stockings, hats, ribbons, towels, buttons and thread; candles, glassware and mirrors; paper, toys, and objects of pewter, tin and iron such as scales and arms; and more exotic items like cinnamon, cloves and nutmeg from the East Indies. Merchandise that the Company/^{believed} would do well in the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru, but which were unavailable in England, was acquired on the Continent, especially in France and Holland. The directors were entirely unaware of the actual market conditions on the coast or in the interior of Spanish America, and gambled their investment on reputed rather than known factors. Simply, they were eager to acquire a share in the legendary wealth of Spain's American mines through their licensed and annual ships, as well as through the slave trade, but in practice they often had to settle for local produce because gold and silver were unavailable. These products were resold in England and Europe, and to a lesser extent in the West Indies and in Britain's North American colonies, and consisted mainly of sugar, tobacco, flax, indigo, cochineal, logwood, hides and sarsaparilla.⁵

Merchandise on the Elizabeth was consigned to the newly appointed factors for Vera Cruz: Catlin Thorowgood, chief factor; Thomas Bedell, accountant; Daivd Patton, surgeon; and William Clarke, John Newton and John Strode. The

4. The flota that year commanded by Manuel López Pintado carried 1,797 2/7 tons of cargo, while that of the Elizabeth officially weighed about 600 tons, just over 25% of all introduced at the fair. Royal officials to Philip V, 22 May 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800; Walker, Galeones y Flotas, p. 106.

On the other hand the Bedford introduced merchandise at Cartagena almost equal in tonnage to that introduced at the fair in Vera Cruz. See below, p. 79.

5. Account of goods on the Bedford, 22 August 1716, BM, Eg. 2172, f. 302; Minute court of directors, 1 December 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 235; Minute court of directors, 5 June and 22 July 1713, BM, Add. 25,495, ff. 58, 69; Minute court of directors, 10 April 1712, BM, Add. 25,494, f. 77; Anon., A True Account of the Design, p. 24.

factors invested personally in the voyage. They hired a sloop, the Catherine (Captain Josiah Nixon), to "pilot" the Elizabeth to Vera Cruz from Jamaica, but which carried--at Company expense--their own goods and slaves.⁶

The accounts of the Elizabeth were not compiled until 1728 by the Company's accountant, John Read, and not in detail until 1733, when they were reviewed and analysed by Spain's representative to the Company in London, Thomas Geraldino. Several account books relating to the sale of the cargo were lost or destroyed during the first represalia, so it is impossible to obtain an exact account of the voyage. Furthermore there are important discrepancies between Read's accounts of 1728 and 1733. Although the earlier ones are less complete they are more accurate; those of 1733 reflect the exigencies of Company directors wishing to present accounts most favourable to the Company. Obviously the official accounts do not indicate the extent of the private and clandestine trade carried on, although strangely enough they do indicate some of it. (See below, p. 75, n10)

Table I

Financial Details of the Elizabeth's Voyage⁷Expenses

Cargo		
British goods ⁸		£164,118
costs		16,358/12/8
Foreign goods		47,995/13/1
costs		5,412/5/8
	sub-total	233,884/11/5
	less duties refunded ⁹	7,432/13/8
	sub-total	£226,451/17/9

6. Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 8 February 1716, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 7; To the Count of Frigiliana, 14 January 1715, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2772.
7. All figures are based on an exchange rate of 54 pence (4/6) per peso.
8. These are the costs for cleaning, drying, folding, pressing, packing and labeling, as well as for various documents and sellos dorados.
9. The money refunded to the Company from British customs represents duties paid on foreign goods introduced into England, but which were reexported on the Elizabeth, and were thus, in effect, in transit. Factura de generos...del navío de guerra Yzabel, 15 June 1715, AGI, Contaduría 266.

Table I (cont.)

Gratuities and miscellaneous	£773/10-
Translations	1/5/-
Duties and expenses on goods returned on the:	
<u>Elizabeth</u>	4,731/19/10
<u>St. George</u>	3,923/19/2
<u>London</u>	1,408/18/-
<u>Royal Prince</u>	2,850/9/8
Gratuity to Captain Vincent	100
Brokerage fee for silver shipped to London	9/16/-
Paid to the owners of the <u>London</u> for freight charges	3,567
Freight charges for logwood	16/11/-
Expenses for shipping silver on the:	
<u>Elizabeth</u>	173/11/-
<u>London</u>	29/-/7
Expenses for shipping flax and indigo	359/19/11
Insurance and commission (1½%)	17,118/4/5
Interest at 5% on the cost of the cargo for the four year period ending in December 1718	45/572/19/-
Total	£307,088/12/4

Table II

Value of Bullion and Produce Returned to London¹⁰

Silver (90,000 pesos and 11 bars)	£21,039/2/2
Cochineal	221,060/10/5
Indigo	77,371/9/9
Logwood	7,197/11/5
Flax	1,756/17/9
Sarsaparilla	166/15/5
Jalapa	4,304/19/11
Achiote	850/8/8
Copper	4/12/6
Money received for damage sustained by merchandise	15/1/2
Duties refunded on flax	2/10/-
	£333,795/6/8

Merchandise Unaccounted for by the Returns

Consigned for sale by individuals but for which results are unknown	£34,772/3/6
Seized and sent to Mexico in the <u>represalia</u> ¹¹	15,821/6/6
Unsold or otherwise unaccounted for	139,076/1/5
	£189,669/11/5
Total bullion and produce returned to London and merchandise unaccounted for:	£523,464/18/1 ¹²

10. The factors are known to have received 1,086,447 pesos ¼ real (£244,450/11/5) in cash for merchandise sold. The difference between that and the figure below possibly represents some of the money unaccounted for, although it could just as likely be a figure inflated by the factors to claim higher commissions.

The accounts for sales in Vera Cruz show goods not included in the original bill of lading which sold for 205,281 pesos 2 reales

The total sale of goods returned on this original investment was either £349,519/19/2 or £357,732/6/10, depending on whether the 1728 or 1733 accounts are used. Based on these figures the net profit from the sale, therefore, was either £42,431/6/10 (13.8%) or £50,643/14/6 (16.5%); costs being £307,088/12/4. These figures do not include goods sent to Mexico, consigned to various individuals and remaining unsold and unaccounted for. If the value of these goods were considered as part of the profit the net profit for the voyage would have been as high as 78% on the investment. Unfortunately it is unknown exactly how much was returned to the Company. It is also unknown how much was paid to Philip V for his share of the profit.

Privately owned money and goods in addition to Company property were returned on the Elizabeth. Catlin Thorowgood carried a valuable personal cargo on the vessel which was tied up in litigation with the Company for years. A considerable amount of effects belonging to the governor of Vera Cruz was also returned. The Company was quite willing to carry Spanish passengers and cargo (A Company director said that they would "on all Occasions be very ready to

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10. (continued from previous page)
(£46,188/5/7). Almost certainly these goods were introduced illicitly; they were included in the accounts either by mistake, or with the knowledge that they would not be checked by Spanish officials.
 11. Most of the Elizabeth's cargo was sold prior to the first represalia, although some of the returns of the sale were never received by the Company and became part of a much larger sum in dispute between the two nations throughout the period of the asiento contract.
The account prepared by David Patton of goods from the Elizabeth which were seized in 1718, shows a value of £15,821/6/6. In comparison with prices received prior to the represalia Patton overvalued every item on the list. Based on the known values of earlier sales the figure should have been £10,968/19/6. Furthermore, he included mediocre goods with better quality ones at the higher price. From David Patton et al, 13 January 1721, AGI, Contaduría 266; Account of sales made in Vera Cruz to 19 November 1717, compiled by John Read, 14 October 1733, AGI, Contaduría 266; Bill of lading of the Elizabeth, 15 June 1715, AGI, Contaduría 266.
 12. Account of the Elizabeth, 1715, AGI, Contaduría 266; Trade for the first five years to 30 April 1722, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 652; Viaje a la Vera Cruz por la Yzabel, Capt. Vincent, 1715, AGI, Contaduría 266.

do any Service that Lyes in their Power to the Spaniards".), although it was contrary to the terms of the asiento treaty.¹³

When Thomas Geraldino analysed the Elizabeth's accounts he said that the gross returns from the trip should not include the amount seized (He did not mention the amounts unsold or consigned.), and argued that Philip V's profit from the trip should be 10% of the difference between the £333,795/6/8 return value and the original purchase price (with costs) of the cargo, £226,451/17/9. That would have given a gross profit of £107,343/8/11, with 10% of that due to the king. It does not appear, however, that Philip V ever received this money, and this issue also blended into the general debate over the settlement of the final accounts at the termination of the trade.¹⁴

The presence of the Elizabeth in Vera Cruz, where it arrived on 2 November 1715, was a mixed blessing to the Spanish. Of particular advantage was the availability of good British and European merchandise at prices as much as 30% less than those charged by merchants on the fleet. (The Company paid very little in taxes or duties on goods introduced or on returns.) On the other hand numerous Spanish merchants, including those on the fleets, stored their goods in Company warehouses to avoid the payment of import duties, and then later sold them in league with Company employees to avoid the payment of the alcabala. As noted elsewhere, Spaniards often placed their returns on Company ships to avoid paying export duties and higher shipping charges.

Mexican merchants had ambiguous feelings about the South Sea Company's license and annual ships, because goods from these ships were usually sold at the fairs, where traditionally high prices prevailed. In 1713 they announced their opposition to the revival of the flotas. During the War of the Spanish Succession they had grown accustomed to a certain independence, and to the

13. Ury to Vera Cruz factors, 11 February 1716, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 23.

14. Account of the Elizabeth's trip to Vera Cruz by Captain Vincent, made up in London by John Read on 14 October 1733, AGI, Contaduría 266; "Observations on the accounts of the annual ship [sic] Elizabeth by Thomas Geraldino", c. 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790.

lower prices for goods on the Manila galleons and from contraband traders. However they soon discovered the advantages offered by dealing with the Company.

What was a blessing to many Spanish merchants and private citizens was prejudicial to the comercio of Cadiz and to the crown's revenue, particularly as represented by the alcabala, "the principal rent that I have in those vast dominions", Philip V said in 1722. The factors who arrived on the Elizabeth claimed that their license authorized them to sell Company goods duty free in the interior, just as on the coast. The consulado of Mexico rejected this contention, and ruled that Company merchandise "interned" was liable to the payment of the alcabala. Otherwise the income of the viceroyalty would be lowered dramatically, with the added danger that it would be further reduced because Spanish merchants would combine their goods with those of the Company (which did happen, as noted above) to avoid the tax. Although the principal purpose of the decision was to maintain the royal income, it also had the function of combating unfair competition by raising the price of Company goods, and of protecting the trade of certain Mexican merchants and royal officials.¹⁵

The factors paid the tax and the dispute was referred to Spain; on 22 January 1717 the junta del asiento de negros ruled in favour of the consulado. The Company later claimed a refund, though without success. This issue was revived later when the Company requested permits for their annual ships to sail to New Spain.¹⁶

The financial accounts of the Bedford's voyage must be compiled from a variety of general accounts dating, for the most part, from the 1730s. The

15. Walker, "Galeones and Flotas", pp. 129-130, 137; Real cédula, 28 November 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; López Pintado to Duran, 15 February 1716, AGI, México 854.
16. Bateman and Shephard to the crown, 24 September 1718, BM, Add. 25,555, ff. 91-92; Anon., Farther Considerations on the Present State of Affairs, at Home and Abroad, as affected by the Late Convention, in a Letter to the Minister....(London, c. 1718), p. 53; Walker, op. cit., pp. 113, 117-118.

original invoice shows the cost of the cargo as £143,525/15/9, considerably less than for the cargo of the Elizabeth; an additional £4,459/16/- was spent on miscellaneous expenses, including a gratuity of £2,080/10/- paid to the officers of the Elizabeth, Bedford and Warwick.¹⁷

The difficulties and delays experienced in the departures of the two license ships were nothing in comparison to the contretemps suffered by the Bedford after its arrival in Cartagena early in 1716. The ship was no exception to the general rule that Company vessels were invariably involved in legal disputes over their cargoes on their arrival at Spanish ports in the West Indies. When the royal officials proceeded to the Bedford's visita they noticed immediately that it was so heavily loaded that pipas of aguardiente weighing nine tons had to be stored on deck because there was no room in the bodega. (That the vessel was carrying aguardiente is proof that it had stopped somewhere en route from England to take on additional cargo.) Using the regulations for measuring vessels as fixed by the Casa de Contratación, they found the cargo to weigh an amazing 2,117 1/3 tons, far in excess of the allowable 600, and confiscated 1,517 1/3 tons, including 545 tons of iron which the factors claimed was intended for sale in Jamaica. Next they collected a bond from the factors on the remaining 600 tons while they awaited Philip V's decision on whether or not that should also be confiscated, and informed the king that they planned to sell the confiscated goods on the royal account; after deducting royal duties they intended to give 2/3 to the real cámara because there was no denunciador and 1/3 to the judges. The factors stopped the sale, but only by the timely appointment of a pliable Spaniard friendly to the Company as juez conservador, and, according to the directors, by paying "an Excessive sum of money" that was extorted from them to short measure the Bedford's cargo. The sum was an incredible 75,000 pesos (£26,875) in money

17. Minute court of directors, 31 July 1717, BM, Add. 25,497, f. 55; Receipts and payments on account of the asiento trade to 30 July 1722, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 644; General cash account of receipts and payments on account on the Company's trade from the beginning to 1 May 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 11.

and gifts, which is a firm indication that there was indeed an excessive amount of cargo.¹⁸

Walker suggests that the bribe was given by the Company because the seizure had become a diplomatic issue with Spain. Yet at this time Philip V was making every effort to please the Company. The bribe was, in fact, a local matter between royal officials and the factors, although it was perhaps given with the approval of the directors. During negotiations in Soissons in 1728 Company representatives said that the Company had lost 74,000 pesos in the sale of the Bedford's cargo. But there was no such loss on the books; the Company was merely trying to recoup the money spent on the bribe.¹⁹

When the directors learned of the seizure they told the Spanish minister in London, the Marquis of Monteleón, that there was not a vessel afloat that could carry 2,000 tons of cargo, and offered documents to support their claim that the ship weighed 1,073 62/94 tons, but that it was only carrying 538 tons of merchandise. They also ordered their agent in Madrid, Thomas Bowles, to withhold money owed to the Spanish from asiento business unrelated to the license ships until the question was resolved. This infuriated the British ambassador, George Bubb, who pointed out that the two license ships were not even part of the asiento treaty, and that the royal officials involved had acted on their own volition without the knowledge of the Spanish court. The delay in making these payments, he added, was making many powerful enemies in Spain.²⁰

The directors asked the British government to intervene in their behalf

18. Philip V to Serrano, 31 May 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776; Committee of correspondence to Cartagena factors, 6 June 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 32; Bateman and Shephard to the crown, 24 September 1718, BM, Add. 25,555, f. 91; Cadiz merchant to London merchant, 10 March 1729, PRO, S.P. 36/10, part ii, f. 136; Walker, op. cit., p. 115.
19. Plowes to Barranechea, 30 September 1728, AGS, Estado 6876; Walker, op. cit.
20. Bubb to Methuen, 21 September 1716, BM, Eg. 2172, f. 354; Bubb to Methuen, 12 October 1716, BM, Eg. 2173, f. 53; Monteleón to governor of Cartagena, 6 September 1716, BM, Add. 25,562, f. 63; Charles Wager et al certificate, 24 August 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800; Committee of correspondence to Bubb, 28 March 1717, BM, Eg. 2174, f. 87.

before the textiles on the Bedford were destroyed by moths and rot. They also enlisted Monteleón's support; the ambassador wrote to the governor of Cartagena to suggest that an error must have been made and enclosed the measurement of the ship and cargo as it was prior to its departure. The result, he said, could be most harmful to relations between the two crowns.

Representations were made to Philip V, and the sale of the excess cargo was suspended while the dispute was investigated, although the factors were allowed to sell the goods under bond. Between 21 March 1716 and 31 March 1717 they received 174,754 pesos (approximately £62,620) in sales.

In a cédula dated 12 November 1716 the king reprimanded the royal officials of Cartagena for making the factors pay a security, and ordered them to release the ship and to remeasure its cargo on the basis of 22½ quintales per ton for iron and 16 for mixed goods, which in fact did not conform to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1716, although it was only slightly unfavourable to the Company. Several months later, on 24 May 1717, he also ordered the commander of the flota, Antonio Serrano, to remeasure the ship. One of the reasons the king acted so promptly in the Company's interest was that it was also in his own. He rebuked the royal officials, saying that they "had done great mischief, not least of all to the [South Sea] Company in which I am a 10% partner".

The seizure of the Bedford's cargo was actually legal, and based on existing instructions on the visitas of arriving ships, both Spanish and foreign. However as one Spanish minister remarked, they had "proceeded without intelligence".²¹

21. Bubb to Methuen, 9 November 1716, BM, Eg. 2173, f. 114; Real orden to Serrano, 24 May 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Real cédula to Cartagena royal officials, 12 November 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2775; Directors to Methuen, 31 August 1716, BM, Add. 25,555, f. 53; Monteleón to governor of Cartagena, 6 September 1716, BM, Eg. 2170, f. 306; Directors to Bubb, 7 September 1716, BM, Eg. 2172, ff. 274-278; Methuen to Bubb, 10 September 1716, PRO, S.P. 104/136; Estimate of damages caused by Spanish officials, n.d., 1735, AGS, Estado 7017; Brown, "The South Sea Company", p. 668; Walker, op. cit., pp. 114-116; True declaration by Matthew Plowes, 18 March 1729, AGS, Estado 7017; Cadiz merchant to London merchant, 10 March 1729, PRO, S.P. 36/10, part ii, f. 137; Pes to Grimaldo, 9 August 1721, AGS, Estado 6851.

One of the principal causes of long-term controversy between the South Sea Company and Spain was over the measurement of the licensed and annual ships. The directors managed to insert an article into the asiento treaty of 1716 (negotiated by George Bubb, see above p. 67) that defined a ton as equal to two Malaga pipas, and the weight of 20 quintales (technically 2,000 pounds). They wanted the cargoes of their merchant vessels measured by weight rather than volume, since the goods, mainly textiles, were light.

Bubb was disturbed by the article. While a ton of 2,000 pounds was commonly used both in England and Spain, it did not conform to regulations adopted by the Casa de Contratación in Seville for measuring Spanish merchant ships. Furthermore he noted that there were two types of Malaga pipas with a difference between them of about 20% in weight.

The treaty was ratified by both crowns, in spite of the article. Bubb said that it had passed unnoticed mainly because of his

having the good Luck to keep it out of the way of any Body the least versed in the Commerce of the Indies; Otherwise it wou'd not only have been difficult but impracticable; being directly contrary to the known Laws of Spain:.....

Bubb knew that there were bound to be problems. The Casa de Contratación determined the rules, he said, "nor do I believe the officers of this Crown in the Indies, know, or are capable of going by any other Rule.... I wish with all my Heart when it comes to be tryed, it may prove otherwise."²²

The Council of the Indies resolved on 31 October 1716 that the entire cargo

22. Monteleón to Grimaldo, 2 July 1716, AGS, Estado 6835; Discussion of license ships, n.d., unsigned, AGS, Estado 6829; Bubb to Stanhope, 18 July 1716, PRO, S.P. 94/85, f. 200; Bubb to directors, 4 August 1716, BM, Eg. 2172, f. 177.

Another reason for controversy in weighing the cargoes of Company ships was the use of different units of measurement by the British and the Spanish. For example a common unit of measurement in Spain was the vara, 48 Spanish inches but only 32½ English; the codo, a basic unit for measuring ships there, equalled 22 9,166/10,000 English inches. Another common unit, the palmo, equalled 8½ English inches. Consequently ships' measurements had to be translated from feet and inches to codos and Spanish inches. Furthermore, measuring ships itself was extremely intricate, whether in Spain or England, with the ship's length, keel, breadth, depth of hold, beam, poop and prow all being measured in the process, the results forming the component parts of complex mathematical formulas.

of the Bedford should be restored to the Company. Surprisingly, the offer was refused by Bubb, who said that the cargo ought to be remeasured, and any tonnage in excess of 600 confiscated. He explained his unusual action: "This I did both because I am sure, that there is no Excess of that Measure, & if we begin by cheating & robbing these People we shall never settle anything here that will last."²³

In July 1717 the Company directors learned that the Bedford's cargo had been released, but they were unaware that permission had not yet been given to transport it to Portobelo. The Company's intention had been to sell part of the cargo in Cartagena and the bulk of it in Portobelo, Royal officials in Cartagena, however, insisted that the entire cargo be sold there, contending--correctly--that the ship's license allowed it to visit Cartagena or Portobelo, but not both. The directors realized that they had misinterpreted the license, but they continued to press for permission to send the cargo to Portobelo.²⁴ In fact, the governor of Panama had already given that permission to the factors in Cartagena. He also consented to their increasing the tonnage of the Bedford's cargo to 600 tons; when the cargo was remeasured in Cartagena it was found to have dwindled to only 444 3/4 tons! Another cédula, dated 7 December 1717, gave permission to sell the remaining cargo in Portobelo, although it was not until 28 June 1718 that H.M.S. Diamond arrived in Cartagena to escort the London there with the cargo.²⁵

The long delay proved to be unfortunate for the Company. War broke out

23. Monteleón to governor of Cartagena, 12 September 1716, BM, Add. 25,562, f. 64; Bubb to Stair, 19 November 1716, BM, Eg. 2173, f. 142.
24. Directors to Uzardi, 31 July 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 66; Directors to Jamaica agents, 12 July 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 54.
25. The Diamond's captain refused to allow his ship to be inspected on arrival, an almost certain sign that it was carrying contraband.
Real cédula to Cartagena royal officials, 7 December 1717, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Royal officials to Philip V, 31 March 1719, AGI, Santa Fe 451; Directors to Lords Commissions for Lord High Admiral, 14 February 1717, BM, Add. 25,555, f. 83; Committee of correspondence to Bowles, 3 October 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 69.

on 13 December 1718 and all Company goods, including cargo from the Bedford worth 408,435 pesos 2½ reales (£91,897/18/10), were seized in the represalia in Panama.²⁶

The Bedford's cargo was sold over a period of several years and returns were made on several ships. The accounts of the voyage were not settled until 1727; the sparse records available then were incomplete and unbalanced and, according to Company directors, no journal had been kept for the cargo. Existing records were not analysed until years later. Also, as much as 1,672 7/12 tons (1,517 1/3 brought in excess to Cartagena, plus 155 3/12 tons allowed by the president of Panama to bring the cargo up to the "allowable" 600) of merchandise were sold illegally, and for this no accounts are available. However if the ratio of sale prices is the same between the legal and illegal sales, the 1,517 1/3 tons should have brought 2,418,558 pesos (£544,176).²⁷

Table III

Financial Details of the Bedford's Voyage²⁸Expenses

Cargo ²⁹	£144,301/3/8
Gratuities to the crew of the <u>Bedford</u>	
Thomas Lyell (captain)	500
To the ship's officers	75
To the ship's sailors (approximately £3 each)	122
Freight, insurance, commission at 1½%	23,527/3/-
Expenses of transporting remaining cargo to Portobelo on the <u>London</u>	3,564/15/-
Interest for three years to December 1718 at 5%	25,240/14/1
Duty on iron shipped from Cartagena to London (75 tons plus 69 barrels and 16 boxes of iron ornaments)	12/-/7½
Freight and labour charges	29/7/5½
	<hr/>
	197,372/3/10

Table IV

Sale Returns

Sale of goods in Cartagena (537,282 pesos 7½ reales), At Cartagena by supercargoes of <u>Royal George</u> (10,592 pesos 2 reales)	£120,888/15/-
Miscellaneous sales (271 pesos 7 reales)	2,383/5/1½
Reprisaledgoods sold in Panama (408,435 pesos 2½ reales)	61/3/5
Reprisaledgoods returned to factors in Panama (110,375 pesos 7 reales)	91,897/18/10
	24,834/12/-
	<hr/>
	£240,063/14/4½

Thus counting reprisaled goods returned to the factors in Panama after the war, the legal profit on the voyage of the Bedford was £42,691/10/6½ (21.6%). However Philip V was paid only £3,695/16/4, somewhat less than the 10% due to him as his share of the profit. He was probably charged interest as was done at other factories.³⁰

The two special license ships sent to America by the South Sea Company were not annual ships as defined by the asiento treaty, but for all practical purposes their effect on the West Indies trade was the same. (See chapter IX, "The Annual Ships") They were instruments for the massive introduction of legal and contraband goods. Procedures were developed for the introduction of goods from the annual ships, and relations established with Spanish merchants and officials that proved to be profitable for those directly involved in the Company's trade—if perhaps not for the Company's stockholders or for the Spanish crown. Pressure by Company directors for privileged treatment for the two license ships was matched by a permissive attitude on the part of the crown, especially notable in the lax handling of the question of the excess cargo on the Bedford.

It is impossible to say exactly what effect the trade of the Company's license ships had on other British and foreign merchants in the West Indies.

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26. For details of this, the first, represalia, see chapter V. Badillo to Philip V, 30 July 1720, AGI, Contaduría 1486.
 27. Directors to Rigby and Johnson, 6 September 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 75; Smith to Geraldino, 13 January 1733, AGS, Estado 7010; General cash account of receipts and payments on trade from its beginning to 1 May 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 11; Undated accounts, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 15.
 28. From Thompson, Pratter and Haselwood, 5 October 1716, AGI, Contaduría 266; Account signed by John Read, 27 October 1733, for June 1717, AGI, Contaduría 266; Account of the Bedford compiled by John Read, 1 August 1728, AGS, Estado 7017; From Thomas Geraldino, 21 November 1733, AGI, Contaduría 266.
 29. These figures do not include expenses at Portobelo.
 30. General account of the asiento trade from its beginning to 1 November 1739, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 497.

However the cries of anguish from Jamaica traders are eloquent testimony to their fear of such competition, and probably of the damage actually caused to their trading activities. The market for goods in Spanish America was more limited than anyone imagined, and easily glutted, in spite of long periods of shortage caused by war and by Spain's archaic economic policy, thus the considerable merchandise carried by the two license ships almost certainly hurt Spanish and private British merchants alike.

Chapter V

The First Reprisalia, 1718

Spanish officials in America were advised by a real orden of 14 September 1718 of the outbreak of war with Britain, and instructed to seize all effects belonging to the South Sea Company and to other British subjects. Consequently Company books relating to the trade were seized, as were ships, unsold slaves, supplies, promissory notes, food and furniture, and even the factors' personal effects. Inventories of embargoed goods were made by the officials and signed by the factors, but the originals of most of these have been lost. For example no books were ever found for the period November 1717 - November 1722 at Vera Cruz. However in several cases the factors had been forewarned of the pending war and had sent their account books to Jamaica. Other factors hid their books or left them with Spanish friends or sympathetic local merchants during the war. It was to their advantage, and even more so to their customers, to hide the accounts from royal officials because they included sales of contraband goods and contracts with Spanish merchants which had been kept secret to avoid the payment of taxes. The extent of these frauds can be surmised by the care taken by the factors to keep their books out of Spanish hands.

Incomplete though this data is, it is valuable in helping to provide a quantitative estimate of the British stake in Spanish America at this time. It represents minimum figures only on the asiento trade. And remembering that there was a considerable unrecorded contraband, and the reexport trade via Cadiz, the data suggests the extent of the British presence in the supposedly impenetrable Spanish empire.

At the time of the seizure the factors were given the choice of being sent inland (so that they could have no contact with British ships) or to Spain. It is unknown what choice most of them made, although a number of them were actually sent to Jamaica, and at least one factor in Panama and Portobelo

escaped custody and returned to England.¹

Most Company effects seized during the first represalia were either sold by royal officials in the Indies or remitted to Spain and sold there. The confiscated property was used to help satisfy the basic needs of empire, although much of it was used to maintain the factors and unsold slaves, and to pay various legal fees and expenses. Governor Geronimo Badillo, on the advice of the junta de guerra in Panama, spent 726,702 ^{2 reales} pesos/seized at the factory to repair the dilapidated fortifications, purchase ammunition and other supplies, and to feed the troops, who had been "dying of hunger." Badillo had orders to repair the forts to defend against a possible enemy invasion, and the only money available was that seized from the South Sea Company. (For details of the represalia in Portobelo and Panama see below, p. 92) Had the British attacked Portobelo at the beginning of the war, according to the junta, they would have met no resistance whatsoever.²

Several of the original inventories of the goods seized in the represalia of 1718 are missing or lost, making it difficult to arrive at the truth concerning the widely varied inventories presented later by the Spanish and the Company. To add to the confusion, Company effects were restored in installments and from different places after the war. Nonetheless accurate figures are available for several factories. At Santo Domingo the Industry, a 170 ton ship commanded by Captain Charles Bayes, was seized. The vessel was under contract to agents in Barbados to deliver slaves to various ports, including Santa Marta. It had visited several prior to arriving in Santo Domingo, and so was not fully loaded. Royal officials seized and sold 17

1. Memo from Burrell, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 1; Real orden to all royal officials in the West Indies, 14 September 1718, AGI, Contaduría 1486; Directors to Craggs, 20 March 1719, BM, Add. 25,555, f. 107; Lizeaga to Philip V, 6 May 1719, AGI, Contaduría 895; Badillo to Philip V, 30 July 1720, AGI, Contaduría 1486; de Studer, La Trata, p. 205.

2. Badillo to Philip V, 30 July 1720, AGI, Panama 128; Panama junta de guerra, 14 December 1718, AGI, Panama 128; Panama junta de hacienda, 15 December 1718, AGI, Panama 128; Badillo to Philip V, 30 July 1720, AGI, Contaduría 1486.

slaves, 90 barrels of flour and 20 of butter, as well as the ship, its fittings and supplies. They brought 5,980 pesos 1 real, with 383 pesos 2 reales of that going for expenses.³

Ten thousand pesos were seized in Santa Marta. It is uncertain if this represents cash seized or money acquired from the sale of effects. However there was no factory there, suggesting that a Company ship and its cargo were seized and then sold.⁴

Royal officials in Santiago de Cuba seized 50,591 pesos 3 reales in goods and promissory notes, of which 1,457 pesos 4 reales went to expenses. The items seized probably included slaves, factory furniture and supplies and tobacco, which was the main produce exported by the Company from Cuba.⁵

Very few Company effects were confiscated at the other Cuban factory, in Havana. The head factor, Richard Farrell, remitted the books and as much money and effects as possible to Jamaica after receiving orders from the Company to do so in case of war. The value of items seized there was only 24,612 pesos 2 reales, as shown below.

Table I

<u>Item</u>	<u>Valuation (in pesos)</u>
Money owed to the factory recovered from Spanish merchants	8,313-3½
1,493 <u>arrobas</u> of snuff at 15 reales each, and 1,541 at 16 reales each	5,881-3
311½ <u>varas</u> of leaf tobacco at 3 reales per <u>vara</u>	116-6½
256 slaves (206 <u>piezas de india</u>) ⁶	10,300
	<u>24,611-5</u>

3. Dudley Woodbridge license, 26 July 1718, AGI, Contaduría 1068; Testimony, 1 January 1719, AGI, Contaduría 1068; Embargoed goods from Santo Domingo factory, 24 July 1727, AGI, Estado 9, ramo 1.

Pesos rather than pounds sterling are used in this section because almost all correspondence and dealings were in pesos. The exchange rate, however, can be considered to have been 4/6 (54 pence) per peso.

4. Account of the first represalia, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 1507.

5. An Account of What Remains Due from the king of Spain to the Company, 20 February 1727, BM, Add. 25,560, f. 70.

6. The low valuation on the slaves (about 40 pesos 2 reales each) was undoubtedly arrived at to keep as low as possible the amount to be returned after the war.

The cost of the seizure and maintaining the factors during the war was 10,233 pesos 1 real, leaving a net of 14,480 pesos 2½ reales. The Company made additional claims after the war, but they were either unrelated to the represalia or cannot be substantiated. They include 16,000 pesos which royal officials had embargoed in 1715 from the French Guinea Company in the name of the South Sea Company.⁷

The seizure in Cartagena, as in Havana, occurred in December 1718, and included:

Table II

<u>Item</u>	<u>Valuation (in pesos)</u>
Various Company papers and documents	-
Effects and negroes sold (including 5,000 pesos received from the sale of 20 negroes seized in Puerto Rico)	94,000
Merchandise sold to Spanish merchants	40,000
Collected from merchants indebted to the Company	30,000
Fine cloth and miscellaneous textiles sold	20,000
Pesos	2,000
Negroes indulted and sold during the war	1,000
	<u>187,000</u>

A Company boat was also seized in Cartagena, but it is unknown if it was sold. An unspecified amount of additional effects were seized during the war, or sold later than the effects described above, with the amount being restored to the Company after the war being greater than that shown in the accounts of the initial represalia. This probably consisted primarily of further debts collected from Spanish merchants. Of the amount seized, royal officials spent 28,057 pesos 6¼ reales on the garrison in Cartagena. The Company claimed later that this sum was never repaid.

7. General Account of the Represalia, 1718, AGI, Contaduría 266; State of the Represalia, 1718-1719, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 695; An Account of what Remains Due from the king of Spain to the Company, 20 February 1727, BM, Add. 25,560, f. 70; Guarzo Calderon to Philip V, 20 February 1719, AGI, Contaduría 1170.

That Company claims were inaccurate is well demonstrated by their demand made after the war that 4,549 pesos worth of tobacco be returned. This is 1,448 pesos 1½ reales less than Spanish records indicate. Account of seizures, n.d., unsigned, AGS, Estado 6850.

The Company said that goods and debts worth either 240,918 or 244,370 pesos (depending on which account is consulted) were seized in Cartagena. They claimed this and a further 16,141 pesos taken from the French Guinea Company, 5,000 pesos seized and sold in Puerto Rico, and an extraordinary 113,394 pesos for miscellaneous expenses and "sundries". This gives a total of either 375,453 or 378,905 pesos. The sum is excessive, particularly the claim for expenses, for which the Company furnished no vouchers or proof.⁸

The represalia in Buenos Aires was haphazard. The original inventory omitted many details on quantities, weights, sizes and value, resulting in predictable difficulties later. Effects and promissory notes seized, and money acquired from their sale:

Table III

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u> <u>(in pesos)</u>
Negroes sold	60,088
Household furniture and provisions	60,000
Negroes and effects sold in Santiago de Chile and Potosi	56,920
Hides (The price of hides at this time was about 12 reales each, making the number seized about 10,400)	15,575
Debts collected from Spanish merchants	13,100
Silver	98
	<hr/> 205,781

Two Company ships were also seized, one measuring 15-20 tons and the other 200. The smaller was probably a launch kept for factory use; the larger was a Guinea ship, the Arabella, which was sent to Cadiz in 1721 with a cargo of 5,000 hides, the proceeds from the sale of its cargo of slaves. The king decreed that the cargo and ship belonged to him. It was sold and an unspecified amount applied to the royal treasury.

After the war, when the Company tried to determine what had been seized

8. Cartagena governor and royal officials to Philip V, 20 July 1719, AGI, Contaduría 1437; State of the First Represalia, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 659; An Account of What Remains due from the king of Spain to the Company, 20 February 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/5, part ii; Bertodano to Duran, 25 October 1719, AGI, Contaduría 1086; To governor of Cartagena, 28 August 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776; Testimony by Diego Ruiz de Villegas, 18 March 1721, AGI, Contratación 5144.

in Buenos Aires they did not have reference to the Spanish inventory. Consequently--and this was typical at several factories--they claimed only 155,482 pesos, 24.4% less than the Spanish figure of 205,781 pesos! However the Company greatly exaggerated peripheral demands. They claimed 95,849 pesos for factory expenses during the war, 7,320 pesos for damage to hides which had remained in the hold of a Company ship throughout the war, and 10,000 pesos in compensation for farm land which should have been, but was not, assigned to the factory by the terms of article ix of the asiento contract. Added to the 155,482 pesos, this gives a total Company claim of 268,551 pesos.⁹

The represalia at Panama and Portobelo, which occurred in December 1718 as it did at most other factories, was by far the most important in quantity of effects seized. It is also the only factory for which we have a complete inventory of the goods embargoed.¹⁰) All Company effects, except weapons, ammunition and other items which could be used in the presidios, were sold at public auction. The included:

Table IV

<u>Item</u>	<u>Value or Sale Price (in pesos)</u>
Money	233,908
Merchandise (mainly textiles), about half from the license ship <u>Bedford</u>	841,619
42 slaves seized in Panama and sold for 325 pesos each	13,650
160 ton ship with eight cannons seized at Portobelo	5,000
Another ship seized at Portobelo	2,000
	<hr/>
	1,075,527

Governor Badillo spent 726,702 pesos 2 reales (67.5% of the total seized)

of this, primarily on defence, as follows:

Table V

<u>Year</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (pesos)</u>
1718	For miscellaneous expenses	23,800
1719	For the infantry, repair of the walls, and on a candle factory	151,151-7
1720	General defence expenses	191,070
1721	General defence expenses	125,107
1722	Infantry salaries	95,598-3 ¹¹
		<hr/>
		586,727-2

Again the Company accounts for the represalia are less accurate than the Spanish, because they lacked access to the Spanish inventory. They claimed only 781,879 pesos for goods and promissory notes, although they brought the total figure to 999,158 pesos 3 reales by making various other claims, mostly unrelated to the represalia. These included:

Table VI

<u>Item</u>	<u>Valuation (in pesos)</u>
Expenses incurred relating to the seizure	42,850
Money lost or embezzled during the war	43,000
Claims against the French Guinea Company	76,158
110 slaves introduced by a Spanish merchant during the war who were seized and sold by royal officials	30,000
Sundry items delivered to royal officials	8,951-6½
80 Company slaves sold by royal officials	16,318
	<u>217,278-6½</u> ¹²

Orders to seize the factory goods reached Vera Cruz on 3 January 1719.

They included instructions to make a detailed inventory (in the presence of a Company factor) of everything seized, and to place Company employees under guard, with provisions—taken from those embargoed—distributed to them on the basis of rank. However the factors' request for six pipas of rum and six of wine brought to Vera Cruz on the Herbert (See next page.), and for provisions

9. From Stanhope, 24 April 1721, AGS, Estado 6851; Gonzalo Machado and Gonzalo Vaquedano to Pes, 18 April 1721, AGI, Contaduría 1880; An Account of What Remains due from the king of Spain to the Company, 20 February 1728, BM, Add. 25,560, f. 69.
10. Upon making the seizure Governor Badillo issued an edict warning all Spanish subjects that they had two days in which to turn in any goods the Company factors might have hidden with them before war broke out. The penalty for not doing so was a fine of 2,000 pesos.
11. Many soldiers did not receive their pay, which led to an unsuccessful mutiny when it was reported that they had been. López Molero to Morzillo, 26 September 1722, AGI, Panama 127.
12. Badillo to Philip V, 30 July 1720, AGI, Contaduría 1486; Philip V to governor of Panama, 30 November 1719, AGI, Contaduría 1486; Badillo and royal officials to Philip V, 19 October 1723, AGI, Panama 143; Account of reprisaled goods at Panama and Portobelo, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 1507; Uamas to Philip V, 21 December 1718, AGI, Contaduría 1486; An Account of what Remains due from the king of Spain to the Company, 20 February 1728, BM, Add. 25,560, f. 70; State of the first Represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 659.

brought by the Neptune, was denied. Although a guard was placed promptly on the factory and on the two Company ships in port, few Company books or papers were found. The factors, who were imprisoned for a short time because they refused to surrender the keys to the Company warehouses, claimed they were sent to England on the annual ship Royal Prince after they had learned of hostilities between the two crowns. The royal officials doubted their story and kept pressing for the accounts, even threatening the factors with some unnamed punishment. They eventually discovered that Company books and effects had been hidden by one Pedro Primo de Rivera, but a search of his house revealed nothing. However a considerable amount of Company effects were seized in Jesuit and Franciscan warehouses.

Company property seized in Vera Cruz and Mexico included slaves, considerable merchandise from the annual ship Elizabeth and two other ships, the Neptune (Captain Alexander Gordon), which brought 30 slaves and supplies from Jamaica, and the "canary" ship Herbert (Captain David Grenhill) with wine and rum from the Canary Islands.¹³ Article xxxvi of the asiento contract granted to the Company the privilege of sending a 300 ton ship to the Canary Islands one time only for a cargo of rum and wine.¹⁴ The Herbert had a cargo of 300 pipas of rum and 150 of wine. If these pipas were standard malaga pipas (two to the ton), then the ship was carrying 225 tons. However the term covers a wide variety of sizes, so it is uncertain how much the Herbert was actually carrying. The value of the cargo was estimated by royal officials at 87,000 pesos (on which by the terms of the treaty a duty of 12%, or 10,440 pesos, was due). Thus the value of each pipa was 193 pesos 2½ reales, which corresponds to the value of a pipa of rum seized from the Company ship Royal George in August 1720, which sold for 192 pesos 4 reales. This suggests that

13. The Herbert arrived in Vera Cruz only two months before the arrival of the order to seize British goods. Why the ship was sent so late is inexplicable.

14. The same privilege was granted to Portuguese asentistas in 1697.

a pipa of uniform size was used by the Company.

A summary of goods seized and evaluations placed on them was made by Spanish officials.

Table VII

<u>Item</u>	<u>Valuation (in pesos)</u>
Goods delivered to J. M. Carter and Pedro de Rivera to sell, probably in Oaxaca	170,739-4
Goods taken from the store of Juan de las Puente	20,250-4-3
Rum and wine on the <u>Herbert</u>	63,207
For seizures at Campeche	1,251-6
Goods contracted with Matheo Gonzales de Casio to sell	54,008
Goods contracted with Martin de Gaycochea to sell	90,000
Unknown number of slaves	9,987-6-6
41 slaves at 250 each (These men were probably taken for work on military installations.)	10,250
Two boats	15,000
Tackle, rigging, ropes, canvasses and litters	22,800
Goods in Company warehouses ¹⁵	312,000
	<u>767,494-4-9</u>

In addition to the above items a large quantity of money, flax and indigo were seized and shipped to Cadiz on two fleets (after the war had already ended): the one commanded by Balthazar de Guevara in August 1719, and another following commanded by Fernando Chacon.

Table VIII

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity (in pounds)</u>	<u>Valuation (in pesos)</u>
Bullion		183,368-6-11½
Flax	59,765 2 oz.	
Indigo (<u>tinta flor</u>)	76,707	
Indigo (<u>tinta sobresaliente</u>)	346,111 8 oz.	495,436-4-7½ ¹⁶
Indigo (<u>tinta corte</u>)	179,164 8 oz.	
		<u>678,805-2-19</u>

The cost of shipping the above items to Spain was 56,671 pesos 1 real 2 maravedis, or 11% of the value of the cargo, and was calculated as follows:

-
15. The effects in the storehouses consisted mainly of unsold woolens from the annual ship Elizabeth. It was estimated that these goods would be worth 80,000 - 100,000 pesos more if there were no flota in 1719, and if they were sold before being destroyed by weather and poor storage conditions.
16. This is the valuation made by Spanish officials when they restored the indigo to the Company; it also probably includes the value of the flax.

Table IX

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u> <u>(in pesos)</u>
Freight charges	19,806-4
Insurance at 7%	35,476-4-31
Unloading, transport to warehouses and miscellaneous expenses	1,387-7-9

The total valuation of effects seized in Vera Cruz and Mexico was 1,262,931 pesos 6 reales 28 maravedis. This does not include the 183,368 pesos 6 reales 11½ maravedis shipped on the two fleets, which was probably money received from the sale of embargoed goods, although it may have been money in factory safes.

Slightly over half of the Company goods seized in Mexico and Vera Cruz were sold at public auction, bringing 396,139 pesos 4 reales 5 maravedis, with a commission paid of 6,516 pesos 2 reales 4 maravedis. This includes 170,328 pesos 7 reales 16 maravedis worth of unspecified goods to merchants, 152,331 pesos 2 reales 7 maravedis worth of goods sent to Mexico and sold there, and 74,479 pesos 1 real 6 maravedis received from individuals who owed the Company money. The two ships were placed in Spanish service, the Herbert probably as a guardacosta, and the Neptune with the armada de barlovento. The South Sea Company paid the owners of the Herbert £5,000 for their loss and later demanded slightly more than this sum from the Spanish in repayment.¹⁷

A dispute erupted over the sale of Company effects seized in Vera Cruz.

17. Account of Company goods sold by royal officials, 15 June 1722, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 198A; Unsigned paper on Vera Cruz seizure, n.d., AGS, Estado 6851; To Pozobueno, 3 February 1721, AGS, Estado 6849; Lizeaga to Philip V, 6, 15 and 18 May 1719 and 20 August 1720, AGI, Contaduría 895; Lizeaga and Messia to Philip V, 6 May 1719, AGI, Contaduría 895; Real cédula to the Marquis of Valero, 23 October 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1601; Stanhope to Craggs, 20 January 1721, BM, Add. 22,520, f. 12; Duran to Valero, 23 September 1718, AGI, Contaduría 812; From Charles Read, 16 and 17 January 1719, AGI, Contaduría 812; Account of goods seized in a Jesuit warehouse, 7 January 1719, AGI, Contaduría 812; Decretos by royal officials, 17 and 19 January 1719, AGI, Contaduría 812; From Company factors, c. 15 January 1719, AGI, Contaduría 812; A Particular of Sundry Effects Seiz'd under the two Represalias, n.d., PRO, S.P. 94/247, f. 318; Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 16 and 31 August 1720, AGI, México 857; Real cédula, 21 May 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Measurement of the Herbert, 16 May 1718, AGI, Contaduría 895; Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 21 and 30 April and 6 May 1721, AGI, México 683; Grenhill to Stanhope, 31 December 1720, AGS, Estado 6851.

It was the king's intention that they be auctioned where the seizures occurred. However the viceroy of New Spain, the Marquis of Valero, ordered them to be shipped to Mexico for sale there and in Puebla, explaining the order by saying that the proceeds would be greater. The auditor in Vera Cruz, Andres de Lizeaga, expressed strong disapproval of the plan, citing the high cost of transport which included a 200 man escort, the damage that would occur to the goods en route, and the poor seasonal weather. Lizeaga had no choice but to send the goods, although the Council of the Indies later berated Valero for having made a foolish decision and for having ignored the king's original orders.¹⁸

The indigo that was sent to Spain was given to the king's creditors in lieu of cash at an inflated valuation; according to Stanhope about 20% above the price the Company could have received in the colonies. The creditors accepted this rate, he said, because they feared that they would remain unpaid otherwise. On the other hand, the price of indigo was usually higher in the metropolis because it was only available in the new world. The valuation given to it by the Spanish when they returned it to the Company almost certainly was not the inflated sale price, because the Company's own valuation was considerably less.¹⁹

After the seizure the head factor in Vera Cruz, Charles Read, remained there to assist royal officials in making inventories of goods seized. Most other Company employees, and the crews of the Herbert and Neptune, were sent to Mexico, where they remained for the duration of the war.²⁰ Read and another factor, John Newton, died during the war. Their personal effects were sold

18. From the Marquis of Valero, 16 August 1720, AGI, Contaduría 812; From the Consejo de Indias, 11 March 1721, AGI, Contaduría 812.

19. Stanhope to Craggs, 5 February 1721, BM, Add. 22,520, f. 26. It is uncertain if the restored items were money or indigo of comparable quality.

20. The Spanish spent 1,032 pesos to acquire 63 mules to transport the men and their provisions, personal effects, servants and guards.

at auction and the money returned to Spain with Fernando Chacon.²¹

After the war the Company claimed that between 229,237 and 243,793 pesos in money and effects were seized in Vera Cruz, and that the purchase price of flax and indigo was 861,634 pesos, making a total of between 1,090,871 and 1,105,427 pesos. Again, because of a lack of documentation to support their claim, it seems reasonable to assume that the Spanish figures, which in any case are higher, are more accurate.²²

Based on the above figures, the value of South Sea Company effects, slaves and promissory notes seized during the first represalia was 2,822,524 pesos $\frac{1}{2}$ real. This agrees very closely with the figure of 2,853,021 pesos given in a separate general account which has no breakdown by factory.²³

A contemporary observer gave warning prior to the war that the Company would be "undone" if there was a war and Company effects seized in America, because confidence in the Company had been diminishing and stock prices falling. However the form this undoing took was unexpected. The first represalia occurred just prior to the launching of the scheme that came to be known as the "South Sea Bubble", and which led to the ruin of many prominent English families. The scheme was initiated during the lull in trade caused by the War of 1718 when the Company was reduced to little more than a powerful but inexperienced financial institution. Its experienced sub and deputy directors died early in the war, Bateman in November 1718 and Shephard the following February, and the Company became even more exposed to financial manipulators who had played a large part in its management from the beginning, particularly one John Blunt, a Company director and a self-made, unscrupulous man.

21. Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 2 April 1721, AGI, Contaduría 895; Grenhill to Stanhope, 31 December 1720, AGS, Estado 6851.

22. State of the first represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 659; Cuenta corriente de Vera Cruz y México, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266.

23. Razón de los que importa la represalia de los bienes de los ingleses hecha en Perú y Nueva España, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 1507.

Inspired by John Law's financial exploits in France, particularly his scheme to take over the national debt (a scheme borrowed originally from the South Sea Company's own assumption of part of the government debt at its founding), Blunt concocted a plan to assume the entire British national debt of approximately £50,000,000 (£30,000,000 borrowed from the public at large and £20,000,000 from the East India Company and the Bank of England). Blunt saw the chance to make millions for the Company and fortunes for private investors like himself. Par value of Company stock was £100; he wanted Parliament to authorize the Company to issue £100 of new stock for every £100 of annuity offered to them for conversion. Market value was then £128, but if, for example, it rose to £300, and an individual holding £300 in government securities wanted to convert them into South Sea Company stock, the Company could issue three shares of £100 each. But it would only have to give the creditor one of them, thus leaving two surplus shares which could be sold by the Company for £300 each. Of course everything depended on the stock value rising.

The other directors were excited by Blunt's plan. More important, it received the support of two influential men in government, Charles Spencer, *Earl of Sunderland*, First Lord of the Treasury, and John Aislable, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (both of whom received expensive bribes for their support). The proposal was altered to make it less objectionable to the Bank of England and to the East India Company, with Blunt now proposing that the Company convert only the £30,000,000 that the government owed the public. The Bank still opposed the scheme, and presented a counter proposal to Parliament. After bitter debates (and the distribution by the Company of £1,250,000 in "rewards" to members of Parliament and others, including individuals very close to the Royal Family), the Company plan was incorporated in an Act of Parliament early in the Spring of 1720. In exchange for £7,500,000 to acquire the privilege, the South Sea Company would convert £30,000,000 of the national debt, while the exchequer would pay the Company 5% interest on the new stock. This would be

reduced to 4% in 1724.

Company stock rose very quickly as soon as the public realized that Parliament would probably pass such a bill. To propagandize the scheme rumours were spread that the asiento trade was to be restored and enlarged, that the king of Spain was willing to cede four ports in Peru in exchange for Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and that the South Sea Company were negotiating for trading rights in Africa. High profits made by early investors needed no publicity. The boom, which started in March 1720, lasted for six months. Speculation became a national craze, with everyone wanting a part of the action. Investment was easy and there was great scope for gambling because shares were sold on credit, a concept almost unknown at the time. Furthermore, the entire venture had respectability because it had the support of the government, Parliament and king.

The directors pushed Company shares to over £1,000 by offering a series of attractive subscriptions to the holders of government securities, most of whom converted them into Company stock, and to private investors.²⁴ The boom also effected other joint stock companies, and dozens of new, mostly illegal, "bubble" companies were established and stock jobbing schemes initiated which angered the directors because money was thus diverted that might be invested in the Company. (Even so, by this time the Company had taken in £8,500,000 in cash, and was owed a further £60,000,000, although there may not have been that much money in all of Britain. It had still made no provision to pay the £7,500,000 owed to government.) In June the Company induced the House of Commons to pass a bill to prosecute joint stock companies that did not hold crown charters. Nevertheless money still flowed in considerable sums to important chartered firms. So the directors saw to it that several firms with charters were closed. The stock in these outlawed firms dropped to almost nothing, and since many people who held South Sea Company stock also held stock

24. The king made £86,500 profit at this time by selling shares that he held; in appreciation he awarded Blunt with a baronetcy.

in these other companies, they were forced to sell Company stock to meet their obligations. On 17 August the Company stock was at £900; by 28 September it had fallen to £190. The bubble had burst.

Abuse was heaped upon the king, who many believed was one of the architects of the scheme, and Parliament for having approved of it, but especially on the directors of the South Sea Company, the most obvious scapegoats under the circumstances. The House of Commons treated the directors roughly after Parliament convened in December, but at least they rejected a proposal to have them all executed. The four House members who were Company directors were expelled from Commons, the directors were all forbidden to serve on the board of any major company, and those who held positions under the crown were dismissed. Furthermore the major portion of their estates were confiscated. John Blunt was left only £5,000 of his £185,349 estate, sub-governor Sir John Fellows £10,000 of £243,096, and deputy governor Charles Joye £5,000 of £40,105. John Aislable was expelled from the House and Charles Spencer Sunderland had to relinquish his post, although he was acquitted of charges of corruption.

Sir Robert Walpole became both First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had invested in South Sea Company shares, and had even urged others to do so, but he had opposed the scheme initially in Parliament, and was the only minister looked upon as capable of restoring public confidence. Thus the tasks of cleaning up the mess fell primarily on him. Fortunately the panic had subsided, Britain's foreign trade was sound, and the war with Spain was over. A plan was adopted in 1722 with the cooperation of the Bank of England to redistribute the Company's surplus stock (which amounted to £8,000,000 plus the £2,000,000 taken from the directors) among the stockholders on the basis of £33 for every £100 of capital stock held. Shares were fixed at £400. People who had borrowed money from the Company on the security of their stock could free themselves of obligations by paying 10% of what they owed, and by forfeiting their holdings. The plan was unpopular with the stockholders involved, but the situation returned to normal and the Company

turned its interest back to trade.²⁵

Partly because of their recent great personal losses, it was important after the war that the Company goods seized, or an equivalent value, be restored. Their losses also helps to explain the inclusion in their inventory of padded sums for items only peripherally related--or even unrelated--to the represalia, as well as an increased involvement in illicit trade.²⁶

The war ended officially on 13 June 1721 with the signing of the Treaty of Madrid; by a real cédula dated 16 August Spanish officials in the Indies were ordered to return all goods seized from the South Sea Company. In the case of British effects sold during the war a sum equivalent to their value at the time of the seizure was to be given.²⁷ Implementing these orders completely was impossible because of the inaccuracy or sparcity of records. Proceeds from the sale of Company effects had been used in a variety of ways by royal officials in the Indies, or remitted to Spain where they were used to pay off crown debts and in other unspecified ways. Many unsold effects were damaged or spoiled, slaves aged and dead or ill, and promissory notes uncollectable. Money and goods dribbled back to the Company for the next 17 years, but were never completely restored.

Records relating to the restoration of Company goods are no more complete than those for the represalia. There are no records to indicate what was restored at Santa Marta, Santo Domingo or Puerto Rico, although records for the latter are almost certainly included in those for Cartagena, as they were for

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25. John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (London, 1960), pp. 76, 89-90, 103, 153, 239; Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy 1714-1760 (Oxford, 1962), pp. 176-178; Virginia Cowles, The Great Swindle: The Story of the South Sea Bubble (New York, 1960), pp. 82-83, 86, 88, 92, 94-95, 119-120, 126, 128, 130-132, 138, 141, 151-152, 162-164, 172, 175.
26. Document concerning the estate of a South Sea Company director transferred to his brother and heirs, c. October 1720, Bodleian, Rawl. C.441, f. 118; Thomas to the Duke of Mar, 12 September 1718, HMC Calendar of Stuart Papers, vol. vii, p. 276.
27. Real cédula, 16 August 1721, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Badillo to Philip V, 28 February 1722, AGI, Contaduría 1486; Aguire to Castelar, 2 October 1721, AGI, Caracas 891; Pes to Grimaldo, 5 September, AGS, Estado 6851.

the seizure.

By Spanish accounts 36,665 pesos were returned at Santiago, leaving 14,926 pesos still owed, in comparison to the Company's claim for a further 23,685 pesos. Similar discrepancies exist for all factories, and are explained by the difference in estimates of amounts seized, by Company demands for payment for expenses and interest, and by the inclusion of sums unrelated or only indirectly related to the represalia.

Of the amount seized in Havana a considerable sum, 10,233 pesos 1 real, was allotted to factory maintenance. After the war royal officials restored 9,864 pesos 6½ reales, of which 5,264 pesos 5 reales were in cash, 1,663 pesos 7 reales in effects, and 2,060 pesos 5 reales in factory debts paid by the officials. However the Spanish and the Company agreed that only 14,413 pesos 3½ reales were seized originally. This suggests that the 256 slaves seized there were returned after the war, and explains the high cost of factory maintenance. All but 4,548 pesos 5 reales were accounted for, according to Spanish records, and all but 5,424 pesos 2½ reales according to the British.²⁸

At Cartagena 208,420 pesos were restored or accounted for as follows:

Table X

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u> <u>(in pesos)</u>
Cash paid to the factors for maintenance during the war	6,414-5
Company debts paid by royal officials	6,062-2
For negroes indulted during the war	2,266-5½
Cash restored	193,678-6¼

The amount restored is 28,000 pesos more than that originally seized, or 23,000 if the 5,000 for the slaves seized in Puerto Rico are included. Either further seizures were made during the war, or when the effects were sold they brought more than anticipated. The Spanish said that they repaid all that was owed to the Company; the Company claimed that 35,131 pesos 5 reales 3

28. State of the first represalia, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 659; Part of a general account of the represalia, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266; Governor of Havana to Philip V, 20 March 1722, AGI, Santo Domingo 379.

maravedis were still owed.

The breakdown of the 148,140 pesos 7 reales restored at Buenos Aires is as follows:

Table XI

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
Cash released from Potosi	50,660
Cash from royal officials in Buenos Aires	39,411
From the sale of hides	28,394-5½
Cash released from Santiago de Chile	26,639-4½
Maintenance and various expenses related to the seizure paid to the factors	3,035-5

By this account 57,642 pesos were still owed to the Company. As usual the Company accounts differ. Originally they claimed that 268,651 pesos had been seized in Buenos Aires, but they later reduced this to 148,219 pesos, almost exactly what the Spanish returned. The vast differences in the Company figures indicates the unreliability of their accounts.

Company accounts for the seizure at Panama and Portobelo were equally confused. They originally said that effects worth 999,158 pesos had been seized, but later reduced this to 679,765 pesos 4½ reales. The Spanish inventory placed the figure at 1,175,527 pesos. The amount they said they restored was valued at 158,241 pesos 6 reales.

Table XII

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
Cash	82,422-4
Salaries of clerks and sundry costs of the <u>represalia</u>	26,670
Paid to maintain the factors during the war	22,031-4
Charges to transport seized goods to a warehouse in Panama	20,878
Paid to maintain unsold slaves	3,239-6
Commission of ½% on 600,000 (reference unclear)	3,000

Thus according to the revised Company claim 521,523 pesos 4½ reales were still owed, against a staggering 917,285 pesos 2 reales by Spanish accounts. Most of the money acquired in the sale of Company effects was spent on the kingdom's defenses.

In January 1722 Governor Badillo was ordered to restore this money. Badillo replied that Panama's treasury was empty, but he promised to pay when the money was received from Lima.²⁹

It is difficult to determine how much of the amount seized in Vera Cruz was returned to the Company, primarily because of the indigo that was shipped to Cadiz. However the indigo that was restored was valued at 495,436 pesos 4 reales 7½ maravedis, less the shipping costs of 56,671 pesos 1 real 2 maravedis. The remaining amount due, therefore, should have been 767,494 pesos. The Company claimed 820,589 pesos, but they included the shipping costs of the indigo and 22,222 pesos as their valuation of the Herbert. The Spanish said that they still owed only 501,341 pesos. Because of the lack of supporting documentation it is impossible to explain the discrepancy between the Company claim, the Spanish claim, and the 767,494 pesos which would have been owed if the indigo was returned. The Marquis of Casafuerte was ordered to pay to the South Sea Company the value of the amount sent to Spain, but he replied in November 1723 that the treasury did not have enough money. Consequently the Company turned to Spain for payment.³⁰

The Spanish accounts for the first represalia state that 1,361,641 pesos of 2,862,383 pesos seized were restored, leaving a balance of 1,495,742 owed when trade ended in 1739; the British accounts give 1,479,961 pesos restored, but are imprecise on the amount seized. However if the Spanish figure for seized goods is used then the balance was 1,382,422 pesos. What emerges in reviewing the two accounts is that the Spanish were generally very thorough and accurate in making inventories of effects seized, but that they were extremely reluctant to furnish copies of these inventories to the British.

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29. Philip V to governor of Panama, 10 January 1722, AGI, Panama 116; Panama royal officials to Philip V, 22 February 1722, AGI, Contaduría 1486; Badillo to Philip V, 31 August 1722, AGI, Panama 129; Philip V to Panama royal officials, 21 June 1726, AGI, Panama 116; A State of What Remains due to the South Sea Company from Philip V, n.d., PRO, S.P. 94/247, f. 316; State of the first represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 659; Memoir, Wescomb to Pozobueno, 25 March 1725, AGS, Estado 6896.
30. Real cédula to the viceroy of New Spain, 23 October 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1601; A State of What Remains, cited above; Account presented by the sub-governor to the House of Commons on 5 March 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 545; South Sea Company to Pozobueno, 25 March 1725, AGS, Estado 6896; Marquis of Casafuerte to Philip V, 24 May 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597.

On the other hand Company factors at the time of the represalia showed a pronounced lack of interest in the proceedings, never demanding copies of the inventories and seldom requesting them, leading to troubles throughout the period of the British asiento contract.

Table XIII

Balance of the First Represalia

<u>Factory or Licensed Trading Post</u>	Value of Effects and Bullion Seized (in pesos)	Expenses (in pesos)	Value of Seized Effects Not Restored (in pesos)	
			<u>Company Account</u>	<u>Spanish Account</u>
Buenos Aires	-,205,781		78-1 overpaid	57,640-3
Cartagena	182,000		35,131-5	all repaid
Havana	24,713-3½	10,233-1	5,424-2½	4,548-5
Santiago	50,591-3	1,457-4	23,685	13,926-3
Panama and Portobelo	1,075,527		521,523-4½	917,285-2
Vera Cruz and Mexico	1,262,931-1		820,589	unavailable
Puerto Rico	5,000			
Santa Marta	10,000			
Santo Domingo	5,980-1	383-2		

Chapter VI

The Second Trading Period, 1722-1728

When William Stanhope went to Madrid in 1720 to represent England in peace negotiations with Spain, he also carried instructions to renew the asiento contract previously held by the South Sea Company, and to discuss the restoration of Company effects seized during the war. As they had done previously with George Bubb, the directors offered Stanhope £1,000 in Company stock to ensure that their demands were well represented. During the negotiations the Spanish tried to use the asiento contract as a lever to secure the restitution of Gibraltar. In August 1720, nearly a year before a treaty was signed, the Spanish ambassador in London, Jacinto de Pozobueno, was authorized to give the Company permission to resume the asiento trade as it was prior to the war--if the British government would give up Gibraltar. Otherwise the Spanish threatened not to honour the Treaty of 1716; thus the liberal concessions conceded to the annual ships would be withdrawn, and the Company could lose considerable revenue. Stanhope encouraged the Spanish to believe that Gibraltar might be returned, but as a gift rather than as a negotiated concession. Previous treaties obliged Spain to permit the resumption of the slave trade and the traffic of the annual ships, and to honour the concessions granted in 1716.

In fact the British had no intention of relinquishing Gibraltar. And eventually the Spanish negotiators abandoned hope of reacquiring the stronghold, although they still refused to allow the asiento trade to begin until orders were issued for the release of Spanish ships seized by the British in Sicily in August 1718. They promised in turn to release British ships seized at Cadiz at about the same time.

Orders to allow the resumption of trade had actually been issued on 12 July 1720, but were not given to the British until a year later when Pozobueno received the British orders for the release of the Spanish ships.

It is likely that the Spanish delayed the resumption of the trade partly

because they wished to see what, if any, repercussions the bursting of the South Sea "Bubble" in 1720 had on the trading capacities of the Company. Spanish agents in London reported every detail of news concerning this collapse of Company stock, and suggested that it might have serious consequences for British commerce and credit. However the danger seemed to have dissipated by August 1721. News of the arrival in England of the first annual ship, the Royal Prince, which had been seized in 1718, and of its very profitable voyage, calmed British nerves. Even more important, the House of Commons had exhausted its vengeance on Company directors after the crash, and new directors had been elected to assume its management.¹

On 13 June 1721 British and Spanish negotiators signed a peace treaty; article two confirmed the asiento contract and the Treaty of 1716; article three provided for the restoration of all Company property seized during the represalia of 1718 or an equivalent amount based on values at the time of the seizure. This property included the Bedford and other ships, money, merchandise and slaves. Spanish officials in America were advised of the resumption of trade and ordered not to obstruct it. Francis Stratford replaced Thomas Bowles as the South Sea Company representative to the Spanish court, while Guillermo Eon returned to London as the Spanish representative to the Company.²

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1. Stanhope to Carteret, 22 March 1724, BM, Add. 32,738, f. 136; Monteleón to Grimaldo, 25 July 1720, AGS, Estado 6843; To Pozobueno, 12 August 1720, AGS, Estado 6844; From Antonio de la Rosa, 6 October 1720, AGS, Estado 6828; From an unnamed correspondent, 11 August 1721, AGS, Estado 6846; From Pozobueno, 10 July 1721, AGS, Estado 6849; Grimaldo to Stanhope, 13 June 1721, AGS, Estado 6844; From Pozobueno, 20 February 1721, AGS, Estado 6847; Pozobueno to Grimaldo, 21 November 1720, AGS, Estado 6844.
 2. Philip V considered the assignment of Robert Shee, an Englishman with strong Spanish loyalties, as a second agent in London. However it was ultimately decided that a second one was unnecessary. Minute court of directors, 27 July 1721, BM, Add. 25,500, f. 81; Philip V to Eon, 8 August 1721, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801; To Pozobueno, n.d., c. July 1721, AGS, Estado 6828; Pozobueno to Grimaldo, 28 August 1721, AGS, Estado 6849; Tratado Particular, 13 June 1721, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; Real cédula, 16 August 1721, AGI, México 863.

After royal officials in Peru and New Spain were notified of the resumption of the asiento trade, the Company reopened factories in Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Buenos Aires, Panama and Portobelo, Cartagena and Vera Cruz, and submitted a proposal--at Eon's request--to open a new factory in either Caracas or Maracaibo to supply the windward coast of South America. This was a response, perhaps, to the growing economic importance of Venezuela and to the labour need of its expanding plantations. But because the directors believed that the sale of slaves alone would be insufficient to pay the expenses of maintaining a factory there, they requested permission to introduce certain goods such as naval stores and flour to supplement the factory's income. Fearing an increase in the already extensive illicit trade along that coast, the Spanish denied the request. Thus trade there remained in the hands of occasional Spanish register ships, contrabandistas, and the Company's licensed ships (not to be confused with the two special license ships, the Elizabeth and the Bedford, that sailed during the first trading period).

Preparations in London to resume trade began with the hasty purchase of a cargo for the next annual ship. The galleons had sailed for America about a month before the treaty was signed, and the Company was anxious that their ship join them in Portobelo for that year's fair.³

Although relations between the South Sea and Royal African companies had never been entirely satisfactory, on 15 March 1721 they renewed their contract on the provision of slaves. At the beginning of the second trading period the Royal African Company were to deliver 3,000 "Good, Sound, healthy & Merchantable Negroes, that want neither Limb nor Eye, nor have any Dangerous Distemper, Sore or Wound, Nor be Lame, Sick, Meagre, or Refuse"; 2,400 were to come from the Gold Coast, Whydah and Jacquin at £22 each, and

3. Minute committee of correspondence, 11 January 1722, BM, Add. 25,551, f. 66; Wescomb to Carteret, 27 July 1721, PRO, S.P. 35/27, part 11, f. 88; Stanhope to Carteret, 14 June 1721, BM, Add. 22,520, f. 134; Real orden, 12 July 1720, AGI, Ind. Gen.. 2785.

600 from Angola at £18/10.⁴ The remaining 1,800 slaves needed to fulfill the South Sea Company's contractual arrangement with the Spanish were to be purchased from private Guinea traders. Males were to comprise 2/3 of the total, females 1/3; 6/7 of the total were to be between 16 and 30 years of age, and 1/7 between 10 and 16--but half of these younger slaves were to be girls.⁵

Shortly after signing their new agreement the South Sea Company accused the Royal African Company of failing to reach its quota of slaves. There was a shortage caused by an inadequate supply of slaves at their outposts in Africa, competition from private Guinea merchants, and piracy. However the Royal African Company justified their actions. If there was a shortage, they argued, it was created artificially by South Sea Company agents in Jamaica to increase their own commissions. These agents claimed that many of the slaves purchased from the Royal African Company were unsuitable for the Spanish market, and consequently sold them locally, using the proceeds to buy other slaves from private merchants. Since they received a commission of 25 Jamaica shillings on each negro purchased in the Company's name, they were thus able to inflate greatly their income.

Shortages were also felt in Buenos Aires, but for different reasons. Pirates attacked some Guinea ships, and the normal vagaries of transportation to the South Atlantic made it impossible to coordinate supply with demand. At other factories the scarcity was compounded by an "over Nicety" in the

4. There is a great deal of contemporary literature on the quality of slaves from various parts of Africa. The general opinion in the first half of the eighteenth century seems to be that the best slaves came from Whydah and the Gold Coast. For a summary of this literature see Donald D. Wax, "Preferences for Slaves in Colonial America", The Journal of Negro History, lviii (October 1973), p. 389-395.

5. The actual duration of the contract between the two companies was not specified, although the relationship did not last long because of the poor relations between them. Wescomb to Lynn, 23 February 1721, Donnan, Documents, ii, 256; Agreement between the South Sea Company and Royal African Company, 15 March 1721, BM, Add. 25,575, ff. 75-77.

selection of slaves. The directors suspected that the main cause of the shortage was collusion between their agents, contraband traders and Spanish officials. They concluded that the factors were guilty because so few negroes were seized by either the factors or Spanish officials for illegal entry.

"Some of You are in Correspondence with the Private Traders, at the Expence and Ruin of the Company", the factors were told, "or else You are Guilty of very Great Ignorance and Folly." However some factors also complained of illicit trade, and accused British men-of-war of convoying these merchants to the Spanish Main. As a result of the supply problem the Company received permission from the East India Company to send ships to Madagascar to tap that source.⁶

The Company calculated that they needed to purchase about 7,000 slaves annually (1,800 for Buenos Aires and 5,200 for the other factories) to meet the required 4,800 after losses through suicide, illness, shipwrecks and piracy. The schedule developed to fulfil these requirements was as follows:

Table I

<u>Source</u>	<u>No. Ships</u>	<u>Sailings</u>	<u>No. Slaves</u>	<u>Destination</u>	<u>Total</u>
Whydah	4	quarterly	500	Jamaica	2,000
Gold Coast	6	bi-monthly	250	Jamaica	1,500
Windward Coast	2	bi-annually	200	Jamaica	400
Gambia	2	bi-annually	200	Jamaica	400
Angola	2	bi-annually	450	Jamaica	900
Angola	4	quarterly	450	Buenos Aires	1,800
Madagascar	(details of scheduled sailings to Madagascar are unknown)				

The records are incomplete, but they do show that this plan was not followed rigidly; buying depended principally on the availability of slaves. If a ship found no slaves in one part of Africa it moved on to others until a cargo was acquired.

6. Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 21 April 1725, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 106; Directors to Panama and Portobelo factors, 12 December 1723, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 17; Directors to Cartagena factors, 12 December 1723, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 7; Agreement between the South Sea Company and Rigby and Pratter, 10 August 1722, BM, Add. 25,575, f. 79; Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 31 March 1724, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 43; Directors to Carteret, 20 February 1723, Donnan, Documents, ii, 297; Batchelor, "The South Sea Company", p. 185; Anon., A Defence of the Observations on the Assiento Trade, pp. 23-24; Anon., An Answer to a Calumny, pp. 34-35.

or Buenos Aires

Once the Guinea trader landed his slaves in Jamaica/his contractual arrangement with the Company was usually ended. The Company ordinarily hired small private sloops of between 50 and 100 tons to transport slaves from that depot to the factories on the Main and Cuba and to return the money and goods realized from their sale. A sloop could normally make a round trip voyage from Jamaica to Cartagena in just over a fortnight, to Portobelo in three weeks, to Havana in a month and to Vera Cruz in just over a month. Frequent inspections were made by the agents and factors to insure that no private trade was shipped on these vessels. However this regulation was flagrantly ignored.

The crews were granted the following monthly salaries:

Table II

First mate and doctor	£3/10
Carpenter	3/5
Second mate and gunner	2/10
Boatswain	2
Sailors	1/5

Sloop captains had instructions to keep daily logs with inventories of effects delivered to and from the factories, salary payments, and accounts of provisions. As on the Guinea ships the health of the slaves was given considerable attention, although economic rather than humanitarian motivations guided Company policy in this sphere. Water was to be fresh, the ship clean, and provisions ample and unadulterated. Crews even had instructions to amuse the negroes during the voyage. If a slave died a death certificate witnessed by the captain and chief mate was prepared by the surgeon indicating the cause of death.

The life of a slave was in far less jeopardy on the relatively short voyage between Jamaica and the factories than on the horrific "middle passage" across the Atlantic. While the weakest perished on that voyage, the survivors were rested to regain their strength in Jamaica before the final stage of their trip. There were fewer deaths from illness, and psychologically he was much better prepared for the second voyage after surviving the first. While

suicides plagued the Guinea trader, incredibly not one was recorded on the sloops.⁷

The Company encountered the same legislative problems in Jamaica over the payment of duties on slaves imported and exported during the second trading period as during the first. In 1726 the law was revised so that effectively the Company was taxed on negroes in transit. The new law declared that the entire cargo of slaves was taxable if any part of it was landed for sale. Flour imported by the Company was also taxed. Governor Portland, never sympathetic to the Company, and suspicious of their agents, defended the passage of the act.

I must Own that the Welfare of this Island, Answers their Objection, & Absolutely requires the diminution or restriction of that Latitude, for they Us'd to land all their Negroes brought in here for refreshment, which Infected the Inhabitants, with all their Malignant Fevers, Small Pox & other dangerous distempers, besides other inconveniences & dangers it expos'd the Towns to, Common Prudence requir'd that Effectuall Care sho'd be taken to prevent this....

Company officials failed to obstruct the passage of the bill in Jamaica. They then petitioned the Board of Trade and Plantations, arguing that the tax was illegal and that similar ones had been annulled previously, and requesting that duties already collected be refunded. Between January 1721 and September 1725 Company agents had paid £10,176 in Jamaican currency in taxes on slaves. Of this sum £174/10/- (2% of the total) was paid on 419 slaves landed for refreshment only. The Board of Trade was less sympathetic to the Company than during the first trading period. The Company had raised the price of slaves in Jamaica beyond the budget of most local plantation owners because of their policy of buying locally from private Guinea traders. This resulted in a labour shortage, and further damaged the sugar trade which was facing increasing competition from other islands. The Board therefore upheld the new tax with

7. Directors to Toft, 5 March 1724, BM, Add. 25,567, ff. 23-25; Calculation of slaves needed, 20 May 1724, AGS 7017; Anon., The Trade Granted to the South-Sea Company, p. 18; Minute court of directors, 24 August 1721, BM, Add. 25,500, f. 93.

one modification: slaves landed for refreshment only were to be duty free. Duties already collected from the Company need not be refunded.⁸

This did not end the dispute between the Company and the Jamaica assembly. In January 1731 another bill was passed levying a duty on the importer of 10 shillings on each slave introduced, and 20 shillings on each slave exported. Like the earlier law, it stipulated that a cargo landed for refreshment only was still subject to an export duty if any part of the cargo was sold in Jamaica. The law was repealed in London, but the issue rose again in 1734 when a new governor, Henry Cunningham, asked permission to tax all slaves brought to the island to raise funds to meet government expenses until revenue could be raised by some other means. Before ruling on the law the Board of Trade asked private Guinea traders and the directors of the South Sea Company for their opinion. Their reason for objecting to the law unanimously was simple: they could not afford the tax. Government, however, was concerned that Jamaica's revenue was insufficient to meet the island's growing expenses; they feared an exodus of the white population if some source of revenue was not found to expand internal and external defenses there. The question was whether the necessary money should be raised locally or come from British subjects generally. They eventually decided on the former. Governor Cunningham was authorized to collect from purchasers a reasonable duty on all imported slaves, thus eliminating any distinction between private and Company slave traders. The decision to raise funds locally was made because England already maintained six companies of troops and a squadron of men-of-war in Jamaica, and assisted in the maintenance of Royal African Company forts. The

8. Certificate of slave duties, 27 September 1725, PRO, C.O. 137/16, ff. 279-280; Portland to Newcastle, 8 February 1725, PRO, C.O. 137/52, f. 115; Hunter to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 16 May 1728, PRO, C.O. 137/17, f. 50; Chetuynd to the king, 7 November 1727, PRO, C.O. 138/17, f. 121; Case of the South Sea Company's duties in Jamaica, October 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/3, part ii, ff. 177-178; Westmorland et al to the king, 31 May 1727, PRO, C.O. 138/17, ff. 71-73; Wescomb to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 6 October 1726, PRO, C.O. 137/16, f. 378.

remained
 tax on slaves/in force for the remainder of the period that the Company held
 the asiento contract, and was not again contested by the Company.⁹

The organization and management of the factories and the methods used in acquiring and selling slaves and merchandise changed little during the three trading periods. Wartime lulls in trade afforded the directors time in which they might have evaluated the factors' diaries, journals and financial records with a view to improving the administration of the trade. Yet there is no evidence that they did so. Throughout the asiento the same basic committees hired and instructed Company servants, purchased merchandise and arranged for shipping, audited accounts and supervised miscellaneous financial transactions. Nevertheless some changes did occur. While the Company reestablished its agency in Jamaica to receive and transmit slaves and to return cargoes, the agency in Barbados was abandoned as a depot, although two men were deputized to collect debts and settle Company accounts there. A new agency was established in Cadiz, with two resident British merchants, Nathaniel Herne and Samuel Pitt, appointed as agents there. Herne and Pitt were to manage the sale of Company goods sent to Spain rather than to England as proceeds from the asiento trade, and to negotiate the return of goods seized from the Company during the war, such as cochineal and indigo, or for the receipt of money received in their sale. The choice of agents was poor. The two men were negligent in their duties and corrupt in their private business practices. They failed to request the return of the seized goods until November 1721, by which time most of the merchandise had been sold or destroyed, and the initial desire of the Spanish to accommodate the Company had been dissipated by the resumption of contraband trade and other practices contrary

9. Fitzwater et al to the Lords of the king's Privy Council, 5 June 1735, PRO, C.O. 138/18, f. 9; Docminique et al to the Lords of the king's Privy Council, 12 December 1734, PRO, C.O. 138/18, ff. 3-7; Docminique et al to the king, 2 August 1732, PRO, C.O. 138/17, ff. 184-186; Smith to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 27 June 1732, PRO, C.O. 137/20, ff. 14-15.

to the asiento contract. William Stanhope interposed to assist Herne and Pitt and got embroiled in a peripheral dispute. The Spanish insisted that the Company was responsible for the freight costs of shipping the seized goods to Cadiz, and that these expenses would be deducted from the amount owed. To demand that the Company pay for the shipment of its own embargoed goods was not only insulting, but expensive. However if the Company refused to pay the freight charges, the Spanish threatened to return the goods to their original place of seizure for collection there.¹⁰

To avoid the general inconvenience and attendant costs of such a step, Stanhope proposed that the cargo be delivered to the Company immediately and promised to settle amicably the disputed freight charges later. His proposal was rejected. In March 1722 Philip ordered that 2,535 bails of indigo be returned to the Company, but only upon payment of the shipping and insurance charges. Money remitted and the sale value of goods already sold in Spain were to be paid to the Company from royal treasuries in Mexico and Vera Cruz because the amount owed had already been spent and the Spanish treasury was in straightened circumstances.¹¹

Late in 1721 the Company came under the direction of a dynamic new sub-governor, Sir John Eyles. Eyles introduced financial reforms and was a proponent of energetic expansion, although his enemies said that he only succeeded in initiating unchecked corruption. Factors were paid commissions rather than salaries, and allowances for medical expenses and the maintenance

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10. Commercial treaties between England and Spain did in fact stipulate that effects or ships seized during a war were to be returned to the place of seizure after the cessation of hostilities. This regulation adversely effected many private British merchants trading in the West Indies. Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763 (London, 1963), pp. 26-28.
11. Pes to Grimaldo, 24 April 1722, AGS, Estado 6851; From Stanhope, 15 April 1722, AGS, Estado 6851; Stanhope to Carteret, 24 November 1721, BM, Add. 22,520, f. 334; Stanhope to Carteret, 23 and 30 March 1722, PRO, S.P. 94/91; Deputation of Herne and Pitt, 9 November 1721, BM, Add. 25,575, f. 68; Power of attorney to Messrs. Withers and Mackeleur, 27 September 1722, BM, Add. 25,575, f. 81; Standing orders, 29 March 1721, BM, Add. 25,581, f. 1; Wescomb to Lynn, 4 April 1722, BM, Add. 25,556, f. 28.

of the slaves were established. These commissions and allowances (which are only known for three factories) were as follows:

Table III

Vera Cruz and Cartagena

<u>Commission</u>	<u>Allowance</u>
5% on negro sales	1 real per day per slave for maintenance
5% on returns	2 pesos per slave for medical expenses (This money paid for the surgeon's salary and for medical supplies.)

Panama and Portobelo

<u>Commission</u>	<u>Allowance</u>
5% on negro sales	2 reales per day per slave for maintenance
2½% on returns	2 pesos per slave for medical expenses

The smaller commission on returns at Panama and Portobelo was probably due to the greater volume of trade there. Commissions and allowances were undoubtedly similar at the other factories. Outstanding services rendered to the Company was rewarded separately. David Patton, for example, received a bonus of £1,000 for looking after the factory in Vera Cruz during the war of 1718-1719.¹²

While the method of payment was new, the selection and responsibilities of the factors did not change noticeably during the second trading period. No slaves were to be purchased from private traders; payment for Company slaves was to be collected upon delivery whenever possible, preferably in bullion, although sales by credit or in kind remained very common. Indultos were to be

Specially restrained to Negroes Introduc'd before Our Assiento, or during the Time of the late Rupture, it has a Great Tendency to Encourage the Private, and Destroy our Own Trade....

This last order seems to have been generally ignored by the factors.

One indulto of particular interest was opened in Cuba in 1724 by Governor

12. Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 21 April 1725, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 110; Minute committee of correspondence, 22 September 1721, BM, Add. 25,551, f. 54; Minute court of directors, 20 June 1723, BM, Add. 25,501, f. 70; Minute committee of correspondence, 18 June 1723, BM, Add. 25,551, f. 75; Batchelor, op. cit., p. 166.

Carlos de Sucre at the request of the factors in Santiago. Over 700 slaves had been seized when the captain general of Havana, at the urgent request of the factors there, ordered the indulto halted. Governor Sucre said that they would have seized more than 3,000 slaves if they had not been stopped. The factors in Havana made the request not because of the directors' orders, but rather because they were excluded from the profits.¹³

The management of most factories during the second trading period was inept and corrupt, characterized by fraudulent practices and personal disputes. Company directors exclaimed that the factors' letters

contain nothing else, but Railing and Accusations One against another of Great Abuses and Irregularitys, Committed and still Carrying on very much to the prejudice and Dishonour of the Company....

The factors at Panama and Portobelo, for example, presented bills for new furniture purchased at outrageous prices in Jamaica, house rent at a rate much higher than before the war, for repairs to the "Negrory" in Portobelo, and for other extravagant expenditures. They also committed more serious frauds, even outright thefts. While "Settling his Cash" one factor "cried out" when he found some money missing; but "he knew where to go and make it up, and went presently after into the Treasury room [to help himself to] Hankerchiefs full" of money. When accounts of such misconduct filtered back to London, the directors instructed supercargoes about to depart for America on the annual ship Royal George to investigate the complaints. Their report indicated that many allegations were true.

The factors cheated the Spanish government out of revenues, breached the asiento contract in various ways, and defrauded the Company for personal gain. They shipped unmarked silver in violation of Spanish law, bribed Spanish officials, and embezzled Company funds. About 12,000 pesos of unmarked

13. Sucre to Arana, 4 July 1724, AGI, Santo Domingo 359; Fiscal's opinion, 28 May 1726, AGI, Santo Domingo 359; Standing orders, 29 March 1721, BM, Add. 25,581, f. 2; Varas y Valdés to the Marquis de la Paz, 21 December 1725, AGS, Estado 6840; Minute court of directors, 7 November 1723, BM, Add. 25,501, f. 123; Directors to Cartagena factors, 12 December 1723, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 7.

silver was shipped from Portobelo to Panama in 1724; when royal officials seized it the factors explained lamely that it could not be marked where they purchased it, and then accused the officials of seizing it illegally.

A similar event occurred in May 1725 when Company money was seized by royal officials between Mexico and Vera Cruz. Nevertheless the Spanish did relatively little to discourage the practice. Punishment meted out was seldom harsh. Once when a mixed cargo of virgin silver and marked gold and silver was seized in Panama, rather than punish the factors the junta del asiento ordered that the marked metal be returned to them, and asked the directors to instruct their agents to refrain from such illegal remissions in the future.¹⁴

The indulto was also used fraudulently by the factors in Panama. They opened one after receiving a bribe from some Spanish merchants in collusion with royal officials. The factors and officials then purchased jointly about 100 slaves who were branded and sold in the Company's name, but for their own profit.

New factors were quickly introduced into these activities—or bribed to keep quiet. One factor was away during the indulto in Panama, but given a share of the profits on his return to keep him quiet. He later denied any complicity in the plot, claiming

That he was Ignorant of the Fact 'til it was out of his power to prevent it, and that he could not discover it when done without great Inconvenience to himself, and to the Company by Exposing the Officers concerned.

Presumably he meant that it would benefit no one to report it--least of all himself--and that it might damage the prestige of some directors in London who were reported, although without substantiation, to have been involved in the deal. Furthermore, by remaining quiet the plot might never

14. Sopeña to Grimaldo, 6 October 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Wescomb to Eon, 29 October 1725, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 73-74; Minute committee of correspondence, 25 September 1724, BM, Add. 25,551, ff. 90-91; Directors to Bumpstead et al, 21 April 1725, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 102.

be discovered and everyone involved enriched, without apparent harm to anyone.

Considering the difficulty of acquiring these posts and the initial heavy expenses, the contemporary mores and religious prejudices, and particularly the dangers to health posed by travel, disease and war, it is not surprising that most factors placed personal enrichment above all other considerations. Of course these attributes were not limited to South Sea Company employees. This mentality permeated private trade and government alike, and illegal business practices were nearly universal. Private merchants of many nationalities traded to Spanish colonies in the West Indies and South America, usually with the approval, and often with the support, of their own governments. And yet/nearly every dealing they had with Spanish merchants and officials was illegal under Spanish law.¹⁵

When Jonathan Denniss arrived in Panama he immediately discovered how profitable his new post might be when he was offered 1,000 pesos to keep the various illegal transactions there confidential.¹⁶ Denniss brought his family to the factory against regulations, and at Company expense. He received numerous gifts for his assistance in illegal activities, including a diamond ring from the governor of Portobelo for opening an indulto there. He explained that the indulto was opened for the benefit of the Company, and that the little gift was merely a token of an old friendship. Later, at the request of the governor and royal officials, Denniss falsified accounts of the sale of negroes. He was eventually dismissed by the Company for forming a partnership

15. Directors to Panama and Portobelo factors, 12 December 1723, BM, Add. 25,564, ff. 14-23; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 24 July and 9 August 1728, BM, Add. 25,552, ff. 29, 32-33.

16. Denniss was one of the most audacious of Company factors. He had once been a corsair, and then after becoming a factor became involved in a religious scandal. (See below, p.198) He was also the author of a plan to establish a British colony between Cartagena and Portobelo with the assistance of the Mosquito Indians of Nicaragua and Honduras. From Joseph Blanco, 18 April 1727, AGS, Estado 6874.

with a merchant from Jamaica to trade privately in jewels, toys and slaves on the Main.

The directors, who acted in the same fashion on a higher plane (the South Sea Bubble, as the supreme example), and thus understood the motives behind Denniss' acts, exonerated him of his numerous transgressions. They commented that he could not have gained personally by falsifying factory accounts. On his denial of guilt they also dismissed charges that he took bribes in gem stones, jewellery and expensive clothes. The directors even expressed their "Opinion that Mr Denniss has not been So blameable in his Conduct, but that he may deserve the Courts Favour in being Employd again in the Comp:s Service when there shall be Occasion." As his assignment in Cuba was to prove later (See below, p.193) this was an unfortunate decision.¹⁷

Royal officials and Company directors alike seemed unusually receptive to believing the most unbelievable excuses and protestations of innocence of illegal activities by the factors. One factor, Thomas Blechynden, defended himself by exclaiming to the directors

that my Youth, want of experience, and the powerful Example of my Representers to you, carried me into those Measures I am now ashamed of, more than any natural Inclination to Dishonesty or wronging the Company.

The supercargoes also were reluctant to make accusations against the factors for fear of exposing their own crimes and those of high ranking British and Spanish officials. One supercargo, Catlin Thorowgood, told the directors "that should he mention Names and particular Sums to whom given abroad, it would be of very ill Consequence to the Company's future Affairs".

The directors concluded that these factors had caused "great Prejudice to the Company", and that they had not "learned the Art of ingratiating with the Spaniards", but they let most illegal activities go unpunished. In fact the directors stretched the credibility of even the most willing Company

17. Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 9 October 1728, BM, Add. 25,552, ff. 42-43; Minute committee of correspondence, 25 September 1724, BM, Add. 25,551, f. 92.

proprietor. For example they brought no charges against one chief factor in Panama, a Mr. Darrock, who had married a Spanish woman against regulations, and then embezzled 20,000 pesos and other property from the Company. Another factor, Richard Farrell, married a Spanish woman in Cuba and continued to trade there in slaves and merchandise when his employment with the Company terminated. The Spanish government was particularly concerned about marriages between British factors and "rich Spanish women". They considered it a threat to Catholicism and were worried that it was a ruse to learn the location of mines, trading patterns, population distribution and defense secrets. Because of their unwillingness to take action against infractions of the asiento contract, the directors were suspected of profiting by these illegal actions, but evidence was almost impossible to collect because they were, in effect, their own judges.¹⁸

Similar predicaments and several unique problems plagued the factory in Buenos Aires. By article 9 of the asiento treaty, it was to have received a plot of land close to the factory and suitable for cultivation or grazing cattle. However during the first trading period the royal officials claimed that there was no government owned land available. Consequently the factors purchased private land, although they did not receive compensation from the Spanish until midway in the second trading period. Another problem which was also resolved, albeit with some difficulty, concerned the 800 slaves that by article 9 could be sold to residents of provinces outside of Buenos Aires if within six months after landing they could not be sold to city residents, but for which the sales had to be made in the city. This restriction was lifted because merchants from the surrounding provinces were unwilling to make the

18. Vara y Valdés to Orendayn, 28 February 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Royal officials of Santo Domingo to Philip V, 29 June 1721, AGI, Santo Domingo 410; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 17 July 1728, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 28; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 25 September 1724, BM, Add. 25,551, ff. 91-92; Directors to Bumpsted et al, 19 November 1724, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 78; Anon., An Enquiry into the Misconduct and frauds, pp. 10, 53; D. Templeman, The Secret History of the Late Directors of the South-Sea Company (London, 1735), p. 25.

arduous, expensive and time-consuming journey to Buenos Aires. The factors were allowed to accompany the slaves inland, but not to take up residence or establish factories there. Each trip was limited to twelve months from the time of departure to the return to Buenos Aires.¹⁹

Contraband trade was the most persistent problem in Buenos Aires. The Río de la Plata was a traditional contraband route for trade to the lucrative markets of Upper Peru and beyond. Now the legal British presence in Buenos Aires gave a new stimulus to this trade. Foreign merchants and Company factors introduced illicit goods and slaves there for sale in Peru and Chile. Merchandise which had been purchased to barter for slaves in Africa and was not used entered Buenos Aires on the Guinea ships and was sold. Goods were also secreted on the 150 ton provision ships during their regular visits to the colony.

Aware of the possibilities of contraband, the directors took several ineffective measures to curtail it. They ordered that the unused portion of the Guinea ship cargoes be locked in Spanish custom houses while the ships were in port and then returned to England. Ship captains were required to keep a log of the journey and given a bonus of £50 to see that none of the cargo was stolen, or that there was no illicit trade. This payment was given in lieu of the primage or an allowance for private trade. Crew members of the Guinea ships caught participating in illicit trade would be dismissed immediately from Company service. However the only effective checks against contraband were cargo inspections before leaving England and on landing in Buenos Aires. These inspections were also eluded by the falsification of certificates and the bribery of officials; large quantities of merchandise entered the colonies in this fashion.²⁰

19. Company memorial, 6 September 1722, PRO, S.P. 104/139; Grimaldo to Pozobueno, 25 June 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804; Real cédula, 5 August 1725, AGS, Estado 6865; Directors to Buenos Aires factors, 15 January 1724, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 88.

20. Instructions to Pease, 15 November 1723, BM, Add. 25,567, f. 1; Minute court of directors, 7 November 1723, BM, Add. 25,501, f. 122; Directors to Buenos Aires factors, 23 January 1723, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 3.

Crews of the provision ships were as successful as those on the Guinea ships in introducing illicit merchandise. More ships were sent out than the requirements of the factory demanded, their inventories including items which could neither be considered naval stores nor provisions. The case of the Tendrin was typical. The ship carried mirrors, watches, books and other items, some of which were given as gifts to expedite sales. Royal officials in Buenos Aires were well aware of the various ruses used to carry on contraband trade and managed to limit somewhat these introductions. Company ships were thoroughly searched during the second trading period. In fact, the frequent seizures of contraband caused the factors to complain that the royal officials were overzealous and had seized some legitimate cargo. However their zeal was not misplaced. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that not one Company ship entered Buenos Aires without some contraband on board.²¹

Similar elaborate frauds were employed at the other four factories. Slaves, merchandise and provisions such as flour were smuggled into all factories for sale. Smuggling was easy for the licensed traders who were supplying slaves in the Bay of Honduras, the Campeche coast, the Río Magdalena and the Río de la Hacha. They were so successful, in fact, that supplying slaves became a secondary consideration to them. One licensee, a Mr. Sissons, "Proceeded so far as to Settle a Factory at Puerto Rico in the Companys Name ever Since the Year 1718". Another did the same thing in Caracas. In April 1723 Sissons imported 48,825 pounds of flour, 765 flasks of rum and 400 pounds of butter at La Guaira alone. Later that year he received another shipment of 2,800 pounds of flour, 50 barrels of salted meat, twenty of butter, four of cheese and three small boxes of candles.

Curtailling the activities of these self-seeking Company servants was not

21. Sopeña to Orendayn, 22 February 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Fiscal's report, 23 July 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803; Directors to Stratford, 4 February 1724, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 99; Directors to Buenos Aires factors, 14 December 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Junta del asiento, 11 September 1728, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2774; Alzayban to Pozobueno, 3 July 1725, AGS, Estado 6864; de Studer, La-Trata de Negros, pp. 208-209.

always supported by local Spanish officials. When the Company attorneys in Barbados asked the governor of Puerto Rico to help suppress the illicit trade, he seemed "Resolved to favour the Interest of these Imposters rather than the Company". It was difficult to stop Sissons and men like him because they often performed valuable services to the notoriously under-supplied Spanish colonies, and the profits made it worth the risk.²²

It is outside the scope of this paper to document all the litigation concerning contraband trade. Needless to say the problem often preoccupied the thinking of the Junta del Asiento. As noted above, while considerable illicit activity was overlooked or participated in, the Spanish did take steps to control it. Several examples are described in this paper. Note particularly the efforts by the Marquis of Castelfuerte, viceroy of Peru. In January 1723 Castelfuerte ordered that no goods from the annual ships could be introduced into the viceroyalty until a decision on the subject was received from Philip V. In response, on 3 December 1724 Philip V took the most effective measures yet against contraband trade. He expanded Castelfuerte's order by denying to all Company employees the right to journey inland to sell slaves or goods from the annual ships. He confined the factors in Cartagena, Portobelo and Vera Cruz to their port residences, ordered the factories in Panama and Mexico closed, and limited the number of factors at each post to six.

The directors complained vociferously, and accused Louis I, who succeeded Philip V for a brief period of eight months, of secretly annulling every real cédula which had amplified the privileges granted to the Company by the asiento contract and the Treaty of 1716. Although there is no proof to substantiate this accusation, the directors were so insensed by the various obstacles hindering their trade, including the failure to return effects seized during the last war, that they used Louis' death in 1724 as an excuse to stop paying

22. Miguel Acosta Saignes, Vida de los esclavos negros en Venezuela (Caracas, n.d.), p. 34; Directors to Stratford, 1 October 1724, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 63.

Spanish ministers and ambassadors (whose salaries came out of the king's asiento receipts) until their appointments were confirmed by Philip when he resumed the throne.

The serious difficulties between the Company and Spain led to the appointment of two Spanish commissioners to meet with Stanhope and Company representatives to discuss the disputes. The British hinted that they would be pleased to have the Marquis of Monteleón represent Spanish interests in these discussions, even if he was considered to be "a very indiscreet, hot & Chimerical Gentleman". No conference was actually held, but the Spanish acquiesced in Company demands, possibly because Ambassador Pozobueno had learned through a generous outlay of spirits that if Company complaints were not satisfied that England might invade Cuba or attempt to seize the galleons. The non-payment of salaries may also have influenced the Spanish decision, as might also have the desire to demonstrate the good will of the new, if familiar, king.

Pozobueno informed the directors in June 1725 that the factories in Mexico and Panama could be reopened, and that factors could again sell slaves inland. Supercargoes were permitted to sail on the annual ships, which in practice lifted the restriction of only six men per factory, and royal officials were told that the returns made by the Company from the sale of slaves could be in bullion or local products. At the same time the disputes over the quota of slaves to be sold in Buenos Aires, and the property question there, were resolved. With this capitulation to Company demands, the efforts to stem the flow of contraband goods were largely negated during the second trading period.²³

23. Real cédula, 10 December 1725, AGS, Estado 6865; Grimaldo to Pozobueno, 25 June 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804; Memorial signed by Wescomb to Pozobueno, 25 March 1725, AGS, Estado 6896; Pozobueno to Grimaldo, 7 December 1724, AGS, Estado 6860; Newcastle to Stanhope, 25 March 1725, PRO, S.P. 94/96, f. 17; Stanhope to Grimaldo, 4 February 1725, AGS, Estado 6865; Mansos to Louis I, 12 July 1724, AGI, Santa Fe 299; Real cédula, 3 December 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Real cédula, 28 July 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805; Vara y Valdés to Orendayn, 28 February 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; To Valero, 3 December 1724, AGS, Ind. Gen. 2785; Panama royal officials to Philip V, 10 May 1725, AGI, Panama 144; Lambert to Marbais, 24 September 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Pozobueno to Grimaldo, 5 October 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Orendayn to Grimaldo, 8 December 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Pozobueno to Ripperda, 18 April and 27 June 1726, AGS, Estado 6867; Avero de Baños to Paz, 23 September 1726, AGS, Estado 6870.

A dispute between Spain and the South Sea Company that began early in the second trading period became a serious threat to the asiento trade. In September 1722 Company factors in Cartagena were informed by royal officials that slaves introduced there must come directly from Africa. This decision was based on a strict interpretation of article 12 of the asiento treaty which stipulated vaguely that the slaves could be introduced from Africa to any Atlantic or Caribbean port which had royal officials. The Cartagena officials made this move because some of the Company slaves coming from Jamaica were competent marksmen, which had led to several deaths and consternation among potential buyers, and others were Protestant converts.²⁴ Conversion to Catholicism was mandatory for all slaves in the Spanish colonies, and the priests were complaining about the difficulties of converting these Protestant slaves, who were themselves proselytizing other slaves. Initially the Junta del Asiento approved of the ruling, which the king confirmed on 18 May 1724.

Immediately the directors protested that this was "equal to, if not worse than, an abolition of the Treaty". Unless it was abrogated they threatened to withhold the payment of all negro duties. They argued that slaves arrived from Africa ailing or exhausted and needed a period of rest and recuperation before being shipped to the Main. The Spanish accepted the justice of the Company position and lifted the restriction, although they stipulated that the rest period in Jamaica must not exceed 20 days, and that no ladinos be mixed with African slaves.

Neither of these requirements were enforceable by the Spanish, and they had little effect on the Company's operations. Whenever there was a shortage of slaves ladinos were purchased and sold by the Company. The governor of Havana complained about this practice in August 1725, and also said that the

24. A similar situation existed in the British mainland colonies. British colonists preferred not to purchase the "seasoned" slaves who had been resident for some time in the West Indies, believing that they were undesirable labourers. They had the reputation of being rejects: aged, physically handicapped, belligerent, refractory, and even violent and criminally inclined. Wax, "Preferences for Slaves", p. 374.

Company regularly imported Protestant English-speaking slaves.

The position taken by the Spanish had been, in fact, unrealistic, although understandable. The *modus operandi* of the Company had always been to use a depot for the cure, convalescence and recuperation of slaves after the "middle passage". Any other method of operation would have made the supply even more erratic than it already was, caused a reduction in revenue for the Company and Spanish crown alike, and encouraged illicit trade in Spanish colonial ports during the long intervals between the arrival of Guinea ships.²⁵

After war again broke out in 1727 the question of heresy among slaves was revived. One Dr. Burnett testified that Company agents regularly mixed impressionable slaves from Africa with long time residents of Jamaica, making conversion extremely difficult.²⁶

The records of this period give an interesting insight into the personalities of Company servants overseas. It is not a pleasant portrait. They were poorly qualified, eccentric, indolent, quarrelsome and dishonest. Their dishonesty has been described elsewhere. That the factors in Buenos Aires at one time kept 76 personal servants well illustrates their indolence. The method of selection, the nature of the work, and the inherent dangers of life in the tropics all had negative effects on the factors, most of whom were young and inexperienced.

Contracts were normally signed for five year periods; frequent vacancies demonstrate that many factors were unable to fulfil their obligations. The main occupational hazard was disease. After an arduous and enfeebling voyage the factors discovered an almost equally hostile climate, poor sanitary

25. Royal officials to Philip V, 18 September 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; Junta del asiento, 23 December 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2771; Orendayn to Marquis of Lede, 18 May 1724, AGS, Estado 6861; Varas y Valdés to Paz, 4 August 1725, AGS, Estado 6840; Fiscal's opinion, 13 December 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; Directors to Stratford, 17 June 1725, EM, Add. 25,564, ff. 113-114; Real cédula, 28 July 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Wescomb to Newcastle, 17 June 1725, PRO, S.P. 94/96, f. 108; Newcastle draft to Stanhope, 24 June 1725, PRO, S.P. 94/96, f. 104.

26. Burnett testimony on Company transgressions, 15 February 1729, AGS, Estado 1717.

conditions and an unfamiliar diet. Malaria, yellow fever, dysentery, cholera and other diseases all took their toll. The directors seemed oblivious to these problems, taking no steps to alleviate them either through the process of selecting factors or the improvement of diet or sanitary conditions.²⁷

An interesting account of the psychology and behaviour of Company servants was written by James Houstoun, the surgeon in Cartagena during the second trading period. Houstoun

did not find any of our Factors with the least Tincture of a Gentleman in him, except one, and he was over-born (or, as I may rather say, over-laid) by a termagante, Billingsgate Woman.

Their backgrounds were varied.

You'll find a Bacallao Merchant amongst the principal Factors, because he can talk a little Spanish;--a mere Tarr, bred before the Mast, because he has a Friend in the Court of Directors, that makes a bawling Noise in it, and will be heard;--a broken Tradesman, because he is represented as an Object of Charity, and must be provided for out of Compassion;--a young Gentleman, who has been at the Academy, and learnt to ride the Great-horse, dance, &c. because he is recommended from Court; with Etceteras in abundance!

Their manners, particularly repellant during meals, and vocabulary, of "very low Expressions; which they termed Freedom and Liberty of Conversation", were equally disturbing to Houstoun. He also remarked on the animosity they harboured towards each other and their relaxed business practices. "I was under no Restraint or Subjection," he said, "farther than to mind my Business". Consequently he spent much of his time in local Spanish society, especially with the women, for whom he wrote plays satirizing his fellow factors. He was fond of the "cunning, subtile, and sagacious" Spaniards, especially the governors who were "generally Men of good Sense and Penetration".²⁸

27. Directors to Panama and Portobelo factors, 18 June 1724, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 55; Minute committee of correspondence, 24 April 1724, BM, Add. 25,551, ff. 88-89; Directors to Buenos Aires factors, 23 January 1723, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 3.

28. Dr. Houstoun's Memoirs of his own Life-Time (London, 1747), pp. 157-159, 173-174. When war broke out in 1727 Houstoun and the other factors were detained as prisoners for several months before being sent to Jamaica, where he remained for 12 months prior to sailing for England. During this time he received his salary from the Company and supplemented it by trading illegally to the Main. Ibid., pp. 172-173.

The Company, which was greeted with hostility from Jamaica merchants during the first trading period, did not find their reception greatly improved in the second. During the war of 1718 merchants in Jamaica and elsewhere took advantage of the South Sea Company's inactivity to deliver merchandise and slaves to the Spanish colonies wherever it was possible to elude the guardacostas. Houstoun, who was involved in this trade during all three wars which interrupted the asiento trade (1718, 1727 and 1739), described this method of illicit commerce. Five or six small vessels belonging to different traders were convoyed to the Main by a British man-of-war in exchange for 12½% of the profit on the sales. The merchants attempted

to under-sell and undermine one another, at any dirty, low Rate, or even by Tricking, and the cunning Spaniard all this while slips no Opportunity to improve that Strife to his own Advantage; so that the Price of every Thing were reduced....

These merchants were "a Burlesque, a synonymous Term for Pedlars", and as for the Jews, who "have a larger Share of Trade than the Christians in Proportion to their Number", they

were the worst Set of Rogues that ever I knew, in the whole Course of my Life; a Set of meer low-life Thieves, (as bad as the Negroes themselves, who are all naturally Thieves) the meaner Part of whom held a strict Correspondence with all thieving Negroes, from whom they received...stolen Goods.

On the other hand, Houstoun greatly respected the Jesuits: the "greatest Traders in the whole Spanish West-Indies". In fact when he was a factor in Cartagena he "always made use of the College of Jesuits to deposit what contraband Goods I introduced".

Any expectations the private British merchants had for a substantial increase in the volume of their illicit trade were disappointed for several reasons: there was a voluminous stock of unsold merchandise introduced by the annual ships in warehouses on the Main, Dutch and French traders offered strong competition, and the Spanish market was never as large as anticipated. British merchants trading to the West Indies from Cadiz and Seville also suffered during the war. The fleets did not sail so their stocks remained unsold,

incurring interest and storage costs as well as damage, pilfering and spoilation.²⁹

Governor Sir Nicholas Lawes of Jamaica feared that once the war ended many unemployed sailors and disgruntled merchants would turn to piracy if some legal employment could not be found for them. Since there was little work available locally, he recommended that they be employed as logwood cutters in Campeche and in the Bay of Honduras—a suggestion that would not have been popular with the Spanish and which was never sanctioned officially, although many men did become involved in this trade, and in which the South Sea Company played a minor role.³⁰ (See below, p. 210)

Harmony between the Company and Jamaica was eroded by an odd incident involving the French schooner Esperance, owned and mastered by Captain James de Neunaine. The ship was hired by the Havana factors, Messrs. Nicholson and Calder, to transport a cargo of snuff, hides and tallow to Mississippi for sale there. In December 1722 the Esperance arrived in Mississippi where it remained for three weeks without making any sales, then sailed to Hispaniola to try to dispose of the cargo there. En route it was seized by a Spanish guardacosta and taken to Puerto Principe in Cuba; the crew were incarcerated and the cargo partially plundered. About three weeks later the ship, crew and remaining cargo were released through the efforts of the factors. An English captain and crew were hired to replace the French, and the ship sailed to Jamaica with its cargo now consigned to the Company agents there. This time the vessel was seized by H.M.S. Winchelsea on the charge that it violated the navigation acts. The ship and cargo were embargoed. The attorney general in

29. Houstoun's Memoirs, pp. 198, 218, 223-224, 227, 315; Stanhope to Townshend, 17 March 1721, BM, Add. 22,520, f. 50; Gisas de Calderon to Philip V, 25 January 1720, AGI, Santo Domingo 378.

30. Lawes to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 6 December 1719, PRO, C.O. 137/13, part 1, f. 190; Lawes to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 24 August 1720, PRO, CO 137/13, part 11, f. 265; Lawes to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 28 August 1721, PRO, C.O. 137/14, f. 63.

Jamaica ruled that the navigation acts had indeed been violated; the vessel was foreign and therefore not permitted to use British ports. On the basis of this opinion the vice-admiralty high court condemned the goods, and ordered them sold at public auction, the proceeds to be distributed equally between King George I, the Duke of Portland (governor of Jamaica), and John Manley, seizer and informer.³¹

At about the same time the Chandos, a Royal African Company slave-ship, was also seized and condemned in Jamaica. The owners of both vessels appealed the decisions of the vice-admiralty court, and a bitter feud broke out between the Duke of Portland, whose hostility to the Company was legend and who was determined to uphold the court ruling, and the owners, who attempted to mobilize public opinion against the decision.³² Portland accused the South Sea Company agents and factors of using the Esperance to carry on a clandestine trade for their own personal gain. To support this claim he cited the case of Mr. Dalzell, the factor who had arranged for the English crew to man the Esperance. Dalzell had arrived in Jamaica the year before under similar circumstances and had persuaded Portland to permit the sale of goods which belonged to him because of financial hardship. He then landed and sold for a substantial profit a great deal more merchandise in contravention of the navigation acts.³³

After the cargo of the Esperance was condemned, the Company agents requested that their appeal be heard before the proceeds were distributed. The judge of the vice-admiralty court in Jamaica refused to grant a delay, but he was equally reluctant to distribute the proceeds of the sale when Portland

31. Sworn statement by Captain de Neunaine enclosed in Portland's of 13 July 1724, PRO, C.O. 137/15, f. 13; Rigby and Pratter to Portland, 22 February 1723, PRO, C.O. 137/15, f. 6; Opinion of Attorney General William Monch, 18 March 1723, PRO, C.O. 137/15, f. 15; Court proceedings, 1 March 1724, PRO, C.O. 137/15, ff. 87-88, 91.

32. Portland was ruined financially by the collapse of South Sea Company stock.

33. Portland to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 13 July 1724, PRO, C.O. 137/15, f. 2.

asked for his share. Consequently he was discharged on the grounds that he was under the influence of Company agents and replaced by a more pliable judge. However when the new judge ordered that the payment be made, the officers of the court (a provost marshal and a register) refused. Portland had them arrested, exclaiming that they had "attempted upon Encouragement to ridicule his proceedings, to execute the decrees According to their own Judgements, as far as wou'd best serve their private purpose and no further". They were released soon afterwards when they promised to pay the money. So ended "a very strange Scene". The "Seizure and Condemnation of these two Ships has raised a greater Combustion in the said Island, than any incident that has happened there for a long time...."

Shortly afterwards, on 4 July 1726, the Duke of Portland died, and was succeeded by Major-General Robert Hunter, who viewed the Company with greater tolerance. Portland was overzealous in pursuing the Company agents through the courts, and in refusing to hear an appeal on the decision. Unquestionably his enmity can be traced to the bursting of the "Bubble" in 1720 and his subsequent "exile" to Jamaica.³⁴

Grievances between the Company and the Spanish disturbed their relations throughout the second trading period. Many of these, such as illicit trade, administrative complaints, fraud, bribery and various contraventions of the asiento treaty were commonplace, as were incidents involving the illegal transport of Spanish passengers and funds to Europe, the latter were so numerous, according to one official, that they threatened to destroy Spanish

34. Carswell, The South Sea Bubble, p. 195; An Answer to some Complaints insinuated against the Duke of Portland, c. 1725, PRO, C.O. 137/52, ff. 290-291; Ayscough to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 14 July 1726, PRO, C.O. 137/16, f. 275; Portland to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 12 April 1725, PRO, C.O. 137/16, f. 90; General Account of the Behaviour of the Duke of Portland, c. 1725, PRO, C.O. 137/52, ff. 208-232.

Hunter assumed his duties in 1727. During the interim the government was presided over by John Ayscough, president of the Jamaica council. Joseph Haydn, The Book of Dignities....(London, 1851), p. 275.

trade. A typical example of the conveyance of Spanish passengers occurred in 1725. Captain Williams of the Syria was convicted and fined 6,000 pesos by royal officials for boarding Spaniards in Buenos Aires (although he claimed that they were Portuguese subjects who had embarked in Brazil).

Another case, concerning the shipment of money, involved two British men-of-war, the Mermaid and the Nonsuch. A Spanish merchant conspired with Company factors to ship 168,657 pesos to England in order to avoid taxes. When the Spanish learned of the incident they demanded that the money be confiscated, and that everyone involved be punished. However evidence was never easy to obtain under these circumstances, and the Company denied that the incident had occurred.

Company factors and ships' crews were obviously unwilling to provide evidence about their own or others' illegal activities. Spanish merchants who remitted goods or money to England did so secretly as did Spanish passengers who traveled on Company ships. Spanish officials could do little about it after the departure of the ships, because the British were unwilling to turn them over to the Spanish since no English law had been broken and the business was profitable. There is no indication that the Company ever seized any money or effects remitted in this way, or that the English government ever deported foreigners travelling on Company ships.

The Company assisted colonial Spanish merchants in avoiding taxes in a way that was even more damaging to Spain's mercantile policy. They established throughout Spanish colonies in America a network of about 100 small banks through which they issued letters of exchange at 8%, promising to pay the customer his money in Spain within 90 days. They accepted virgin, or unmarked, silver, which meant 5% savings immediately in duties to Spanish merchants, who also saved approximately another 15% because of the heavy taxes levied on money and bullion shipped on the fleets. It was suggested that there was not a Spaniard in the Indies with relatives in the metropolis who would not have taken advantage of remitting money in this fashion, since the risk of

getting caught was so small. Although no proof was discovered, it was said that the merchants of Cadiz and Seville were also involved. They supposedly issued secret orders to their agents in America to remit the major part of their returns on Company ships to England, where it would be invested or smuggled into Spain.³⁵

The tension that had developed between the Company and Spain by 1726 was combined with a growing tension between the two crowns, mainly as a result of Company and private trading practices in America. In March Philip V ordered his governors in America to make reprisals against British merchants there if they continued to break the law by trading on the Main. A year later, on 27 March 1727, war was declared; Company effects were seized and employees arrested, just as had happened in 1718.³⁶

35. Consulado of Cádiz to Araña, 16 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; Junta del asiento, 15 December 1722, AGS, Estado 6858; Varas y Valdés to Orendayn, 28 February 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Anon. letter, 20 January 1725, AGS, Estado 6862; Balzar to Orendayn, 19 October 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Resumen de los acuerdos de los comercios de Sevilla y Cádiz, c. 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2726; Blanco to Corobarrutia, 19 September 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804; Cartagena royal officials to Philip V, 20 July 1729, AGI, Santa Fé 450; Vera Cruz royal officials to the crown, 11 August 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804; Blanco to Corobarrutia, 12 October 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803; Sopeña to Grimaldo, 6 October 1725, AGS, Estado 6860; Rudge and Eyles to Newcastle, 10 December 1724, BM, Add. 25,556, f. 59; Grimaldo to Stanhope, 21 November 1724, BM, Add. 32,741, f. 292; Wescomb to Eon, 6 October 1726, BM, Add. 25,556, f. 92.

36. Stratford to Paz, 20 March 1727, AGS, Estado 6873; Real cédula, 29 March 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597.

The causes of the war in 1727 in Europe and the West Indies have been well studied by several authors, which is why no further detail is provided here. See particularly Horsfall, "British Relations", pp. 134-158.

Chapter VII

The Second Reprisalia, 1727

The order of 27 March 1727 to seize all South Sea Company and other British property in the Spanish colonies was similar to the one issued for the first reprisalia in 1718: All Company factors were to be placed under house arrest and then expelled from America after a detailed inventory of confiscated Company property was compiled in the presence of Company representatives. British and Irish Catholics were exempted from the reprisalia. Company factors had standing instructions from the directors to obtain copies of inventories made by the royal officials in case of seizure so that the information would be available for negotiations over their restoration. However few such copies were acquired. The factors in Cartagena claimed that the royal officials there refused to give them copies of the inventories. The directors were further handicapped in making claims for seized goods by sketchy or lost accounts. The books for Panama and Portobelo for 1723-1727 were incomplete, and several were lost during the seizure, as happened also in Buenos Aires.¹

What was substantially different about the second reprisalia was the experience gained from the first. Upon hearing the first rumours of hostilities many factors sent their account books and effects to Jamaica or secreted them with sympathetic Spaniards. Royal officials were aware of the tactics used by the factors in the first reprisalia to avoid confiscation, and took their own precautions to impede them. On receiving the reprisal orders, in July 1727, the viceroy of New Spain, the Marquis of Casafuerte, issued an edict, offering a reward of 10% of the value of any goods or money discovered which belonged to the Company or to other British subjects. Persons concealing British goods were liable to confiscation of their property, 10 years imprisonment, and banishment from the kingdom.

1. Real cédula, 27 March 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Unsigned memo, probably by Burrell, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 1; Minute committee of correspondence, 12 December 1728, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 49.

Captain Williams of the annual ship Prince Frederick, who was himself arrested, commented that Spaniards were rushing to their priests for advice. He told the Company directors that the priests

encourage them to discover all things; So that what with Excommunication and Confiscation, I fear most Persons will be frighted into a Compliance and to forsake their Confianzas; so that in my Opinion your Affairs will fare but indifferently among them.²

The severity of the represalia varied from place to place, and was dependent to some extent on the personal relations between the factors and royal officials. However the threats of excommunication and imprisonment were effective. The Company's financial loss almost equalled that of the first seizure.³

In view of the early knowledge the directors had of the diplomatic crisis prior to the war, it is difficult to understand why they did not order all factors to clear merchandise and slaves as quickly as possible and remit all money and remaining effects. Even considering the slowness of communications they had sufficient time to do so; the two nations were on the verge of war for a year before its outbreak.

The reprisal orders reached all ports in America by late July or August, except Buenos Aires, where it arrived in September. The seizures began immediately. Amounts seized were sizeable at established factories, but small or nonexistent at ports visited by ships under license from Company agents in Jamaica and Barbados. Royal officials found only 20 barrels of Company flour in Puerto Rico, worth 320 pesos. Two ships were seized at Santo Domingo, the Loyal Thomas, Captain Thomas Sommers, and the Maria, Captain Samuel Spefor, and several items from the ships, including six cannons, eight barrels of rum,

2. Extract Williams to directors, 9 August 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/2, ff. 129-130; Proclamation of Marquis of Casafuerte, 28 July 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/6, part i, f. 8; Wescomb to Rigby and Pratter, 9 February 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 14.

3. Because of the great losses suffered due to the represalia, the directors decided in February 1728 to limit the dividend paid to Company shareholders for 1727 to 2%. Anon. letter, 9 February 1728, AGS, Estado 6877.

five pistols and 16 rifles, and several hundred barrels of flour. Ninety slaves were seized, plus a number of things from the house of the Company factor, Robert Galbraith, including clothing, furniture, 177 hides, some hams, a horse and a burro and the Company's correspondence and sale book. Of the items seized 439 barrels of flour were sold for 7,850 pesos 3 reales 12 maravedis (an average of 135 pesos 7 reales each).⁴

The Marta, a Company ship from Curaçao, was seized at Maracaibo. Besides provisions, its cargo, acquired from the sale of 50 slaves, included:

Table I

<u>Item</u>	<u>Estimated value (in pesos)</u>
22,000 pounds of Brazil-wood	
419 hides	628
2,975 pounds of tobacco	223
24 <u>millares</u> of cacao (between 84 and 96 pounds)	
1 <u>caldero</u> of copper	

This cargo was sold by the Spanish for a net price of 1,496 pesos 7 reales 4 maravedis, less than 30 pesos a slave. The low proceeds might be explained in several ways. Royal officials might have received "kickbacks" from buyers which were unrecorded, or perhaps there was money on the ship that was seized and not recorded, or which was hidden successfully by the crew. One can reject the possibility that the slaves were of such poor quality as to warrant the extremely low price. The 50 slaves represented only 24 2/3 piezas de indias, yet their sale price would still have been 130 or 140 pesos each.⁵

The sale of confiscated Company effects in Caracas brought 8,560 pesos 3 reales, and consisted of:

Table II

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
Public sale of 22 slaves	3,891
71 mules and one horse sold	1,705
Two pair oxen and 140 head of cattle	831-4
Collected from three debtors to the Company	621-1
From the sale of 791 pounds of lead	98-7
From Joseph de la Plaza	1,402-7

4. Francisco de la Rocha Ferrer to Philip V, 3 August 1727, AGS, Contaduría 1068; Méndez to Philip V, 26 June 1727, AGS, Contaduría 1086; From Rocha Ferrer, 22 April 1729, AGI, Estado 9, ramo 1; List of embargoed goods at Santo Domingo, 24 July 1727, AGI, Estado 9, ramo 1; Certificate from Santo Domingo royal officials, 29 July 1727, Estado 9, ramo 1.

Effects confiscated from the household of the chief factor, Samuel Colet, and his assistant, included: 52 slaves, 344 hides, 35 sheep, 37 litres of seeding corn, 75,800 pounds of Brazil-wood, 11 mules, 2 iron hoops, 3 spades, 2 pruning hooks, 2 axes, 3 casks of wine, and 27 barrels of gunpowder. None of the items taken from the factors was included in the represalia inventory, and it is unknown what became of them.⁶

After the seizure at Cartagena the factors were sent to Jamaica, and then ordered by the Company to take to London all books and accounts they had of the factory's transactions. As elsewhere royal officials in Cartagena refused to give them copies of the reprisal inventories. Furthermore the original Spanish inventory also seems to be missing. In 1735 the British reconstructed a list of goods seized from notes and letters from the factors. Its accuracy is open to considerable doubt, yet experience shows that the figures may err in either direction.

Table III

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
Money seized between October 1726 and June 1727	152,220-6½
Uncollected promissory notes	109,197-3¼
22 slaves valued by royal officials at an average of 166 pesos 6½ reales each	3,670
Eight slaves taken from the <u>Queen of Spain</u> , valued by the factors at 250 pesos each	2,000
The Company ship <u>Queen of Spain</u>	4,285
Goods seized from the <u>Queen of Spain</u>	2,727-2¼
Miscellaneous effects, such as factory furniture, provisions and personal effects	30,122-¼
Silver	353
Total:	304,575-4½

The second represalia occurred at Cartagena in October 1726, long before the receipt of the cédula of 27 March 1727. Early seizures such as this were probably the result of the cédula of 29 March 1726 which instructed royal

5. Governor and royal officials of Maracaibo to Philip V, 10 August 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805; Manuel Gonzalo de la Casa to Philip V, 24 December 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805.

6. Cartagena royal officials to Philip V, 5 November 1728, AGI, Contaduría 1633A.

officials in the Indies to seize British effects if they were insulted by British vessels. Another question is more easily answered: why was there such a tremendous difference in the valuation of seized slaves by factors and by royal officials? Company estimates tended to be higher and Spanish estimates lower than actual values. No doubt both parties were considering the post-war restoration of Company effects, and established estimates that would be favourable to their respective cases.⁷

The Spanish used almost all of the money seized in Cartagena to repair galleons (80,000 pesos) and for local defence (70,000 pesos).⁸

In Santiago de Cuba seized money, debts and effects were worth as much as in the first represalia. They amounted to 15,705 pesos 4 reales, but do not include debts that royal officials were unable to collect. Administrative costs were 1,550 pesos 4 reales 25 maravedis, and 4,451 pesos 5 reales were spent to maintain the factors during their detention.⁹

The Only British account of the embargo of Company goods in Havana was made years later, and the directors did not have reference to the original Spanish inventories of the represalia, or of the sale of these effects. A Company ship, the Don Lewis [sic], Captain Gibson, was seized, as were some slaves and a considerable amount of tobacco. It is unknown if the ship and its cargo were sold, or if the value of goods seized according to the Company records, 51,495 pesos 7 reales, includes them. The pesos were partially

7. Real cédula, 29 March 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Wescomb to Newcastle, 4 December 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/21, part 1, f. 112; Wescomb to Newcastle, 20 July 1727, BM, Add. 25,556, f. 114; Su Mag. católica por cuenta de la segunda represalia en Cartagena, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266; Governor and royal officials of Cartagena to Philip V, 14 March 1729, AGI, Contaduría 1437; Directors to Thompson et al, 18 January 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 12.

8. Royal officials to Philip V, 1 October 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Patiño to royal officials of Cartagena, 1 February 1728, BM, Add. 32,779, f. 295.

9. Account of the second represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 569; Su Mag. católica por cuenta de la segunda represalia, en Santiago de Cuba, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266; Certificate of Company goods embargoed at Santiago de Cuba, 21 August 1729, AGI, Contaduría 268.

accounted for as follows:

Table IV

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
23 slaves sold at an average of 148 pesos 6 reales each	3,422-2
346,854 pounds of snuff and 64,518 pounds of leaf tobacco, total value estimated to be	24,000

The tobacco was sent to Spain for sale, the money going into the royal treasury.¹⁰

The last seizure was made in Buenos Aires, on 11 September 1727, with money, goods and debts worth 185,137 pesos 5½ reales being confiscated.

The major items, not counting numerous debts owed to the Company, were the following:

Table V

<u>Item</u>	<u>Value (in pesos)</u>
Goods and debts seized in Santiago de Chile	80,628-5
From the sale at public auction of an unknown number of slaves brought to Buenos Aires on the <u>St. Michael</u>	16,000
From the sale at public auction of an unknown number of slaves brought to Buenos Aires on the <u>Seahorse</u>	6,000

The Spanish also seized at least four and possibly six Company ships at Buenos Aires, including the Essex, Syria, Booth and Prince William. The Company included the Bristow and the Duke of Cambridge on the list of ships seized, although this was denied by the Spanish. The Bristow left London in September 1726 with supplies for the factory and was never heard from again. The cargoes of the other ships are unknown.

The cost of maintaining many factors, dependents and sailors in Buenos Aires during the war was very high. Four hundred pesos were spent monthly between 11 September 1727 and 11 March 1730 to keep the factors, / and another 1,514 pesos 2 reales were needed for repairs at the factory. The amount spent on the ships' crews is unknown.

10. Wescomb to Newcastle, 20 July 1727, BM, Add. 25,556, f. 114; Account of the second represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 568; Account of tobacco seized from the English, compiled by Martin de Loynas, 18 November 1732, AGI, Contaduría 266.

Some of the money acquired in the seizure at Buenos Aires was probably included in the 600,000 pesos remitted by the viceroy of Peru to Spain in October 1728. This sum included bullion from Mexico, money received from the sale of tobacco, and 141,246 pesos 1½ reales reprisaed from South Sea Company factories. There is no indication what percentage of this came from the Buenos Aires factory, but the factors there said that 200,000 pesos embargoed in Santiago de Chile and Potosi had been sent to Spain. There is no evidence to support this, but it is likely that whatever was seized there was remitted to Spain.¹¹

The Company later claimed that goods and money worth 282,469 pesos 1½ reales were seized in Buenos Aires, 97,331 pesos more than the Spanish figure. Again, the difference was probably due primarily to the tendency of each side to arrive at figures favouring them. However part of the difference might be 32,000 hides belonging to the Company that the cabildo of Buenos Aires sent to Spain. At an average price of 12 reales per hide the value of this seizure would be 48,000 pesos.¹²

Effects embargoed in Panama and Portobelo, according to Spanish records, were markedly less than in 1718.

Table VI

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
Money received from Company debts embargoed in Lima	153,191-1½
For 26 slaves sold at an average price of 161.538 pesos	4,200
For 14 slaves acquired by royal officials for work on the fortifications at an average price of 274.2 pesos	3,840
For 14 slaves acquired by royal officials at an average price of 250 pesos	3,500
Money seized in Portobelo	2,940
Money received from various debtors	840
Equipment, provisions and a small boat	718
For medicine sold	138
	169,367-1½

11. Lima royal officials to Diaz Roman, 29 October 1728, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813; Wescomb to Newcastle, 11 September 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/20, part i, f. 159; Buenos Aires royal officials to Philip V, 31 October 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807; Represalia account for Buenos Aires from 11 September 1729, Bodleian, Rawl. D 580; Represalia account for Buenos Aires, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 1921B; Su Mag. Cat. por cuenta de la segunda represalia, n.d., Buenos Aires, AGI, Contaduría 266.

The expenses of the seizure were 6,486 pesos 2½ reales, of which 1,787 pesos 3½ reales were spent in Peru and 4,698 pesos 7 reales in Lima to collect debts, leaving net proceeds of 162,881 pesos.

The Company claimed that a much larger sum, 409,211 pesos 3½ reales was seized, including 16,176 pesos 4 reales in cash and goods and 393,034 pesos 7½ reales embargoed in Lima. This sum is not as disparate from the Spanish claim as it would first appear. The Company admitted that 236,645 pesos 5 reales had been "disembargoed" after the resumption of trade from the debts seized in Lima. Subtracting this sum from the amount seized there, according to Company records, the remainder is 156,389 pesos, only 3,198 pesos more than the Spanish said were seized in Lima. The "disembargoed" amount may represent debts that royal officials were unable to collect and therefore returned to the factors in the form of IOU's. Some of this amount may have been in promissory notes hidden by the factors at the time of the represalia. In any case, if these documents were returned to the Company the difference in amounts claimed was insignificant.

One reason why such a relatively small sum was seized at this factory was because the factors left some effects and invoices of money owed to the Company with friends in Panama. When they were sent to Jamaica soon afterwards they spirited out most of their account books and a letter listing individual debtors and amounts that they owed to the Company. Items left with Joseph de Ochoa in Panama included an unknown sum of money, 1,300 serones of cacao, and promissory notes worth 111,710 from Nicholas Cavallero Tejido, Domingo Savejer, Angel Calderon and Estevan de Recobar. The factors sent to Panama after the war were instructed to collect these debts, but how much they collected is unknown.¹³

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12. Wescomb to Newcastle, 20 July 1727, BM, Add. 25,556, f. 114; Account of the second represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 568; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 14 March 1727, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 8.
 13. Account of the second represalia, cited above; Su Mag. Cat. por cuenta de la segunda Represalia, cited above; Instructions of the first secret committee to Rigby et al, 30 April 1729, AGS, Estado 7008; Directors to Blechynden et al, 18 January 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 13.

Very little was seized in the represalia in Vera Cruz. It began at 8 PM on 30 July 1727 when a guard was placed on the factory and an unsuccessful search made for the Company books. The factors claimed that they had been sent to Havana on a Spanish vessel. Unfortunately, most of the surviving Spanish documentation on the seizure was badly damaged in a fire in the Archives of the Indies in Seville in 1924. As a result the accounts are sparse for Mexico, Puebla, Oaxaca and other cities in New Spain. At Vera Cruz the embargoed items consisted of:

Table VII

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
Money deposited by the supercargoes of the <u>Prince Frederick</u> with royal officials for the value of the <u>Don Luis</u> and <u>St. George</u>	8,129-2
Money collected from Miguel de Belarrosa	7,194-1
Money collected from Francisco Xavier de Luna	560
Goods carried by the Company slave ship <u>Samuel</u> to Guinea, but which remained unsold and subsequently brought to Vera Cruz, where they were seized and sold by the royal officials	1,935
For the sale of six male slaves at 300 pesos each	1,800
Miscellaneous	287
Total:	<u>20,570-1</u>

Five Company ships were also seized at Vera Cruz: the annual ship Prince Frederick (which became a major subject of Anglo-Spanish diplomacy; see below p. 146); one guinea ship, the Samuel; and three snows, the St. George, the Don Carlos and the Don Luis (alias Prince of Asturias). The Prince Frederick and the Don Luis were renamed the San Felipe and San Fernando, and fitted out to carry a treasure to Havana to meet the galleons for the return voyage to Spain. The Samuel sank when an anchor pierced her keel; the St. George remained in port and the Don Carlos, which was "already old", was used to transport 184 British officers and crew members to Jamaica.

More than half of the amount seized at Vera Cruz was consumed in maintaining the factors during the war and in sending the sailors to Jamaica. The expenditures included:

Table VIII

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
To maintain the factors between 1 October 1727 and 1 August 1728 (at an average of 1,008 pesos per month) ¹⁴	10,080
To pay the costs of transporting 184 men to Jamaica	1,575-5
Maintenance of the 184 men prior to departure	140
Total:	<u>11,795-5</u> ¹⁵

The seizure in Mexico City was much more substantial and included much of the cargo of the annual ship Royal Prince, which had remained unsold when it returned to England in 1723, and most of the cargo of the Prince Frederick. The original inventory of goods seized in Mexico, including effects from Vera Cruz, Puebla, and Oaxaca, is badly damaged, but the following can be extracted from it:

<u>Item</u>	Table IX		
	<u>Collected (in pesos)</u>	<u>To be Collected (in pesos)</u>	<u>Total (in pesos)</u>
Cash	252,627-3	139,266-5 $\frac{3}{4}$	391,894- $\frac{3}{4}$
Cochineal	220,190-4	389,527-7	609,718-3
Merchandise	677,752-7	541-6	678,294-5
Promissory Notes		102,769-3	102,769-3
Bullion	2,172-3		2,172-3
In dispute		207,843- $\frac{1}{2}$	207,843- $\frac{1}{2}$
Totals:	<u>1,152,743-1</u>	<u>839,948-5 $\frac{3}{4}$</u>	<u>1,992,691-6 $\frac{3}{4}$</u>

Another account of the seizure indicates that 372,669 of the 839,948 pesos 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ reales owed were collected, which suggests that much of it was collected by royal officials. In any case the value of goods seized in New Spain was much greater than at any of the other factories.¹⁶

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14. Only 400 pesos were spent monthly in Buenos Aires, although the Company had more employees there.
15. Cuenta de la segunda represalia en Vera Cruz, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266; Extract from Upton to directors, 15 September 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/3, part i, f. 84; Extract from Bowles and Williams to directors, 8 August 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/2, f. 127; Extract from Vera Cruz factors, 17 November 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/6, part i, f. 10; Petition from Samuel Lock, et al, 31 July 1727, AGI, Contaduría 812; From Castelfuerte, 10 August 1727, AGI, Contaduría 812.
16. Account of second represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 567; Relation of goods seized, c. 1728, AGI, Contaduría 812; From Marquis of Casafuerte, 7 December 1727, AGI, Contaduría 812.

Royal officials appointed to enforce the represalia in Mexico, the oidores Pedro Malo de Villa Visiencia and Juan de Oliven Robolledo, were zealous in their duties. They declared that everyone who had purchased goods from the South Sea Company since the arrival of the Prince Frederick had to furnish witnesses to each sale. Furthermore the witnesses had to be men approved by them. As one factor observed:

This has put all those who had to do with the Supra Cargoes [of the Prince Frederick], under the greatest difficultys, for they are Order'd again to lay down the Sums, that they cannot prove to be paid before Witnesses..., or to guarantee their Value; And all and proper and methodical Sales with the Supra Cargoes Receipts, for the Amount of them Avouched by Entrys in the Spaniards own Books, Stand them in no manner of Stead.¹⁷

Of the money seized in Mexico, 14,000 pesos were sent by Viceroy Casafuerte to the Casa de Contratación in Cadiz and used to pay the salaries of the junta del asiento, which were in arrears.¹⁸

In view of the value of their property in Spain's American colonies, just before the war Company directors requested assistance from the British government in securing their release if necessary. Prior to this request, in June 1726, Vice-Admiral James Hosier, commander of the West Indies fleet, had been ordered to blockade Portobelo and Cartagena to prevent the return of the galleons to Spain. The object was to prevent Philip V from replenishing his treasury, and thus to force him to curtail war expenditures in Europe. It was also a retaliatory measure against Spanish guardacostas which had begun to attack British merchantmen with increasing ferocity. The blockade was successful, but it had a harmful effect on commercial activities generally. Merchants on the galleons were forced to travel to Lima to sell their goods.

There was almost no trade in Vera Cruz after the represalia. In 1727 there were shortages of cinnamon, wax, oil and wine in New Spain. Wine cost

17. From Vera Cruz factors, 17 November 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/6, part 1, f. 10.

18. Casafuerte to Corobarrutia y Zúpide, 27 November 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807; Razón de la forma en que se hizo el repartimiento de los 14,000 pesos, n.d., 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807.

between 110 and 120 pesos a barrel. The English also suffered during the seige. Vice-Admiral Hosier and numerous officers died in an epidemic that killed 4,000 men on the British fleet.¹⁹

No sooner had the war begun, bringing interruption to trade in the Indies, and inconvenience to British merchants, than peace negotiations began in Europe. The Company directors tried to induce Horace Walpole, one of the British negotiators, to take a firm stand with Spanish negotiators.

If you were to tell them plainly, that 'till the two Anual Ships, have been allowed the benefitt of Selling their Goods, and gathering in their Effects according to the Priviledges allow'd by Treatys, and that, what ought so long Since to have been restored to the Company, be perform'd, and paid in New Spain,...and that 'till the said Annual Ships are first Saild away, and the Company have had full Satisfaction, Neither the Galleons nor Flota, shall be Suffer'd to go out of Port, and that if in the mean time any Seizure or other Molestation be offer'd to the Company or any His Majestys Subjects Exercising lawfull Trade, they must take the Consequences.²⁰

Their request was heeded. After the preliminary articles of peace were signed in Paris in May 1727, and in Vienna in June, the Duke of Newcastle ordered Hosier to lift the blockade of Spanish ports, to restore seized Spanish goods (but only after all British goods, ships and subjects were released), and to convoy the Prince Frederick to England, leaving only as many ships in the West Indies as was usual during peacetime to protect British trading interests there.²¹

The preliminary articles of peace provided that Anglo-Spanish relations

19. Instructions to Hosier, 28 March 1726, BM, Add. 33,028, f. 52; John Burnett's testimony on hostilities, 15 February 1729, AGS, Estado 7017; Vera Lee Brown, "The South Sea Company and Contraband Trade", The American Historical Review, xxxi, no. 4 (1926), p. 675; From Vera Cruz factors, 17 November 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/6, part i, f. 11.
20. Eyles and Rudge to Walpole, 16 April 1726, BM, Add. 25,556, f. 95.
21. Newcastle to Hosier, n.d., November 1727, BM, Add. 32,753, f. 24; Newcastle to Hosier, 1 June 1727, BM, Add. 32,687, f. 210; Newcastle to Walpole, 21 September 1727, BM, Add. 32,752, ff. 76-77; Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763 (London, 1963), p. 14; Lucy Francis Horsfall, "British Relations with the Spanish Colonies in the Caribbean 1713-1739", Unpublished M.A. dissertation, 1935, London University, Institute of Historical Research, pp. 157-158.

return to the same status as established by treaty prior to 1725. As applied to the South Sea Company, all its property seized during the war was to be restored. Suspicions that the Spanish signed the preliminaries only to raise the blockade on the galleons, and that afterwards they would resume hostilities, proved untrue. In any case the galleons only carried 21,000,000 pesos, with the king's share not above 6,000,000. Of this 1/3 was owed to the Emperor, and once the army, household, and civil lists were taken care of "there will not be a penny left for a War".²²

The Company directors learned after these orders were dispatched that most of the Prince Frederick's cargo was unsold. They asked Newcastle to obtain permission from the Spanish for the ship to remain in the West Indies until everything was sold. Newcastle informed Horace Walpole, who was then negotiating the definitive treaty in Madrid, of the Company's request, and on Newcastle's advice Walpole decided not to ask for a convoy home for the ship, to make it appear to be a concession to the Spanish, who were unaware that the cargo had not been sold, and considered the Prince Frederick to be their main bargaining counter. Benjamin Keene, the British minister to the Spanish court, was ordered to:

make a merit of it, and in discoursing with Count Rottembourg you may let him know that to avoid all disputes, which may arise between England & Spain as to the pretention of honour whether the Prince Frederick should be actually restored to admiral Hozier before he leaves the West Indies, or whether he should first leave the Indies depending upon the proper orders, given by Spain for the restitution of that Ship, His Majesty is willing to consent that upon Spain's giving clear and explicit orders for taking off the Imbargo or seizure of the Prince Frederick, and other Effects belonging to the South Sea Company, and for opening their trade upon the foot it was carried on by virtue of the Assiento Treaty conformably to the third article of the Preliminaries, the orders for Admiral Hozier will be framed in such a manner as that he shall immediately raise the blockade of the Gallions, and return home with his Squadron.²³

22. Extract, Poyntz to Delafaye, 24 March 1729, BM, Add. 32,760, f. 270; Castelfuerte to Philip V, 1 November 1731, AGI, Santa Fé 1161.

23. Walpole to Keene, 20 October 1727, BM, Add. 32,752, f. 176; Walpole to Newcastle, 4 November 1727, BM, Add. 32,752, f. 323; Newcastle to Walpole, 3 October 1727, BM, Add. 32,752, ff. 146-147.

The war was officially ended by a convention which was signed on 6 March 1728 at the Pardo. By the terms of the treaty the English agreed to raise their blockades in the West Indies and withdraw war-ships from the Mediterranean. The Spanish raised the blockade of Gibraltar and agreed to restore the asiento trade. Disputes concerning the Prince Frederick, contraband trade, and the restitution of prizes taken during the war, were to be decided by a Congress in Soissons. Spanish officials in America were advised of the peace and ordered to release Company and personal effects, and resume the asiento trade on the same basis as before the war. A precise inventory was requested of all British ships taken as prizes during the war to use at the Congress.²⁴

The restitution of Company effects was very slow except for the Prince Frederick, which was mentioned specifically in the orders sent to the viceroy of New Spain. The ship was returned on 31 July 1728 to Captain Williams at Vera Cruz. However it was in poor condition because it had been used during the war; without considerable repair it was incapable of making the voyage to England. Captain Williams had neither material with which to make repairs nor a crew large enough to man the ship. Consequently the Company requested permission to send out a crew with about 300 tons of provisions and necessary materials. The Spanish rejected the request, probably on the advice of Matthew Plowes (see below p. 157), who said that it was only an excuse to introduce more contraband goods. There were also fears that if the merchants of Cadiz learned that a Company store-ship was going to the West Indies they would refuse to invest in the next flota, believing that the ship was carrying contraband goods which would ruin the market. As an alternative, Spanish ministers offered to sell the Company the necessary stores in the Indies at

24. Philip V to the viceroy of Mexico, 25 April 1727, PRO, S.P. 94/99; The Act for the Execution of the Preliminary Articles signed at the Pardo, 6 March 1728, Historical Register, vol. xiii (1728), pp. 147-148; The Weekly Journal or the British Gazetteer, 30 March 1728; The Daily Journal, 10 May 1728; Project by ministers of England, France and Spain, AGS, Estado 6875.

the same price that they would have paid in England. If this was unsatisfactory then they could send the necessary supplies from Jamaica to Vera Cruz on the slave ships, which by treaty were permitted to transport supplies to the factories.

Convinced that the Spanish were acting from a legitimate fear, rather than from any nefarious effort to avoid executing the treaty, the directors agreed to repair the Prince Frederick with supplies sent from England via Jamaica. The cost would be considerably greater than buying materials in Vera Cruz, but they doubted that the necessary items would be available there. The ship was subsequently repaired and returned to England.²⁵

As suggested above, the restoration of Company property was so slow as to be virtually nonexistent, although orders to that effect had reached America in 1728. When the directors realized this they complained to the Spanish government. On 14 December 1729 Philip V repeated his instructions to the viceroys of Peru and New Spain to return all Company effects. The following September Benjamin Keene complained that these orders had still not been received in several places in America. The restoration remained slow and rather insignificant in amount. There are several explanations for this. First, much of the seized money was remitted to Spain. Tracing it was a complicated process, as was the determination of who was responsible for repaying it. Years of investigation and argument failed to resolve this question before the expiration of the asiento contract. Secondly, some of the money was spent during the war on public works and defences in the Indies. When orders were received to repay the money, colonial treasuries were

25. Wescomb to Keene, 29 August 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 30-31; Williams to directors, 1 August 1728, BM, Add. 32,760, f. 99; Paz to Keene, 1 January 1729, BM, Add. 32,759, ff. 485-486; Keene to Paz, 30 September 1728, BM, Add. 32,758, f. 438; Keene to Philip V, 29 July 1728, PRO, S.P. 94/99; Brown, op. cit., p. 669; Keene to Newcastle, 15 August 1728, BM, Add. 32,757, ff. 372-375; Paz to Keene, 12 August 1728, BM, Add. 32,757, ff. 379, 383; Poyntz to Stanhope and Walpole, 14 July 1728, BM, Add. 32,757, f. 82; Newcastle to plenipotentiaries at Soissons, 27 June 1728, BM, Add. 32,756, f. 479.

invariably found to be empty or nearly so. Thus funds had to be acquired from other treasuries, such as in Lima or Mexico, and then only after endless exchanges of correspondence. Even then money might not be forthcoming because of a shortage of funds.

The records do not indicate if Company goods were returned at Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Maracaibo or Caracas. However the Company made few complaints about restoration in those places, and it is reasonable to assume that the effects were restored.²⁶

Reparations at the two Cuban factories was also fairly complete. Everything was returned at Santiago. However the orders to restore Company effects in Havana arrived on foreign vessels, which led to controversy. The governor of Havana claimed that there was a real cédula in the escribanía which prohibited him from observing cédulas that arrived by foreign transport. He asked for instructions from the Marquis of Casafuerte, but the viceroy told him simply to use his own judgment. He decided against restoring the goods, mainly tobacco. In May 1732 Philip V ordered that the tobacco which had been seized in Havana and sent to Spain be returned to the Company, or an equivalent value given. However the Company was apparently not reimbursed. Subtracting the value of the tobacco from the total seizure leaves 26,495 pesos, almost exactly the amount the royal officials in Havana said that they owed that factory when trade ended. The Company estimated that 41,000 pesos were still owed, but this includes interest and expenses involved in the seizure. Benjamin Wooley, a factor there, said that 307,007 pesos 1 3/4 reales were owed to the Company, but his claim was ignored.²⁷

26. Real cédula, 14 December 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Carrillo to Patiño, 8 November 1728, AGI, Contaduría 1633A; Keene to Paz, 29 September 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104.

27. From Wooley, n.d., c. 25 June 1727, AGS, Estado 7006; Casafuerte to Philip V, 22 July 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1601; Particular of Sundry Effects Seized under the two Represalias, PRO, S.P. 94/247, f. 318; Account Presented by the Sub-Governor to the House of Commons, 5 March 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 245; Account of the second represalia, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 568-569.

Governor Zavala of Buenos Aires reestablished the asiento trade there on 23 March 1730, and on his orders all Company effects were returned promptly. However returning money, promissory notes and other effects embargoed in Santiago de Chile and Potosi, which were worth 67,656 pesos 5/6 real, was considerably more difficult. At the request of the directors, who were afraid that factory accounts would become confused, on 27 February 1732 Philip V ordered the viceroy of Peru to return these notes to the factors in Buenos Aires and not to Portobelo as had been contemplated. However the 67,656 pesos were never received by the Company, and became part of the money in dispute at the conclusion of the asiento trade.²⁸

Royal officials in Cartagena at first ignored orders to return the sizeable sums of money embargoed there, prompting the British government to instruct Benjamin Keene to investigate the matter in Madrid. Keene reported that 230,000 pesos seized from the factory had been used to repair the galleons and to pay troops. However the governor of Cartagena denied that this was Company money, and the Company had no way to prove their claim since the royal officials had refused the factors access to the accounts of the seizure. Nevertheless, considering the normally destitute state of the treasury there, the money in question must have belonged to the Company. Keene did, in fact, succeed in getting new orders sent out late in 1730 with instructions that the money be restored. The Company directors were relieved, but they said that "they wish that by a little rigour of his Pen Mr. Patiño" had censored the governor of Cartagena to prevent him "from any future Conduct of the like kind." The new orders had no effect. A British factor in Cartagena, Edward Garthwaite, accused the royal officials there of keeping the embargoed goods for themselves. The officials retaliated, calling this denunciation a "calumnia infuriosa", and accusing Garthwaite (who was raised in Cartagena and

28. Account of the second represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 568; Real cédula to the viceroy of Peru, 27 February 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1601; A State of what Remains due to the South Sea Company from the second represalia, n.d., PRO, S.P. 94/247, f. 316; de Studer, La trata, p. 212.

had many friends there) of hiding most of the money and effects belonging to the Company at the time of the reprisal. In March 1733 the king ordered the viceroy of Peru, the Marquis of Castelfuerte, to reimburse the Company from the treasury in Lima. The money was still not paid, and when the asiento contract expired the royal officials in Cartagena owed 239,555 pesos to the Company, having refunded only 65,020 pesos. (The Company set the figure at 245,032 pesos.)²⁹

Only the barest accounts are available on the restoration at Panama and Portobelo. All but 7,049 pesos 6 reales of the money seized at the factory was returned, but when trade ended a further 90,810 pesos 1/6 real were still owed from promissory notes embargoed in Lima.³⁰

At Vera Cruz 8,713 pesos were returned to the factors. This represents the entire sum seized less money spent during the war for the maintenance of the factors and for other necessary expenses. This was not contested by the Company. The destruction of documentation on Mexico makes it impossible to determine what was returned there.³¹

In conclusion, the value of money and effects seized from the Company in the second represalia was 2,745,511 pesos, only 87,013 pesos ½ real less than that seized in the first. Because the factors had the advantage of

29. Royal officials of Cartagena to Philip V, 11 June 1731, AGI, Santa Fe 1009; An Account of the second represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 567; Account presented by the sub-governor to the House of Commons, 5 March 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 545; Marquis of Paz to Keene, 14 November 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Wescomb to Newcastle, 4 December 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/21, part i, f. 111; Wescomb to Delafaye, 10 December 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/21, part ii, f. 136; Royal decree, 26 January 1731, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Smith to Geraldino, 2 December 1732, BM, Add. 32,779, f. 287; Real orden to Castelfuerte, 27 March 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Keene to Cartagena factors, 30 March 1733, BM, Add. 43,416, f. 268; Cartagena royal officials to Philip V, 4 November 1733 and 20 June 1734, AGI, Santa Fé 1160; Real cédula to viceroys of Peru and New Spain, 14 December 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785.

30. A state of what remains due to the South Sea Company on the two represalias, n.d., PRO, S.P. 94/247, f. 316; Account presented by the sub-governor to the House of Commons, cited above; An Account of the second represalia, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 568.

31. Smith to Geraldino, 12 December 1735, AGS, Estado 7006; From the junta del asiento, 7 December 1731, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597.

experience learned in the first represalia, one would have imagined that a smaller percentage of Company goods would have been seized. More than anything else, however, the main determination of amounts seized was the presence or absence of goods from the license or annual ships at the time of the seizures.³² The amounts seized do not necessarily reflect the volume of trade because of the great variation in the amount of effects at the various factories at different times. For example note that 1,075,527 pesos were seized in Panama and Portobelo in the first represalia, but only 169,367 pesos 5½ reales in the second, and yet the number of slaves entered there was greater in the second, and in the third, than in the first; in Mexico and Vera Cruz 1,262,931 pesos 1 real were seized in the first, and 2,013,261 pesos 7½ reales in the second.

That the amounts seized in both the first and second represalias was as great as it was suggests a massive trade, with probably an absolute minimum of 3,000,000 pesos (£675,000) worth of effects (in the form of slaves, bullion, property, merchandise and ships) at the various factories at any time. If an accurate figure of total number of slaves seized in represalias were available it would perhaps be possible to obtain at least a rough estimate of the total volume of trade during the British asiento by relating by cross multiplication the number of slaves seized and the total number introduced to the value of all effects seized.

32. Goods and money worth only 48,179 pesos 7 reales were seized in the third represalia, reflecting to some extent experience gained from the first two, but more important demonstrating the great decrease in Company trade by 1739 caused by increasing tension between the two crowns in the West Indies.

Table X

Balance of the Second Represalia

<u>Factory or Licensed Trading Post</u>	<u>Value of Effects and Bullion Seized (in pesos)</u>	<u>First Represalia</u>	<u>Value of Seize Effects Restored According to Spanish Accounts (in pesos)</u>
Buenos Aires	185,138-5½	205,781	117,482
Cartagena	304,575-4½	182,000	60,020
Havana	51,495-7	24,713-3½	26,495
Santiago	15,705-4	50,591-3	all
Panama and Portobelo	169,367-5½	1,075,527	71,508
Vera Cruz and Mexico	1,992,691-6	1,206,259	unavailable
Puerto Rico	320	5,000	all
Santa Marta			
Santo Domingo	16,000	5,980-1	all
Maracaibo	1,667-5		all
Caracas	8,553-3		all

Chapter VIII

The Third Trading Period, 1728-1739:

Trade, Policies and Problems

Preliminary articles of peace concluding hostilities involving Great Britain, Spain, France, the Netherlands and the Emperor were signed on 31 May 1727. They provided 1) for the resumption of all trading privileges in Europe and the West Indies granted to the English, French and Dutch by several treaties prior to 1725, 2) for the restoration of effects seized during the recent war, 3) for the reestablishment of the asiento trade, 4) for Spain to raise the blockade of Gibraltar, and 5) for the British to withdraw the fleets commanded by admirals Wager and Hosier from the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. Although the treaty failed to resolve the outstanding questions involving seizures and contraband trade prior to the war, the signatory powers agreed to present their complaints to the congress held in Soissons, the purpose of which was to draw up the final treaty of peace.

Months passed without the preliminary articles being ratified, or the congress convened, primarily because the annual ship Prince Frederick, which was seized in Vera Cruz at the outbreak of the recent war (See above p. 144), had not been returned to the South Sea Company. However through the adept negotiations of the Count of Koningseg, the Austrian emperor's representative, the ship was finally returned, Admiral Hosier withdrew his ships from Portobelo, and a declaration confirming the preliminary articles was signed on 6 March 1728 by the negotiators. The Congress of Soissons was convened soon afterwards on 29 May 1728.¹

William Shanhope, Horatio Walpole and Stephen Poyntz were the official British plenipotentiaries to the Congress. They were joined by Richard Rigby, a Company employee who was sent to advise them, and to present Company complaints

1. Rothenburg to Paz, 3 December 1727, AGS, Estado 6875; Paz to Koningseg, 4 December 1727, AGS, Estado 6875; Koningseg to Philip V, 5 November 1727, AGS, Estado 6875; Clive Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (65 vols., New York, 1969), xxxii, 439; Horsfall, "British Relations", pp. 161-163.

against the Spanish, substantiated by written reports from employees in the West Indies.² Rigby had two assistants, Claude Crespigny, a clerk, and Matthew Plowes, secretary and principal accountant. Plowes betrayed the Company soon after his arrival by giving the Spanish plenipotentiaries more than 40 documents which implicated Company servants and Spanish officials in illicit commerce, and Spanish ministers in bribery. He accused the Marquis of Grimaldo of accepting £8,000 in jewellery and a pension of £3,000 a year as rewards for concluding a peace favourable to the Company in 1721, and Guillermo Eon of falsifying the measurements of annual ships in exchange for £1,000 and a pension of £800 a year. Plowes blamed the Company for every dispute that had arisen over the asiento trade, and commented that Company complaints against the Spanish were nothing more than "a sort of a Miscellany Jargon of words, put together, in an harsh ambiguous Stile".

Benjamin Keene was pained by Plowes' treason. All "that I am vexed at", he said, "is, that such prudent and wise Persons as these [Spanish] Ministers are, should let themselves be imposed upon by such mean Creatures as this is".³

2. A merchant from Liverpool recommended that merchants who had grievances against the Spanish should be allowed to appoint someone to represent their claims during the negotiations. However they had to be satisfied with submitting their claims to the official British negotiators. The Daily Journal, 6 May 1728.
3. Minute committee of correspondence to factories, 12 December 1728, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 49; Keene to Waldegrave, 21 March 1732, BM, Add. 43,415, f. 158; Barranechea to Paz, 31 August 1728, AGS, Estado 7017; From Plowes, 21 November 1728, AGS, Estado 6878; Paz to Patiño, 5 October 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Plowes to Barranechea, 30 September 1728, AGS, Estado 6878; Directors to Rigby, June 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 22; George H. Nelson, "Contraband Trade Under the Asiento, 1730-1739", The American Historical Review, vol. 51 (1945), p. 55.

In return for the information he presented, Plowes received £60 in cash, a promise of protection, and an annual pension of 500 doblones, which was subsequently raised to 2,000 pesos per year. When he died in 1750 the pension was given to his widow, but reduced by half.

The Company was also betrayed by Dr. John Burnett, a former factor in Portobelo, whose reward was the post of médico de cámara in Madrid. Petition from Matthew Plowes' wife, presented for decision on 16 January 1760, AGS, Estado 7019; Directors to Bumpsted et al, 19 November 1724, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 79.

When the Congress opened, British ministers (who were unaware of Plowes' defection) demanded restitution of all Company effects seized during the represalia in 1727, complaining that they had been seized in contravention of the asiento treaty, just as they had been in 1718. Anticipating a reluctance on the part of the Spanish to restore these goods unless the Company paid duties that they owed on the sale of slaves, the Duke of Newcastle advised the plenipotentiaries to blame the Spanish for the delinquent payments. How could the Company prepare correct accounts--and therefore determine the duties owed, he asked, when their slaves, personal effects, merchandise from the annual ships and even account books had been seized?

Besides demanding the restitution of Company effects, the British plenipotentiaries were instructed to request permission to send another annual ship, and to obtain confirmation of the cédula of 7 September 1721 which had allowed the Company to sell merchandise from the annual ships inland, not just at the port of landing. This privilege had been revoked on 11 March 1724, when sales were restricted to the sites and times of the fairs. The Company also hoped to recover the privilege of introducing slaves from Jamaica. (On 20 October 1724 they were ordered to import slaves directly from Africa.)⁴

The Company pressed other claims against the Spanish through different channels. In February 1728 they replaced their agent in Madrid, Thomas Stratford, with Benjamin Keene, who was also the British plenipotentiary there.⁵ There were obvious advantages to the Company of having Keene represent them (and in fact he was criticized for holding the two posts simultaneously because of the possibility of a conflict of interest). He spoke Spanish and French fluently, had access to Spanish ministers, and was familiar with British government policy. In spite of these advantages it did not appear that the

4. Draft instructions to Stanhope, Walpole and Poyntz, 30 April 1728, BM, Add. 32,756, ff. 63-69; Additional instructions to Stanhope, Walpole and Poyntz, 23 May 1728, BM, Add. 32,756, f. 77; Keene to Paz, 6 May 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/103; Wescomb to Newcastle, 5 September 1728, PRO, S.P. 36/8, part 1, f. 111; Extract directors to Keene 20 February 1729, PRO, S.P. 36/19, part 1, f. 30.

Company would regain the benefits that it had prior to the rupture. Joseph Patiño and the Marquis of Paz were more intransigent in their opposition to the Company than before because of the intelligence gained from Plowes and Burnett. Keene complained that Paz had always been a difficult negotiator, but that now he had become excessively cautious and that it was impossible to discover his true opinion on anything; as for Patiño, he was more determined than ever to destroy British commerce in the Indies and to annul the asiento contract.⁶

News of the signing of the preliminary articles of peace reached the Spanish West Indies by July 1728, but in a form unsatisfactory to Keene and to the Company. Paz had ordered Spanish officials in America to reestablish the asiento trade in the form prescribed by the original treaty of 1713; but he rescinded subsequent treaties and cédulas which modified and improved the Company's trading privileges.

The instructions were interpreted differently throughout America. The viceroy of Mexico promptly withdrew the guard which had been maintained on the Vera Cruz factory during the war, and restored two Company snaws, the St. George and the Prince of Asturias, and the annual ship Prince Frederick. On the advice of the oidores of the audiencia he refused to return other Company effects or slaves, explaining that his orders only stipulated the restitution of the ships. The governors of Cartagena and Santiago de Cuba prohibited Company factors from landing after they returned from exile in Jamaica, insisting that they had not received confirmation of the peace, or orders to reestablish trade, although copies of the necessary orders were delivered by

5. In addition to his government remuneration and allowances, Keene received the same privileges and salary (£1,000) as Stratford. Wescomb to Keene, 3 February 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 67.

6. Keene to Walpole and Poyntz, 20 October 1729, BM, Add. 32,763, ff. 504-505; Wescomb to Keene, 15 May 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 100; Keene to Wescomb, 16 May 1728, BM, Add. 32,755, f. 445; Directors to Stratford, 29 February 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 16; The Daily Courant, 29 April 1728.

a British naval officer to the governor of Cartagena, and probably to Santiago as well.⁷

Eight months after the declaration confirming the preliminary articles of peace was signed, most factories remained closed, and most Company property unrestored. Moreover, British merchants complained that Spanish incursions against them continued. Company officials offered several plausible hypotheses to explain the delay in the resumption of the asiento trade. They suggested that the Spanish were trying "to gain Time 'till the Galleons are come away" after the blockade by Hosier in order to replenish the treasury in case hostilities should continue in Europe. Furthermore, in some cases instructions to Spanish officials in America announcing the peace, and ordering the resumption of the asiento trade, had been delivered by British naval ships; Spanish officials in Havana, and almost certainly elsewhere, had orders not to obey any cédulas delivered by foreigners. Company officials frequently complained about the instructions sent to Spanish officials in America, and suspected that all the injustices from which they suffered emanated from "Secret Orders sent from Spain to the several Governments in the Indies to pay no regard to the publick Ones". There is no evidence to support this suspicion.⁸

When Company representatives complained at Soissons that the Spanish colonial officials refused to obey their orders, the Spanish plenipotentiaries claimed that they were equally perplexed. Adamantly insisting that Philip V intended to honour the preliminary articles of peace, they denied any knowledge of continuing hostilities in the Indies, or of a failure to restore trade.

7. Keene to Newcastle, 17 March 1728, BM, Add. 32,754, f. 407; Williams to directors, 1 August 1728, BM, Add. 32,760, f. 99; Extract factors of Vera Cruz to directors, 15 August 1728, BM, Add. 32,687, ff. 256-257; Patiño to viceroy of México, 25 April 1728, PRO, S.P. 94/99; St. Lo to Burchett, 6 July 1728, PRO, Adm. 1/230; Wescomb to Keene, 10 October 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 54; Paz to Keene, 5 December 1728, PRO, S.P. 94/99; Farley's Exeter Journal, 18 October 1728.

8. Wescomb to Keene, 24 October 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 56; Rigby to Poyntz, 6 November 1728, BM, Add. 32,759, f. 87; Wescomb to Delafaye, 7 November 1728, BM, Add. 32,687, f. 241; Wescomb to Newcastle, 1 August 1730, PRO, PRO, S.P. 36/10, part 1, ff. 2-3.

Newcastle was also piqued by Spanish depredations and their refusal to reopen the asiento trade. He ordered the ministers at Soissons to inform their Spanish counterparts

that these Violent & unjustifiable proceedings of the Spaniards in the West Indies are come to such a height, that the King's Subjects will be under a Necessity of doing themselves Justice & of repelling Force by Force, & that His Maj.ty's Ships in those parts can not in such case refuse them their Assistance for the security of their persons & Effects, and the protection of their Trade & Navigation, so unwarrantably interrupted by the Spaniards:

The British plenipotentiaries made numerous representations to rectify this situation, even soliciting French support.

Meanwhile, rumours spread that the Spanish had no intention of restoring English trade. News of the establishment of the Caracas Company bewildered negotiators in Soissons, as did reports that some Spanish colonial governors had granted licenses to local merchants to supply slaves because of the continuing inactivity of the South Sea Company. It looked as if war might break out again after the Spanish representatives left the Congress, and word was received that the galleons had reached Spain.

The main problem at Soissons had been the question of British commerce in the West Indies. Spain had threatened to place all commercial disputes before the Congress unless the British agreed to Spanish demands in Italy. The British believed that a general discussion of commerce could ruin their predominant position in the West Indies trade.⁹

Relations between the two crowns began to improve by the summer of 1729; in August Philip V ordered royal officials to restore Company effects in Buenos Aires; soon afterwards Benjamin Keene was assured that permission would soon be given for an annual ship to sail; on 9 November a treaty of peace and

9. Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 November 1728, BM, Add. 32,759, f. 31; Newcastle to British plenipotentiaries, 11 October 1728, BM, Add. 32,758, ff. 413-414; Walpole to Newcastle, 27 October 1728, BM, Add. 32,758, f. 448; Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 10 December 1728, BM, Add. 32,759, f. 325; Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 14 February 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 68; Horsfall, "British Relations", pp. 161-163.

friendship was signed in Paris between Spain, France and Great Britain. The signatory powers agreed to cease all hostilities, and affirmed that French and British commerce in Europe and the West Indies would be reestablished on the basis of treaties signed prior to 1725. Spain agreed to make reparations for damages suffered by the French and English at the hands of Spanish guardacostas and officials in the Indies since the preliminary articles of peace were signed in 1727. Cédulas to this effect were sent to the viceroys, governors and other royal officials in Peru and New Spain, and Keene was informed of the imminent appointment of an ambassador to England.¹⁰

Just before the Treaty of Paris was signed, the South Sea Company convened a joint committee of correspondence and factories to determine the most favourable method of reestablishing the asiento trade, both in terms of assuring profits to the Company and of making a good impression on the Spanish. They were determined to avoid the pre-rupture abuses and inefficiencies of the factories and ships, including the clandestine trade conducted by the crews of the annual, slave, license and provision ships. They decided that the best way to prevent contraband trade was to permit supercargoes, officers and crews of Company ships to carry privately small amounts of goods under strict control.

The captain of each ship was required to keep an inventory of all provisions and stores taken to the factories, and of the money and goods remitted. Before he could receive his wages these books were reviewed by the Company's committee of shipping. The discovery of contraband on a ship was grounds for the immediate dismissal of the captain. In addition, the ratio of ships' tonnage to slaves was standardized to prevent the loading of an excessive amount of provisions which might be sold illicitly. At Vera Cruz, Cartagena

10. Real cédula to governor and royal officials of Buenos Aires, 31 August 1729, BM, Add. 32,762, f. 301; Keene and Stanhope to Newcastle, 10 November 1729, BM, Add. 32,764, f. 37; Treaty of Peace, Union Friendship and Mutual Defence between Great Britain, France and Spain, 9 November 1729, PRO, C.O. 388/89, ff. 2-9; Real cédula to viceroys, governors and royal officials of Peru and New Spain, 14 December 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Keene to British plenipotentiaries, 1 September 1729, BM, Add. 32,763, f. 155.

and Panama and Portobelo the ratio was two tons per slave: thus a 100 ton ship had to carry at least 50 slaves. Buenos Aires was exempted from this regulation because slaves were shipped there directly from Africa. Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Caracas and Campeche were also exempted, either because sales were in small numbers, or because a barter system was used in the trade, which required ships larger than was strictly necessary to carry slaves in order to transport the return cargoes. Guinea ships destined for Buenos Aires were also subject to new regulations. A fine of £20 per slave was imposed on captains who carried more slaves than their contracts stipulated, and one of £30 was imposed for each slave sold in Buenos Aires not registered with the Company. The amount was to be deducted from the earnings of the offending ship. There is no indication how well these new regulations were enforced, but judging from the numerous Spanish seizures, they do not appear to have been particularly effective.¹¹

The instructions issued to Company agents in Jamaica when trade resumed contained only minor innovations from those under which they had previously operated. The most important addition was the right to issue licenses to merchants for supplying slaves to Spanish communities lacking factories, and to nominate them as factors so that they would be protected under the terms of the asiento treaty. The Company estimated that this branch of the slave trade brought an annual profit of £10,000, but admitted that it offered numerous opportunities to introduce contraband merchandise. Therefore when the right was revoked by the Spanish in 1733, mainly because of the contraband, the Company suffered a considerable loss of revenue.

11. Addendum to Guinea Ship contract, 25 February 1731, BM, Add. 25,581, f. 25; General order, 8 November 1734, Donnan, Documents, ii, 453; Geraldino to Saravia y Antolinez, 10 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 15 May 1730, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 33-34; Directors to captains of Company ships, 10 March 1731, BM, Add. 25,581, f. 26.

Sperling claims that the regulations for controlling illicit trade were so successful that by 1735 contraband on slave ships was negligible. Sperling, The South Sea Company, p. 43. Although the controls initiated by the Company helped to limit illicit trade, they did not stop it. There are records of extensive contraband throughout the last trading period.

The agents were authorized to arbitrate disputes between the factors and to grant permission to indult slaves which had been introduced illegally during the rupture.¹² They received a commission of 1% on all money and effects remitted from the factories, and had the option of drawing this money in sterling bills of exchange, or in pesos because of the instability of Jamaican currency. Since no contract was signed with the Royal African Company during this, the last, trading period, the agents purchased most of the slaves for the factories from private Guinea traders, although the Company did send some ships to Africa in addition to those destined for Buenos Aires.

These minor revisions in the agents' instructions were insufficient to prevent serious misconduct by them, mainly because of the unsystematic method of selection. Personal relationships with Company directors were still the main criteria in most appointments.¹³

The main modifications in Company procedures were directed at the factories. Each factor had to sign a partnership agreement with the Company which made him responsible jointly with all other factors for the conduct of the factory. The factors received a commission on sales and returns, in lieu of a salary, and their expenses were calculated on a tarif or schedule of expenses allowed by the Company for the maintenance of the negroes prior to their sale, and for the salaries of Spanish officials who supervised and

12. Indultos appear to have been opened at every factory when trade resumed. The Company still paid 33 1/3 pesos per pieza in duties, and 110 pesos per pieza to the owners, but the profit was divided differently. One-half of the net proceeds went to the factors, the other half to the Company. The factors' percentage was divided as follows:
 1/3 to the factor who seized the slaves, and
 2/3 to be divided among the remaining factors according to their shares of the commission.
 Instructions of the first secret committee to Panama and Portobelo factors, 30 April 1729, AGS, Estado 7008.
13. Wescomb to Humphrey, 18 June 1731, Donnan, Documents, ii, 439; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 18 June 1731, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 25,553, ff. 40-41; Smith to Keene, 28 May 1736, BM, Add. 32,791, f. 198; Minute committee of correspondence, 14 May 1734, BM, Add. 25,554, f. 95; Geraldino to Patiño, 21 January 1734, Donnan, Documents, ii, 451; Geraldino to Patiño, 7 January 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790.

examined the trade. These tariffs varied slightly from factory to factory. At Panama and Portobelo the tariff included a housekeeping allowance of 7,000 pesos a year beginning when factors signed their contract and extending for two years after their arrival at the factory. Subsequently their commission (which was now intended to cover housekeeping expenses) was 5% on the sale of slaves and 2½% on returns remitted to England. The commission at Buenos Aires was 5% on both negro sales and returns, with a further provision that if the total commission amounted to less than 17,500 pesos per year then the Company would make up the difference. The division of the commission was 1/2 to the head factor, 1/3 to the second and 1/6 to the third. Money advanced to factors prior to the voyage to the Indies was to be deducted from their share of the commission.¹⁴

Under the new regulations surgeons, bookkeepers and secretaries were chosen by the factors, who were also responsible for transporting them to the Indies and for paying their salaries. The Company maintained the right to approve these appointments and required successful applicants to furnish bonds to the Company since they were eligible to become factors in the event of a superior's death. Subject to slight variations at the different factories, bookkeepers received a salary of 1,000 pesos a year, surgeons 666 and secretaries 500. While these costs were defrayed from the factors' commissions, 1/3 of their salaries were kept to cover room and board.¹⁵

While certain procedures for operating the factory were new, the factors' instructions differed mainly in so much as they reflected the rupture of 1727. They were directed to request the return of all confiscated goods or the receipts of their sale if they had been sold. Company slaves were to be

14. Minute joint committee of correspondence and factories, 12 November 1729, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 9-10; Minute joint committee of correspondence and factories, 14 and 23 August 1728, BM, Add. 25,552, ff. 35, 37.

15. Minute joint committee of correspondence and factories, 18 February 1729, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 54; Directors to Hutchinson, 11 March 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 84-85; Directors to D'Oyle and Davison, 11 March 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 36, 88.

measured as before, but branded with new marks, the old brands having been destroyed in 1727 to prevent their unauthorized use by private traders.

Examples of the new brands are as follows:



The slaves were to be sold quickly, for cash if possible, to avoid undue medical or burial expenses. No unmarked gold or silver was to be accepted in payment; all books and accounts were to be open to the entire factory; and the recurrent evils of illicit trade and offensive behaviour were to be avoided.¹⁶

When trade resumed in 1729 the Company had factories in Havana, Santiago (under the direction of the Havana factory), Vera Cruz, Panama and Portobelo, Buenos Aires, and Cartagena. Its resumption was inauspicious in spite of the preparations made. New personnel were largely unfit, frauds rampant and communications inefficient. One ex-factor emphasized that to renew trade in this traditional manner was to destroy it. A Company employee suggested that trade could be improved by establishing a factory in Lima to supply the Peruvian merchants, thus avoiding the restrictions placed on the export of bullion from that viceroyalty. While the Company initially favoured the suggestion, they eventually dismissed it, believing it to be "a dangerous Experiment to alter the Chanel of the Sales of the Negroes, and of Such fatal Consequence as not Easily to be retrieved after done." The fear of change and reform were largely responsible for the continuing frauds committed by Company employees. Moreover, even when an infraction of the treaty or fraud against the Company was discovered, punitive action was rarely taken, to the despair of Spanish and British officials

16. In the case of the joint factory at Panama and Portobelo the business ledgers were kept in Panama. Transactions in Portobelo were entered in cash books and sent weekly across the isthmus to be entered in the ledger. Directors to Garthwait and Nasmyth, 11 July 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 123-124; Directors to Rigby and Johnson, 6 September 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 38-84; Directors to Denniss et al, 4 July 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 105-114.

and merchants. One person succinctly summarized the feelings of many.

that such Corporations [as the South Sea Company] are not only destructive of Trade, dangerous to Liberty, and prejudicial to the Publick in general; but, by Fraud and Mismanagement, are commonly attended with great Losses to the Proprietors Themselves.

An analysis of the proceedings of the factories during the last trading period confirm these dire predictions.¹⁷

The reestablishment of the Company's trade did not stop Spanish guardacostas from continuing to patrol against contraband traders or occasionally to accost ships engaged in legal trade. In fact the establishment of the Caracas Company increased this activity, as did a real cédula dated 14 June 1730 which advised colonial officials to watch for illicit trade on Company ships. An asiento ship, the St. James, encountered two Spanish men-of-war early in 1730 after leaving Portobelo. The Spaniards, who had reportedly taken over £100,000 recently from Dutch vessels trading along the coast, seized "all the private Trade, and plunder'd her even of Linnen and other things belonging to the Officers of the Vessel". Hostilities against Company ships, compounded by various difficulties in reestablishing trade, led the Company to protest that the

Assiento Contract is become No More than what his C.M. is pleased from time to time by his Cedula's to declare it to be, And these very Ced.s again lyable to the Misconstructions of Gov.rs at pleasure, & that with impunity, provided they be made in more disfavour to the Comp.a....¹⁸

The directors made several unusual efforts to gain Spanish cooperation or favour. Deputy director John Eyles wrote to one Spanish minister soliciting

17. The Country Journal or the Craftsman, by Caleb D'Anvers, 13 January 1733, PRO, S.P. 36/29, f. 15; Minute joint committee of correspondence and factories, 8 September 1730, BM, Add. 25,553, f. 49; Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 14 February 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 68; Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 18 April 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 96; Minute joint committee of correspondence and factories, 1 May 1729, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 61.
18. Parza de la Torre to Philip V, 31 May 1731, AGI, Santo Domingo 702; Stewart to (probably) Burchett, 10 May 1730, PRO, Adm. 1/231; Directors to Keene, 15 May 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/18, part ii, f. 75; Wescomb to Newcastle, 11 September 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/20, part i, f. 159; Pares, War and Trade, p. 14.

better treatment of Company employees in return for "favorable results". When this veiled bribe offer was ignored they withheld salaries normally paid to Spanish ministers from the duties on the slave trade. The Spanish ambassador in Venice, the Marquis of Monteleón, remained unpaid for six years and nine months. When he appealed to the Company for payment he was told

to use his Credit and good Offices with the Ministers in Spain for removing these difficultys, For till that is done it will not be in my power, notwithstanding my Inclination to Serve the Marquis, to induce our Court of Directors to make any payments whatsoever on Account of the Negro Dutys.

Although it appears that Monteleón made no effort to intercede with Philip V on behalf of the Company, he did receive his salary ultimately.¹⁹

The Company also pressed for redress through more conventional channels. In response to pressure from the directors and private merchants in London, Newcastle informed British governors in the West Indies that British subjects engaged in lawful trade who were molested by guardacostas could gain naval support in obtaining retribution by furnishing evidence to a vice-admiralty court in Jamaica. The court was authorized to send warships to Spanish ports where captured goods were taken to demand their immediate release, and if necessary to seize Spanish goods in retaliation. Company employees in the West Indies considered this an over reaction. They feared that it might result in increased guardacosta activity and perhaps even another represalia.²⁰

19. From John Eyles, 17 June 1730, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 391; Eyles to Delafaye, 12 March 1729, PRO, S.P. 36/18, part 1, f. 31; Patiño to Keene 20 August 1732, PRO, S.P. 94/114; Directors to Keene, 15 September 1732, PRO, S.P. 36/28, f. 152.

According to one calculation made in the late 1730s, the following annual assignments were made from the asiento duties: a private embassy chapel in London, 2,000 pesos; the Count of Montijo, 48,000 pesos; Thomas Geraldino, 10,000 pesos; Geraldino's two secretaries, 2,000 pesos; the Count of St. Gil, 15,000 pesos; and the Marquis of Capicello, 8,000 pesos; a total of 110,900 pesos. Duties on 4,000 Company slaves were 133,333 1/3 pesos. Calculation of the distribution of negro duties, n.d., AGS, Sect.a y sup.a de hacienda 973.

20. Pratter and Rigby to Stewart, 4 March 1730, PRO, Adm. 1/231; Newcastle to Hunter, 25 September 1730, PRO, C.O. 5/4, part ii, f. 204.

The incident that caused these orders to be issued was the seizure of the Mary by Puerto Rican privateers. Read-Admiral Stewart was unable to obtain the release of the ship and was proceeding to execute the reprisal

The refusal of Spanish officials in America to permit the resumption of trade, to cease hostilities, or to comply with other articles of the Treaty of 1729 were "of so crying a Nature", Newcastle said, "that the King cannot bring himself to conceive that it is possible they should have the Countenance or approbation of His Catholic Maj.ty or his Ministers". Unless Spanish ministers honoured their engagements,

it cannot be expected, that His Majesty, who hitherto has been the most forward of any of the Contracting Parties of the Treaty of Seville, to perform the Conditions of it, should any longer look upon Himself to be under any obligation to execute that Treaty towards Spain....

Benjamin Keene, who transmitted his superior's testy complaints, as well as the incessant demands of the Company, lamented: "if it be remarked that one of my Letters...is too like another I have nothing to say for myself, but that if you strike the same String, You must expect the same Sound". Since the Company refused to accede to Spanish demands concerning the payment of duties, salaries and the presentation of accounts, it was not surprising that the Spanish remained uncooperative. Nonetheless Keene was convinced that the factors would have been permitted to resume their duties without trouble had they had the patience to await the arrival of advice ships carrying Philip V's orders. Spanish ministers were perhaps officious, but they did not purposely obstruct the treaty, nor did they send "contre orders to elude the force of the Cédulas" authorizing the resumption of trade, as can be proven by the "different usage" the factors met with in different ports.²¹

An agreement was reached on 8 February 1732 between Benjamin Keene, Joseph Patiño and the Marquis of Paz which was intended to redress complaints by both

20. (continued from previous page) orders when Company agents asked him to refrain from acting. They feared retaliation against the annual ship then in Portobelo, and argued that the Spanish would undoubtedly issue similar orders against all British traders. Steward agreed to their request and confined himself to cruising against the guardacostas. Pares suggests that this restraining action by the Company prevented "the situation in the West Indies from developing into what would have amounted to a war." Pares, op. cit., p. 15.

21. Keene to Delafaye, 28 September 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Newcastle to Keene, 28 September 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/105.

parties. They declared that reparations would be made for all seizures made by the British and Spanish since the Treaty of Seville (1729). To prevent excesses by their guardacostas and privateers in the future the Spanish promised that captains of all ships fitted out for the purpose of combating illicit trade would post bonds which would be forfeited if they made illegal seizures. In return the British agreed that their warships would not convoy or protect any merchant ships carrying on unlawful trade.²²

Meanwhile, the commission established by the Treaty of Seville to discuss the question of seizures met in Madrid for the first time on 3 March 1732. Discussions were to continue for three years. The commissioners representing the Company and British merchants were Benjamin Keene, Arthur Stert and John Goddard; Pablo Diaz del Abandero (later replaced by the Marquis of Torrenueva), Francisco Manuel de Herrera and Joseph Quintana represented Spain. Before the commission even began its deliberations, the Spanish delegation said that they would discuss none of the various outstanding claims until the South Sea Company paid all negro duties which had accrued since the signing of the Treaty of Seville. They argued that since the Company had continued to trade they could hardly refuse to pay these duties.²³

After considerable discussion the commissioners finally agreed that the Company was liable to pay duties from 1 January 1731. This compromise allowed a duty free trading period for the Company, and was intended as compensation for the irregular resumption of trade at the different factories. Payment was due on 1 May 1732, and the asiento accounts were to be given to Philip by 31 July 1732. Shortly after this agreement was reached the Spanish commissioners

22. Paz to Keene, 3 October 1730, PRO, C.O. 94/104; Joint declaration by Keene, Patiño and Paz, 8 February 1732, Bodleian, MS Clarendon Dept. C 468; Real cédula to Spanish governors in port cities in America, 10 January 1732, Ibid.

23. Appointment of commissioners, 19 January 1732, AGS, Estado 6883; Newcastle to Eyles, 17 April 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/18, part ii, f. 55; Keene, Stert and Goddard to Newcastle, 14 March 1732, PRO, S.P. 94/106; Translation of a Spanish paper delivered to the British commissioners, 3 March 1732, PRO, S.P. 94/106; British commissioners to Spanish commissioners, 13 March 1732, PRO, S.P. 94/106.

expanded their demands, insisting that the Company pay duties on all goods sold illicitly--specifically referring to provisions--from Company ships. The Company would not have declared the amount of this contraband even if they knew, and denied any responsibility for it. They contended that most of it was by captains of British men-of-war rather than by Company employees. (In fact both sold provisions and merchandise illegally.) In any case the directors refused to honour the agreement of 1 January 1732 because they were unable to provide accounts of the asiento trade. The books, they said, had been lost or destroyed. Furthermore, because of the unfair demands the Spanish commissioners made on the Company, and the numerous delays, they suggested that the commission be dissolved.²⁴

Thus negotiations had reached an impasse. Keene blamed the Company for its obstinancy. Unable to understand why they refused to hand over accounts of the trade, he concluded that

we must come to some sort of an understanding for it can never be for the Interest of a regular Company to let Things run on in a shackled manner as they have since the Peace of 1721 always en bon Compte.

As long as the Company refused to provide accounts, the Spanish refused to discuss British complaints. Eventually both parties agreed that no solution could be reached, and the commission was indeed dissolved, leaving all issues unsettled.²⁵

A suggestion that negotiations be transferred to London was rejected; thus disputes between the two crowns and their subjects were referred to

24. Eyles (probably) to Geraldino, 25 August 1732, BM, Add. 32,778, ff. 135-136; Spanish to British commissioners, 17 April 1732, Bodleian, MS Clarendon Dept. C 468; Agreement between Spanish and British commissioners, 27 March 1732, PRO, S.P. 94/106.

At this time approximately one-fourth of the South Sea Company's total capital investment was divided between the asiento trade and a Greenland whale fishing project. The latter was abandoned in December 1732 after the Company suffered losses in excess of £50,000. Anon. letter, 26 January 1733, AGS, Estado 6897; Anon. letter, 10 November 1732, AGS, Estado 6884; Anon. letter, 22 December 1732, AGS, Estado 6884; Gentleman's Magazine (1732), ii, 583, 721.

25. Keene to Delafaye, 29 August 1732, PRO, S.P. 94/112; Geraldino to Patiño, 18 February 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790; Newcastle to Keene, 24 February 1735, BM, Add. 32,787, f. 71; From Stert and Goddard, 5 December 1734, PRO, S.P. 94/106.

traditional diplomatic channels. The most auspicious diplomatic development was the appointment on 21 April 1732 of Thomas Geraldino as Spain's representative in London to the South Sea Company. Geraldino presented his credentials to the Company on 2 June 1732. In Keene's opinion the Spanish could not have selected "a more fair or Honest Man". His appointment was interpreted by the English as a desire by Patiño to inaugurate a new era of understanding and peaceful commerce.

Their hopes were soon shattered. Geraldino was well-briefed on the South Sea Company, and his instructions were more severe than had been anticipated by the directors. He was to monitor closely the asiento trade; attend all directors' meetings; keep his government informed about new factory regulations, the schedule of Company ships, the appointment of officials and the number of slaves introduced; and to give special attention to the prevention of contraband on the annual ships. In addition he was responsible for keeping the newly appointed Spanish agents to Company factories apprised of the situation in England as it pertained to the asiento trade.²⁶

The appointment of Spanish factors in America during the third trading period was justified on grounds that the Company had not complied with their contract. (The only control the Spanish exercised over the Company during the first two trading periods was through representatives to the court of directors, the Junta del Asiento de Negros, and royal officials in the Indies.) Spanish ministers did not know the extent of the trade and therefore had no idea of their share in the annual ships, or the amount owed in duties on slaves.

The primary responsibility of these factors was the same as Geraldino's:

26. To compensate Geraldino for the inconvenience of moving to England, he was named Knight of the Order of Santiago, granted the privileges and titles of a councillor of Hacienda, and given a salary of 10,000 pesos a year. Keene to directors, 11 and 26 April 1732, PRO, S.P. 94/111; Smith to Geraldino, 2 June 1732, BM, Add. 25,557, f. 72.

At about the same time, the Marquis of Montijo was named ambassador and minister plenipotentiary to England. Both men received their salaries from asiento duties. Resolution, court of directors, 3 December 1731, PRO, S.P. 36/25, f. 119; Instructions to Thomas Geraldino, 1 May 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

to keep a close vigil on the asiento trade. They were to inspect each annual, slave, license and provision ship for illicit goods, participate in the visitas, see that slaves were properly branded, regulate sales and inspect return cargoes. Their accounts and findings were to be transmitted to Geraldino and to Spanish ministers in Madrid. In general it was an efficient system. Geraldino and the factors could warn of suspected frauds on Company ships, which could then be inspected immediately upon arrival in the West Indies or in England.

Spanish representatives were appointed in Havana, Vera Cruz, Campeche, Caracas, Cartagena, Panama and Portobelo, and Buenos Aires. In most cases they were local residents who had previously held official posts. The factor appointed in Havana, for example, was the contador de cuentas for the barlovento islands at the time of his appointment; the one at Campeche was the sargento mayor there. These men received their instructions in late March or early April 1734.²⁷

While the Company ordered their employees in America to cooperate with the Spanish factors, they told Benjamin Keene to protest against their employment as an infringement of article xxviii of the asiento treaty, which stipulated that the Spanish could only appoint two people to supervise the trade. The directors saw the appointments as another obstacle to efficient operations, and naturally most Company factors feared a strict supervision of their activities. Smuggling would become much more difficult, and complete accounts would now be more often available, thereby eliminating an excuse so often used in refusing to comply with Spanish demands.

Although the appointment of these supervisors undoubtedly prevented many illegal activities, there were numerous grievances that could not be controlled or eliminated in this way.²⁸

27. Factors named to supervise the asiento trade, n.d., c. 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; General instructions to factors, 15 September 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Philip V to Zentellas, 18 September 1733, AGI, Santa Fé 1167; Sequeira to Patiño, 18 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen 2794; Patiño (probably) to directors, 31 July and 11 August 1733, AGS, Estado 7009.
28. Directors to Keene, 14 September 1733, BM, Add. 32,782, f. 226; Geraldino to Martínez de la Vega, 12 January 1734, Donnan, Documents, ii, 447.

A particularly acrimonious dispute erupted in 1735 over the exchange rate to be used in paying negro duties. When the asiento contract was signed in 1713 the peso escudo de plata, or piece of eight, was Spain's primary unit of currency. It was still in use in 1735 and bore the same weight, stamp and standard. Another coin used in Spain and in the Indies in 1713, the real de plata, eight of which equalled one peso escudo, was recalled in Spain in 1725, but remained current in America. The following year a new coin was introduced which was commonly called a provincial, ten equalling one peso escudo. The argument between the Company and Spain was whether negro duties accrued since 1726 should be paid in pesos consisting of eight or ten parts, that is whether the Company should pay in reales de plata or in provinciales.

The Spanish contended that the duties were to be paid in the coinage used in 1713, particularly as the devaluation of 1726 was in Spain and not in America, where the slaves were sold and payment received. To further substantiate their argument they pointed out that contracts signed between the Company and licensees after 1726 specified that the rate of exchange would be four shillings and six pence per peso, which was the old exchange rate. If this rate was used between the Company and licensees, they argued, why should another be used between the Company and Spain? The Company replied that the value of the peso escudo de plata could only be its current rate in Spain. They insisted that their contracts with licensees had nothing to do with the issue. To complicate the issue even more, the current exchange rate fluctuated continually.²⁹

When they failed to reach an agreement, the Spanish threatened to order American officials not to admit Company slaves until the duties owed were

29. Hopkins to George II, 15 May 1735, PRO, S.P. 36/35, ff. 45-46; Fitzgerald to Newcastle, n.d., late 1730s, BM, Add. 19,034, f. 82; Geraldino to directors, 26 November 1734, PRO, S.P. 104/141; Geraldino to directors, 18 September 1733, PRO, S.P. 104/140; Directors to Keene, 25 October 1734, BM, Add. 32,786, f. 71; Minute joint committee of correspondence, and committee appointed to deal with Geraldino, 18 November 1734, PRO, S.P. 104/141; Treasury committee report, 12 September 1733, enclosed in Smith to Geraldino, 15 September 1733, PRO, S.P. 104/140.

paid--and at a rate of 4/6 per peso. The directors complained to Newcastle, who avoided the responsibility by suggesting that discussions be transferred to Spain. (A similar tactic was employed when the commissioners reached an impasse in their debates.) The change of locale made little difference, and served to irritate Patiño, who considered it a delaying tactic. Eventually, in May 1737, a compromise was reached and an exchange rate of 4/4 (52 pence) per peso was set.³⁰

The entire drawn-out debate exasperated Keene, who had been ordered to reiterate the same inflexible demands on behalf of the Company. He remarked that "This was a simple and unconnected affair, that only concerned the real not nominal value of a Peso: a Dispute, which every Merchant in Europe would decide against the Assiento...." It is surprising that a compromise was reached considering the intransigence on each side, and the actions taken by each to enforce their demands. During the two years of discussions the Spanish refused to grant permission for any annual ship to sail, and procrastinated in restoring Company goods seized during the rupture of 1728. The Company refused to pay any duties, thereby continuing to hold up the salaries of many Spanish ministers.³¹

With the frequency of verbal confrontation over the asiento contract and other disputes between the two crowns, the possibility of an open conflict grew. Peter Burrell, Company deputy director in 1736, contended that the deteriorating relations between the two countries was exacerbated by Geraldino,

30. Keene to Newcastle, 28 March 1735, BM, Add. 43,419, f. 150; Petition from the directors, 4 July 1734, PRO, S.P. 36/33, f. 111; Smith to Newcastle, 22 November 1734, BM, Add. 32,786, f. 347; Newcastle to Keene, 24 February 1735, BM, Add. 32,787, f. 64; Keene to directors, 28 February 1735, PRO, S.P. 36/34, ff. 90-91.

31. Geraldino to Patiño, 2 March 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Burrell to Keene, 20 August 1736, BM, Add. 32,792, f. 103; Directors to Keene, 23 December 1736, BM, Add. 32,793, f. 335; Geraldino to Torrenueva, 9 and 30 May 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793; Keene to Newcastle, 24 April 1739, PRO, S.P. 94/133; To Torrenueva, 23 December 1737, AGS, Estado 6902; Geraldino to Patiño, 25 February 1735, AGS, Estado 6895.

who seemed particularly hostile to the Company. Burrell accused him of prying into Company correspondence, assuming unauthorized authority over Company affairs, and maligning the Company to his own government. Alternatively, it might be interpreted merely as proof that he was obeying his instructions. In any case the directors despaired of reaching any settlement to existing disputes as long as Geraldino remained in England. Keene and Newcastle disagreed, even greatly valuing Geraldino because of his influence with Philip V.³²

Before discussions were renewed important changes occurred in the Spanish cabinet which greatly effected the future of Anglo-Spanish relations. Patiño died on 3 November 1736 and was replaced by Sebastian de la Quadra; the Marquis of Torrenueva (one of the old commissioners) acquired the portfolios of Finance, Marine and of the Indies, the latter ad-interim; the Count of Montijo, then ambassador to England, was appointed president of the Council of the Indies and thereby became protector of the asiento. Montijo was succeeded by Geraldino as ambassador, and Geraldino's post went to Pedro Tyrry, who arrived in London on 3 December 1737.

Tyrry was distrusted by Newcastle, who was suspicious of his Irish parentage and suspected him of having once spied against England.³³ Nevertheless it was generally assumed that these changes would be favourable to the Company. Perhaps the directors thought that any change would be for the better, for it is difficult to say what other grounds there were for optimism. Patiño had been unfriendly to the Company but Montijo held similar views. In fact it was reported that he was at least partly responsible for Patiño's antagonism.

32. Burrell to Keene, 10 June 1736, BM, Add. 32,791, ff. 225-227; Newcastle to Keene, 3 March 1737, BM, Add. 32,794, f. 175; Keene to Newcastle, 6 April 1737, BM, Add. 32,794, f. 283.

33. Tyrry received the same salary as Geraldino (10,000 pesos per year) and had the same general instructions (to attend Company meetings, measure annual ships, examine cargoes and transmit financial and sale records). He also had secret instructions to report on British military activities. Philip V to Torrenueva, 23 July 1737, AGS, Estado 6902; Torrenueva to Geraldino, 11 November 1737, AGS, Estado 7013; Instructions to Pedro Tyrry, 24 September 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Torrenueva to directors, 20 November 1737, AGS, Estado 6902.

Torrenueva followed Patiño's policy of delegating considerable responsibility on Company affairs to Quintana (another ex-commissioner), "the most abstract and Metaphysical Negotiator upon matters of Commerce that can be imagined", according to Keene, who complained that

This Country is at present governed by three or four mean stubborn People of little minds and limited understandings, but full of the Romantick Ideas They have found in old memorials and Speculative authors who have treated of the immense grandeur of the Spanish Monarchy; People who have vanity enough to think themselves reserved by Providence to rectify and reform the mistakes and abuses of past ministers and Ages, and who have not comprehension enough to perceive the Injury They do to the whole of the Government by their precipitate mending and botching up some particular Parts of it.

Despite the initial feeling of optimism in British government and Company circles, the changes taking place did not augur well for the future. Certainly they did not initiate the desired era of benevolence. Quite the contrary; Anglo-Spanish relations became even more strained, primarily because of the still unsolved financial dispute between the Company and the Spanish crown.³⁴

Although the question of the exchange rate had been resolved, other disputed financial issues were not. Money seized by the Spanish in the represalias of 1718 and 1727 had still not been returned in full, and the Company had not paid any duties on slaves introduced during the current trading period, or the king's share of profits from the last annual ship, the Royal Caroline. Until the money seized during the ruptures--as it appeared on royal officials' accounts--was returned, the Company refused to pay their debts. They suggested two methods by which the Spanish might pay the Company: either by a direct payment, or as a deduction from negro duties. If the latter method were adopted, they said, then the asiento contract would have to be extended some

34. Keene to Newcastle, 6 April 1737, BM, Add. 32,794, f. 284; Keene to Newcastle, 13 August 1736, BM, Add. 43,421, f. 280; Keene to Trevor, 6 November 1736, BM, Add. 43,422, f. 78; Keene to Burrell, 17 June 1737, BM, Add. 32,795, f. 96; Keene to Newcastle, 29 July and 12 September 1737, BM, Add. 32,795, ff. 171, 324; Geraldino to Torrenueva, 5 December 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793; Tyrry to Torrenueva, 5 December 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793; Keene to Newcastle, 24 April 1739, BM, Add. 32,800, f. 394.

30 years to allow time for sufficient duties to be collected.³⁵

The Company made several other demands. They asked for the renewal of the privilege to grant licenses to individuals to sell negroes in Spanish ports in the Indies where there were no factories, and requested that the accounts which they were required to turn in every five years (but which they had not done) be accepted in an outline form covering all factories rather than a detailed account for each. The reasons for this last request were twofold: first, detailed accounts were unavailable, and second, illicit or extra-legal activities by the Company could be hidden more easily in general accounts. Permission to send another annual ship was also requested, although it seems unlikely that the directors actually wanted to send another one. The request was probably made as a result of various reports and proposals that were submitted to the Company from Spanish merchants. In 1738 several of these merchants in America proposed that their ships be employed by the Company to carry goods to the viceroyalty of Peru. They provided the directors with information about the coastline to assist them in this proposed illicit trade. Another merchant suggested that a trade in slaves and supplies be conducted by Spanish merchants and managed by the Company. While none of these offers were accepted, they demonstrated to the directors the continuing demand for merchandise.³⁶

In reply to the Company's petitions Quadra said that their obligation to pay slave duties and a percentage of the profits from sales made on the Royal Caroline were unconditional; they could not be made contingent on the satisfaction

35. Burrell to George II, 30 June 1737, PRO, S.P. 94/132; Geraldino to Torrenueva, 25 July 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793; Minute of a special committee, 13 December 1737, BM, Add. 25,583, f. 7; Burrell and Bristol to George II, 21 December 1737, PRO, S.P. 94/132; Keene to Newcastle, 15 September 1737, PRO, S.P. 94/131; Abstract of the South Sea Company's Demands, with the Spanish Answers and Mr. Keene's Observations Thereupon, n.d., PRO, S.P. 131; Company proposal, 23 June and 1 December 1737, AGS, Estado 6907.

36. Memorandum of the Spanish India trade, n.d., c. 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 22-23; Burrell to (probably) Keene, 9 February 1738, BM, Add. 32,797, ff. 57-58.

of Company claims. Moreover he threatened to suspend the asiento contract if they were not paid shortly. Although Newcastle was upset by the threat, he was so poorly informed about the details of the long-standing dispute he could give Keene only imprecise and vague instructions to support the Company. It now looked as if negotiations might break down completely and that Spain might abrogate the treaty unilaterally. When Keene became aware of this threat he declared that

A Dispute of this nature with the Company cannot be a Reason for Suspending a national Treaty, as That of the Assiento is; There is Nothing in that Treaty, that gives any such Power to the King of Spain....³⁷

In addition to these problems a crisis situation had arisen in the Indies over attempts by guardacostas to suppress smuggling by British merchants to the Spanish Main. In their zealousness they seized innocent and guilty alike, including British merchant ships engaged in inter-colonial and trans-Atlantic trade. There were other issues damaging Anglo-Spanish relations, including the Georgia boundary question, logwood, and British settlements on the Mosquito Coast, and incursions in Central America, but the dispute over the restitution of seized ships and goods was perhaps the major cause of the War of Jenkin's Ear, which erupted in 1739.

The British case against seizures was based on the treaties of 1667 and 1670. By the terms of the American Treaty of 1670 trade between England and her colonies was to be uninterrupted on condition that England restrain her merchants from trading with Spanish colonies. The treaty of 1667 specified the rights of a ship, including the question of search. Only a ship's papers could be examined, according to the British interpretation of the treaty. Cargoes could not be searched indiscriminately, and only goods on Spain's list of contraband could be condemned. The Spanish claimed the right to search any

37. Newcastle to Keene, 8 May 1739, BM, Add. 32,800, f. 374; Quadra to Keene, 29 December 1738, PRO, S.P. 94/133; Newcastle to Keene, 13 November 1738, PRO, SP 94/132; Keene to Newcastle, 13 January 1739, BM, Add.32,800, ff. 5-10; Ernest Hildner, "The Role of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy Leading to the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1729-1739", Hispanic American Historical Review, xviii (1938), p. 329.

ship in the Indies because of Spain's sovereignty there, and that they had authority to seize contraband goods, even on British territory. The first assertion was considered a search on the high seas by the British, and therefore illegal. They also refuted the second, noting that some merchandise on the contraband list was acquired legally. The South Sea Company, for example, often acquired such goods from the proceeds of the slave trade.³⁸

A public outcry in England demanding compensation for seizures made by guardcostas prompted British ministers to increase their demands. On 9 August 1738 the Duke of Newcastle, Sir Robert Walpole, and Lord Harrington agreed with Thomas Geraldino that Philip V would pay £95,000 as the balance due to British merchants for redress against illegal seizures after similar claims from Spanish merchants against the British were deducted. This agreement formed the basis of a treaty signed at the Pardo on 14 January 1739 in which Spain agreed to pay £95,000 compensation for seizures on condition that the South Sea Company pay £68,000 due on negro duties and the profits from the Royal Caroline. Thus the net balance British merchants were to receive was only £27,000, far less than the original claim for £200,000, which the Spanish had actually admitted was due from guardacosta depredations. A proviso attached to the treaty by the Spanish made it impossible for it to succeed; unless the Company paid the money they owed Spain, the £95,000 would not be paid and the asiento suspended.

The treaty did not settle the questions of search, Florida and Georgia boundaries, logwood or the Mosquito Coast. Nor did it settle the conflicting demands for compensation. Company directors refused to pay the £68,000 unless the Spanish paid the money owed from the represalias over and above the £95,000, which included claims from private merchants. Quadra refused to submit to this demand in the terms the Company required: either that the

38. Pares, War and Trade, pp. 28-29, 31, 37, 39-40; William Sorsby, "The British Superintendency of the Mosquito Shore 1749-1787", Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1969, University of London, Institute of Historical Research, p. 9.

viceroy of New Spain and Peru repay the amount seized in 1718 and 1727 in regular bi-annual payments or that the asiento contract be extended 30 years. Keene summarized the reaction in Madrid: "It is not easy for me to express... half the wrath they throw out against the said Company on this occasion."³⁹

Meanwhile, to placate angry public opinion in England over continuing Spanish depredations, British war ships commanded by Read-Admiral Haddock, which had been sent to reinforce the Mediterranean fleet early in 1738, were ordered on 21 March 1739 to remain there. When Quadra and other Spanish ministers learned of this, the outbreak of hostilities became certain. Spain refused to pay the £95,000, and the South Sea Company would concede nothing. On 19 July 1739 British naval commanders in the West Indies were ordered to attack the Spanish. A fortnight later Keene was summoned home, and a month later, on 27 August, Philip V retaliated. He recalled Tyrry and Geraldino⁴⁰ from London and ordered all South Sea Company effects in America seized.⁴¹

The War of Jenkins' Ear brought an end to South Sea Company activities in the West Indies and South America. For the third and last time Company effects were seized, factors arrested and ships detained. The war was fought

39. Minutes of a meeting at Lord Harrington's, 9 August 1738, BM, Add. 32,799, f. 48; The Daily Post, 2 March 1739; Keene to Newcastle, 29 September 1738, BM, Add. 32,799, f. 130; Burrell and Bristow to George II, 21 December 1737, PRO, S.P. 94/132; Newcastle to Keene, 21 August 1738, PRO, S.P. 94/132; Directors to Keene, 17 March 1739, BM, Add. 32,800, ff. 206-207; Newcastle to Keene, 8 May 1739, BM, Add. 32,800, f. 374; Pares, War and Trade, pp. 51, 55; Real cédula, 13 October 1738, PRO, S.P. 94/247, f. 310; Royal decree signed by Quadra, 10 January 1739, PRO, S.P. 94/133; Quintana to Quadra, 27 December 1738, AGS, Estado 6905; Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy 1714-1760 (Oxford, 1962), p. 209.

40. Geraldino was ordered to try to find someone to report secretly from England during his absence. To Geraldino, 28 August 1739, AGS, Estado 6909.

41. Newcastle to Keene, 26 January 1739, PRO, S.P. 94/134; Memorial from the directors to Newcastle, 1 June 1739, PRO, S.P. 94/248, f. 54B; Orders to governors and royal officials in Spanish American ports, 27 August 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2771; Minute junta del asiento, 5 December 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2771; Verdes Montenegro to general treasury, 19 September 1740, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2786; To Marquis of Salas, 13 July 1739, AGS, Estado 6909.

For well-documented studies on the causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear see Pares, op. cit., Harold Temperley, "The Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1739", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Third series, vol. iii (1909); and McLachlan, Trade and Peace.

in a desultory manner, ending in 1748 with the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Neither side gained a marked victory. The treaty provided that the asiento contract be extended for four years, the time remaining to complete the 30 years of the original treaty. The slave trade was to be renewed on the same basis as previously, with an annual ship to sail in each of the last four years. However the Company was in no position to renew the trade. Despairing of prospect of successful trading after so many prior setbacks, they left the factories closed. They had already ordered all factors to return to England at the beginning of the war.⁴² Now, in the years immediately after the war the directors concentrated their efforts on obtaining compensation for alledged losses sustained in the trade during the seizures of 1718, 1727 and 1739.⁴³

Benjamin Keene returned to Spain after the war with renewed instructions to promote Company claims for compensation, this time as part of the negotiations for a general commercial treaty. The Company complicated the negotiations for a brief period by insisting on some indemnification in exchange for relinquishing the four trading years due to them. But their claims were not supported by the British government, who were no longer willing to jeopardize England's trading position for the dubious benefit of the Company, particularly since they feared that coveted trading concessions would go to the French if the Spanish became antagonized over Company demands. As Keene expressed it, "I am a friend to a friendship with this Country not only for the Advantages of commerce which are considerable", but as "the only means to pare down to

42. Not all Company employees returned to England. William Lea, who had a license to supply slaves to Guatemala, went to Jamaica. In 1741 he presented a proposal to the governor for an invasion of Guatemala; the plan was rejected after serious consideration. Sorsby, op. cit., p. 26.

43. Keene to Carvajal y Lancaster, 21 March 1749, AGS, Estado 6916; Bedford to Keene, 12 February 1750, BM, Add. 43,424, f. 39.

Pares says that the South Sea Company had three kinds of claims against Spain: 1) slave duties and the annual ships, 2) private debts to Philip V, which included money lent to him at the beginning of the asiento contract, and 3) represalias. All three categories were related to the asiento contract. Pares, op. cit., p. 520.

For a study of the development of new trading patterns see Frances Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies (London, 1953).

Size our haughty Rival & Neighbour"—the French.⁴⁴

On 5 October 1750 Spain and England signed a treaty which terminated the asiento contract and ended 36 years of Anglo-Spanish bickering over it. On the assurance that they would give up all further claims against Spain, the South Sea Company was granted £100,000 to cover losses sustained during the three represalias, because of the infrequent sailings of the annual ships, and for the repeated interruptions in the slave trade. The special trading privileges granted to England by the treaties of 1667 and 1670 were renewed. This treaty brought an end not only to a conflict but also to a controversy: it resolved the debate over the monopolistic Company and private traders in favour of the latter.⁴⁵

44. Wall to Carvajal y Lancaster, 23 October and 20 November 1749, AGS, Estado 6914; Keene to (probably) Newcastle, 22 March 1750, BM, Add. 43,424, f. 104; Bedford to Keene, 17 August 1749, BM, Add. 43,423, ff. 176-177; Sperling, The South Sea Company, p. 45; Bedford to Keene, 26 October 1749, BM, Add. 43,424, ff. 244-247.

45. Bedford to Keene, 30 August 1750, BM, Add. 43,424, ff. 214-215; Convention signed by Keene and Carvajal y Lancaster, 5 October 1750, AHN, Estado 2954; Williams, op. cit., pp. 265-315; Ryder to Bedford, 8 February 1750, AHN, Estado 2954.

Chapter IX

The Third Trading Period:

Trade of the Factors

South Sea Company employees in Buenos Aires remained at the factory during the rupture of 1728-1729, although they were inactive and nearly penniless. During the war money owed to the Company in Potosi and Chile was collected by Spanish officials and sent to Spain. Consequently the factors had to borrow money to maintain the factory and to support a number of unsold slaves, which for some reason were not seized during the represalia.

When news of peace arrived the factors continued their duties as before (although they were soon replaced). Their first two obligations were to obtain the restitution of Company effects seized in the represalia and to reestablish the slave trade. The Spanish refused at first to restore embargoed goods or to allow the resumption of the trade. The order to release the Prince Frederick (See above p. 149), they contended, made no reference to Buenos Aires. The Company slave ship Sirene, which had arrived in December 1729 with 480 slaves, was detained until March, when royal officials finally agreed to restore trade. The embargoed effects, including account books, were not released until after new factors arrived on 9 October 1730.¹

The management of the factory suffered considerably under the new men, who had been split by dissension during the difficult 100 day voyage. The chief factor, John Browne, was a friend of Sir John Eyles,² which undoubtedly explains his appointment, because he brought few personal qualifications to the post. During the trip he antagonized the captain and his fellow factors, fighting over

1. Factors to Keene, 18 May 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/20, part 1, f. 163; To Varas y Valdés, 12 December 1729, AGI, Contratación 5145; Petition from Robert Cross et al, c. 23 March 1730, and response from royal officials, 23 March 1730, AGS, Estado 6880.

2. Not only did Eyles apparently participate in illicit trade through pliable factors, but also through the letting of contracts. Most of the ships the Company sent to Buenos Aires were owned by his cousin, Joseph Eyles, and his partner, William Chapman. Geraldino's comments on the factors, n.d., AGS, Estado 7008.

matters "too Ridiculous to mention". This discord continued in Buenos Aires when Browne refused to meet the governor in company with the other factors.

A more serious controversy arose over the sale of slaves in Buenos Aires. The Company claimed that sales were so poor there early in the third trading period that it was "Impossible to sell 50 Negroes in 6 Months". They blamed the problem primarily on the governor for not containing illicit Portuguese introductions, but also on the general poverty of the province, the earthquake in Chile which temporarily prevented merchants from travelling to Buenos Aires, and the decision by the viceroy of Peru to prohibit the movement of funds to the coast except during the fairs.

Browne decided to improve sales by sending one of the junior factors, Robert Hilton, to Chile with a consignment of slaves. Hilton refused to go, because he had instructions from the Company to remain in Buenos Aires. Consequently Browne suspended him and ordered him expelled from the colony. But the other factors persuaded the governor, as juez interventor, to annul the order.

When the directors learned of this dispute they recalled Hilton, and urged the others to resolve their differences "to avoid the Unfolding the Secrets, Instructions and Affairs of the Company to the Spanish Government, which Protests against each other lay open & Expose[d]".³

Because of Hilton's refusal to take slaves to Chile, Browne contracted with one Joseph de Salinas to transport them to Potosi by way of Chile, and directed the Company agent in Potosi, Pedro Navarro, to make the necessary arrangements for their sale. With instructions to sell as many slaves as possible en route, and to be wary of bandits, Salinas hired a surgeon and a

3. Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 18 November 1731, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 95-110; From John Eyles, 28 November 1734, BM, Add. 32,786, f. 315; Hilton to Burrell, 12 March 1731, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 439; Saville to Burrell, 25 March 1731, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 421-423; Saville to Burrell, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 414-417; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 5 August 1731, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 84-85; Zavala to Philip V, 30 March 1731, AGI, Contaduría 268; de Studer, La trata de negros, p. 221.

guard for the journey, and prepared a caravan with ample supplies of clothing, food and medicine. They departed early in 1731 with 407 slaves. The trip was tortuous; 50 slaves died en route and only 10 were sold before their arrival in Potosi. (Of these 10 three were women who brought an average price of 416 pesos 6 reales--probably a record price for the Company.) Twenty more slaves died in Potosi but the remainder were sold for 117,714 pesos (an extremely high average of 360 pesos per slave), of which 25,608 pesos 1 real were in effects such as olive oil, aguardiente, cocoa, sugar and chilli. There were 133 separate sales, the great majority being single sales as was typical in the Company's trade.⁴

Royal officials in Chile and Peru refused to allow the proceeds of these sales to be remitted to Buenos Aires, but when the Company complained the decision was overruled in Madrid. This authorization to transfer Company money and effects from one factory to another effectively annulled an earlier decision by the viceroy of Peru. The export of silver from Potosi and elsewhere through Buenos Aires on Company register and private ships became a major problem that was not resolved prior to the War of Jenkins' Ear.⁵

Spanish officials in Buenos Aires were ordered to assist the Company by stopping the illicit introductions of slaves from the nearby "malicious" Portuguese colony. They had very little success. Moreover, when contraband slaves were seized they were often kept or sold privately rather than turned

4. Details of slaves sold by Joseph de Salinas between 1 February 1731 and 20 January 1734, n.d., AGI, Buenos Aires 591; List of slaves; 18 August 1731, AGI, Buenos Aires 591; Instructions to Salinas and Rodriguez, 14 August 1731, AGI, Buenos Aires 591; For further details on this trip see de Studer, op. cit., pp. 223-225, and Villalobos, El Comercio, pp. 42-43.

5. Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 16 May 1728, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 14; Philip V to viceroy of Peru, 27 February 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Keene to Patiño, 28 March 1732, AGS, Estado 6883; Salas y Villela to Philip V, 28 February 1737, AGI, Lima 414.

The factors also accused the royal officials of hindering the remittance of their salaries to England. If they could not do so, several of them commented, "it may without offence be asked, what we came hither for?" Extract from Messrs. Faure and Tooke, 15 October 1736, AGS, Estado 7009.

over to the Company as stipulated by treaty. Illicit trade through Sacramento continued virtually unchecked. Company ships were supposed to pick up Spanish guards in Montevideo, but these men were pliable and so captains freely unloaded contraband there, and "turned their vessels into public markets".

When the governor of Buenos Aires, Miguel de Salcedo, complained to the Portuguese governor of Sacramento, Antonio Pedro de Vasconcelos, about this illegal trade, Vasconcelos said that he could do nothing. Nor would he; the British were allies, he said, and he was obliged to be hospitable to them. Salcedo claimed that he had no other recourse; the Portuguese were too strong to attack, and his vessels could not approach the British ships because of a small fortification they had palced on San Gabriel.

The factors in Buenos Aires also sold an abundance of contraband goods, according to Viceroy Castelfuerte, so much so that when the galleons arrived in Portobelo there was not enough silver left to make purchases at the fair.⁶

Although the real audiencia of Lima considered Buenos Aires to be the centre for illicit trade now that guardacostas patrolled more frequently between Portobelo and Cartagena, the factory there was of practical value to local inhabitants. The Company doctor, Robert Young, was the only doctor in Buenos Aires, and the only source of medical supplies. He freely gave his time to the Spaniards and even treated sailors on Spanish warships.⁷

The asiento trade in Buenos Aires ended on 21 April 1740 when news arrived of Anglo-Spanish hostilities and the factors were placed under house arrest. The guard was removed in September after the factors gave their word--fortified

6. Philip V to the governor and royal officials of Buenos Aires, 19 January 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Spackman and Faure to directors, 9 December 1734, BM, Add. 32,790, f. 331; Faure to Burrell, 12 March 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 367; Junta del asiento, 20 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2777; Quintana to Philip V, 25 November 1737, AGI, Buenos Aires 590; Vasconcelos to Salcedo, 4 January 1738, AGI, Buenos Aires 591; Salcedo to Torrenueva, 23 February 1738, AGI, Buenos Aires 591; Castelfuerte to Patiño, 4 May 1731, AGI, Lima 642.

7. Quintana to Geraldino, 9 October 1736, AGS, Estado 7006; Herran to president of Buenos Aires, 30 December 1730, AGI, Contratación 5145; Real Audiencia to Philip V, 21 July 1732, AGI, Lima 414.

by a bond--that they would not leave the city without permission. Most of them left for England early in 1741 on a British ship, the Royal Mercury. Company property left behind was the subject of debate for many years.⁸ (See below p.253)

The third trading period in Cartagena was successful if measured by the number of slaves introduced, but as at Buenos Aires, difficult from the point of view of the factors.⁹ New factors arrived in June 1728 carrying with them copies of the preliminary articles of peace. A British naval officer broadcast the news ashore, "and as he gave them the first Notice of the Peace, the Streets were Crowded with People Shouting and Rejoycing and Chearfullness Appear'd in every Body."

The governor was far less receptive. The galleons had arrived and he thought it unwise for South Sea Company employees to be there at the same time. He refused to allow the factors into town, contending that he had not received orders from his court. Consequently the factors returned to Jamaica, although undoubtedly they would have been permitted to land after the galleons sailed on 21 October 1726. (The factors at Caracas were permitted to land on 1 November.)¹⁰

These factors did not return to Cartagena, and were replaced in June 1729 by Edward Garthwaite and Thomas Nasmyth, who left for their post after the Treaty of Seville was signed in November. They arrived in Cartagena on 5 April

8. Extract Messrs. Faure and Tooke to directors, 18 May 1742, PRO, S.P. 94/248, f. 392C; de Studer, op. cit., p. 228.

9. The commissions the factors received are unknown, but their tariff of expenses is as follows:
 15 reales per slave for medical expenses and treatment
 2 pesos 1 real per slave for port charges
 1 real per slave per day for maintenance
 4 reales per slave for doctors' examinations
 18½ reales per slave for rent of negrory and salaries of guards
 Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 15 May 1729, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 62.

10. St. Lo to Burchett, 24 June, 6 July and 10 November 1728, PRO, Adm. 1/230; Wescomb to Keene, 10 and 24 October 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 54, 56; Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 14 February 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 68.

1730 on the Don Carlos, which also carried 181 slaves. They were allowed to land, but their welcome was unenthusiastic and it appeared that they would have difficulty reopening the trade in spite of official documents that they carried.

A British naval officer remarked:

The indifferent reception...and the little regard the Governour shew'd to the Cedulae they carried, gave some Apprehension as if those Cedulae were not Sufficient, but that one must come directly from Spain...before restitution cou'd be made, or permission for the Factors, to Ship freely the produce of the Negroes which have of late been carried there.

After presenting to the captain-general, Antonio de Salas, several petitions quoting the relevant cédulas and orders, the factors received permission to sell slaves, but as happened at Buenos Aires. in a similar incident they were not permitted to remit receipts until instructions were received from Patiño late in 1730 or early 1731. After receiving a report on the state of the trade from Benjamin Keene, Patiño ordered Salas to allow the resumption of the asiento trade as it was before the war, and to restore Company effects seized in the represalia. Before these orders arrived, however, he constantly thwarted the factors. He rejected their petition for the return of slaves seized during the war (most had worked on government projects), and of 230,000 pesos which had been confiscated and used to support the local garrison. Salas added a further insult when he informed the factors that the Company would be taxed on the introduction of slaves because the provincial revenue was so meagre.¹¹

Antonio de Salas was so hostile to the Company that he threatened to drive the factors from Cartagena. Houstoun, the Company surgeon during the second trading period who returned as a factor with Garthwaite and Nasmyth, described Salas as

a stubborn, resolute, old Soldier, with little or no Education, and what little Understanding he had was purely natural, from whom we met with a very unmannerly and rude Reception, insomuch that the Very Inhabitants of the Place, our old Friends and Acquaintance, durst not even speak to us in the Streets, or invite us to their Houses; but were obliged to come skulking to us in the Night-time, with Protestations of their Friendship, though they were positively forbid by the Governor to shew us any Manner of Countenance.

11. Extract from the factors, 24 May 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/18, part ii, f. 63; Garthwaite to Díaz y Muñoz, c. 5 May 1730, AGS, Estado 6880; Patiño to
(continued on next page)

The treatment of Spanish inhabitants in Cartagena was equally cruel. In September 1732 the bishop was moved to plead with the king "to liberate [the city] from the tyranny it suffers".

Nonetheless Salas' interference in the Company trade was occasionally justified. The factors were involved constantly in a wide variety of illegal activities. As at most factories they sold provisions that were introduced under the pretext that they were for factory use. These goods included flour, pepper, cinnamon, ham, cheese, butter, rum, seeds, clothing and ships' stores. Wine and spirits were seized from Company ships whether or not they were for factory consumption; wine was scarce, and according to the factors particularly sought after by the governor, who had the avid support of other royal officials; "for the sake of a Barrel of Wine [the Spanish] would at any Time detain a Vessel of the Company's for a Month".¹²

Salas also meddled in Company affairs at Santa Marta, a small Company outpost under the jurisdiction of the factors in Cartagena. Spanish merchants often preferred to buy slaves there because they were cheaper, and transportation was easier. But Salas closed down that office because of the contraband introduced, and posted guards along the Río Magdalena to prevent Company ships from entering there. As a result local merchants turned to the French, Dutch and private British merchants for slaves. There was such a rush of contrabandistas that the market became overstocked with both slaves and merchandise. There is evidence that the governor, other royal officials, the

11. (continued from previous page) royal officials, 1 February 1728, BM, Add. 32,779, f. 295; Patiño to Salas, 22 November 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Wescomb to Thomas and Butcher, 20 June 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 101; Real cédula, 14 December 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1601; Salas to Philip V, 13 May 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Royal officials to Philip V, 26 May 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Stewart to Burchett, 9 June 1730, PRO, Adm. 1/231; Auto, c. 13 April 1730, AGS, Estado 6880.
12. Crowe and Ord to directors, 28 April 1735, BM, Add. 32,788, f. 250; Directors to Keene, 4 July 1735, BM, Add. 32,788, f. 176; Real cédula, 22 February 1734, AGI, Santa Fé 442; Gregorio, Bishop of Cartagena, to Philip V, 10 September 1732, AGI, Santa Fé 1009; Houstoun, op. cit., pp. 157, 183.

factors, and officers of Company ships actually cooperated occasionally in illicit trade, although Salas said that the accusations against him were "debased". Far from "the stores being so filled that it looked as if the galleons had arrived", he said, there was hardly enough cloth available "to make a decent suit".

Salas' action had a prejudicial effect on both the Company's legal, and the factors' illicit, trade. Reports from Salas and other royal officials in Cartagena (which were prompted by accusations of illicit trade against them) led to a ruling that all unregistered goods arriving in the Indies on Company ships be seized, and that all registered goods be placed under three keys, one each to be kept by the factors, the royal officials and the mayordomo of the storehouse. As suggested above, many merchants were now afraid to have any dealings whatsoever with the factors.¹³

Supplies, particularly flour, were often scarce in Cartagena, which helps to explain the demand for illicit goods. In October 1737 Company factors signed a contract with the president and oidores of Santa Fe and the new governor of Cartagena, Pedro Joseph Fidalgo, to furnish flour on order, even if war should break out. Philip V annulled the contract as soon as he learned of it; obviously it was a license to illicit trade.¹⁴

Slaves introduced in Cartagena during the last trading period included a number of Catholics from the "Kingdom of the Congo" who the Company branded on the chest with a cross. Royal officials complained to the king about the practice, suggesting that it was not right that Christians enslaved other Christians. However Philip V decided that these slaves could be admitted and sold, explaining that it was far better for them to be taken to a Catholic than

13. Salas to Philip V, 15 March 1735, AGI, Santa Fé 1009; Gary to directors, 7 August 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Junta del asiento, 26 March 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Geraldino to Baamonte, 30 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Geraldino to Patiño, 5 July 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793; Real cédula, 22 February 1734, AGI, Santa Fé 442.

14. Philip V to the audiencia of Santa Fé, 31 August 1739, AGI, Santa Fé 432; Philip V to Fidalgo, n.d., c. May 1739, AGI, Santa Fé 432.

to a Protestant country. There was no firm policy regarding the enslavement of Christians. On orders from the Inquisition royal officials in Havana once "saved" a Catholic woman slave from being sent to a British colony, but later the junta del asiento ordered her returned to her Protestant owners.¹⁵

As it did elsewhere the Company's trade came to a bizarre end in Cartagena. On 20 September 1739 a British warship commanded by one Captain Stapleton arrived in Cartagena to inform the factors privately of the outbreak of hostilities. (The official declarations of war were not issued by the British until 19 October and by the Spanish on 28 November.) The following day the governor sent a pilot out to assist the British ship into port, assuming it to be a negro or provision/^{ship} When the pilot boat arrived Stapleton inexplicably seized it and made its officers and men captive. The act resulted in the immediate closure of the factory, the seizure of all Company effects and the imprisonment of the factors, who turned in desperation to Governor Trelawny of Jamaica for help. The governor had done them many favours, they said, one of which had been to despatch the pilot boat seized by Stapleton. "English Arms can receive no honour from taking a Boat & twenty defenceless Men", they said, "much less any Advantage, and we as well as the other Factors shall pay for this who have no blame."

The factors were permitted to proceed to Jamaica after official word of the outbreak of war reached Cartagena on 31 March 1740. It is presumed that the Spanish pilot boat and crew were released beforehand. After gaining their freedom the factors announced that no factory debts had been seized because they had never sold on credit. However they feared that debts still in litigation from the second reprisal would never be collected. This money was, in fact, included as part of the final demands the Company made on Spain.¹⁶

15. Real cédula, 5 October 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2777; Summary of testimony, c. 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

16. Real orden, 27 August 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2771; Ord to Burrell, 20 July 1740, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 693; Gray to Trelawny, 30 September 1739, PRO, C.O. 137/56, ff. 275-276; Navarreta to Quintana, 8 June 1740, AGI, Santa Fé 1009.

South Sea Company directors decided at the beginning of the last trading period that the asiento trade could support only one factory in Cuba, and recalled the factor who had been stationed in Santiago. Soon afterwards they changed their minds and reopened the Santiago factory, placing it under Havana's jurisdiction. Then, on 21 April 1730, it was again made independent. Wargent Nicholson, who had spent many years in Havana, and his old crony, Hubert Tassel, were reassigned there, and Jonathan Denniss and Leonard Cooke to Santiago.

A tariff of allowable expenses was promulgated in 1729 by the directors based on an annual sale of 550 slaves in Cuba (440 in Havana and 110 in Santiago), and increased in 1730 to include expenses in Santiago. Havana was allotted 14,066 pesos for annual expenses, and Santiago half that. They were to be distributed in the following manner:

Table I

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
Port charges ¹⁷	about 230 pesos per ship
Provisions for slaves (for 12 days)	2/3 real per day per slave
Rent of a negrory	1 peso per slave
Salaries of a guard, nurse and barber	4 reales per slave
Maintenance and clothing for slaves	1 real per slave per day
House and warehouse rent	unspecified
Barges	2/3 real per day per barge
Doctor and medicine	2 pesos per slave
Burial of 16 slaves	7 pesos each
Contingent charges	3 pesos per slave ¹⁸

The basis for the tariff in Havana was lowered from 440 to 400 slaves in 1733, and again changed in 1735 when it was computed on actual expenses rather than on the number of slaves introduced. In addition the factors received commissions

17. The money allotted for port charges was paid to various Spanish officials, including superior officials, soldiers and guards, physicians, an inquisitor, the guardamayor, the secretary to the registry office, and for fees such as registration, anchorage, city duties, pilotage, and verification of ships' tonnage.
18. Contingent charges included entertainment for Spanish officials; expenses for "public rejoicing"; charges for landing slaves; nursing sick slaves; payment for autos, wood, candles, and alms on sundry occasions; and for information on arriving vessels and illicit slave introductions.

of 5% on gross sales and on returns remitted to England.¹⁹

Factors in Havana and Santiago feuded with royal officials throughout the last trading period. They experienced the same resistance to the reestablishment of trade as did the factors in Cartagena. Even though they had copies of the necessary cédulas they were not admitted to their posts until authorization arrived directly from Spain. And even then the hostility of local officials had not dissipated. They refused to return Company effects seized in the previous represalia, to turn over slaves introduced into the island during the recent war, or even to allow testimonies to be taken during disputes. When the Company complained that these actions were in violation of the asiento treaty, they were informed that the treaty had been suspended during the war. Nonetheless Denniss and Cocke did open an indulto to gather the slaves illegally introduced during the rupture, although they waited until 1733, partly because they were not permitted to open one earlier, and partly as a cover to protect an illicit trade in slaves. Their timing angered the directors, who dismissed them, having correctly suspected them of illicit trade.²⁰

A major problem which effected both factories throughout the last trading period, and which was probably the main reason for the diminution of slave introductions in the last half of the period, was the activity of privateers and renegade guardacostas. In 1731 there were reported to be 12 to 14 guardacostas cruising against foreign merchants along the Cuban coast. Probably

19. Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 8 May 1729, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 61; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 21 April 1730, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 19-21; Directors to Denniss et al, 4 July 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 102-105; Paper on tariffs, n.d., c. 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 244; Tariffs (in Burrell's hand), n.d., c. 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 243; Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 14 February 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 68
20. Wescomb to Keene, 10 October 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 54; Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 15 November 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 62; Cocke to Hayman and Hynes, 12 July 1730, Bodleian, MS Clarendon Dept. C 468; Casafuerte to Philip V, 22 July 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1601; To Benjamin Keene, 23 April 1731, AGS, Estado 6882; Smith to Geraldino, 23 January 1736, AGS, Estado 7006; Real cédula, 20 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2777; Minute committee of correspondence, 29 November 1733 and 11 September 1734, BM, Add. 25,554, ff. 51-52.

because of this Denniss' requests for slaves at Santiago went unheeded by Company agents in Jamaica. This situation led to such poor relations between the factors and agents that Denniss remarked that "we in particular seem to be singled out by the people of Jamaica to be treated with injustice & inhumanity." The situation only improved when the governor of Havana seized one of the guardacostas for piratical activities after receiving numerous complaints from the factors.²¹

The relative profit or loss of the asiento trade in Cuba during the last trading period is difficult to determine because of the extensive illegal activities of almost all the factors at both factories. Introductions of slaves far exceeded expectations from July 1729 through 1732, and the sizeable remittances of tobacco, sugar, logwood and silver during that period strongly suggests a healthy profit indeed, although the factors continually underestimated it. In fact based on the figures available there appeared to be a loss because the factors frequently sold on credit and there were always several outstanding debts.

In 1733 one of the factors, Benjamin Wooley, said that the amount owed to the Company was 307,097 pesos 1 3/4 reales. Three years later a Company accountant estimated that these debts totaled 200,000 pesos, in addition to money still owed from the second trading period, but he recommended no change in the operating policy of the Cuban factories. The Spanish asiento inspector, Juan Francisco Sequeira, gave a figure much closer to the estimated 200,000 pesos. He listed debtors to the Company as follows, and made comments about several of them.

21. Extract, factors to directors, 15 July 1731, PRO, S.P. 36/23, f. 229; Denniss and Cocke to Hunter, 1 August 1731, PRO, Adm. 1/231; Denniss to Eyles and Burrell, 1 November 1731, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 339; State of Orders for Reprisals, n.d., PRO, S.P. 94/101; Denniss and Cocke to Hayman and Hines, 10 May 1732, PRO, C.O. 5/12, f. 75; Denniss to Burrell, 2 November 1731, Donnan, Documents, ii, 439.

Table II

<u>Debtor</u>	<u>Amount owed (in pesos)</u>
Juan Thomas de Sayas	974
Diego de Salazar	67,014
(This debt would probably be paid off in local products.)	
Richard Farrell (a former factor)	8,074
Gabriel Gonzales del Alamo	7,428
Juan de la Barrera	22,793
(This debt would probably never be collected.)	
Constantino Recaño	85,452
(Recaño had already paid 14,628 pesos he owed to the Company, but in "poor quality tobacco". Sequeira estimated that the Company would be lucky to receive a quarter of the remaining sum owed.)	

Such large debts had been accumulated, Sequeira surmised, because the factors did not take the proper precautions before extending a loan, and because they diverted money from the sale of slaves to their own personal accounts "to support a licentious life". He accused one factor, Wargent Nicholson, of embezzling about 20,000 pesos from the Company.²²

Introductions and returns had begun to fall dramatically late in 1732, and total sales during the last six years of the trading period (1733-1738) were far less than during any one of the first three. There are several reasons for this dramatic diminution in trade. So much snuff and other tobacco products had been remitted that European markets were glutted. When the price of tobacco fell the directors ordered the factors to accept only silver for sales, except in special cases. Because money was in such short supply in Cuba, however, nearly every case became a special one. If anything, a smaller percentage of silver was returned than before. The increasing privaterring also hurt trade, but not as much as illicit introductions. There is substantial evidence that royal officials, Company factors, officers of Company ships and private British merchants were all involved in contraband trade. In June 1734 Sequeira claimed that British merchants were inundating the island with slaves, although the Company only introduced 60 slaves that year. Certainly the need for slaves

22. Sequeira to Torrenueva, 25 June 1737, AGS, Estado 7006; From Benjamin Wooley, n.d., c. 25 June 1737, AGS, Estado 7006; Paper by George Peete, n.d., c. 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 913.

did not diminish in the latter years of the trading period. Sequeira commented in 1736 that "negroes in Cuba are the very substance and fuel of all haciendas". Governor Güemes y Horcasitas of Havana asserted that the real business of the Havana factors was the introduction of illicit goods, including slaves, under the shadow of the asiento trade. One of the Spanish officials who participated in contraband slave trade was the governor of Santiago, who was notorious for acquiring slaves for resale from private merchants.²³

The main port of entry for illicit slaves was Puerto del Principe. When the directors replaced Nicholson and Tassel with Messrs. Hallway and Eden, they suggested that they compete with the contraband traders by introducing Company slaves there. This seems to have been a veiled authorization for the factors to sell contraband slaves on behalf of the Company, but there is no indication if the scheme was tried.

The Company's trade was occasionally curtailed in other ways. A particularly prevalent problem was disease. Not only did great numbers of slaves die before arriving in Spanish settlements, but many more died in quarantine after they arrived. Because the Spanish held smallpox in "the utmost horror", health inspections were rigidly enforced.²⁴

In spite of the almost certain profit made by the Cuban factories early in the third trading period, by the summer of 1732, the directors had decided that the trade there was losing money--probably because of the misconduct of the factors. They contemplated several methods for improving it, including the replacement of the factories with a licensed trade, closing the Santiago factory,

23. Directors to Keene, 4 August 1732, BM, Add. 32,778, f. 40; Minute committee of correspondence, 21 March 1733, BM, Add. 25,554, f. 21; Denniss and Cocke to Hunter, 18 August 1731, PRO, S.P. 36/25, f. 46; Sequeira to Patiño, 16 June 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2749; Güemes y Horcasitas to Varas y Valdés, 11 November 1732, AGI, Contratación 5146; Sequeira to Geraldino, 29 April 1736, AGS, Estado 7013.

24. Minute committee of correspondence, 21 March and 23 May 1733, BM, Add. 25,554, ff. 21, 20; Merewether to directors, 29 January 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 793; Governor of Havana to Philip V, 26 January 1732, AGI, Santo Domingo 381.

replacing the existing factors with new ones, and selling in Spain by contract the tobacco purchased with the proceeds of the slave trade. The plan to license the trade was dropped because they feared that the licensees would also lose money, and turn to private and illicit trade for compensation. The Santiago factory remained open because there were conflicting reports about its profitability, and the Spanish rejected the suggestion that the Company export tobacco to Spain because it would compete with the trade of Spanish merchants. Perhaps the most effective measure would have been to replace the factors, but this, too, proved difficult. Early in 1733 Denniss and Cocke were ordered not to trade on behalf of the Company in Santiago under any circumstances. Nevertheless they opened an indulto for which they were dismissed in September 1734. Still they continued to trade. When Cooke was again informed of his dismissal he travelled to Jamaica, from where he traded privately with Cuba. For some reason he was reinstated in his post in the summer of 1735.

Denniss continued in Company employment in spite of the first notice of dismissal.²⁵ However he was fired later because he had "made himself so obnoxious there, that he will certainly be taken up by the Inquisition unless he be forthwith recalled". Spanish officials accused him of violating article vii of the asiento treaty by denying an English youth who had absented himself from a Company ship the right to convert to Catholicism. Consequently orders were sent to Spanish officials throughout America not to permit Denniss to land anywhere, even if he was on asiento business.²⁶ Denniss departed from Santiago abruptly and was replaced ad interim by John Creagh and William Rogers, who happened to be in Santiago on private business at the time. They demonstrated the same flare for contraband, incurring the wrath of local Spanish officials

25. The directors originally planned to turn the factory's affairs over to the Havana factors, but they soon changed their minds, probably because of the difficulties of collecting debts in Santiago. Newcastle to Keene, 3 April 1735, BM, Add. 32,787, f. 106; Minute committee of correspondence, 11 September 1734, BM, Add. 25,554, f. 108.

26. The order was rescinded towards the end of the trading period when Denniss was appointed head factor at Panama. See below p.206.

as had their predecessors.²⁷

The Company had even greater difficulties at the Havana factory, largely because the factors there, led by Wargent Nicholson, were much more entrenched in their private trade. With the support of influential Spanish residents and private British merchants the factors managed a large contraband trade until February 1733 when Nicholson and Tassel were replaced. Getting them to leave Cuba was much more difficult. After learning early in 1735 that the two men were still there, Thomas Geraldino told Governor Güemes y Horcasitas that they must be expelled. However they did not leave until the summer of 1737, four years after they had been dismissed. As Güemes y Horcasitas remarked, ejecting them "had offered no small difficulties".²⁸

When Nicholson and Tassel arrived in London the following spring the Company informed them that various items in their account were irregular and were being disallowed. The main item in question concerned a consignment of snuff. Upon learning that the price of snuff in England was falling because so much had been imported from Cuba, but that it still fetched a good price in Spain, in March 1732 the two men had consigned 37,000 pesos' worth on the flota to an agent in Cadiz. Unfortunately the flota was badly mauled by a hurricane, and although the Company's tobacco was saved, the factors had to pay a salvage bill of 11,000 pesos. The directors refused to approve the expense, and billed the factors for it. The outcome of this dispute is unknown, but it is unlikely that the factors ever paid. The directors rarely pursued grievances against

27. Minute committee of correspondence, 12 February 1733 and 30 January 1734, BM, Add. 25,554, ff. 2, 139; Geraldino to Patiño, 9 June 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2791; Newcastle to Hopkins, 17 December 1734, PRO, S.P. 36/33, f. 138; Denniss to Montijo, 8 May 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2791; Petition from directors, n.d., PRO, S.P. 36/33, f. 113; From Panama royal officials, 12 October 1735, AGI, Santa Fé 1167; Quintana to Mello, 7 October 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2791; From Patiño, n.d., April 1736, AGS, Estado 7010.

28. Petty to Buckworth, 10 December 1734, AGI, Santo Domingo 382; Minute committee of correspondence, 19 February 1733, BM, Add. 25,554, f. 3; Geraldino to Güemes y Horcasitas, 14 February 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2791; Güemes y Horcasitas to Geraldino, 2 August 1737, AGS, Estado 7006; To Nicholson and Tassel, 25 April 1738, BM, Add. 25,558, f. 39.

employees to the point of collecting on bonds posted by them when they went into Company employment.²⁹

The factors who replaced Nicholson and Tassel quickly fell into the habits of their predecessors, and even joined forces with them in private trade. They were involved in remitting about 10,000 pounds of unregistered cochineal and indigo, and several bars of silver to England, and introducing contraband on the Company vessel Lion, which arrived in Havana with only 12 young slaves but 479 barrels of flour and lard for their maintenance. Needless to say Benjamin Wooley, the new head factor, was a poor choice for the post. He was not suited to life in Havana, and after several disputes with royal officials found himself under house arrest. Then when he was replaced in January 1736 one of the directors accused him of defrauding the Company of revenue. However he too remained unpunished.³⁰

Wooley was replaced by Messrs. Weltden and Lambert, who experienced still greater problems. Weltden also became closely associated with Nicholson and Tassel, who had still not left the island, and contrary to his instructions carried on all Company business alone, styling himself "Factor Principal" or "Factor Actual". Lambert tried to represent the Company honestly and was denounced for bringing "a little Italian" with him to Cuba. Soon afterwards Weltden found himself unopposed and inter-factory feuds at an end when Lambert died of the "black vomit".³¹

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29. From Nicholson and Tassel, n.d., c. 1733, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 189; Directors to Keene, 4 June 1732, BM, Add. 32,778, f. 40; State of the case of goods shipped on the flota, 1733, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 189-194.
30. Güemes y Horcasitas to Patiño, 28 April 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Sequeira to Patiño, 25 February 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812; Geraldino to Vega, 12 January 1734, Donnan, Documents, ii, 447; Sequeira to Patiño, 29 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Güemes y Horcasitas to Patiño, 16 June 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794; Sequeira to Patiño, 12 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812; Informe de la contaduría, n.d., c. 1735, AGI, Santo Domingo 382; Coope, A Letter to the proprietors, pp. 14-18.
31. Lambert to Cleland, 27 September 1736, AGS, Estado 7006; Lambert to Geraldino, 8 October 1736, AGS, Estado 7006; Tassel to Burrell, 7 January 1737, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 941.

During the last few years of the third trading period royal officials in Cuba, supported by Juan Francisco Sequeira, began to regulate the introduction of Company supplies and provisions. Excessive or unregistered goods were seized and sold from the Cork and Venture in 1736 and from the Armstrong and Prince of Asturias in 1737. In fact the inspections became so harsh that Geraldino chided them for interfering unnecessarily in the Company's trade.³²

Another reason for ill will between the factors and royal officials concerned the seizure of Spanish ships by British privateers and men-of-war. The Spanish frequently blamed the Company for these seizures, or at least turned to the factors for reparations. Leonard Cocke, who had returned to the Santiago factory in 1735, was obliged by the governor on at least five different occasions between 1735 and 1737 to pay for Spanish vessels that had been seized. He was also compelled to pay for a number of slaves indulted when Denniss was factor. Another cause of tension occurred in 1737 when the directors reduced the salaries of Spanish officials who assisted the factors, but the full effect of this action was never felt.³³

Trade at the Cuban factories ended for all practical purposes in January 1738 when royal officials refused to allow the Sea Horse and several Company supply ships to sail because of a report that the English were preparing to attack Georgia. Although the Sea Horse was allowed to leave in April, an embargo was placed on all other vessels. When word reached Havana the following July that war was imminent, the embargo was extended. In November Governor Güemes y Horcasitas accused the factors of "violent & scandalous behaviour" and

32. Güemes y Horcasitas to Torrenueva, 24 June 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815; Royal officials to Philip V, 26 June 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814; From Thomas Geraldino, 2 August 1737, AGS, Estado 7008; Weltden to Burrell, 27 May 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 915; Sequeira to Geraldino, 6 August 1737, AGS, Estado 7006; Instructions to factors, 15 September 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785.

33. Cocke to directors, 18 April, 18 July and 15 December 1737, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 319, 317, 315; Extracts, n.d., 1735 and 1736, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 60B; Weltden to directors, 22 April 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 924.

detained several more ships.

The British government protested to the Spanish government, which admitted in February 1739 that Governor Güemes y Horcasitas had acted without authorization. In spite of Philip V's assurance that Spain wanted peace, trade was never reestablished in Cuba, making it the first place where the British asiento trade ended; the factory in Havana was closed on 18 September 1739, and the one in Santiago on 25 October. Weltden and Cocke stayed on until early in 1742 to terminate all business and settle Company accounts.³⁴

Company trade at Panama and Portobelo, which was renewed on 23 October 1729, experienced difficulties as trying as those in Cuba. The factory was torn by the usual internecine feuds, and the factors involved in illicit trade, illegal remittance of gold and silver, the bribery of Spanish officials--and the exaction of bribes from Spanish merchants. Factory business was impaired by the viceroy of Peru's refusal to allow money to be sent to any coastal city from the interior (see below p. 204), by the forced closure of the Panama factory by the governor of Panama, and by the activities of private British merchants.

Most of these problems adversely effected the factors' commissions. At the start of the third trading period the new factors were granted a commission of 5% on the gross sale of slaves and 2½% on the proceeds remitted to England. The expenses of maintaining the factory and selling the slaves were paid by the Company on the following basis:

34. Council of the Indies, 6 December 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Weltden to directors, 22 April 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 921; Governor of Havana to Trelawny, 29 November 1738, PRO, C.O. 137/56, ff. 170-171; Extract, Westden to directors, 15 October 1738, BM, Add. 32,800, f. 87; Trelawny to Güemes y Horcasitas, 27 October 1738, PRO, C.O. 137/56, ff. 151-152; Newcastle to Keene, 26 January 1739, PRO, S.P. 94/134; To Pedro Tyrry, 9 February 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Represalia de ingleses..., 18 September 1739 and 12 December 1742, AGI, Contaduría 1170; Royal officials to Philip V, 9 January 1740, AGI, Santo Domingo 408; Governor of Santiago to Trelawny, 24 August 1740, PRO, C.O. 137/56, f. 393; Weltden to directors, 2 May 1742, PRO, S.P. 36/58, f. 282; Smith to Newcastle, 9 June 1742, PRO, S.P. 36/58, f. 287.

Table III

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u> <u>(in pesos)</u>
For the <u>visita</u>	3 reales per slave landed
Food in Portobelo	2 reales per slave
Expenses for the trip between Portobelo and Panama	2 reales per slave per day
Lodging en route to Panama for four nights	1 real per slave
For the hire of each mule (one mule needed for every 10 slaves)	14 pesos
For the hire of one guide (one guide needed for every 10 mules)	14 pesos
Food in Panama	1 1/3 pesos per slave per day
Medicine and doctor	1 1/2 pesos per slave landed
Rent of two negrories and guards	3 pesos per slave

Thus the allowable cost of landing 100 slaves in Portobelo and transporting them almost immediately to Panama was about 900 pesos.³⁵

On 23 October 1730, exactly one year after the factors had returned, the president of Panama ordered the Panama branch to be closed. The command was based on the real cédula of 9 December 1726 which stated that the Company must close the Panama factory and conduct all business from Portobelo. The cédula was not implemented during the second trading period, however, because of the outbreak of war in 1727. Upon learning of the closure the directors protested and asked that the order be rescinded. The factory in Panama had always been the principal one, they explained, Portobelo serving only as a depot for receiving slaves from Jamaica. Furthermore it was an unhealthy place, they argued, and if they were forced to conduct all business there the result would be great mortality among the negroes and sickness among the factors. They did not mention that the Panama factory was considered vital for contact with Peru, especially for the recovery of effects seized during the wars. The factors were particularly interested in keeping it open because they received a commission of 10% on all money sent from Peru to Spain during the represalia, and 25% on everything else seized that they were able to recover. The junta

35. Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 28 January 1729, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 52.

del asiento reported favourably on the directors' petition, but the order was not rescinded until January 1734.³⁶

The prohibition by the viceroy of Peru to send money to the coast came not long after the Panama factory was closed. Money could thenceforth not be taken to Company factories for the purchase of slaves or the discharge of debts except during the fairs. The immediate effect was to reduce the cash available for the purchase of slaves, and thus to force the factors to sell on credit. And experience had shown that each time war broke out customers who purchased on credit used it as an excuse not to pay the Company. Unless this money was released for the payment of ^{debts} / and the purchase of slaves, the directors claimed that it would be impractical to continue the asiento trade. It was unrealistic to expect the Company to "Trust for Their Negroes, So Long and Uncertain a Time, as from Fair to Fair," especially "when They Purchase Them with Ready Money, and pay Dutys half Yearly". In spite of this regulation the Company did remit some money from Peru with the assistance of friends in Lima.³⁷

The exaction of bribes from Spanish merchants by factors in Panama and Portobelo was perhaps unique to this factory. In 1731 the head factor, Henry Johnson, in collusion with two other factors, was demanding a premium of about 18 pesos per slave. Merchants who agreed to pay the premium in cash were allowed to purchase slaves on credit. Thus if the asiento trade was interrupted, whether by war or otherwise, the customer possessed a slave with little capital outlay, and the factor made his commission at the expense of the Company, and with little or no risk. Some merchants who acquired slaves in this manner resold

36. Directors to Keene, 2 August 1734, BM, Add. 32,785, f. 314; Paz to Keene, 26 August 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Decrees by the Marquis of Villahermosa, 23 and 27 October 1730, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 569-571; Tinker to Villahermosa, c. January 1732, C.L., Shel vol. 44, f. 578; Directors to Newcastle, 16 March 1732, PRO, S.P. 36/26, part 1, f. 133; Junta del asiento, 7 January 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2777; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 1 July 1731, BM, Add. 25,553, f. 81.

37. Castelfuerte to Philip V, 14 January 1733, AGI, Lima 414; Directors to Newcastle, 16 March 1732, PRO, S.P. 36/26, part 1, ff. 133-134; Directors to Keene, 2 August 1734, BM, Add. 32,785, f. 317.

them cheaply without ever intending to pay the Company. Because the factors received a commission for each slave sold, whether by cash or on credit, as well as the premium, they were negligent in taking action to collect these debts. Moreover it was difficult to collect them. Most slave merchants were owner-captains of small vessels, or supercargoes, and not men of substance. It was even more difficult to collect debts from more substantial customers. Many debtors died leaving complicated wills, and heirs who were unable or unwilling to pay the money owed to the Company.³⁸

The factors were not alone in soliciting bribes. Unless the factors paid 12 pesos per slave certain royal officials refused to measure them. This was in addition to the flat charge of 200 pesos per visita. The officials also extracted bribes from Spanish slave merchants. To transport slaves from Portobelo to Panama Peruvian merchants were obliged to pay one peso per slave disguised as a type of road tax. When they complained that the road was poor and the trip insecure, the Council of the Indies decreed in 1737 that this "tax" was illegal unless the money was used to improve the roads and protect the trade. The decision was made too late to have much effect because the asiento trade was already declining.³⁹

The Company's trade was further impeded by private British merchants from Jamaica who were occasionally aided by the British navy. In 1736 one sloop arrived at Bastimentos convoyed by H.M.S. Kingsale, Captain John Forrester. The two vessels sold goods worth an estimated 400,000 pesos, thereby acquiring money the factors hoped would be spent on Company slaves. As a consequence of this extensive illicit trade, the factors could never be certain when money

38. Parminter to Geraldino, 30 September 1735, AGS, Estado 7006; Hutchinson to directors, 1 December 1731, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 531; "Remarks on the Negro Trade at Portobelo and Panama", n.d., c. 1734, AGS, Estado 7010.

39. Council of the Indies, 22 January 1737, AGI, Lima 596; Davison to Burrell and Bristow, 25 October 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 517-518; Geraldino to Patiño, 3 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Hutchinson to directors, 1 December 1731, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 531-540; To the president of Panama, 25 July 1734, AGI, Panama 118.

would be available. By the time Jonathan Denniss became head factor in December 1738 they were reduced to bartering slaves for wool. Poor sales were aggravated by the conflagration that destroyed most of Panama that year, and the epidemic that swept the city afterwards. No deaths were recorded among the factors, but the Company lost a large amount of gold which melted during the fire, destroying the quinto marks. Since the factors could not prove that they had paid the quinto they decided to delay remitting the gold to England. It was seized by the Spanish when conflict stopped trade in 1739 for the third and last time.⁴⁰

Throughout the asiento contract the main function of the factory in Vera Cruz was to assist in the sale of merchandise introduced on the annual ships. However when the Company began to send supercargoes on the annual ships (early in the second trading period), the need for a factory was eliminated almost entirely. A licensed trading post, such as in Campeche or La Guaira, would have been sufficient to handle the 200 slaves sold there annually. Thus in 1732 when two British merchants, Harry Spencer and Shadrick Bastie, proposed to assume much of the responsibility for the slave trade there, the offer was eagerly accepted. The directors signed a three year contract with the men that was unique in the Company's history. It incorporated procedures from both the factory and the license trading systems, and gave them a monopoly on the introduction of slaves to Mexico. Spencer and Bastie promised to buy annually 300 piezas de indias (to be branded with the usual factory mark)--later reduced to 200--from Company agents in Jamaica for 60 pesos per pieza above the purchase price paid by the agents. They were responsible for transportation and all

40. Humphreys to Burrell, 28 January 1737, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 303; Geraldino to Torrenueva, 23 May 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Davison to Burrell, 3 June 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 473; Denniss to Burrell, 15 February 1739, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 463-464; Humphreys to the deputy and sub-directors, 15 February 1739, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 459-460; Davison and Humphreys to Burrell, 6 March 1739, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 293-294; Castelfuerte to Patiño, 28 February 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793; Tyrry to Torrenueva, 12 June 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Anon. "Remarks on the Slave Trade at Panama and Portobelo", n.d., c. 1735, AGS, Estado 7010; Bazan to president of Panama, 26 March 1739, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 459C.

expenses including 25% of the salaries of Spanish officials in Vera Cruz who assisted and monitored the trade. The Company agreed to pay the other 75% because these officials regulated the sale of merchandise from the annual ships. The contractors received the same privileges and protection as other factors, as well as a commission of 5% on all debts collected from previous trading periods. When an annual ship was in port this commission was to be shared with the supercargoes.⁴¹

The two men sailed to Vera Cruz as supercargoes on the Royal Caroline, the last annual ship. Soon afterwards Geraldino informed the directors that they had no right to farm out any part of the asiento trade. While the directors disagreed they decided to annul the contract to show their intention to cooperate with the Spanish. In February 1733 Spencer and Bastie were informed that their contract was void. Spencer returned to England on the Royal Caroline and Bastie remained behind as the principal factor in Vera Cruz until his death in 1735.

The factory in Vera Cruz was unprofitable.⁴² To induce employees to remain there the directors raised their commission to 6% on all goods remitted to England, and promised to pay the difference if this did not yield 10,000 pesos in the first two years. This arrangement was also unsatisfactory. Louis Hayes, who became head factor after Bastie's death, complained in December 1736 that his allowance was insufficient to live decently. Not all factors in Vera Cruz were impoverished. An inventory of Shadrick Bastie's belongings compiled after his death included diamonds, rubies, pearl rings, necklaces, earrings, silver

41. Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 30 January 1734, BM, Add. 25,554, f. 139; Proposal for purchasing negroes to introduce into New Spain, n.d., c. 1732, AGS, Estado 7006; Covenant between the Company and Spencer and Bastie, 31 August 1732, BM, Add. 25,576, ff. 197-199; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 4 May 1732, BM, Add. 25,553, f. 120.

42. In 1730 it became a disaster for the mayordomo of the Company plantation in Vera Cruz, William Booth, who was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labour in a Spanish fortress in Africa for the murder of a Dominican friar. William Patton, who later became the head factor in Caracas, was also arrested but later freed. Confessions by William Booth and William Patton, 4 August 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2806; Junta del asiento opinion, 28 November 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776; Geraldino to Patiño, 12 January 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Díaz Roman and Vara y Valdés to president of the Casa de Contratación, 5 December 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769.

cross and gold and silver bars.⁴³

In 1735 because of the decline in the sale of slaves in Vera Cruz (Only 16 were sold the previous year.), the factors were instructed to sell slaves by head rather than by pieza de indias. It was hoped that sales would increase since the price would be reduced. Ignacio de Frias, the Spanish interventor, was opposed to the new practice because he believed that Philip V's revenue would thus be reduced as well. However the order was implemented in 1736, although few slaves were sold in this manner.⁴⁴

Frias became more antagonistic to the Company because of this incident. Later that year he demanded a complete account of all outstanding debts and held a Company ship ransom until it was produced. He also refused to permit Hayes to collect his commission or remit any money to the Company. The factors did not have an accurate account of the trade in Vera Cruz, which further angered the Spaniards. He accused them of inefficiency and indolence (Each factor had a personal slave, and the factory had two cooks, two washing women and seven handymen.), and continued to thwart the trade. He ruled that proceeds from the annual ships could be remitted only on annual ships. While potentially troublesome this order had no effect on the Company as it was promulgated after the last annual ship sailed. More irritating, on hearing that English warships had attacked the Pensacola area, Frias ordered shore batteries to fire upon and detain a Company sloop, the Don Carlos, after it had been cleared for departure.⁴⁵

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43. Hayes to Burrell, 28 December 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 261-262; Minute committee of correspondence, 16 October 1734, BM, Add. 25,554, f. 105; Paper on tariffs, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 244; Inventory of Bastie's belongings, 17 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789; Foral Valdés to Philip V, 20 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789; Minutes committee of correspondence, 20 and 21 February and 19 March 1732, BM, Add. 25,554, ff. 4, 9.
44. Foral Valdés to Philip V, 1 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789; Frias to Philip V, 28 December 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816; Butler and Hayes to Foral Valdés, 19 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789; Smith to Geraldino, 3 May 1736, AGS, Estado 7006; From Findlay and Butler, 21 December 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817; From Ignacio de Frias, 29 November 1736, AGS, Estado 7006.
45. Smith to Geraldino, 3 May 1736, AGS, Estado 7006; Frias to Geraldino, 24 January 1737, AGS, Estado 7006.

The asiento trade effectively ended at Vera Cruz in July 1738 when a cargo of Company slaves delivered there by Diego Rentone was detained. Word had just been received of incipient hostilities between Spain and England, and the viceroy of Mexico, Juan Antonio Arpo, decided to detain the ship until the azogues departed to join the squadron in Havana.⁴⁶

The Company permitted an extensive licensed trade in the last trading period, but the records are incomplete mainly because so much contraband trade was concealed under its cover. The conduct of the trade did not vary much from the first two trading periods, although the treatment the licensees received, and the goods they purchased with the proceeds of slave sales varied considerably from one location to another. Bullion was scarce so slaves were normally exchanged for local products. In the case of Puerto Rico, the country was so poor that the governor authorized the exchange of mules and horses for slaves, even though it was against Spanish law.⁴⁷

Most of the licensed trade was to port cities, but since the beginning of the British asiento small Company branch offices had been established in various inland cities such as Potosi, Lima, Mexico City, Oaxaca and Guatemala. The office in Guatemala was one of the few established inland during the third trading period. William Lea arrived there in September 1731 and requested permission from the governor to bring 66 Company slaves inland from Gulfo Dulce. Permission was granted although Lea did not return with the slaves until early June 1733. He opened an office, purchased furniture and hired employees, but a small indiscretion prevented him from trading. In partnership with a Spanish merchant Lea imported an excessive amount of supplies that he claimed were for "personal and factory use". The entire cargo was seized on the advice of the fiscal. Lea's personal property and that belonging to the Company was later returned, but the merchandise belonging to the Spanish merchant was not.

46. Arpo to Torrenueva, 29 December 1738, AGI, Santa Fé 1162.

47. Junta del asiento, 5 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785.

Although the fiscal said that the Spaniard should have been executed for trading with foreigners, he was only expelled from the province; Lea left voluntarily, thus ending this ill-fated adventure.⁴⁸

The Company was more fortunate in their licensed trade to Campeche. Early in the third trading period the Company's Jamaican agents licensed Messrs. Blackwood and Cathcart to supply slaves there in exchange for logwood. They retained the contract until 1733 when the Spanish revoked the Company's power to grant licenses and withdrew those already issued. Blackwood and Cathcart were ejected from Campeche so abruptly that they left behind a number of slaves, merchandise, uncollected debts and personal belongings, some of which were later restored.⁴⁹

In 1732 an incident occurred in Campeche which nearly had serious consequences on Anglo-Spanish relations, and which was probably the reason for Blackwood's and Cathcart's expulsion. The Dichosa, a Spanish register ship en route to Tabasco was seized by a British warship and taken to Jamaica. In retaliation the governor of Campeche, Antonio de Figueroa, detained all British ships, embargoed Company effects and money, and solicited the support of the governors of Havana and Vera Cruz who took similar steps. If the Dichosa was not returned promptly Figueroa threatened to take "other procedures against the persons and effects of the factors". When the factors replied that they should not be held liable for seizures made by British warships, they were told by Viceroy Castelfuerte of Mexico that perhaps the British would proceed with greater "moderation and reflection" in the future when they found their trade

48. From Pratter and Rigby, 30 July 1731, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Lea to the governor of Guatemala, 14 September 1731, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Petition from Lea and Gilles, c. 20 June 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; From the president and royal officials of Guatemala, 9 July 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Opinion of the royal officials, 28 November 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Tesorero to Philip V, 8 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Junta del asiento, 9 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.

49. The case of Blackwood and Cathcart, n.d., c. 1734, PRO, S.P. 36/33, f. 181; Trade papers, 21 August 1735, PRO, C.O. 391/44, f. 199; Meeting of the committee for trade and plantations, 22 August 1735, PRO, C.O. 391/44, f. 199; To Geraldino, 23 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851.

interrupted. He was right. Newcastle sent orders for the Dichosa's release immediately upon learning of its seizure. Soon afterwards, on 4 October, it arrived in Campeche. However prior to its release Castelfuerte had lifted the restrictions on the Company, explaining that legal steps could always be taken to seize British effects. Moreover Company employees had promised that the Dichosa would be returned.⁵⁰

No Company slaves were sold in Campeche between March 1733 and September 1734, when Blackwood and Cathcart were allowed to return. At this time a growing need for slave labour developed because of the expansion of the logwood industry. More slaves were introduced than ever before, inducing the directors to contemplate establishing a factory there. However they decided against it when they considered the cost, and discovered that the demand for slaves was not stable because of the availability of Indian labour. Moreover, in April 1735 the Spanish ordered them not to introduce any more slaves at Campeche, partly because of the Spaniards' general opposition to farmed trade, but perhaps even more because of Spain's campaign against the illegal cutting and export of logwood along the coast from Belize to Campeche. The trade was at best tenuous from then on until the factors left in October 1738.⁵¹

During the first two trading periods there were no factories on the windward coast (the "Spanish Main") of South America. Slaves were supplied by licensed traders. In November 1729 Samuel Collet and Jonathan Perrie, Company licensees there during the second trading period, were granted a new two year

50. To Patiño, 10 June and 24 October 1732, AGI, México 3162; Castelfuerte to Patiño, 4 November 1732, AGI, México 3162; Anon. letter, 6 November 1732, AGS, Estado 6884; Anon. letter, 8 December 1732, AGS, Estado 6884.

51. Nasmyth to Burrell, 14 July 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 265; Geraldino to Patiño, 23 August 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; To Geraldino, 23 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Tyrry to Torrenueva, 26 February 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851.

After the War of Jenkins' Ear, Blackwood and Cathcart offered to supply the Spanish in Campeche with slaves in exchange for logwood "which is of no use or value" to Spain. Their proposal was rejected. Council of the Indies, 12 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 7.

license, with an optional provision to renew it annually, to supply 400 piezas de indias along the coast between the Orinoco and the Río Grande de Magdalena. They also introduced slaves in Trinidad, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and Margarita. Their contract also authorized them to collect Company debts. One debt that particularly irritated the directors amounted to 10,000 pesos which had been lent to Governor Lopez de Carillo of Venezuela. Although the governor had given a bond and the patent for his job as security, the money remained uncollected, as frequently happened when the Company loaned money to Spanish officials.⁵²

Soon after receiving their new license Perrie accepted an offer to become a factor in Panama. Collet sailed to Caracas, arriving late in October 1728. He limited his trade to this one area, managing it much as if it were a factory. It is uncertain if he ever made use of the license as it was originally intended. In July 1731 the Company agents in Jamaica, Pratter and Rigby, informed royal officials in Spanish America that they were the agents for the windward coast, including Caracas. Nonetheless Collet remained at his post until May 1732, when his license was revoked by the Spanish who accused him of offending Catholicism by turning a young Irishman who had recently converted to Catholicism out of his home.⁵³

The licensed trade was never a great success, perhaps least of all along the windward coast. The area was poor, the demand for slaves relatively small, and communications and transportation difficult. The round trip from Barbados

52. Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 13 November 1729, BM, Add. 25,553, f. 10; Governor of Caracas to Philip V, 13 October 1738, AGI, Santo Domingo 704; Directors to López de Carillo, 18 July 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 27; Directors to Collet and Perrie, 18 July 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 28.

53. Pratter and Rigby to all Spanish royal officials, 30 July 1731, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Directors to Keene, 2 August 1734, BM, Add. 32,785, f. 317; Collet to directors, 12 September 1734, BM, Add. 32,785, f. 456; Madera de los Ríos to Philip V, 31 May 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805; Directors to Rigby and Pratter, 14 February 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 68.

to La Guaira took months because of the prevailing winds. Most slaves delivered there were exchanged for cacao which was frequently spoiled by bad weather and vermin before it reached England. Profits from the legitimate slave trade were so small that the only reason licenses were sought after was the greater facility they furnished for contraband trade. Collet and Perrie were adept in this trade, but they were not always successful. In July 1729 the governor of Caracas asked them to take 99 barrels of flour to Santo Domingo. On arrival the flour was seized in spite of the factors' assertion that it was brought as a favour

to relieve the City from starving, in which condition we found it, not having so much as one Quintal of flower [sic] in it, and most of it's Inhabitants Sick of the Small Pox, which has raged among them twelve M.os.

Collet and Perrie had in fact questioned the right of the governor of Caracas to ask this favour, but the opportunity to make a profit was too tempting to question the legal complications. In any case they claimed

that it has been the practice of all the Spanish Gov.s and Comm.er in cheif, both by sea and Land in America, to value themselves on Assiento Vessels, for Such Provisions, Ammunition, and Naval Stores, as they cannot be without, nor procure by other means, and that the Audience have no right of Inspection in this Affair....⁵⁴

When the license system was abolished by the Spanish in February 1733 the Company placed factors at various places along the windward coast to receive slaves, and revived the agency in Barbados, appointing three agents there who were to divide a commission of 5% on gross sales and 1% on goods remitted. Trading procedures did not change. Slaves were still sent to coincide with the harvest season so that they could help with the harvest and so that the Company would have something to buy to remit to London. The only difference now was that the Company had permanent representatives on the coast to analyse market

54. Collet and Perrie to Keene, 9 May 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/18, part ii, f. 53; Audiencia of Santo Domingo to Philip V, 28 January 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2806; Minutes committee of correspondence and factories, 13 November 1729 and 30 July 1730, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 10, 48; Olauarriaga to Patiño, 10 December 1731, AGI, Caracas 56; Account of the charges attending a cargo of negroes from Barbados to La Guaira..., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 123-124; Account of vessels necessary to carry on the Caracas trade, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 131; Summary of a letter (in Burrell's hand), n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 181.

conditions and to request slaves as needed. One factor was stationed in Maracaibo and two in Caracas. This new arrangement was approved by Spanish officials, who found it easier to monitor the trade of a resident merchant than that of a licensee whose schedule was unpredictable. The new factors arrived at their posts early in 1736.⁵⁵

As was typical at the larger factories, the sale of slaves in Caracas and Maracaibo was fraught with scandals and corruption. The main culprits were the Company agents in Barbados, who defrauded the Company and Spanish in various ingenious ways. They replaced "prime Guinea slaves" intended for the Cartagena factory with their own sick slaves, charged the Company for the Guinea slaves and then sold them privately. The principal agent and chief promoter of these crimes, Richard Morecrafts, was a man "of an indifferent Character", according to a former British custom's officer. He treated the slaves abominably, starving them and confining them in miserably cramped spaces. Because of this, slaves usually arrived in Caracas in much worse condition than those at other factories. Several vessels arrived with smallpox raging aboard. Morecrafts had allowed them to sail even though he was undoubtedly aware of the disease's presence before departure. Eventually royal officials everywhere subjected vessels from Barbados to 40 days' quarantine.⁵⁶

Late in the last trading period the Spanish took a series of steps damaging to the Company's trade on the Spanish Main. By controlling exports from Caracas,

55. Minute committee of correspondence, 6 November 1733, BM, Add. 25,554, f. 47; Minutes committee of correspondence, 20 May and 3 October 1733 and 7 August 1734, BM, Add. 25,554, ff. 18, 42, 107; Geraldino to Patiño, 27 August 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790; Geraldino to Patiño, 12 January 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792; Butcher to Burrell, 30 April 1739, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 597.

Slaves' brands used at licensed trading posts were the following:

Windward Coast

ⓑ

Barbados

Ⓦ

Guatemala

Ⓜ

56. Somers to Burrell, 29 April 1737, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 647; Butcher to Burrell, 13 April and 22 March 1737, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 649, 659-661; Geraldino to Torrenueva, 25 July 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

especially cacao, the Caracas Company manipulated the market generally. Early in 1738 they flooded Vera Cruz with about 2,088,000 pounds of cacao. Consequently the price dropped alarmingly, with little cash becoming available to purchase other goods, such as slaves. According to one factor, Thomas Butcher, slaves could not even be sold on credit. Employees of the Caracas Company also assisted royal officials in the registration, bonding and visitas of South Sea Company vessels. While Company agents argued that this was the sole responsibility of the royal officials, they had no more success in eliminating the practice than Benjamin Keene had in 1732 when he had presented a formal complaint to Patiño on the subject.

In 1738 the escribano de registros in Caracas discovered an old cédula which decreed that the French asentistas must pay a duty of four reales on each slave introduced. The escribano informed the South Sea Company factors that they must now pay the same duty. About the same time the governor of Caracas settled a dispute between the factors and a former governor of Puerto Rico, Francisco Domingo Granados, in favour of the latter. Granados had sent slaves from Puerto Rico to La Guaira for sale, and his right to do so had been contested by the Company. The governor ruled that they were legal introductions because Granados had not imported them originally into the West Indies. On these grounds, the factors complained, anyone could buy contraband slaves and then sell them elsewhere legally in competition with the Company. Before either question could be settled the Company's trade on the Spanish Main ended. Late in 1739 or early in 1740 Thomas Butcher and another factor were seized, sent to Spain on a Caracas Company ship and imprisoned in San Sebastian.⁵⁷ Thus the British asiento ended ignominiously at all factories at the start of the war. It remained

57. Patton and Butcher to directors, 15 July 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815; Directors to Weyland, 9 January 1741, BM, Add. 25,558, f. 47; Butcher to Burrell, 13 January and 9 June 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, ff. 619-620, 631; Keene to Patiño, 9 May 1732, AGS, Estado 6883; Arcila Farias, Economía colonial, pp. 190-192.

It is unknown what happened to Butcher and his friend, although they probably returned to England after the War of Jenkins' Ear.

to be seen whether or not the South Sea Company could revive the trade yet again. In fact they did not, nor were they particularly eager to do so.

Chapter X

The Annual Ships

By the terms of the asiento treaty the South Sea Company introduced legally into Spanish colonies in America on "annual ships" British and other European merchandise. The legal introduction was accompanied by a voluminous trade in contraband goods which evaded duties and diminished the volume of Spanish trade, denied revenue to the Spanish treasury, and competed with the fleets. As a result the Spanish government eventually proposed to abolish the annual ships for 2% of the returns of the flotas and galleons. Although the proposal was supported by many of the Company's proprietors, an agreement was never reached, mainly because the directors feared that the Spanish would not make the equivalent payments.¹

The first annual ship, the Royal Prince,² was to have sailed in 1713, but there was a long delay in despatching it, partly for administrative reasons, but primarily because the Company was suffering numerous delays in outfitting the two license ships.³ The ship, commanded by Bayham Raymond, left London in August 1716 for Vera Cruz. Although it did not sail with the flota of Antonio Serrano, it joined the fleet in November for the fair in Vera Cruz. Ships of the flota carried 2,841 tons of merchandise, making it the largest to date that century, yet there is some indirect evidence that the Royal Prince

1. Proposal, Geraldino to directors, n.d., c. 1734, PRO, S.P. 36/30, ff. 334-335; Geraldino to Patiño, 20 January and 17 February 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2791.
2. The Royal Prince, 700 tons, and its sister ship the Royal George, 630 1/3 tons, were constructed by the Company. The Royal Prince was finished in 1716, the Royal George in March 1718. Including provisions for their first voyages, but not for merchandise, crew's wages or other expenses, the Royal Prince cost £15,000 and the Royal George £13,238/11/5. Wood, "Annual Ships", p. 140; Account of the Royal Prince's voyage to Vera Cruz, 1717, AGI, Contaduría 266; Directors to Cartagena factors, 30 April 1718, BM, Add. 25,563, ff. 159-160.
3. Before the departure of the Royal Prince the conditions under which the annual ships were to sail were modified by the Treaty of 1716. The most important stipulation of this treaty was that the legal tonnage was raised from 500 to 650 tons for each ship.

and escorting British vessels carried at least 2,000 tons of merchandise. The six succeeding annual ships also exceeded their allowed tonnage, and it is possible that the amount of goods they introduced nearly equalled that of the fleets.⁴ Aware that the Company or its employees might try to introduce illicit goods, the Spanish instructed Serrano to remeasure the Royal Prince when it arrived in Vera Cruz, and to allow the Company to land up to 50 tons over the stipulated amount, but which would be deducted from the next annual ship. Any further excess was to be confiscated.⁵

Captain Raymond and his officers were permitted to purchase merchandise to be sold privately, one half of which had to be the same kind as that of the Company, and which could not exceed a total of five tons. The value of goods allotted to each officer was as follows:

Table I

Captain	£1,500
Chief mate	300
Second mate	200
Third mate	150
Fourth mate	100
Surgeon, boatswain, gunner, steward, carpenter and midshipmen	50 each
Quartermaster	30

From the proceeds of the sale of this merchandise the officers could purchase any produce in America except indigo and cochineal, which were undoubtedly proscribed to avoid competition between the Company and their employees, and to prevent glutting the English market.

The Royal Prince's cargo was consigned jointly to the factors in Vera Cruz and to the ships' officers to sell, and Captain Raymond was instructed to join the factory council during his stay. It was not a happy arrangement. The factors refused to cooperate with Raymond or his officers because they were

4. One Spaniard suggested that the Company had ships constructed to hold a larger cargo than other ships of the same dimensions. This would not be discovered when the ship was measured because the cargo tonnage was determined on the basis of the calculated ship measurement. Anon. letter, n.d., c. 1730, AGS, Estado 7006.
5. Walker, "Galeones and Flotas", pp. 125, 234.

trying to conceal their own illicit activities. They gave the Company a poor exchange rate, mixed the cargoes of the license ship Elizabeth and the Royal Prince to their own advantage, and sold goods at a profit which they listed in the accounts as damaged. The officers of the Royal Prince also swindled the Company. They shipped contraband on H.M.S. Diamond, which convoyed the annual ship, supposedly to protect it from pirates, and on the Sarah, an accompanying storeship. When the Spanish complained of these activities the directors denied responsibility and chided the royal officials for their inefficiency in curtailing contraband.⁶

The sale of the Royal Prince's cargo was hampered by delays and irritations. Part of the cargo was seized in the represalia on 3 January 1719, and afterwards the accounts were missing. The factors claimed that the books had been sent home on the Royal Prince, which sailed just prior to the represalia; the directors said that they were lost. Thus it is difficult to reconstruct the details of the sale. Company accountants had to base their calculations of the voyage on miscellaneous letters, receipts and interviews with the factors and the ship's crew. The most complete record of the voyage indicates a large profit.

Table II

Costs

Cargo	£233,500
Ship and supplies	15,000
Gifts	883/0/8
	<hr/>
Total:	£249,383/0/8

Receipts

Sale price of cargo less expenses	£357,551/16/10
Profit on grain purchased in America from the proceeds of the cargo, and sold in Europe, less a loss on indigo	3,872/18/1
	<hr/>
Total:	£361,424/14/11

6. Minute court of directors, 5 June 1717, BM, Add. 25,497, ff. 39-40; Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 12 July 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, ff. 44, 46; Minute committee of correspondence, 13 February 1722, BM, Add. 25,551, f. 71; List of goods and merchandise on the Royal Prince, 17 July 1717, AGI, Contaduría 266; Directors to Bowles, 26 June 1718, BM, Add. 25,555, ff. 88-89; Wescomb to Craggs, 27 June 1718, BM, Add. 25,555, f. 88; Fiscal's report, 16 September 1728, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801; Walker, op. cit., p. 126.

Gross profit:	£112,041/14/3 ⁷
Philip V's share	£32,212/1/7
Company's share	£79,828/18/5

Philip V never received his share of the ship's profit. The Company claimed that he owed a percentage of interest on the original investment in the cargo as well as on the returns remitted from America. He was charged 8% interest for his share of the cargo, i.e., one quarter plus 5% of the remaining three quarters. This reduced his net profit to only £8,678/4/4½.⁸

The second annual ship, the Royal George, Captain Davison, was originally scheduled to sail in 1718.⁹ A crew was hired and a cargo worth £264,964/4/1 purchased. Before it sailed, however, Guillermo Eon informed the directors that the departure of the galleons had been delayed. Then in September war broke out between the two crowns, and the ship's departure was further postponed.

The Royal George's crew were not idle while their ship lay an anchor. They took East India goods onto the vessel from other ships, and then smuggled them ashore to avoid British duties. No evidence linked the crew to the practice, however, and when it was discovered the directors did no more than order them to refrain from such acts in the future.¹⁰

7. The Company computed the earnings to be £111,730/15/6, but they subtracted the expenses of provisions for the factors.
8. Lizeaga to Philip V, 6 May 1719, AGI, Contaduría 895; Vera Cruz factors to directors, 7 May 1718, AGI, Contaduría 266; Cuenta de la factoría de la Vera Cruz y México, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266; Cuenta del viage que hizo a la Vera Cruz el navio el príncipe real, n.d., 1717, AGI, Contaduría 266; Spanish account of the asiento trade from the beginning to 1 November 1739, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 497; Wood, op. cit., p. 136.
9. Captain Davison and his officers were given the same allowances for private trade as the officers of the Royal Prince. Minute court of directors, 7 May 1718, EM, Add. 25,498, f. 32.
10. Receipts and payments on account of the asiento trade to 30 April 1722, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 646; Directors to Bowles, 5 June 1718, EM, Add. 25,563, f. 170; Shephard to the crown, 5 June 1718, EM, Add. 25,555, f. 86; Minute court of directors, 7 April 1720, EM, Add. 25,499, f. 4; Wescomb to Carkess, 7 April 1720, EM, Add. 25,555, f. 111; Wood, op. cit., p. 140.

After the war Philip V issued cédulas permitting the ship to sail with the galleons and for its cargo to be sold inland if necessary. He also ordered that the ship be remeasured in the Indies as a precaution against merchandise being added to the cargo in Jamaica, and because there was no way of knowing whether or not its tonnage had altered since Guillermo Eon had measured it in 1718. However royal officials in Cartagena decided not to remeasure the ship until it was unloaded because of the difficulty of doing so in its "overloaded" condition.¹¹

The cargo of the Royal George was measured officially at 664 tons 30 1/8 palmos, of which 180 tons 44 palmos were unloaded at Cartagena and the remaining 483 tons 152 4/8 palmos in Portobelo.

Table III

<u>Official Cargo Manifest</u>	<u>Unloaded in Cartagena</u>	<u>Unloaded in Portobelo</u>	<u>Purchase Price (in £)</u>
Cloth & thread, 5,077 bales	1,523	3,554	£218,183/-/2
Cloth & thread, 431 cases	37	394	
Osnaburgs, 246 pieces	-unknown-)	
Beeswax, 794 cakes	374	420	9,313/17/8
Sealing wax, 10 cases	-unknown-		233/6/8
Cinnamon, 60 bales	20	40	1,590/4/11
Cloves, 12 casks	-unknown-		793/13/6
Pewter, 26 casks	2	24	225/4/-
Spanish nails, 360 casks	unknown	8,768 lbs.	961/9/8
Spanish iron, 4,738 bars	unknown	184,674 lbs.	2,281/10/-
Looking glasses, 37 cases	-unknown-		600/6/10
Jews harps, 2 cases	-unknown-		42/10/-
Hats, 50 cases	-unknown-		3,949/14/7
Gold & silver ornaments, 17 cases	-unknown-		14,626/19/2

The following items were listed by royal officials as having been unloaded in Portobelo, but which were not listed in the cargo manifest given to the Spanish. Values were not specified.

Pepper, 35 bales
Medicine, 12 boxes
Gifts, 11 chests

	£252,346/17/3
Freight costs:	12,617/6/10
Total cost:	£264,964/4/1

11. Real cédula, 27 September 1721, BM, Add. 32,741, f. 166; Grimaldo to Stanhope, 10 August 1721, BM, Add. 22,520, f. 182; Walker, op. cit., p. 171; Stanhope to Carteret, 22 September 1721, BM, Add. 22,520, f. 279; Auto de diligencia, 15 January 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2726; Pes to Grimaldo, 9 August 1721, AGS, Estado 6851.

There were 6,879 numbered items in the cargo of the Royal George (1,822 were unloaded at Cartagena), although only 6,541 were measured to determine weight. The royal officials in Portobelo suggested that about 416 items, which were recently stamped and poorly packaged, were introduced illicitly.¹²

The most reliable account available indicates that the sale price of the cargo was £290,569/3/9, giving a gross profit of £25,604/19/8. Philip V received only £3,398/13/11 as his share, less than half the £7,366/3/2 he should have received under the terms of the contract. The difference was probably consumed by interest charges which had accumulated during the long delay between the acquisition of the cargo and the sailing of the ship.¹³

The South Sea Company began preparations late in 1721 to send the Royal Prince on its second voyage. William Cleland was selected as captain by a ballot of the court of directors, a crew hired and a cargo worth £292,992/11/2 purchased. The following March the Company was again notified that the fleet's departure would be delayed because the Indies were overstocked with European goods—principally by French contrabandistas. Consequently Philip V asked the Company to postpone the sailing of the annual ship. Although Stanhope pointed out that the Company had the legal right to send the ship whether or not the fleet sailed, he advised the Company not to do so. But the directors continued preparations to send the ship. It was measured at 622 60/100 tons by two mathematicians, one representing the Company and the other the Spanish. However when their request for a cédula permitting it to sail was ignored, the directors turned to their king for help. Spanish ministers still refused to grant a

12. Certificate of weight by royal officials in Portobelo, 21 July 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Certificate of the cargo of the Royal George by the Company, 2 February 1723, AGS, Estado 7017. There were 166 3/8 palmas to the ton.

13. Estimate of damages caused by Spanish officials, n.d., c. 1730, AGS, Estado 7017; Spanish general account of the asiento trade from the beginning to 1 November 1739, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 497; Receipts and payments by the Company, account of the trade to 1 May 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 5.

Wood concludes that the net profit of the voyage was £11,850, based on the percentage paid to Philip V. Wood, op. cit., p. 181.

license when Stanhope applied for one on behalf of the Company. Grimaldo explained that most of the 4,438 5/8 tons of cargo taken to the Indies on the flota in 1720 remained unsold, and that throughout the recent war illicit traders and merchants from the Philippines had supplied the Indies. Even Spaniards were now forbidden to send merchandise to America; allowing the annual ship to sail would be a grave injustice to them and to Spain's economy in the New World.

Believing that the Spanish intended no prejudice to Company interests, Stanhope worked to obtain future concessions for them. In exchange for not sending a ship in 1722 the Company received permission to send two the next year. One was to sail with the flota to Vera Cruz in April 1723, and the other to Cartagena in August, whether or not the galleons sailed. The Company received other liberal pledges. Their ships were no longer to be measured in the Indies, and Company merchandise could be sold inland without the payment of duties. The latter, however, caused such a clamour among Spanish merchants in the Indies, who had to pay duties on entry and on sales inland as well, that it was later revoked.¹⁴

Early in September 1722 the Company bowed to the inevitable and agreed to postpone the sailing of the Royal Prince. Shortly afterwards the liberal concessions granted in the summer of 1722 were rescinded. In November Joseph Patiño and the Council of the Indies advised Philip V to restrict the trade of the annual ships only to those ports where Spanish merchants could trade, and to take measures to offset the advantageous prices of Company merchandise. Since it was impossible to delay the annual ship indefinitely without a new treaty, or serious diplomatic consequences, they suggested that it be required to travel with the fleet from Cadiz, and its entire cargo to be sold on the coast.

14. Minute court of directors, 2 November 1721, BM, Add. 25,500, f. 123; Stanhope to Carteret, 23 and 30 March 1722, PRO, S.P. 94/91; Carteret to Stanhope, 13 July 1722, PRO, S.P. 104/139; Petition from the Company directors, 13 July 1722, PRO, S.P. 104/139; Grimaldo to Stanhope, 30 July 1722, PRO, S.P. 94/91; Stanhope to Carteret, 6 August 1722, PRO, S.P. 94/91; Grimaldo to Stanhope, 5 August 1722, PRO, S.P. 94/91.

The privilege of sending merchandise inland for sale duty free should be permanently revoked. This concession had been opposed by Mexican merchants and royal officials since the arrival of the Elizabeth in 1715. Royal officials there had uncovered a scheme to avoid taxation in which Spanish merchants on the fleets placed much of their merchandise in South Sea Company warehouses, and then, with the aid of Company factors, transported the goods inland for sale. They estimated the consequent loss in royal revenue to be about 360,000 pesos.

The Company claimed that by treaty the cargoes of the annual ships were duty free regardless of where they were sold. However on 28 November 1722 Philip V issued a cédula which required the Company to pay the alcabala on "interned" merchandise, even if taken inland as reprisaled goods. It also declared that annual ships must be remeasured on arrival in the Indies. Although the decision was probably contrary to the intent of the asiento treaty, its imposition reflected a general tightening of controls on the annual ships.¹⁵

After these precautions to protect Spanish merchants in the fleet were taken, Philip V decided on 15 December 1722 to allow two annual ships to sail the following year. In March he granted a license for this purpose to the Royal Prince.¹⁶

The Company made several innovations in the management of the annual ships in the second trading period. Instead of selling the cargo through the captain and factors, they hired supercargoes to travel with the Company ships to oversee the disposal of the merchandise. The purpose was to assure the sale of the entire cargo, and to give greater control from London over the sale of cargoes and the acquisition of money and goods for return trips. Four men were

15. Junta del asiento, 15 December 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2773; Real cédula to the viceroy of Peru, 3 December 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Philip V to Castelfuerte, 15 December 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2773; Real cédula, 28 November 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Résumé of a letter from Patiño to the comercio of Cadiz, 7 November 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801; Memorial from the Company directors, 6 September 1722, PRO, S.P. 104/139; From the consulado of México, 20 March 1723, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 198A.

16. Real cédula, 13 March 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776.

selected by ballot; one was to remain in Vera Cruz as the chief factor there, and the other three were to return with the ship. The supercargoes selected for the Royal Prince received no concessions for private trade as had been the case on the first two annual ships, but were to be paid subsistence for the trip and a commission of 3% on the gross sale price of the cargo to be divided among them. Those appointed as supercargoes, with the percentage of commission each was to receive and the amount of bond money each was to pay was as follows:

Table IV

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Commission</u>	<u>Advance</u>
Catlin Thorowgood	First supercargo	1 1/8%	£8,000
John Pitt	Second supercargo & chief factor	1% (He received 1/2 and the other factors 1/2 in proportion to their salaries)	3,000
James Dollissee	Third supercargo	3/4%	5,000
William Cleland	Fourth supercargo & captain	1/8%	1,000 ¹⁷

The Royal Prince arrived in Vera Cruz on 8 August 1723, but the supercargoes did not begin to sell its cargo until the flota arrived on 20 September. A large percentage of the cargo was taken into the interior for sale in the rich mining communities. Viceroy Castelfuerte complained on 13 November 1723 that Company factors were extracting gold and silver from the mines in great quantity, assisted by Spanish merchants desirous of avoiding the payment of duties and taxes. The cédula of 11 March 1724, which greatly restricted Company sales, was prompted by Castelfuerte's complaint, corroborated by the comercio of Andalucia and by Baltasar de Guevara, commander of the flota.¹⁸

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17. Real cédula, 12 June 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Junta del asiento, 15 December 1722, AGS, Estado 6858; Minute committee of correspondence, 5 February 1722, BM, Add. 25,551, f. 68; Crosby's Merchant's and Trades man's pocket Dictionary (London, 1810), p. 492; Minute court of directors, 14 February 1722, BM, Add. 25,501, f. 21; Minute court of directors, 26 April 1723, BM, Add. 25,501, f. 57; From Philip V, 12 June 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; D. Templeman, The Secret History of the Late Directors of the South-Sea Company (London, 1735), p. 2; Hatton, The Merchant's Magazine, p. 254; Anon., An Enquiry into the misconduct and frauds, p. 7.
18. Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 19 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803; Philip V to Castelfuerte, 11 March 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776; Walker, op. cit., pp. 173-175.

While the percentage of the Royal Prince's cargo sold inland is unknown, Company employees made every effort to avoid paying the alcabala. In 1725, however, a shipment of Company money being transported to Vera Cruz was seized under the viceroy's orders on the pretence that it was owed on alcabalas. Although the Company complained, the Junta del Asiento ruled in August 1726 that goods taken inland in 1723 were taxable, and the seized money was not returned even though the factors had given a security for the duty when the ship first landed.¹⁹

Efforts by the Spanish to guard against illicit trade, and the appointment of supercargoes by the Company to monitor the sale of merchandise, proved equally ineffective. The Royal Prince carried a cargo far exceeding the authorized tonnage: perhaps as much as 2,000 tons counting accompanying support and convoy vessels, or nearly half the tonnage of the entire flota. French and Spanish businessmen in Seville and Cadiz instructed their agents in America to ship most of their profits of sales on the fleets in South Sea Company ships to England to avoid paying Spanish duties. Some money was sent on the fleet to mask the activity, but Castelfuerte learned of this manoeuvre and published an order which threatened the punishment of death to anyone sending gold, silver or other effects on Company vessels. It did not seem to stop the practice. When the Royal Prince left Vera Cruz on 21 May 1724 with the flota it carried, according to one report, between 2,000,000 and 6,000,000 pesos. It is unknown how much actually was carried on the Company's account and how much represented illicit returns and money taken on letters of credit.²⁰

The flota commanded by Antonio Serrano returned cash and effects worth 13,260,941 pesos, of which the crown received only 663,092 pesos 4 reales; gold and silver returned by private individuals was valued at 10,952,441 pesos

19. Junta del Asiento, 9 August 1726, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 198A.

20. Consulado of Cadiz to Arana, 16 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802; Castelfuerte to Philip V, 3 May 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803; Anon. letter, 20 January 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Corrobarrutia y Zúpide to Serrano, 29 August 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2524.

7½ reales. Since no account books were kept on the Royal Prince's voyage by the supercargoes, what few accounts survived are contradictory and incomplete. The cargo and expenses of the voyage were approximately £292,993. While it is unknown what profit was made on the voyage, the Spanish king was paid £16,553/13½ for his share of the net proceeds.²¹

The Royal George, Captain John Davison,²² left England on its second voyage as an annual ship on 3 February 1724, travelling without a convoy, but well-armed and with a privaterring commission in case of attack. Davison had instructions to sail directly to Cartagena or Portobelo and to remain in port as long as necessary to sell the cargo and the unsold merchandise from the Bedford and the Royal George, and to acquire a return cargo from the factors or from the accompanying supercargoes. Regulations governing the voyage were similar to previous trips. The Company was still required to wait for the fair or four months for the fleet to arrive before they could still their cargo, and the ship was to be remeasured on its arrival. Goods which could not be sold at the ports of entry, however, were permitted to be taken inland. Private trade was proscribed; to limit the crew's acquisition of merchandise prior to sailing, officers were forbidden to advance more than a quarter of a sailor's wages for the trip. Because of previous complaints by the Spanish, Davison was ordered not to bring any Spanish passengers or goods away from America.²³

21. Returns of the flota commanded by Serrano, n.d., c. 1724, AGS, Estado 6878; Walker, op. cit., p. 174; Anon., Relación en orden al comercio ilícito... que hacen los ingleses, n.d., AGS, Estado 6866; General cash account of receipts and payments on account of trade from the beginning to 1 May 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 5, 11; Spanish general account of the asiento trade from its beginning to 1 November 1739, AGS, Estado 7009.

22. After his first trip on the Royal George, Captain Davison was accused of returning silver to England in private trade, but he professed his innocence to the satisfaction of the Spanish representative to the Company. Minute court of directors, 28 March 1723, BM, Add. 25,501, f. 47.

23. Junta del asiento, 11 May and 30 July 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2774; Real cédula, 27 September 1721, BM, Add. 32,741, f. 166; Grimaldo to Stanhope, 10 August 1721, BM, Add. 22,520, f. 182; Reales cédulas, 14 August and 26 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Instructions to Davison, 12 December 1723, BM, Add. 25,567, ff. 8-10.

The method of paying the supercargoes was altered slightly to their disadvantage. The commission was increased to $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ of the sale price of the cargo, $\frac{1}{2}\%$ more than on the Royal Prince, but divided into 56 equal parts, 12 of which were reserved for the Company's use. The supercargoes' division of the commission, and money advanced to each for the voyage, was as follows:

Table V ²⁴

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Commission</u>	<u>Advance</u>
William Bumpstead	First supercargo	17 parts	£1,200
Joseph Bachelor	Second supercargo	11	800
Thomas Canham	Third supercargo	8	500
John Tutt	Fourth supercargo	8	500

Before the supercargoes could begin the sale of the ship's cargo the cédula of 11 March arrived. It ordered Spanish officials in the Indies to observe rigidly the terms of the asiento as described in the documents of 26 March 1713 and 12 June 1716, and to ignore other cédulas amplifying these treaties. The cédula of 27 September 1721, which allowed the Company to send goods inland for sale, was expressly annulled.²⁵ The factors were limited to selling merchandise only during the fairs, and forbidden to transport Spanish subjects, effects or money from the Indies.

The Spanish attitude was harmful to Anglo-Spanish relations. Newcastle instructed Stanhope to complain to the Spanish government, whom he accused of deceiving the Company into sending merchandise to America by issuing advantageous cédulas, and then revoking them before the goods could be sold. They "must reflect", he said, "that their disobliging so considerable a Body of His Subjects as the South Sea Company...is not the way of putting His Majesty in a condition of being Serviceable to them".²⁶

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24. Minute committee of correspondence, 19 November 1723, BM, Add. 25,551, f. 81; Instructions to supercargoes, 12 December 1723, BM, Add. 25,564, ff. 25-31.
25. This cédula was revoked on 27 September 1727. Thus merchandise on the last two annual ships not sold at the port of arrival could be taken inland for sale. Real cédula, 27 September 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769.
26. Draft, Newcastle to Stanhope, 9 November 1724, BM, Add. 32,741, f. 198; Pozobueno to Grimaldo, 20 December 1724, AGS, Estado 6860; Decree of the Marquis of Castelfuerte, 16 July 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805; Royal decree, 11 March 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Wescomb to Newcastle, 3 November 1724, BM, Add. 32,741, f. 159; Extract, Bumpstead to directors, 6 August 1724, BM, Add. 32,741, f. 169.

There was considerable controversy over the sale of the Royal George's cargo, which included the usual large amount of contraband goods. Disobeying his instructions, Captain Davison stopped at St. Christopher's en route under the pretence of taking on necessary supplies, but, in fact, to add several hundred bales of merchandise to the cargo, including a large amount from the Mary, a British merchantman. The Royal George was heavily overloaded when it arrived in Cartagena. Even as it was being unloaded goods were transferred to it from other British vessels. One Spanish official estimated that the total cargo must have been worth 3,000,000 pesos.²⁷

The stopover in St. Christopher's was just the first in a series of extraordinary incidents which occurred on the trip. Captain Edward Phillips, who had succeeded Captain Davison after the latter's death in Cartagena, took the ship to Jamaica because it was shipping water. After being repaired it sprang another leak, and the captain and William Bumpstead agreed that the ship was unfit to sail. Another inspection revealed that the damage was slight, however, and the ship sailed on 7 November 1726, but only after the entire compliment (except Bumpstead) signed a document accepting the risks of the voyage. The ship next arrived in Antigua, where Bumpstead, who seemed to have complete sway over Captain Phillips, dismissed 100 men (leaving an insufficient crew to man the ship), and condemned the vessel as unfit to sail. His action caused a furor in London, where many people believed that the condemnation was done with the intention of defrauding the insurers. The directors sent Elias Bird and Nicholas Hill to Antigua to investigate the charges, with several shipwrights and calkers to repair the ship if possible.²⁸ Bumpstead was ordered

27. Varas y Valdés to Orendayn, 28 February 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Testimony of Edward Phillips, 13 June 1727, AGS, Estado 7017; Merchant in Cadiz to a merchant in London, 10 March 1729, PRO, S.P. 36/10, part ii, f. 138; Burnett to the Marquis of Bavenhead, 3 February 1729, AGS, Estado 7017; Minute committee for law suits, 17 November 1736, EM, Add. 25,570, f. 19.

28. The Royal George did return to London, but it was not used again on Company business. The "corps" of the vessel was sold in 1733 for £465. Anon. letter, 26 January 1733, AGS, Estado 6897.

to send the Royal Prince's cargo to London on H.M.S. Kingsale, Captain Girlington, a service for which the Company had to pay 2½% of the value of the cargo in freight charges.²⁹

One Captain Griffith testified that the ship was fit to sail but that Bumpstead was determined to condemn it, and had induced Girlington to agree to the step. It does seem likely that some fraud was intended by Bumpstead, but there is no evidence to support the suspicion. He later received a large reward for his services to the Company, and then married the daughter of Sir John Eyles, Company sub-governor, which could explain his being rewarded rather than punished. However charges were brought against him by the Company, and he appealed unsuccessfully to the House of Lords in February 1728 to exonerate him. In July 1730 the Company agreed to arbitrate its dispute with him, but the question was never resolved.

The voyage of the Royal George was ill-fated in other ways. Captain Davison and the second supercargo, Joseph Batchelor, died in Cartagena, and John Tutt, the fourth supercargo, died on the return voyage to Jamaica.³⁰

The Company spent £264,964/4/1 on the ship's cargo, of which merchandise worth £222,204/6/8 was intended for Portobelo, and £42,759/17/5 for Cartagena. It is unknown how much was spent on expenses for the voyage, or what was returned to London. One report indicated that the Company paid £6,000 to Captain Girlington to transport the return cargo to England. At 2½% of the value of the cargo, this would have made the value of the returns remitted at about

29. Testimony by Edward Phillips, 13 June 1727, AGS, Estado 7017; Houstoun, Memoirs, p. 169; Directors to Bumpstead, 28 February 1727, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 1; Wescomb to Phillips, 23 February 1727, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 3; Directors to Bird and Hill, 18 April 1727, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 4; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 5 April 1727, BM, Add. 25,552, f. 1.

30. Templeman, The Secret History, pp. 15-17, 23; Wescomb to Bryan, 14 September 1727, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 11; From John Eyles, 4 September 1736, BM, Add. 32,792, f. 199; Committee for law suits, 10 July 1730, BM, Add. 25,568, ff. 82-85.

All accounts indicate some confusion between the two sailings of the Royal George. It is extremely unlikely that exactly the same sum was spent on both voyages.

£240,000. If this were true, there was a net loss for the trip of £24,964, which is confirmed by Philip V having been charged £10,279/5 for his share of the loss. In fact, based on his obligation to pay 25% of the total loss, plus 5% of the remaining 75%, this would indicate that the total loss on the voyage was approximately £35,736. The proprietors probably did, indeed, lose money on the voyage, although the ship's officers, factors and supercargoes, and their backers, profited handsomely.³¹

The sailing of the next annual ship, the Prince Frederick, was opposed by factions within the Spanish government. In October 1724, Joseph Patiño and the consulado and comercio of Cadiz recommended that the flota be suspended until 1726 to avoid a glut of goods in New Spain, and to limit the introduction of Company merchandise. Not only were the Company goods duty free, they came from all over Europe, making it almost impossible for Spanish merchants to determine what to buy for the fleets. It was even suggested that the Company be denied permission to send another annual ship, at least until all their previous accounts were settled. However other factions in the Spanish government favoured granting the license, and on the advice of Grimaldo, Pozobueno and Sopeña, the king decided late in 1724 that the flota would sail in May, and that the cédula for the Prince Frederick would be given to the British agent in Madrid. It was dated 20 October 1724, but had not been delivered because the junta del asiento wanted to await the king's decision on the recommendation not to send the flota that year.³²

31. Instructions to supercargoes, 12 December 1723, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 25; Committee for law suits, 10 July 1730, BM, Add. 25,568, f. 83; Certificate of Royal George's cargo, 2 February 1723, AGS, Estado 7017; Spanish general account of the asiento from its beginning to 1 November 1739, AGS, Estado 7009; Spanish general account from 1 May 1713 to 30 April 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 500.

32. Patiño to Sopeña, 13 October 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2528; Siguenza to Valentin de Guerra, 18 June 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Alzayban to Pozobueno, 3 July 1725, AGS, Estado 6864; Varas y Valdés to Orendayn, 28 February 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Grimaldo to Pozobueno, 25 June 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804; Pozobueno to Grimaldo, 21 December 1724, AGS, Estado 6860; Sopeña to Grimaldo, 27 November 1724, AGS, Estado 6861.

The Prince Frederick, 40 guns and 170 men, Captain Wittington Williams, left London for Vera Cruz in August 1725, despite unsettled circumstances in the Indies, and against the advice of Townshend. It arrived at Vera Cruz on 25 October, 44 days after the flota. Williams carried a letter from Guillermo Eon affirming that the ship's cargo measured 645 tons. Antonio Serrano, commander of that year's flota, remeasured it on its arrival, although he had instructions not to do so if it had been measured in London, and found that it carried over 689 tons of goods, 39 more than authorized by treaty.³³ This is proof that contraband goods had been added to the cargo, although it is no indication of how much was on accompanying vessels.

The Prince Frederick was still at Vera Cruz in the summer of 1727, when news arrived of the diplomatic rupture with England, with instructions to seize all British ships and effects. This was the second annual ship to have its cargo seized because of war, the first being the Royal Prince in 1717.³⁴

The accounts of the Prince Frederick are fragmented and contradictory. The cost of the cargo was about £290,352, but total sales by Thomas Bowles and the other supercargoes, according to one account, was only £260,313, indicating a net loss of £30,039. Analyzing the accounts of the ship is complicated by the fact that one of the two principal buyers of the ship's goods, Gabriel de la Laguna (the other was Vicente Calderon), governor of Chiapas, died in 1737 without having paid the Company 130,000 pesos that he owed them. There is no record that the Company received the money from his heirs. According to

33. Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 26 March 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805; Philip V to royal officials of Vera Cruz, Cartagena and Portobelo, 28 July 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776; Statement by Messrs. Donneley and Scatcliffe, 16 January 1724, PRO, S.P. 36/14, part 1, f. 14; Stanhope to Townshend, 6 August 1725, BM, Add. 32,744, f. 23; Real orden, 14 April 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2769; Wescomb to Delafaye, 1 June 1725, BM, Add. 25,556, f. 69; Walker, op. cit., p. 234.

34. Eon to Ripperda, 28 March 1726, AGS, Estado 6840; Visita on the Prince Frederick, 26 October 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805; Cornejo to Alderete, 9 February 1726, AGI, Panama 134; Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 26 March 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805,

one anonymous correspondent in London, however, the ship returned money and produce worth about £300,000, including 360,000 pesos in cash, 1,062 serones of cochineal, 211 of indigo and 167 tons of logwood. In any case the Company claimed that they lost money on the voyage. They charged Philip £36,905/14 for his share of the loss, which should have indicated a loss of £128,365, excessive even if interest were included. Understandably the Spanish refused to pay, claiming that according to treaties they were to share in the profit only, and not in losses. Without further explanation the Company asserted that approximately £45,000 was left as an uncollected debt or in funds sent to Madrid.

The voyage was officially a financial failure, but as usual the vessel carried considerable illicit cargo. The Spotswood, for example, transferred 300 tons of merchandise to the Prince Frederick after its arrival in Vera Cruz.³⁵

The Prince William, Captain William Cleland, was the first annual ship to sail in the third trading period after the war of 1728, and only the sixth in the 17 years of the asiento contract. Its departure was delayed, however, during the peace negotiations, and as the months passed and no word was received concerning the despatch of the next fleet, the directors became increasingly nervous. Sir John Eyles wrote on 15 August 1728

The Flota & Galleons are certainly to be dispatch'd next year, & Supposing We are design'd to be protected in all our Priviledges agreable to the Preliminarys sign'd at the Pardo, If we are kept much longer in doubt, on what Conditions and Assurances We are to trade, We shall be too late to provide the Cargo, And Spain will on that disappointment obtain their desired End, as much for that Year, as if the Annual Ship was taken away.

More months passed; in March 1729 Eyles said that if the Spanish would only allow them to enjoy their trading privileges, the Company would make payments

35. Anon. letter, 17 April 1730, AGS, Estado 6880; Copy of instructions regarding debt, n.d., AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819; Hayes and Bowles to Romero, N.d., c. May 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819; Patiño to Keene, 3 April 1736, AGS, Estado 7009; Declaration by Plowes, 18 March 1729, AGS, Estado 7017; Burnett's testimony on annual ships, 25 February 1729, AGS, Estado 7017; Undated accounts, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 15; Receipts and payments by the Company account to 1 May 1736, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 4-5; Spanish general account 1 May 1713 to 1 November 1739, AGS, Estado 7009; Wood, op. cit., p. 257.

on money owed to Philip V, but because the delay in reestablishing trade was so injurious the directors would not "make any payments whatsoever on Account of the Negro Dutys."³⁶

It is uncertain if Eyles' threat influenced the Spaniards, but soon afterwards orders to reestablish the asiento trade were sent to Spanish officials in America, and the Company began to assemble a cargo for an annual ship, although no license for its departure had been received. By early September the flota had already sailed from Cadiz, and the Company was frantic that their ship would miss the fair unless a cédula was issued immediately. Without it, Wescomb said, "neither can the Company nor the Kingdom suppose the Assiento reestablished". When the document had still not arrived by late October the directors abandoned plans to send a vessel with the flota, and concentrated on preparing one to accompany the galleons. Finally, on 28 January 1730 Philip V issued a license for a Company ship to visit Cartagena and Portobelo that year with the galleons.

Various disputes and difficulties further postponed the ship's departure. The most vexing problem was over the measurement of the Prince William. It was customary for the annual ships to be measured in London under the supervision, or at least the attendance, of a Spanish official in London. After the recent war the arrival of the new representative was delayed through the late winter and spring months of 1730 in spite of repeated requests by the Company that his arrival be expedited. Measuring the vessel without his presence, Company officials realized, would probably lead to endless difficulties in America. In desperation that the Prince William would now miss this year's fair, however, the directors had it measured without a Spanish witness, and asked George II to help them acquire a license for it to sail. In consequence Newcastle instructed Keene to use strong terms in acquiring the license, and even declare to the Court of Spain, that the King will look upon their Compliance in this Affair, as a Test of the ancient good Correspondence between the Two Crowns being restored by the Treaty of Seville³⁷

36. Eyles to Rigby, 15 August 1728, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 34; Eyles to Delafaye, 12 March 1729, PRO, S.P. 36/18, part 1, f. 31.

Keene acquired the cédula on 18 August, and was assured by Patiño that the fair would not be held until October, and that the Prince William would arrive in time if it left early in September. The galleons had already left without informing the Company as they were obliged to do by treaty.³⁸

The Spanish refused to accept the Company's measurement of the Prince William, and one Luis Jacob Beaufort was assigned to represent them during a remeasurement, which was done on 16 September 1730. A document was issued which certified that the vessel was carrying 620 and 707/10,000 Spanish tons of merchandise, and exempted it from another measurement in the Indies. Thus the ship was finally ready to sail. Company officials were convinced that its departure had been delayed purposely, and that secret orders had been issued to hold the fair before its arrival. Consequently they asked that either the fair be prolonged until the annual ship arrived, or that they be permitted to sell their merchandise in the interior if the ship arrived too late; both requests were denied.³⁹

Although Patiño said that the delay was probably due to some "inadvertant error", the Spanish probably did try to delay the sailing of the annual ship. Benjamin Keene thought so, and he was often critical of the Company. If the Spaniards did intend the Prince William to miss the fair, they failed. The vessel sailed late in 1730, and arrived in Portobelo on 11 February 1731, just three days before the arrival of the merchants of Lima, who were carrying more

37. Directors to governor of Buenos Aires, 3 April 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 91; Wescomb to Keene, 14 August and 4 September 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, ff. 133, 266; Keene to Paz, 29 August 1730, AGS, Estado 6880; Newcastle to Stanhope, 9 September 1729, BM, Add. 32,763, f. 184; Wescomb to Keene, 30 October 1729, BM, Add. 25,566, f. 141; Newcastle to Keene, 25 July 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/105; Real cédula, 16 August 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Wescomb to Newcastle, 17 July 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/19, part ii, ff. 185-186.
38. Patiño to Paz, 10 November 1730, AGS, Estado 6880; Keene to directors, 31 August 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Paz to Keene, 16 August 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Keene to Newcastle, 5 April 1730, BM, Add. 43,412, f. 111.
39. Paz to Keene, 2 September 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Certificate of Prince William's weight, 21 September 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Company memorial to Newcastle, 22 September 1730, PRO, S.P. 36/20, part ii, ff. 231-234; Beaufort certificate, 25 September 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104.

than 12,000,000 registered pesos with which to purchase merchandise. Four Spanish merchant vessels arrived from Guayaquil still later with considerable cacao and 200,000 registered pesos. Reportedly a large additional sum of unregistered money also arrived.⁴⁰

Several regulations were promulgated specifically for this fair which were intended to rectify previous abuses. To dry up sources of funds to contrabandistas, no money could be sent from the various Spanish American provinces except during the fair. All sales were restricted to the site of the fair itself; goods could neither be sold inland by the factors nor by merchants travelling on the fleets.

Merchants on the galleons and those from Peru met in May to try to regulate prices for the fair, but they could not reach an agreement, which was undoubtedly advantageous to the Company who could always offer competition prices. Company agents were later accused of undercutting illegally the prices of the galleon merchants. In fact, instructions had been issued by the directors to sell the cargo "at any price". Eyles suggested that this was necessary because of Spain's refusal to return reprisaled goods or to reinstate the trade as it was before the war.

The directors altered the procedures for selling the cargo of the Prince William because of accusations of illicit trade made against supercargoes on previous voyages. The merchandise was consigned jointly to a council composed of the factors in Cartagena and Panama and Portobelo, the supercargo, James Dollisse, and Captain Cleland. They were to divide a commission of 4% on sales into 50 equal parts as follows:

Table VI

26 parts to the Panama and Portobelo factors
 12 parts to the Cartagena factors
 8 parts to James Dollisse
 4 parts to William Cleland

40. Patiño to Paz, 10 November 1730, AGS, Estado 6880; Keene to Newcastle, 17 November 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Keene to Paz, 2 November 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Paz to Keene, 14 November 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Rigby and Pratter to Stewart, 20 March 1731, PRO, Adm. 1/231; Stewart to Burchett, 10 February 1731, PRO, Adm. 1/231; From John Eyles, 15 May 1731, PRO, S.P. 36/23, f. 115; Jimenez to Varas y Valdés, 26 March 1731, AGI, Contratación 5146.

All business was to be negotiated jointly by this council. Sales were to be restricted to the period of the fair, with unsold goods (on which no commission was paid) to be returned to England.⁴¹

To compensate for these restrictions the directors decided again to allow the ship's officers to trade in "privileged goods". Money was advanced to purchase merchandise, and bonds were issued at a premium of 15% to guarantee repayment of the loans. All advances were deducted from the remittance, and the net profit divided according to shares. As an incentive to curb illicit trade an award was offered worth 25% of the value of any illegal merchandise discovered.

The total value of the private merchandise was not to exceed 40 tons or £15,000, with the 40 tons to be part of the Company's allotted 650 tons. It was to be divided as follows:

Table VII

Captain	£4,500
Supercargo	4,500
Writer	400
Chief mate	1,500
Second mate	500
Third mate	400
Fourth mate	300
Fifth mate	200
Surgeon and purser	150 each
Boatswain, gunner, carpenter and caulker	75 each
Eight midshipmen, six mates and petty officers, eight quartermasters and an amoner	45 each

As might have been predicted the precautions taken to avoid illicit trade proved useless. An anonymous address to the Company proprietors charged that although there was concern that the ship would not arrive in time for the fair, the "convenanters" took time to go to Portsmouth to load a cargo of illicit goods. When the ship arrived at St. Christopher's in January 1731, Captain Cleland⁴²

41. Keene to directors, 31 August 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104; Keene to directors, 8 February 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/103; Minutes committee of correspondence and factories, 7 May and 4 June 1730, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 27-28, 37; Stewart to Burchett, 30 May 1731, PRO, Adm. 1/231.

42. Both Captain Cleland and James Dollisse had served on a previous annual ship, the Royal Prince, which had carried considerable illicit merchandise.

transferred the ship's guns to a Company snow and loaded his ship to the gunwales with illicit merchandise.⁴³

The Company made an enquiry into the voyage when the Prince William returned to England, "The result of which amounted to nothing of Importance". Cleland placed himself at the Company's mercy after having confessed to an involvement in illicit trade. Others agreed to testify, but only on certain conditions. Mr. Hutchinson, a former factor at Portobelo, said

That he did know of some Things that might be of advantage to the Company, and if the Company will adjust his accounts, he will give them what assistance he is able, but 'till That is done, he desired to be Excused.

After agreeing to this provision the Company heard the testimony of several witnesses. Their evidence prompted the directors to appropriate the profits from the privileged goods to recover losses caused by the illicit trade.⁴⁴

This was one of the poorest fairs yet held, in spite of expectations. Considerable merchandise remained unsold from the 1727 fair, and the market was glutted with contraband goods. Furthermore, a disastrous earthquake in Chile restricted mining activities, and reduced the amount of money available. Finally, an epidemic broke out after the arrival of the galleons which killed hundreds of people, and probably scared off many merchants. Sir John Eyles calculated that after deducting duties, religious tithes, returns of former galleons and other private investments and past debts, the galleons returned less than the cost of the goods. (The original cost had been approximately 10,000,000 pesos.) On the other hand, the annual ship made a healthy profit. Some British officials feared that news of this profit would be ill-received by the Spanish, although Eyles believed that it might offer an opportunity to obtain concessions from

43. Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 15 May 1730, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 31-33; Anon., An Address to the Proprietors of the South-Sea Capital (London, 1732), pp. 10-11; Minute general court, 14 January 1731, BM, Add. 25,544, f. 85; A note from E.V., n.d., C.L. Shel. vol. 43.

44. Minutes committee for law suits, 26 June and 12 November 1735, BM, Add. 25,569, ff. 63, 72; Minute general court, 14 January 1731, BM, Add. 25,544, ff. 85-86.

Patiño, and teach him a lesson into the bargain.⁴⁵

There are considerable discrepancies regarding the accounts of the Prince William. The cost of the trip, £250,370/9/1½ (about 1,112,757 pesos), included the cargo and construction of the ship, various commissions, supplies, gifts and salaries. The total sale price of its cargo was £299,814/7/5, suggesting a profit of £43,443/18/4. Yet Philip V only received £9,102/3/10 as his share, although by the terms of the asiento contract he should have received £12,395. As was the case for other annual ships the difference probably represents interest on the original investment.⁴⁶

The last and most profitable annual ship, the Royal Caroline, Captain Samuel Mead, left England in October 1732 to join the flota commanded by Rodrigo de Torres. It arrived in Vera Cruz on Christmas day, from where its cargo was transported to the site of the fair at Jalapa.⁴⁷ The ship sailed at an inauspicious time. A Spanish register ship, the Dichosa, had recently been seized by a British warship, and Company directors were afraid that their vessel would be seized in retaliation. They induced Newcastle to send an express ship to Cadiz to relay to America any orders that Keene could obtain from the Spanish court to prevent its seizure, or to release it if seized.⁴⁸

Conditions for the sale of the cargo were similar to those for previous annual ships. All goods were duty free and could be sold at any place where the flotistas did, or four months after the ship's arrival if the flota did not arrive. The Company received permission to sell its goods elsewhere in

45. Alzedo to Patiño, 23 December 1731, AGI, Santa Fé 1161; Eyles to Keene, 16 September 1731, PRO, S.P. 36/24, ff. 130-132; Delafaye to Keene, 1 October 1731, PRO, S.P. 94/109; Salas to Philip V, 3 November 1730, AGI, Santa Fe 440.

46. Eyles to Keene, 16 September 1731, PRO, S.P. 36/24, f. 131; Undated general accounts, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 15.

47. For a discussion of the organization of the new fairs in Jalapa see Eduardo Arcila Farias, Reformas económicas, I, 80-91.

48. Extract, Newcastle to Keene, 30 October 1732, Bodleian, Rawl. C 468; State of orders for reprisals, c. 1732, PRO, S.P. 94/101.

the viceroyalty upon payment of the alcabalas if no buyers came to the coast.⁴⁹

The Royal Caroline was constructed on the Company's specifications. Four supercargoes were selected by ballot to accompany it,⁵⁰ and required to sign a joint covenant agreeing not to engage in activities contrary to the asiento contract on pain of forfeiting their commissions and allowances. Ship's officers caught participating in illegal activities were to lose their wages and be discharged from the Company, and to pay the Company for the value of the contraband goods, or £250 per ton if the value was not ascertainable--but only if fraud were discovered within six months after the ship returned to London.⁵¹

The accounts of the voyage are the most complete of any of the two license and seven annual ships. The cargo cost £180,814/13/7, with other expenses including £11,765/-/10½ for the ship and supplies, £5,756/10/9½ in salaries for sailors and soldiers, and £24,613/5/8 for the expenses and salaries of the supercargoes. This last item included the cost of unloading the cargo, payments to carpenters, servants, doctors and for other services required, rent of a house in Vera Cruz, travel, mail, gifts for Spanish officials, and other miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses in selling the cargo.⁵² Thus the total cost of the trip was £222,967/10/9, not counting interest paid by the Company or Philip V.

49. Real cédula, 26 March 1732, PRO, S.P. 94/111. Although Thomas Geraldino was secretly instructed not to permit the Royal Caroline to carry any foreign merchandise, it was not enforced. To Geraldino, 1 May 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851.
50. Geraldino asked to be allowed to name one of the supercargoes to protect his king's interest, but the directors rejected his request although they did make efforts to eliminate fraud. Geraldino to directors, 14 July 1732, AGS, Estado 7010.
51. Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 27 July 1732, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 133-134.
52. Probably included in the expenses of the supercargoes were two sums, 6,000 and 6,607 pesos, set aside "to facilitate" the departure of the ship and to "award the zeal of royal officials". The Spanish officials who assisted in the trip to Jalapa received 400 pesos, and several other British and Spanish servants received small amounts. Very little of the 6,607 pesos was spent, and there is no record of what happened to the other 6,000. Almost certainly the money was divided among the supercargoes. Via Ochoa to Geraldino, 23 April 1735, AGS, Estado 7006.

The legal cargo was sold for 1,550,000 pesos (£349/778/9/12) to two Spanish merchants, Manuel de la Canal of Mexico and Juan Baptista de Belarmaran of Vera Cruz. A secret contract between the two merchants and the supercargoes stipulated that 900,000 pesos would be paid in Mexican plata doble del cuño, in cash, and the remainder in local produce by the following 20th of September. The two had the option of paying the entire amount in cash. The gross profit, therefore, was £126,810/18/5.⁵³ Philip V received as his share £27,896/12/3, which indicates that the net profit was £97,034. As authorized by article xxviii of the asiento treaty, the Company charged him 8% interest per year for his share in the cargo, ship and supply costs. The Company charged themselves 4% interest on the remaining original investment.

The £349,778/9/12 was returned or spent in the following way:

Table VIII

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Acquisition</u>	<u>Expenses</u>	<u>Sale price in England</u>	<u>Net profit or loss</u>
£24,631/5/8	Supercargoes commissions and expenses			
143,109/18/8	Flax, 900 <u>serones</u>	£9,897/2/10	£157,803/12/10	£4,796/11/4
22,724/17/9	Indigo, 700 <u>serones</u>	1,372/16/-	21,856/7/11	-2,241/5/10
159,312/7/1	Gold and silver	9,735/4/4	159,520/4/7	-9,767/13/4

The apparent loss on the returns was vastly compensated by the net profit of the entire voyage, which was about 46% on the original investment. Each supercargo earned approximately £6,783 on the sale of the returns in England, and approximately £6,995 on sales at the fair. Thus their total earnings, not considering any illicit profit they might have made, was about £13,778 each.⁵⁴

The accounts above represent only the legal and recorded trade on the Royal Caroline. There was considerable illicit trade, and other illegal activities. In spite of the apparent unimportance of the incident, the Spanish

53. The Company accounts show that the profit was £125,834/18/6, but a check of their figures suggests that an error was made in their calculations.

54. Davila to Geraldino, 13 March 1733, AGS, Estado 7006; Anon. letter, 2 June 1733, AGS, Estado 6897; Accounts of the Royal Caroline's voyage to Vera Cruz, AGI, Contaduría 266; Via Ochoa to Geraldino, 23 April 1735, AGS, Estado 7006.

were greatly disturbed by a report that a poor Italian named Geronimo was brought to England on the ship. They considered the case to be evidence that there had been more serious infractions of the orders against transporting passengers and unregistered money from the Indies, and accused the supercargoes of returning unregistered goods. Just before the vessel left Vera Cruz in November 1733, royal officials confiscated five bars of silver worth over 4,000 pesos which were found hidden in barrels of meat. They missed a great deal more. According to a member of the crew, Alexander Menzies, as soon as the Spaniards left the ship provision casks were opened and silver removed for storage elsewhere. The provisions were badly damaged in the process, and hardly fit to eat during the voyage. Menzies said that he later saw six chests of silver unloaded onto a waiting ship in the Downs, and that he himself helped to unload approximately another 40 chests. The Spanish estimated that the amount of illicit silver involved was worth over 600,000 pesos.⁵⁵

Captain Mead denied having any knowledge of illegal returns. Several directors told Geraldino that they hoped to give the Spanish complete satisfaction on the question, but that they could not issue formal complaints against Mead and Captain Waring of the St. James, the vessel which accompanied the Royal Caroline on the return voyage, or the supercargoes. Captain Waring was dismissed, but this action meant little because he and his ship were only on contract for the one voyage; the supercargoes were cleared of any misdeeds, as was Mead. According to their contracts any frauds committed had to be discovered and accusations proved within six months after their return to England. Although six months had not passed when the frauds were discovered, no action was taken, prompting Geraldino to accuse the directors of evasion.⁵⁶

55. Geraldino to Patiño, 18 March 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790; Minute committee of correspondence and factories, 5 March 1733, BM, Add. 25,554, ff. 81-82; Vera Cruz governor and royal officials to Philip V, 26 March 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Geraldino to Avila, 30 March 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790; Alexander Menzies testimony, 20 February 1733, AGS, Estado 7009; Keene to Newcastle, 12 May 1734, BM, Add. 43,418, f. 132.

56. Hopkins to Newcastle, 24 January 1735, BM, Add. 32,787, ff. 62-63; Geraldino to Patiño, 27 May 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790.

Meanwhile Philip V was not paid his share of the profits. When he asked for payment the Company was short of cash and put him off by claiming that the accounts were incomplete, and would remain so until after the returns were sold. This was misleading because their sale was not related to the profit realized by the sale of the cargo, the basis on which Philip V's share was determined. Even after the sale of the returns in May 1734 the directors still refused to pay. In August 1735 the Company said that the ship's accounts would be submitted in January 1736, at the end of the five year accounting period on the slave trade. The asiento contract did not in fact stipulate that the accounts of the slave trade and the annual ships be considered together. Moreover, the directors claimed that Philip V was responsible for a share in certain losses sustained in the voyage, but that they had not yet been fully calculated. This was a reference to the loss on the returns, which were not his responsibility. Philip V was never paid his share of the profit of the Royal Caroline, and his claim blended into the general Spanish claims against the Company negotiated after the War of Jenkins' Ear.⁵⁷

In conclusion, between 1715 and 1732 the South Sea Company sent seven annual and two license ships to America, an average of slightly more than one merchant ship every two years. These ships introduced legal merchandise valued at £2,208,158/14/6½ (9,815,075 pesos 5 reales at one peso per 54 pence), an average of £245,376/18/- per trip, or £128,644/3/9½ per year. These figures suggest a relatively small volume of trade, but they represent only stated legal introductions, and do not take into consideration the voluminous legal and contraband introductions on provision ships and by Company licensees. Every indication is that more than that amount of illicit merchandise was introduced on each license and annual ship or accompanying vessels. A conservative estimate

57. Geraldino to Patiño, 29 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790; Patiño to Newcastle, 7 August 1735, PRO, S.P. 36/36, f. 170; Patiño to Keene, 7 August 1735, PRO, S.P. 94/244, f. 17; Hopkins to Newcastle, 4 December 1735, PRO, S.P. 36/37, ff. 92-94; Hopkins' general summary of negotiations, 1735, C.L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 537-540.

of the total value of legal and illegal goods introduced annually into Spanish colonies by the South Sea Company and its employees on the annual and license ships is £300,000 (1,333,333 1/3 pesos).

Table VIII

The Licensed and Annual Ships, 1715-1732⁵⁸

<u>Ship and Captain</u>	<u>London Departure Date</u>	<u>First Trading Period</u>		<u>Destination and Date of Arrival</u>	<u>Commander of Accompanying Spanish Fleet</u>
		<u>Supercargoes</u>			
<u>Elizabeth</u> (Samuel Vincent)	August 1715	Cargoes of the first four ships were consigned to factors.		Vera Cruz 2 November 1715	Manuel López Pintado
<u>Bedford</u> (Thomas Lyell)	November 1715			Cartagena & Portobelo	none
<u>Royal Prince</u> (Baynham Raymond)	August 1717			Vera Cruz 19 November 1717	Antonio Serrano
<u>Second Trading Period</u>					
<u>Royal George</u> (John Davison)	4 November 1721			Cartagena & Portobelo 7 January 1722	Balthasar de Guevara & Carlos Grillo
<u>Royal Prince</u> (William Cleland)	Summer 1723	1. Catlin Thorowgood 2. John Pitt 3. James Dollisse 4. William Cleland		Vera Cruz 8 August 1725	Antonio Serrano
<u>Royal George</u> (John Davison & Edward Phillips)	3 February 1724	1. William Bumpsted 2. Joseph Batchelor 3. Thomas Canham 4. John Tutt		Cartagena & Portobelo 7 May 1724	Carlos Grillo & Francisco Cornejo
<u>Prince Frederick</u> (Whittington Williams)	August 1725	1. Samuel Lockpox 2. David Patton 3. John Shippeen 4. Thomas Bowles		Vera Cruz 25 October 1725	Antonio Serrano
<u>Third Trading Period</u>					
<u>Prince William</u> (William Cleland)	Winter 1730	1. James Dollisse and a writer		Cartagena & Portobelo 11 February 1731	Manuel López Pintado
<u>Royal Caroline</u> (Samuel Mead)	October 1732	1. Shadrick Bastie 2. Christopher Burrows 3. Harry Spencer 4. James Holland 5. Samuel Mead		Vera Cruz & Jalapa	Rodrigo de Torres

(Table VIII continued on next page)

Table VIII (continued from previous page)

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Cost of Cargo</u>	<u>Sale Price</u>	<u>Date Returned to London & Total Length of Voyage</u>	<u>Miscellaneous Comments</u>
<u>Elizabeth</u>	£227,863/11/-		1 November 1716; 1 year 4 months	Transported 9 passengers to England, including 2 Spaniards
<u>Bedford</u>	144,301/3/8	249,371/-/5		75,000 peso bribe given to Spanish officials
<u>Royal Prince</u>	249,383/-/8	357,551/16/10	3 December 1718; 1 year 5 months	Accompanied by H.M.S. <u>Diamond</u> & <u>Sarah</u>
<u>Royal George</u>	264,964/4/1	290,569/3/9		
<u>Royal Prince</u>	292,992/11/2		c. August 1724; 1 year	
<u>Royal George</u>	264,964/4/1		December 1724	Captain Davison died in Cartagena
<u>Prince Frederick</u>	290,352		April 1730; 4 years 9 months	On 9 July 1727 the ship was seized and used as a Spanish warship during the war.
<u>Prince William</u>	250,730/9/1½	299,814/7/5		Stopped in St. Christopher's en route to take on contraband
<u>Royal Caroline</u>	220,967/10/9	349,778/9/12	6 January 1734; 1 year 4 months	Transported money on account of private individuals to Europe

58. References for licensed and annual ships' table:

- Minute court of directors, 29 September 1714, BM, Add. 25,495, f. 208.
 Varas y Valdés to Morales Velasco, 21 July 1715, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2645.
 Ury to Vera Cruz factors, 11 February 1716, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 23.
 Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 22 May 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800.
Elizabeth's returns, 16 August 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 6.
Bedford's certificate, 24 August 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800.
 Monteleón to Grimaldo, 5 November 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 6.
 Monteleón to Grimaldo, 19 November 1716, AGS, Estado 6835.
 Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 12 July 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 45.
 Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 14 March 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801
 Measurement of the Royal Prince by Antonio Serrano, enclosed in royal officials to Philip V, 8 April 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801.
 Directors to Bowles, 26 June 1718, BM, Add. 25,555, ff. 88-89.
 Wescomb to Craggs, 27 June 1718, BM, Add. 25,555, f. 88.
 From Antonio de la Rosa, 8 December 1718, AGS, Estado 6841.
 Grimaldo to Stanhope, 10 August 1721, BM, Add. 22,520, f. 182.
 Minute court of directors, 2 November 1721, BM, Add. 25,500, f. 123.
 From Robert Shee, 13 November 1721, AGI, Caracas 891.
Auto, 15 January 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2726.
 To Philip V, 17 January 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2726.
 Guevara to Pes, 24 January 1722, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
 Minute court of directors, 14 February 1722, BM, Add. 25,501, f. 21.

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58. (continued from previous page)

- Eon to Corobarrutia, 4 March 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802.
Real cédula, 13 March 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776.
 Minute court of directors, 28 March 1723, BM, Add. 25,501, f. 47.
Real cédula, 14 August 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776.
 Serrano to Corobarrutia, 19 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
 Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 19 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803
Real cédula, 26 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776.
 Directors to Royal George supercargoes, 12 December 1723, BM, Add. 25,564, f. 25.
 Cartagena royal officials to the crown, 18 May 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
 Corobarrutia to Serrano, 29 August 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2524.
 Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 19 November 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
 Eon to Corobarrutia, 21 December 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
 From a Spanish agent, 11 January 1725, AGS, Estado 6862.
 Wescomb to Delafaye, 1 June 1725, BM, Add. 25,556, f. 69.
 Cornejo to Alderete, 9 February 1726, AGI, Panama 134.
 Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 26 March 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805.
 Testimony of Edward Phillips, 13 June 1727, AGS, Estado 7017.
 Extract, Upton to directors, 15 September 1727, PRO, S.P. 36/3, part 1, f. 84.
 Poyntz to Stanhope and Walpole, 14 July 1728, BM, Add. 32,757, f. 82.
 Accounts by John Read of the Elizabeth and Bedford, 1 August 1728, AGS, Estado 7017.
 Plowes to Barranechea, 30 September 1728, AGS, Estado 6878.
 Burnett to Barranechea, 3 February 1729, AGS, Estado 7017.
 Testimony by John Burnett on exports, 15 February 1729, AGS, Estado 7017.
Prince William's account, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, f. 121.
 From a Spanish agent, 17 April 1730, AGS, Estado 6880.
 Minutes joint committee of correspondence and factories, 7 and 15 May 1730, BM, Add. 25,553, ff. 27, 31-32.
 Luis Jacob de Beaufort certificate, 25 September 1730, PRO, S.P. 94/104.
 Minute general court, 14 January 1731, BM, Add. 25,544, f. 85.
 Covenant between the South Sea Company and Messrs. Spencer and Bastie, 31 August 1732, BM, Add. 25,576, f. 198.
 Panama royal officials testimony, 18 September 1732, AGI, Contaduría 268.
 Panama royal officials to Philip V, 20 September 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.
 Vera Cruz royal officials, 8 November 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2809.
 Davila to Geraldino, 17 January 1733, AGS, Estado 7006.
 Petition of Thomas Bedell, 24 January 1733, AGS, Estado 7008.
 Copy of Elizabeth's returns, 14 August 1714, AGI, Contaduría 266.
 Accounts of the Elizabeth and Royal Prince, 14 October 1733, AGS, Contaduría 266.
 Avila to Philip V, 15 November 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794.
 Vera Cruz governors and royal officials to Philip V, 1 December 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789.
 Vera Cruz governor and royal officials, 26 March 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.
 Geraldino to Avila, 30 March 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790.
 Keene to Newcastle, 12 May 1734, BM, Add. 43,418, f. 132.
 Geraldino to Patiño, 10 February 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2791.
 La Via to Geraldino, 23 April 1735, AGS, Estado 7006.
 John Read account of the Royal Caroline, 28 December 1735, AGI, Contaduría 266.
 Geraldino to Patiño, 28 December 1735, AGI, Contaduría 266.
 Receipts and payments of the Company account to 1 May 1736, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 4-5.
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58. (continued from previous page)

Walker, "Galeones and Flotas", p. 234.

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AGS, Estado 7009.

Royal Caroline's general account, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266.

Account of the Royal Prince's voyage in 1717, n.d., Contaduría 266.

Chapter XI

The Third Represalia, 1739

The failure of royal officials in New Spain and Peru to return most of the money and goods seized from South Sea Company factories in 1718 and 1727 remained a constant irritant to the Company, and was an important reason for the deterioration of Anglo-Spanish relations during the 1730s. Diplomatic efforts were made throughout the period to improve relations, and the Spanish were aware that the restoration of effects was a prerequisite. As late as October 1738 Philip V sent instructions to Matheo Pablo Diaz, the viceroy of New Spain, to restore immediately money owed to the Company; the following February he reemphasized his desire for harmony between the two crowns.

However a rupture was near. Even before Philip V's real orden reached New Spain Company factors in Santiago de Cuba had been placed under guard, and Company ships in Havana denied permission to sail on the orders of the governor, who had heard that war had actually broken out. This action during a period of peaceful if deteriorating relations caused considerable consternation in England. Pedro Tyrry advised the Marquis of Torrenueva that the factors must be released immediately and the embargo on the Company ships raised if peace was to be maintained.¹

The Spanish government took Tyrry's advice (although war remained imminent) and ordered the release of Company personnel and property. Meanwhile the directors made preparations to avoid the losses that would accompany a third represalia. Newcastle told them on 19 June 1739 of the differences between the two crowns, and soon afterwards they ordered their agents in Jamaica to stop shipping slaves to the factories. This annoyed Pedro Tyrry, who called it a breach of the asiento contract and prejudicial to Spaniards in the Indies who needed the labour. The directors explained somewhat weakly that all factories

1. Real orden to Pablo Díaz, 13 October 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Tyrry to Torrenueva, 22 January 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815; Philip V to Tyrry, 9 February 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

were well stocked. In any case, they said, the action was justified because of the losses they had suffered in 1718 and 1727, and because of the steps taken recently in Cuba "upon Suspicion only of a Rupture". They explained that they

think it highly reasonable for them on some occasions, to use Such Caution as may be proper for preventing damages of this sort to the Company, and that it is by no means Incumbent on them to give an Account of what Measures, They may think it necessary to take for that purpose....²

Their precautions proved appropriate. On 27 August 1739 Keene informed the Spanish that he had received instructions to return to England. On the same day royal officials in the Indies were ordered to seize all British effects. The next day Philip V ordered Tyrry and Geraldino to leave England for France. Just as in 1718 and in 1727, orders were issued to place all factors under house arrest and to seize all Company money, supplies, slaves and boats; special emphasis was placed on acquiring Company account books and registers. Few of the Company books were found during the first and second represalias, and as a result the Spanish government had no record of Spanish merchants who had purchased slaves, merchandise or provisions from the Company on credit. Later, when the Company demanded that the reprisaed goods be returned they also demanded payment on these promissory notes. Since royal officials had no record of these debts, or feigned ignorance of them, disputes arose about their actual value. The Spanish government were bothered because they suspected that the royal treasury had been defrauded, believing that some credits were given secretly to avoid the payment of duties.³

Orders to seize Company effects reached Cartagena in January 1740, but they were unnecessary. Royal officials there had learned of the war late in September and had embargoed all Company goods then. The seizure included 1,330

2. Smith to Tyrry, 19 July 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Tyrry to Quintana, 22 July 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; To Geraldino, 27 July 1739, AGS, Estado 6909; Geraldino to Villarias, 13 August 1739, AGS, Estado 6909.

3. Junta del asiento, 5 December 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2771; Marquis of Villarias to Quintana, 12 August 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 1597; Zuloaga to Philip V, 30 December 1739, AGI, Caracas 891.

pesos 6 reales, flour, household furniture and 26 slaves, but no account books. The factors were placed under house arrest away from the coast to keep them from having any contact with British ships, and told to acquire whatever provisions they needed on credit if they had no money. The money seized was insufficient to maintain them, and the city treasury was empty. Details of their release and return to England are unknown. The flour, which was worth 2,624 pesos, was given to the San Lazaro Hospital for incurables in Cartagena, saving the 160 residents from being turned into the streets because of insufficient funds.⁴

The factors in Panama and Portobelo did not experience a long period of house arrest during the third represalia. A British fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Edward Vernon seized Portobelo in December 1739, and Vernon demanded the release of all British subjects and their effects. He based his demand on article xl of the asiento treaty, which guaranteed the Company 18 months to remove their agents and effects from the Spanish colonies in the event of war. The president of Panama, Dionisio Martínez de la Vega, at first rejected Vernon's demands, but when Vernon reminded Martínez de la Vega that the inhabitants of Portobelo and their possessions were in his hands, and that "he had little compassion for them", Martínez capitulated to prevent the threatened destruction of the city and death of its inhabitants. The factors were transported to Jamaica. There is no indication of whether Company effects were remitted to Jamaica at the same time or seized during the represalia.⁵

While the departure of the British factors ended the commercial activities of the South Sea Company in Panama, at least one Company factor, Joseph Compton, remained behind. Compton switched his allegiance to the Spanish when Vernon

4. Philip V to the governor of Cartagena, 1 November 1740, AGI, Santa Fe 432; Cartagena royal officials to Quintana, 4 January 1740, AGI, Santa Fe 1160.

5. Vernon to Martínez de la Vega, 24 November, 1 and 10 December 1739, AGI, Lima 651; Martínez de la Vega to Vernon, 9 and 15 December 1739, AGI, Lima 651; Villagarcía to Monsso, 23 February 1740, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878.

seized the city, and lived in the abandoned factory in Portobelo after the other factors left. Eventually he embraced Catholicism, and for a fee of 200 pesos received his carta de naturaleza, good so long as he lived in Panama rather than Portobelo.⁶

The governor of Campeche, Manuel de Salcedo, ordered the seizure of all British effects there in March 1740, although it is unknown if any were found. The orders of reprisal were received in Santa Marta in June; nothing ^{belonging} to the British was found there. Nor does it appear that any of their effects were confiscated in Caracas or Lima.⁷

The only important item seized in Santiago de Cuba was a brigantine, the Santa Clara, which was converted into a guardacosta. The seizure in Havana began on 18 September 1739. Many British ships, including the Woolball, were seized, as were all effects belonging to the Company and a great deal of other British property. However not much was found in the Company factory. These included:

Table I

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
From the factors' house	5,608-4
From the factory	120
Owed to the Company for the purchase of slaves	1,000
Promissory notes seized	1,329-6
Nine barrels of flour	63
Total:	8,121-2

One Company factor, Anthony Weltdon, was kept in Havana until July 1741, when he was allowed to sail to Spain. He ultimately made his way to England. His living expenses, including provisions for the return voyage, in Havana were paid out of seized funds. They amounted to 81% of the total recorded amount seized at the factory. It can be accounted for as follows:

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6. Philip V to bishop of Panama, 1 February 1744, AGI, Panama 120; Philip V to audiencia of Panama, 3 July 1749, AGI, Panama 120.
 7. Governor and royal officials of Santa Marta to Philip V, 8 June 1740, AGI, Santa Fé 1243; Manuel de Salcedo to Quintana, 6 March 1740, AGI, México 3162; Zuloaga to Philip V, 30 December 1739, AGI, Caracas 891; Villagarcia to Philip V, 8 April 1740, AGI, Lima 642.

Table II

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
Maintenance from September 1739 through July 1741 at 6 pesos per day	4,098
House rent	2,125
Expenses for the voyage to Spain	360
Total:	6,583

Because the inventory of Company property seized in Havana is included in the general accounts of all British property seized there, it is impossible to say how the remaining 1,538 pesos 2 reales seized from the Company were spent. However other embargoed funds were spent on salaries, legal services, the garrison and the costs of making the seizure.⁸

Company goods were seized at Vera Cruz in October 1739, after royal officials there had received news from the governor of Havana that the English had committed numerous depredations along that coast. It was the most substantial known seizure of the third represalia, totaling 38,727 pesos 7 reales and 9 maravedis.

Table III

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
From the sale of goods on the <u>Royal Caroline</u>	21,500
From the auction of factory furniture	8,790
From the sale of slaves	6,830-5-3
Belonging to Shadrick Bastie	1,607-2-6

Of this amount 5,550 pesos 2 reales were used to transport the factors and crew of an English ship to Toluca for detention and to maintain the slaves until they were sold.⁹

Five boxes of books and accounts were also seized, and sent to Madrid. They showed that that the Company was owed 228,741 pesos 7 reales 3 maravedis

8. Represalia de ingleses corriente desde 18 Septiembre 1739 hasta 12 Diciembre 1742, AGI, Contaduría 1170; Royal officials' certificate of expenditures, 1 May 1743, AGI, Contaduría 1170.
9. Vera Cruz royal officials to Philip V, 9 January 1740, AGI, Santo Domingo 408; Extract of goods seized at Vera Cruz, 20 October 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819; Vera Cruz royal officials and governor to Quintana, 16 February 1740, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819.

for negroes and merchandise introduced on the annual ships. Of this amount 130,000 pesos were owed by Gabriel de la Laguna, the late alcalde mayor of Chiapas. A special commission, headed by Antonio de Perea, ministro principal de marina in Vera Cruz, investigated Laguna's debt, however neither it nor any other was ever paid to the Company.¹⁰

The factory about which we have the most complete information for the third represalia is Buenos Aires, where the represalia took place on 21 April 1740. An inventory of items seized was made by the royal officials in the presence of two factors, Henry Faure and Rudolph Tooke, and included all factory property and the personal possessions of Company employees (who were permitted to remain in the Company residence for lack of a decent jail). In the main room of the factory there were three large mirrors, 12 armless English chairs, two sitting chairs, 17 small paintings, one marble and two round cedar tables, a clock and a cabinet filled with English books. The office contained 181 books, note books and accounts of past factors, and 12 books containing the current accounts. All were placed in a strong box and taken to the real contaduría. Other interesting items included three dozen Chinese plates and a telescope over 21 feet long. No money was found but 58 or 59 slaves were seized, of whom seven were women.

Rudolph Tooke's private quarters in the factory contained one red English writing desk, six small red chairs, a sitting chair, a small round table, a cabinet, three swords with silver handles, a pair of pistols, several hats and assorted clothing, a bed with a camelote of silk and wool, a bedside table and a gilded mirror six feet high, three engravings, six small maps and miscellaneous other items. The rooms of the other factors were similarly furnished.

At El Retiro, the large Company farm outside the city walls which was also

10. Philip V to viceroy of New Spain, 2 September 1746, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819; Vera Cruz royal officials to Quintana, 21 June 1740, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819; Geraldino to Carvajal y Lancaster, 20 December 1743, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819; Junta del asiento, 22 August 1746, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2819.

used as an infirmary for slaves, and at the factory's cervecería nearby, the Spanish seized 29 more slaves and considerable furniture and equipment. Confiscated items included numerous tables and beds, large cooking pots, 22 hides, 90 strings of onions and 50 of garlic, dozens of barrels, pipes and other large containers. The farm itself was appropriated with its gardens and groves of trees: 71 walnut, 39 pear, 20 orange, 100 apple, and a grove of peach and fig trees. A great number of items used in the various aspects of the slave trade were found in a Company storehouse. They included five scales with weights, 14 rolls of ship rigging, five muskets, burlap, 49 bedspreads for slaves, two garden rakes, 31 scythes, 53 ankle shackles and 46 hand-cuffs, six "iron cats"(used in the punishment of slaves), iron pokers, kettles, brooms, padlocks, files, saws, drills and other items. The factory launch, the Britania, was also seized.¹¹

The royal officials in Buenos Aires sold some of the Company effects after the seizure, and placed the proceeds in the royal treasury. Slaves were auctioned at intervals as follows:

Table IV

<u>Date</u>	<u>Price and Average Price (in pesos)</u>		<u>Number</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Boys</u>	<u>Girls</u>
7 December 1740	3,025	137-4	22				
13 November - 26 December 1741	2,170	197	11	6	3	2	0
20 February - 15 August 1742	760	190	4	4	0	0	0
16 June 1745	1,250	250	5	5	0	0	0

However most of the Company effects, including the Britania, were not sold until well after the war.¹²

The factors remained under house arrest of varying forms throughout the

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11. Inventory of Buenos Aires factory, 21 April 1740, AGS, Escribanía de Cámara 878; Junta of royal officials, 21 April 1740, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878; Further embargoes, 21 April 1740, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878.
12. Account of the sale of 22 slaves, 7 December 1740, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2818; Account of the sale of slaves, 13 November 1741, 15 August 1742 and 16 June 1745, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878.

war. Their first opportunity to leave came in May 1741 when a British war ship arrived at the neighbouring Portuguese colony. Tooke and Faure asked permission for the factors to return to England on the ship, but their request was denied and they were taken seven leagues into the country to thwart any possible escape attempt. They complained bitterly of this treatment, and the royal officials were, in fact, in a dilemma about how to treat the factors. They had instructions from the king not to molest Company employees, which implied that they should not be imprisoned, but the officials feared that if they were allowed their freedom they would try to escape or act in some other sinister fashion. Eventually they decided to give the factors freedom of the city if they would post a bond of 20,000 pesos. However the factors had no way of raising that much money, and on 7 September, after numerous petitions in which they argued that such restrictions had not been made on the movement of factors during previous represalias, they received the freedom to move about the city without having to post a bond.

In October a Spanish ship, the Real Mercurio, arrived in port, and Tooke and Faure announced that they had resolved to sail on it with their dependents to place themselves in the hands of the king of Spain. To support their petition they cited the real cédula of 12 April 1726, which said that factors seized should be sent to Spain, and the cédula of 27 August 1739, which said that previous cédulas relating to represalias should be observed. The Spanish officials agreed to allow the factors to leave (no doubt happy to resolve the problem in that fashion), on condition that someone remain behind with authority to represent the Company. Consequently Richard Lindsey was selected by Tooke and Faure to act as factory director after their departure.

Tooke and Faure sailed in January 1742, taking with them the factory surgeon, William Mitchell, and the mayordomo of El Retiro, George Shrimpton. Anticipating the eventual reopening of the asiento trade, they left three other factors with Lindsey: William Grey, Joseph Harrison and Thomas Stewart. Three other factors also remained behind, but only because there was insufficient

space on the ship.¹³

Lindsey did little in behalf of the Company; in fact there was little to do. His expenses, and those of the remaining factors and slaves, were paid by royal officials from the reprisaled money. In June 1743 he went to Cordoba without delegating authority to anyone to represent the Company, and from there to Europe in March 1745. It was obvious by then that the asiento trade was not going to be reestablished. The factory complex was nearly in ruins, as was the Britania, which was sold in July 1744 for 560 pesos. In August 1745 the royal officials decided to sell the remaining slaves, cattle, furniture and other Company effects at auction, although their value had greatly depreciated through the normal ravages of time.

The auction was a disaster. Every morning for over a week various royal officials, including the alcalde ordinario de primer voto, the tesorero and the contador, met at the ayuntamiento in Buenos Aires where the auctioneer described "in a high and intelligible voice" the various effects, slaves and livestock belonging to the South Sea Company being sold for the account of the royal treasury. As night approached on the last day, after the auctioneer had cried repeatedly with "all precision and clarity", but without selling a single item, the officials suspended activities. Eventually they decided that William Grey, who they had named defender of the asiento after Lindsey's departure, with a salary of 300 pesos a year, would be allowed to sell the goods extrajudicially, i.e., without duties, and at the best price he could get. The outcome of these sales is unknown, but the proceeds must have been negligible.

13. Petitions from Tooke and Faure, c. 15 October, 4 May, 9 June 7 September, 7 and 19 November 1741, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878; Memorial, c. 22 December 1741, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878; Judgment by Joseph López, 31 August 1741, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878.

Provisions acquired by Tooke and Faure for the return voyage included 10 barrels of wine, four large sacks of biscuits, six small sacks of barley and one bale of maté, flour, seven barrels of salted meat, 100 pounds of dried beef, a bale of garbanzos and another of pocotos beans, and one of oregano; ten legs of ham, a box of sugar, chocolate, almonds and pork sausages, 20 sacks of corn, dried fruit and various other items such as chickens, ducks, geese and suckling pigs. Memorial, c. 22 December 1741, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878.

Grey was still in Buenos Aires as late as October 1747, when he asked for and received 1,465 pesos from the royal officials for maintenance, complaining that he was poor and ill clothed. The amount he received included 576 pesos for the subsistence of several unsold slaves.¹⁴ The accounts of the represalia in Buenos Aires end at this point, and it is uncertain what became of Grey or the remaining Company property there. However almost certainly all money earned from the sale of Company effects was spent in the maintenance and upkeep of the factory, factors and slaves.

The amount seized during the third represalia was small. Nothing was seized at Panama and Portobelo, Lima, Campeche and Santa Marta, and very little elsewhere.

Table V

Balance of the Third Represalia

<u>Factory or Licensed Trading Post</u>	<u>Effects and Pesos Seized</u>
Buenos Aires	One ship, 58-59 slaves and miscellaneous effects
Cartagena	3,954-6, 26 slaves and miscellaneous effects
Havana	8,121-2
Santiago	One ship
Vera Cruz	38,727-7 and 5 boxes of account books

14. Petitions from William Grey, c. 16 June 1743, c. 11 March 1745, and c. 6 October 1747, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878; Petition from J. F. de Basurco, c. 17 July 1744, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878; Ortiz de Rosas et al to Philip V, 17 August 1745, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878; Auction account, 18 August 1745, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878; Petitions from Richard Lindsey, c. 15 April and 2 September 1742, Escribanía de Cámara 878; Auto, 27 August 1745, AGI, Escribanía de Cámara 878.

Chapter XII

Asiento Slave Accounts 1714-1739:

An Approach at Quantification

Several problems make the systematization of Company accounts difficult. A bi-annual audit of factory books was mandatory, but rarely observed, primarily because they were incomplete and inaccurate, and conformed to no standardized accounting system. The distinctive method of book-keeping that evolved at each factory, often with each new accountant, resulted in numerous errors and omissions. In addition many of the account books were seized by the Spanish during the three represalias. Of those that survived some were lost or destroyed in America while others were sent to Spain and often misplaced. Consequently when Company accountants in London began their final audit of factory books at the end of each five year period so as to submit a complete record of the asiento trade they had insufficient information to determine the amount of duties owed from the introduction of slaves, or the profit due to Philip V from the merchandise introduced on the license and annual ships. An attempt was made to extract the missing information from the factors' letters, but when no record of sales could be found, the Company and Spanish officials agreed that for purposes of book-keeping the sale price of each slave introduced would be entered as 200 pesos, a figure that probably favoured the Company. No such easy compromise was reached over the disputed merchandise sold from Company ships.

Until 1732, when Philip V appointed a representative at each Company outpost in the West Indies to monitor and send records of the asiento trade to Thomas Geraldino in London and to the junta del asiento in Madrid, the Spanish had no consistent means of obtaining accurate accounts of slaves introduced, merchandise sold or goods and money remitted. While royal officials at one factory would send detailed records of the visitas, measurement and sale of slaves and the money or goods purchased from the sale, those at another

might be careless and negligent. Even after the Spanish agents were appointed, records dispatched to Spain were incomplete. Spanish records usually ended with the arrival and measurement of Company slaves. Therefore various details of sales, including dates, prices, names of buyers, expenses and medical records, and factory operating expenses such as rent, food, salaries and transportation, are often missing. The Spanish accounts were resumed, although sporadically, when Company ships prepared to return to Jamaica or England and royal officials inspected the ships for contraband and recorded the contents of outgoing cargoes.¹

Although Company accounts occasionally complement the Spanish ones, there are great gaps for which no information is available, particularly the details of sales and of merchandise and bullion remitted to the Company. Moreover most Spanish and English accounts were compiled in the 1730s from earlier records when it became necessary to resolve disputes over the payment of Company debts which had accrued on the asiento trade. As a result entries were often misunderstood, and clerical errors were frequent.²

Because of the lack of documentation and the triangular structure of the slave trade, it is impossible to determine the ultimate profit or loss the South Sea Company experienced from the asiento contract. Records are scarce covering the purchase of merchandise in Europe and the bartering for slaves in Africa. The approximate cost of delivering one slave from Africa to America at the beginning of the British asiento contract was £6/15; towards the end of the contract it had increased to £20 or even higher.³ The last branch of the

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1. Secret instructions to Geraldino, 1 May 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851; Instructions to Spanish factors, 15 September 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785; Vara y Valdés to Paz, c. 4 August 1725, AGS, Estado 6840.
 2. The majority of the accounts, including copies of the Company books, are in Spanish archives. There are almost no financial statements of the asiento trade in the papers the South Sea Company trustees deposited in the British Museum in 1864.
 3. Accounts of the St. Michael and Rudge, n.d., c. 1738, C.L., Shel. vol. 44, f. 137; Pery to Pym, 24 November 1713, BM, Add. 25,562, f. 6.

trade, when the proceeds of the slave sales (bullion and indigenous products) were remitted to the Company, is also incompletely documented. While some accounts of merchandise and bullion remitted are available there are almost no records of the price they realized when they were sold in Europe. As a result the discussion here is necessarily limited to analyzing the middle branch of the trade--the introduction and sale of Company slaves in Spanish America.

No effort has been made to quantify the extensive contraband trade in merchandise, provisions and slaves introduced at each Company factory and licensed trading post. Undoubtedly the illicit trade was profitable to some directors and most factors and Company ships' officers; it is doubtful if much benefit accrued to Company stockholders. The final balance sheet of the Company's asiento trade can be assessed only from the legal, registered and recorded trade.

In examining the general factory accounts for the first trading period (1714-1718) there are several components that must be considered. They include the accounts for the two license ships, one annual ship, the duties paid by the Company to Philip V, and the goods seized during the war of 1718. These accounts will be analyzed separately for several reasons: 1) because the payment of duties was calculated and paid in London, and therefore not included in the factory records, 2) because a large quantity of the merchandise introduced on the license and annual ships was not sold during the first trading period, so the accounts remained opened throughout the asiento contract, and 3) because the amounts of money and effects seized during the represalia were contested, resulting in repayment by instalments.

The first trading period began when the Charles arrived in Cartagena in December 1714 and ended when the Arabella arrived in Buenos Aires in May 1719. The trade, however, had technically ended the previous autumn with the outbreak of war. For purposes of calculation the last ship at Buenos Aires will be included in the accounts of this period, but its arrival date will be discounted since the Company had no way of communicating rapidly with ships

engaged in the Guinea trade to notify them of the war. The trade lasted three years and 11 months, with Cartagena and Caracas enjoying the longest periods of consecutive commerce (the full time) and Vera Cruz the shortest (two years and 10 months). During this time 12,013 Company slaves were introduced at factories and licensed trading posts and 572 indulted, giving a total of 12,585.⁴ By the terms of the asiento contract the Company should have introduced 18,800 slaves during that period (400 slaves per month). In fact, they only introduced 64% of the agreed number. Slave introductions began slowly (174 in the first year), reaching a peak of 4,065 in 1718. Ninety-five percent of all Company slaves were introduced at the factories, with the remaining 5% at the licensed trading posts.

Table I

<u>Factory</u>	<u>Percentage of total number of slaves introduced</u>
Buenos Aires	30%
Cartagena	13%
Panama and Portobelo	31%
Havana	12%
Santiago	4%
Vera Cruz	4%
Caracas	4%
Santo Domingo	1%

Company slaves were transported to Spanish colonies during the first trading period in 117 voyages, with an average introduction of 102.68 slaves per voyage. The largest average number of slaves per voyage was at Buenos Aires (222.5), where the ships came directly from Africa, and the lowest were at

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4. According to one account the Company purchased 19,934 slaves between 1714 and 1718, of which
- 1,267 were sold in Barbados and Jamaica
 - 2,900 were sold in British colonies after the outbreak of war
 - 1,209 were sold in British colonies because they were too ill to be transported to Spanish colonies
 - 3,386 died
- 8,762

Thus 11,172 slaves were shipped to the factories, plus another 386 slaves delivered by the licensed traders, giving a total of 11,944. By this account only 58% of the slaves purchased by the Company ever reached Spanish buyers, and 17% of the total purchased died. Duties paid to Philip V to 1722, n.d., AGS, Estado 7009.

Santiago de Cuba (33.87) and Caracas (37.54), where smaller sloops ferried the slaves from entrepôts in Jamaica or Barbados. The number of slaves normally introduced per voyage at the licensed trading posts were^{as} small, partly because of the unknown demand, with voyages tending to be more frequent and unscheduled. For example, there were almost as many voyages to Caracas as to Buenos Aires, yet 3,074 more slaves were introduced at the latter. The main reason, however, was that the licensed trade was used as a cover for extensive illicit introductions of provisions and merchandise, and some slaves.

The trade to Havana was insecure, almost as insecure as at Santiago, which was always considered a secondary factory, and which the directors considered closing on several occasions. In May 1718 residents of Havana complained to Philip V that the Company failed to supply the demand for slave labour, thus forcing them to abandon some sugar plantations and divert the labour force to cultivating tobacco, which needed fewer hands. This is one of the rare examples of the Company not supplying the labour required; it is difficult to determine exactly why the market was misjudged. It might have been a deliberate attempt to force Cuban plantation owners away from sugar cultivation because of the potential competition with the British sugar colonies. A more likely explanation, however, is the erratic nature of the slave trade. Little or no effort was ever made to analyze the slave market, although that was one reason for carrying slaves first to entrepôts in Jamaica and Barbados. Slaves were likely to be shipped in large quantities to factories where there was neither money nor demand. Moreover, since the factors were required to sell for cash only at the beginning of the asiento they frequently found themselves saddled with huge expenses for maintaining the slaves until they could be sold. This problem improved somewhat when the factors were permitted to sell on credit or in exchange for local products.⁵

5. Committee of correspondence to Woodbridge, 10 May 1718, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 165; Directors to Santiago factors, 31 October 1717, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 83; Directors to Buenos Aires factors, 24 January 1716, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 2; Directors to Vera Cruz factors, 8 February 1716, BM, Add. 25,563, f. 7.

The frequency of slave introductions can also be viewed in terms of time. For the first trading period, an average of 255.60 slaves were introduced monthly, the highest number at Panama and Portobelo (99.13 slaves per month) and the lowest at Caracas, a license port, (10.38 per month).

The figures are incomplete, but we do have some indication of the number of men, women and children introduced during the first trading period. While the Company normally expected a ship's cargo to be two-thirds men, in fact percentages varied from factory to factory, and were related to the needs of the Spanish communities, and to a lesser extent the availability of the proper slaves in Africa. For those factories for which statistics are available, the proportion of men, women and children introduced is as follows:

<u>Factory</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Percentage of Children</u>	<u>Uncertain</u>
Panama and Portobelo	43%	24%	17%	16%
Cartagena	45%	28%	19%	8%
Havana	54%	13%	21%	12%
Santiago	54%	17%	5%	21%

It is assumed that the high percentage of men introduced at the two Cuban factories indicates a demand for labourers on the sugar and tobacco plantations.

In theory the ratio of pieza de indias to slave should also serve as a guide to the type of slave introduced, and therefore the labour required. The higher the ratio the greater the number of prime male slaves. If this were the case the correlation should be evident where information is available on both the ratio of pieza to slave and the percentage of slave introductions by sex. Havana and Santiago which had 54% male slaves, should have the highest ratios of pieza to slave. In fact they do not. Cartagena had the highest, .88, although only 45% of the slaves introduced there were men. There are only two plausible explanations for this discrepancy, one that female slaves were greatly sought after in Spanish communities where white and Indian women were less readily available, and the other that the system of measuring piezas varied considerably at the different ports in the Spanish colonies. Few

details are available concerning the measurement of slaves, but the factors had instructions to obtain the most advantageous measurements, and there are indications that royal officials could be bribed to alter their measurements. Because the Company paid a duty on the number of piezas de indias rather than on the number of slaves, it was in their interest to have the smallest ratio of piezas to slaves as possible.

Illness could also have effected the measurements. Although sick slaves were given a period of 15 days to recuperate before they were measured, undoubtedly some were measured when they were still ill, which would have resulted in a reduction in the number of piezas. For these reasons it is misleading to think of a pieza de indias as a strict measurement of labour, or work unit.

Slaves were purchased individually and in large groups, by private citizens for domestic purposes, by royal officials for public works, and by slave merchants for resale. Purchases were made in the following manner at the six factories:

Table III

<u>Factory</u>	<u>No. Slaves</u>	<u>No. Buyers</u>	<u>Average</u>
Buenos Aires	3,560	303	11.75
Cartagena	1,588	368	4.32
Panama and Portobelo	3,767	712	5.29
Vera Cruz	523	102	5.13
Havana	1,479	503	2.94
Santiago	508	265	1.92
	<u>11,425</u>	<u>2,253</u>	<u>5.07</u>

Purchases in large numbers were usually for resale, although occasionally a private individual would require a large parcel of slaves to open a new plantation. The figures suggest that most of the slaves introduced at Buenos Aires were bought by merchants, who took their slaves to Chile and Peru, particularly to Potosi, for resale. The same is true to a lesser degree at Cartagena, Portobelo and Vera Cruz, the sites of annual fairs. The small average number of slaves purchased at both Cuban factories would appear to indicate that most purchases were for personal use.

It is impossible to calculate the amount of duty the South Sea Company paid on the slaves they introduced during the first trading period. The number of piezas de indias (including indulted slaves) known to have been introduced in the first trading period was 8,303. At 33 1/3 pesos per pieza the Company would have been liable for a payment of 276,905 pesos 5 reales. There are indications, however, that more than this was paid. The treaty stipulated that only the first 4,000 slaves/piezas introduced yearly were taxable. If all 4,000 were introduced it would have amounted to 133,333 pesos in duty, but it is uncertain if they were required to pay duty on the entire 4,000 regardless of the number actually introduced.⁶

In 1723 the Spanish tried to determine the state of the asiento contract. According to their calculations (They had no access to any Company accounts.) they were owed 1,000,000 pesos in duties on slaves introduced between 1 May 1714 and 1 May 1723. (None were entered during the three years of war between August 1718 and June 1721.) They assumed the Company was liable for duties on the full 4,000 slaves/piezas per year. The Company actually paid 683,602 pesos 3 reales in duties during this period. Disregarding the 200,000 pesos of "anticipation" money that they had agreed to advance Philip V when the contract was signed, but had not done so, and which was included as part of their debt, the Company had liquidated all but 116,396 pesos of the duty they owed. A payment of 435,623 pesos 2 reales was made to the treasury in Hinolosa sometime between 1 January 1717 and 1 January 1721; the remainder was paid directly to various Spanish officials in salaries and pensions.⁷

Assuming the duty was assessed on 4,000 slaves/piezas annually, then for three years and 11 months of trade the Company would have owed 522,168 pesos

6. Asiento contract adjusted between Spain and England, 26 March 1713, AGS, Estado 6896.

7. The State of the Asiento trade..., 27 August 1723, AGS, Estado 6870; Spanish account of negro duties from 1 May 1714 to the end of April 1722, enclosed in Smith to Keene, 9 February 1738, BM, Add. 32,797, ff. 69-70. This account indicates that the Company calculated their duties on the full 4,000 slaves.

6 reales on a maximum introduction of 15,666.63 piezas/slaves. The Company paid 634,674 pesos 3 reales in duties before the war broke out in 1718, the remaining 48,928 pesos between 1718 and 1723. In other words, on a maximum assessment for the time they actually traded, they overpaid by 112,505 pesos, or by 22%.

The gross sale price for Company and indulted slaves was 2,325,659 pesos 6 reales. Excluding Santo Domingo, where 100 men were sold at a fixed price of 300 pesos each, the highest average sale price was at Panama and Portobelo (241 pesos 7 reales per slave), and the lowest at Cartagena (189 pesos 6½ reales per slave). The low average price at Cartagena is another indication that the ratio of pieza de indias to slave (this factory had the highest ratio) cannot be used as an indication of the type of slave introduced.

Although it is impossible to compute the profit on the asiento trade, we can determine the relation between expenses and the net proceeds from the sale of slaves. Expenses and percentages to gross sale prices are as follows:

Table IV

<u>Factory</u>	<u>Gross Sale Price Slaves (in pesos)</u>	<u>Expenses</u>	<u>Net Sale Price</u>	<u>Percentage of Gross Sale Price (in pesos)</u>
Panama and Portobelo	925,216	172,158	753,058	19%
Buenos Aires	592,635	268,747	323,888	35%
Cartagena	274,779	112,623	162,156	41%
Havana	307,438	85,141	222,297	28%
Santiago	102,540	32,583	69,957	32%
Vera Cruz	93,052	89,743	3,309	96%
	<u>2,295,660</u>	<u>760,995</u>	<u>1,534,665</u>	<u>33%</u>

The least efficient factory was Vera Cruz, where only 4% of the gross sale price could have been remitted to the Company, and the most efficient was Panama and Portobelo, where 81% of the gross sale price could have been remitted. There appears to have been no correlation between efficiency and size or any other easily discernable criteria, since expenses at the different factories should have been more nearly uniform.

Although the money and effects remitted by the factors to the Company do not equal the net proceeds from the sale of slaves, the difference is probably explained by the lack of sufficient data. Fifty three percent of

the net sale price was remitted to the Company in the form of bullion, but the percentage of the total bullion remitted (819,163 pesos $2\frac{3}{4}$ reales) varied tremendously from one factory to another.

Table V

<u>Factory</u>	<u>Percentage of total bullion remitted</u>
Buenos Aires	0%
Cartagena	17%
Havana	17%
Santiago	2%
Panama and Portobelo	69%
Vera Cruz	1%

These figures give a good indication of the availability of money at the various locations where the Company traded. All factors were instructed to sell for cash if possible. While it is possible that money was received for a sale, converted into a local product such as cochineal, and remitted to the Company, it probably was not a frequent occurrence. The main objective of the Company had always been to acquire bullion. The calculations of bullion remitted by each factory do not, however, take into consideration the number of slaves sold on credit for which bullion might have been received at some later date.

The total known value of produce and money remitted from the six factories is 1,016,807 pesos $5\frac{3}{4}$ reales. This sum does not include returns sent on the Royal Prince from Vera Cruz since it was an annual ship, or the cost of 211,120 pounds of cacao sent from Vera Cruz, which is unknown. The total known remittance is 48% of the gross sale price of all slaves sold for which there are accounts. The following percentages of the net sale price of slaves were remitted to the Company in bullion and local products.

Table VI

<u>Factory</u>	<u>Gross Sale Price (in pesos)</u>	<u>Amount Remitted (in pesos)</u>	<u>Percentage Remitted</u>
Buenos Aires	590,024-6	191,389- $7\frac{1}{2}$	32%
Cartagena	245,861- $5\frac{3}{4}$	141,428- $1\frac{1}{2}$	$57\frac{1}{2}\%$
Havana	257,980- $4\frac{1}{2}$	149,993	58%
Panama and Portobelo	888,029-4	517,597	58%
Santiago	90,991	16,399- $4\frac{1}{2}$	18%
Vera Cruz	77,582-7	11,029-3	14%
	<u>2,150,470-$3\frac{3}{4}$</u>	<u>1,027,837-$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>48%</u>

The general trading pattern in the second trading period (1722-1728) was the same as in the first. It opened when the Asiento arrived at Cartagena in March 1722, and ended with the Sea Horse's arrival in Buenos Aires in January 1728. Trade ended, however, six months earlier in June 1727 when war again broke out, and Company factories were closed, their merchandise and effects seized and the factors arrested. The effective trading period was five years and four months, one year five months longer than the first trading period. The factory enjoying the longest period of trade was again Cartagena (five years four months), and the shortest was Panama and Portobelo (four years eight months). The length of trade at the various licensed posts, which in all cases began several years after the factories opened, varied from an individual voyage (Río de la Hacha) to two years six months (Maracaibo).

During this time a total of 20,113 slaves were introduced by the factors and licensed traders, and 89 slaves were indulted, giving a total of 20,202, or 7,617 more than were introduced during the first trading period, but still only 78% of the amount that they should have introduced by the terms of the asiento contract (25,600). Yet this was a considerable advance on the 64% of the agreed amount introduced in the first trading period.

The frequency of slave arrivals was different than previously. Introductions built to a peak in the fourth year of trade, then dropped dramatically in the last two years. The Company introduced more than the stipulated amount (5,076 slaves) for the first time in 1724; the following year a high introduction was maintained (5,177 slaves). The decline in slave introductions towards the end of the period was probably caused by deteriorating relations between Spain and England rather than because of economic conditions or changes in supply and demand. Relations had been tense between the two crowns from 1726 until hostilities broke out. Realizing the consequences a war would have on their trade, the Company probably tried to keep their introductions down to avoid seizure.

The factories received 97% of all slaves; the licensed posts 3%. The

proportion of slaves introduced at each factory and licensed trading post in relation to the total number of slaves introduced in the period is as follows:

Table VII

<u>Factory</u>	<u>Percentage of Introductions</u>	<u>Increase over first period</u>	<u>Decrease over first period</u>
Buenos Aires	29%		1%
Cartagena ⁸	20%	7%	
Havana	10%		2%
Panama and Portobelo	32%	1%	
Vera Cruz	5%	1%	
Campeche	-		
Caracas	1%		3%
Maracaibo	1%		
Río de la Hacha	-		
Santa Marta	1%		
Santo Domingo	-		

The only factory where there was a significant fluctuation in the number of slaves introduced was at Cartagena. The expansion of this factory is attributable to an increasing demand for labour and to a change in trading patterns. The Spanish had taken precautions to eliminate contraband in this area by sending more guardacostas to cruise against the contrabandistas, thus forcing more Spanish merchants to purchase slaves through a legitimate channel--the South Sea Company.

The slaves were brought on 177 separate voyages with an average of 113.63 slaves per voyage, an average increase of 10.95 slaves per voyage from the first trading period. As would be expected the highest average number of slaves per ship continued to be at Buenos Aires (343.18), the only factory to receive slaves directly from Africa. This figure represents an increase of 120.68 slaves per voyage, indicating an increase in the size of Guinea ships, and greater efficiency gained through experience in the first trading period. The lowest number of slaves per voyage (4.42) was at the licensed trading post of Caracas.⁹

8. Jorge Palacios says that the second trading period lasted six years, during which time 4,096 slaves were introduced in Cartagena in 26 voyages. By this calculation Cartagena still claimed 20% of the asiento trade. Palacios, La Trata, p. 286.

9. The question of tonnage cannot be resolved satisfactorily. What accounts we have indicates that the increase was small. From Julian Garcia Guitierrez, 9 January 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817.

Despite the success against contrabandistas on the Spanish Main, combating illicit trade on Company ships, or ships carrying Company licenses, was far more difficult. The governor of Caracas, Diego Portales Meneses, estimated that every one of the 50 Company ships that had entered Caracas, La Guaira and Coro carried contraband. The smallest amount was worth 4,000 pesos, he said, the largest between 12,000 and 16,000. Taking 10,000 pesos as an estimate of the average per voyage, then the total value of contraband was a staggering 500,000 pesos for an 18 month period. At La Guaira alone 5,000 barrels of flour were introduced on 24 ships (an average of 208.33 barrels per ship). No Spanish register ships had visited the area since 1720, thus local inhabitants, merchants and royal officials presented few obstacles to the illicit trade. They needed supplies.¹⁰

While it is impossible to quantify accurately the contraband entered by South Sea Company employees or licensees, we can get some idea of the magnitude of this trade from comments made on the amount of provisions and supplies sold by these men. Between 1 January 1721 and 1 January 1730 the factors in the province of Caracas sold supplies worth 137,148 pesos 7 reales, paying a duty of 21,698 pesos (15.8%). During the same period they introduced about 400 slaves. This gives an average of 342 pesos 6 reales worth of provisions per slave. If that volume was maintained throughout the asiento contract at all licensed trading posts and factories, then 21,679,658 pesos worth of provisions and supplies were sold quasi-legally by the Company. However the Junta del Asiento estimated that only 200,000 pesos worth of provisions were sold yearly.¹¹

The monthly introduction of slaves increased by 58.67 to 314.27 slaves in the second trading period, but was still short of the 400 slaves per month they had contracted to deliver. Panama and Portobelo continued to have the largest number (115.73); the smallest (4.1), as would be expected, was at one of the

10. Portales Meneses to Philip V, 24 November 1725, AGI, Santo Domingo 700.

11. Junta del Asiento, 26 March 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785.

licensed posts, Maracaibo.

No information is available on the division of slaves by sex during the second trading period. Therefore the only indication of the type of slave supplied to the Spanish colonies is the ratio of pieza de indias to slave. The average for all factories and licensed trading posts is .79, an increase over the previous trading period. (The number of piezas de indias at Campeche, Río de la Hacha and Santo Domingo was estimated by a comparison with the known ratio of piezas to slaves at other licensed trading posts. The calculation is based on the assumption that the type of slave delivered at all licensed posts was similar. The average ratio (.53) was then divided by the number of slaves at each licensed post to get the estimated ratio of pieza to slave at that post.) The highest ratio continued to be at Cartagena (.958), closely followed by Vera Cruz (.925). While it is known that there was a growing need for slave labour to work mines near Cartagena, and that slaves were purchased there for that purpose, it is difficult to believe that almost all slaves introduced at these two factories were prime males, as the ratio would seem to indicate.¹²

If measurements were carried out under the same conditions as previously then more adult slaves were introduced in the second trading period. At Buenos Aires, Panama and Portobelo the ratio of pieza to slave was much lower than at the other factories. This would be expected since most of the slaves there were sold to Spanish merchants for resale so a less uniform cargo was desired. The lowest ratio was at a licensed trading post (Santo Domingo, .39). In general the ratio of pieza to slave had not changed markedly at any of the factories (in Vera Cruz it was .92 for both trading periods) which would seem to indicate that the composition of slaves was constant, and therefore that the demand for labour had not significantly altered.

12. Slaves in New Granada in the 18th century were used in mining, agriculture, cattle-raising, handicrafts, commerce and domestic work. Women and girls were often--perhaps usually placed into concubinage. Most of the sales in Cartagena appear to have been to miners either directly or through slave merchants. Palacios, op. cit., p. 289; Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, Ensayos sobre historia social Colombiana (Bogotá, 1968), pp. 20, 27.

The amount of taxes the Company actually owed on the slaves introduced during this period is uncertain. If the duty was calculated by the number of piezas introduced it would have amounted to 526,614 pesos. If, on the other hand, it was based on the full complement of 4,000 slaves/piezas per year, then it would have been 711,039 pesos $4\frac{1}{2}$ reales. Between August 1721 and April 1725 the Company paid 321,656 pesos in duties. They claimed to have paid an additional 44,374 pesos, but this was contested by the Spanish. Thus at best the Company paid only 70% of the amount of duty they owed (366,030 of 526,614 pesos), or as little as 45% (321,656 of 711,039 pesos $4\frac{1}{2}$ reales).¹³

The Spanish had no record of the number of slaves provided by the Company, but appear either to have assumed that the maximum number had been introduced or that the full duty was mandatory regardless of the number. While Company officials used every excuse to avoid the tax—even claiming that the contador was ill on one occasion—they based their figures on the maximum duty on 4,000 slaves per year. Thus they calculated that they owed 133,333 pesos per year. As with the Spanish they were either unsure of the actual number of slaves introduced, or they interpreted the treaty to mean that the full tax was due annually regardless of the number supplied.¹⁴

There are no accounts for Santiago de Cuba for the second trading period, and only sporadic records of sales and of money and effects remitted from the proceeds of the slave trade. It would appear that remittances made by the factors had not changed markedly, although there is insufficient data to determine this conclusively. Buenos Aires continued to return large numbers of hides; Havana remitted primarily logwood, although tobacco now occupied a

13. Eon to Paz, 7 September 1725, AGS, Estado 6866; Philip V's account of negro duties from 1 May 1722 to end of April 1727, enclosed in Smith to Keene, 9 February 1738, BM, Add. 32,797, ff. 71-72. This account, which was made years later, indicated that the Company paid 401,485 pesos $7\frac{1}{3}$ reales.

14. Blanco to Paz, 19 December 1726, AGS, Estado 6874; Relación de las cantidades en el producto del asiento de negros según la noticia que hay en la tesorería general, 13 April 1726, AGS, Estado 6870.

larger percent of the returns than previously, and sugar was exported for the first time; Panama and Portobelo continued to remit mainly bullion.

The third and last trading period opened when the Hermosa Ana landed in Caracas in February 1729 and closed 10 years five months later in July 1739 when the Britania docked at Vera Cruz. It had lasted five years one month longer than the second trading period (1.95 times longer), and six years six months longer than the first (2.65 times longer). The number of introductions reached a peak in the third and fourth years of trade, and then dropped steadily until trade stopped. In 1731 and 1732 the Company introduced 5,906 and 5,119 slaves respectively, only the third and fourth years in which they introduced more than the stipulated number of slaves.

The Company introduced 31,080 slaves during the period, and 532 more were indulted, for a total of 31,612. This is 64% of the 50,000 slaves that they should have introduced--exactly the same percentage of introduction as in the first period, but 14% less than in the second. The factories had 84% of the trade, the licensed trading posts 16%, unless Caracas is considered to have been a factory, which it was for all practical purposes, then 95% of the slaves were introduced at the factories and 5% at the licensed posts, the same proportions as in the first trading period. The percentage of slaves introduced at each factory and licensed posts is as follows:

Table VIII

<u>Factory</u>	<u>Percentage of Introductions</u>	<u>Increase over 1st period</u>	<u>Decrease over 1st period</u>	<u>Increase over 2nd period</u>	<u>Decrease over 2nd period</u>
Buenos Aires	19%		11%		10%
Cartagena	17%	4%			3%
Havana	9%		3%		1%
Panama and Portobelo	33%	2%		1%	
Santiago	2%		2%		
Vera Cruz	4%				1%
Campeche	2%				
Caracas	11%	7%		10%	
Guatemala	1%				
Maracaibo	1%				
Puerto Rico	-				
Santa Marta	1%				
Santo Domingo	-				

Panama and Portobelo maintained the largest percent of the trade during all three periods. Although Buenos Aires always received the second highest number, it dropped considerably in the third trading period, falling from 29% and 30% in the first two periods to 19% in the third. The most likely reason for this decline was a great increase in contraband introductions. During the last years of the contract the factors there frequently complained of the extensive illegal introductions of slaves through the Portuguese outpost of Colônia do Sacramento. The only other location where the percentage of introductions changed significantly was at Caracas. Here the percentage of trade increased 7% over the first period and 10% over the second. The demand for slaves increased steadily until the directors decided to station factors there permanently.

Perhaps the slight decrease in the percentage of trade handled by the Cartagena factory in the third trading period was because slaves previously sent there to supply slave merchants who frequently came from distant provinces were now sent to several ports on the windward coast of South America.

The slaves were delivered on 244 voyages with an average of 127.38 slaves per voyage. This represents an average increase of 13.75 slaves per trip over the second period and 24.7 over the first. The increase was primarily the result of new Spanish regulations governing the trade, but it also represents a continuing increase in the tonnage of ships employed in the asiento trade. During the later years of trade the Company was told that one slave for every two tons was the minimum shipment permitted in order to prevent, or at least to limit, contraband.¹⁵ If this regulation was enforced rigorously, the tonnage of ships at Panama and Portobelo, for example, was a total of 5,112, or approximately 116 tons per ship. The highest ratio of slaves per voyage (364) continued to be at the only factory receiving slaves directly from Africa--Buenos Aires. It represents an increase of 20.82 slaves over the second trading period

15. Geraldino to Saravia y Antolinez, 10 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792.

and 141.50 over the first.

The lowest number of slaves introduced per voyage was at the licensed port of Campeche, where an average of 31.1 slaves arrived on each ship. The only factory which consistently had such a small average delivery was Santiago, with 33.87 in the first period and 34.17 in the third. Most slaves introduced in Cuba were supplied to the Havana factory. It was probably unnecessary to keep a factory in Santiago, though it served as a convenient door for illicit trade. (See above p.196) Overall, the average number of slaves introduced on each license ship increased in the last trading period. At three licensed posts, Caracas (106.94 per voyage), Santa Marta (99.67) and Guatemala (79.5), the average introduction of slaves per ship was higher than at three of the factories: Havana (77.39), Vera Cruz (65.89) and Santiago (34.17).

The average number of slaves delivered each month in the last period (248.64) was only 6.96 slaves less than in the first period, but 65.63 less than in the second. By these accounts, therefore, if the same period of trade elapsed during each trading period the projected number of slaves delivered would have been greatest in the second trading period and the least in the third. In fact, the volume of slaves introduced per month was the greatest during the second trading period for all factories except Cartagena, which had a slight increase in the third period, and Havana, which had a slight increase in the first.

Table IX

<u>Factory</u>	Average Number of Slaves Introduced per Month		
	<u>First Period</u>	<u>Second Period</u>	<u>Third Period</u>
Buenos Aires	79.11	95.64	60
Cartagena	33.79	64.41	66.30
Havana	36.07	32.68	27.65
Santiago	14.51	-	7.59
Panama and Portobelo	99.13	115.73	92.95
Vera Cruz	15.38	16.84	10.02

There is no indication that the supply of slaves decreased in the last trading period; the paucity of introductions was partly the result of a decrease in the demand for Company slaves caused by competition from illicit traders,

but primarily because of the long period of deteriorating Anglo-Spanish relations prior to the War of Jenkin's Ear.

The average ratio of pieza de indias to slave (.81) for all factories and licensed posts in the last period is close to that in the second period (.79). This is the only indication of the composition of slaves delivered during the third period, and while it does not identify any characteristics of slaves such as age, sex or health, it probably demonstrates that the labour demand had not altered significantly. The composition of slaves introduced at the licensed posts had changed as can be seen from the following chart:

Table X

Ratio of pieza to slave

First Period		Second Period		Third Period	
<u>Factories</u>	<u>Licensed</u>	<u>Factories</u>	<u>Licensed</u>	<u>Factories</u>	<u>Licensed</u>
.77	.77	.838	.498	.85	.708

The chart indicates that a large number of very young, very old, or infirmed slaves were sold by the licensed traders during the second period.

The question of duties cannot easily be resolved. If the Company paid a tax on the 25,330 piezas de indias introduced during the third trading period, the amount would have been 844,248 pesos 7 reales. If, on the other hand, they paid on the full quota, the amount due would have been 1,388,749 pesos 3 reales. One account claims that the Company paid 1,039,337 pesos 4 reales to cover slaves introduced between January 1731 and April 1739. This amount is 74% of the full quota and represents an over-payment of 195,088 pesos 3 reales on the actual number of piezas de indias introduced.¹⁶

The only factory where there are any reasonably complete statistics on the sale prices during the last period is Buenos Aires. Between October 1730 and October 1736 this factory received 3,800 slaves, of which 1,124 died (34%), and 2,676 were sold for 534,980 pesos, an average of 199 pesos 7¼ reales per

16. Payment by the Company for duties since 1 January 1731, 26 April 1739, AGS, Estado 7007.

slave. The expenses were as follows:

Table XI

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount (in pesos)</u>
To deliver 3,652 slaves from Africa	306,941-2½
Maintenance of slaves	48,021-1½
To purchase 75 slaves already in the factory at 90 pesos each	6,750
Factors' commissions	179,150-6½
Total:	<u>540,863-2½</u>

This indicates that there was a net loss of 5,882 pesos during the third trading period at the Buenos Aires factory. The loss is explained by the extremely high mortality among the slaves.¹⁷

Unfortunately the data on the proceeds from the slave trade which were remitted to the Company is too sparse to analyse.

In conclusion, the Company introduced 63,206 slaves at the various factories and licensed posts in 19 years and eight months of actual trade.¹⁸ In addition, 1,193 slaves were indulted, giving a total of 64,399 slaves. They were brought on 538 separate voyages, an average of 117.48 slaves per trip.

Assuming that the Company should have paid a duty on the number of piezas de indias actually introduced (49,439), then Philip V would have received 1,647,768 pesos 4 reales (£370,748/1/1) from the asiento trade. Taking the average sale price of slaves introduced during the first period (210.46), and assuming that it remained constant,¹⁹ then the Company would have received

17. General Buenos Aires account, October 1730 to October 1736, n.d., C.L., Shel. vol. 43, ff. 542-543.

18. This is an average introduction of 267.82 slaves per month, or 3,213.84 slaves per year. Curtin estimates that the average number of slaves introduced from all sources between 1641 and 1773 was 3,880 slaves per year. Curtin argues that the asentistas pretended to carry more slaves than they actually did, filling the cargo space with merchandise rather than slaves. This was not the case with the South Sea Company's trade. In fact Company factors used various means to smuggle in more slaves. The trade in contraband merchandise was lucrative, but generally over and above the slave trade. Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade (Madison, 1969), pp. 21-22, 25.

19. One of the unanswered questions is whether or not the South Sea Company caused the price of slaves to rise in the Spanish colonies. It would appear from the accounts available that it remained fairly constant, although the price in Africa and Jamaica more than doubled. Ignacio de Frias account, 11 January 1737, AGS, Estado 7013; Manuel Alvarez account, 30 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817.

13,553,413 pesos (£3,049,517/8/6) for slaves they introduced and those indulted.

First Trading period slave introduction and returns, 1714-1718

Factory or Licensed Trade	Years of Trade	Number of Voyages	Number of Slaves	Men	Women
Buenos Aires	3 years 9 months	16	3,560		
Cartagena	3 years 11 months	20	1,588	709	437
Havana	3 years 5 months	23	1,479	792	186
Panama & Portobelo	3 years 2 months	23	3,767	1,602	903
Santiago de Cuba	2 years 11 months	15	508	275	84
Vera Cruz	2 years 10 months	7	523		
Caracas	3 years 11 months	13	488		
Santo Domingo	-	-	100		
Totals	3 years 11 months	117	12,013	3,378	1,610

Factory or Licensed Trade	boys	girls	Number of Piezas	Ratio of pieza to slave	Number of dead slaves
Buenos Aires			$2,385 - \frac{1}{6}$ ¹	.67	500
Cartagena	207	98	$1,394 - \frac{5}{7}$.88	86
Havana	203	111	1,085	.73	50
Panama & Portobelo	451	174	$2,583 - \frac{1}{2}$.69	78
Santiago de Cuba	35	8	est. 373 ²	est. .73	11
Vera Cruz			482-5	.92	3
Caracas			376	.77	
Santo Domingo					
Totals	896	391	c. 8,308		728

Factory or Licensed Trade	Number of Slaves Sold	Indulted Slaves	Total Sale Price Pesos	Expenses Pesos	Net Sale Price Pesos
Buenos Aires	3,060		592,635	2,610,,2	590,024,,6
Cartagena	1,295	27	274,778,,4	28,916,,6½	245,861,,5½
Havana	1,246	234	307,437,,5	48,906,,1½	257,980,,4½
Panama & Portobelo	3,671	311	925,216	45,373,,3	888,029,,4
Santiago de Cuba	457		102,540	11,549	90,991
Vera Cruz	389		93,052,,5	15,469,,6	77,582,,7
Caracas	-		-		
Santo Domingo	100		30,000		
Totals	10,218	572	2,325,659,,6	152,825,,1	2,150,470,,2¾

Factory or Licensed Trade	Average Sale Price Pesos	Salaries Pesos	Expenses of Factory Pesos	Number of Slaves/ Voyage	Number of Slaves/ Month
Buenos Aires	192.8	76,601,,4	189,535,,¾	222.5	79.11
Cartagena	189.8	59,557,,1½	24,148,,5½	79.4	33.79
Havana	207	25,201,,2½	11,033,,4	64.3	36.07
Panama & Portobelo	241.9	93,792	32,993	163.78	99.13
Santiago de Cuba	199.1	11,896	9,138	33.87	14.51
Vera Cruz	-	12,185	62,088,,7	74.71	15.38
Caracas	300	-		37.54	10.38
Santo Domingo		-			
Totals	210.46	279,232,,7¾	328,937,,1½	102.68	255.60

Factory or Licensed Trade	Contraband Pesos	Number of Barrels Flour	Pesos Returned	Logwood lbs.	Tobacco lbs.
Buenos Aires	21,139,,4				
Cartagena			139,937,,3½	219,645	
Havana		1,071	135,622	496,250	33,450
Panama & Portobelo		582	517,597,,3		
Santiago de Cuba			16,000	est. 37,100	
Vera Cruz	612		10,006,,4	96,435	
Caracas		691			
Santo Domingo					
Totals	21,751,,4	2,344	819,163,,2½	849,430	33,450

Factory or Licensed Trade	Hides	Cochineal lbs.	Mate lbs	Tallow lbs.	Wool lbs.	Cacao lbs.
Buenos Aires	113,990	12,736 ½	10,475	107,106	303	
Cartagena						
Havana						
Panama & Portobelo						
Santiago de Cuba						
Vera Cruz						211,120
Caracas						
Santo Domingo						
Totals	113,990	12,736 ½	10,475	107,106	303	211,120

1. Fractions are rounded off for purposes of calculation.
2. The estimate is based on the ratio of pieza to slave at the Havana factory.

BUENOS AIRES 1715-1718¹

DATE OF LONDON DEPARTURE	DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
15 May 1715	15 September 1715	William & Sarah	George Jesson		
21 January 1715	15 September 1715	Warwick	Henry Partington		
13 December 1714	15 October 1715	Wiltshire	Degory Herle	248	197 2/3
25 November 1714	2 November 1715	Europe	Thomas Bound	373	291
18 November 1714	25 December 1715	Indian Queen	William Nabbot	247	202 1/2
	2 January 1716	Prince of Wales	Henry Dodson	353	206
10 June 1715	10 August 1716	Windsor	Isaac Townsend	162	
15 August 1715	29 November 1716	Hope	Walter Cronker	189	146
	24 February 1717	Kingston	Thomas Sanders		
	9 April 1717	Sarah	Henry Bloom	356	217
19 May 1716	11 July 1717	George ²	William Malthus	243	
	31 January 1718	San Quintin	Thomas Hunt	297	284 2/3
	8 February 1718	Thomas & Deborah	John Norton	281	208
	30 April 1718	Europe	James Dufay	314	240 1/2 1/6
	11 August 1718	The Crown	Giles Lone	285	250 2/3
	15 May 1719	Arabella	William Hamilton	212	141 1/6
Totals for three years nine months trade in the first trading period (16 voyages)				3,560	2,385 1/6

1. References

2. The George was placed in quarentine on its arrival because small pox was raging on board.

SHIP	NO. SLAVES SOLD & SALE PRICE (pesos)	EXPENSES	NET SALE PRICE	AVG./ SLAVE	NO. BUYERS	SLAVES DEAD BEFORE SALE
Wiltshire	242 46,110	130	45,980	190	6	6
Europe	336 59,865/2	0	59,865/2	178/1	9	37
Indian Queen	236 41,920	0	41,920	177/5	20	11
Prince of Wales	323 55,881/6	30/2	55,551/4	172	38	30
Windsor	120 22,136	250	21,886	182/3	46	42
Hope	149 27,090	180	26,910	180/5	11	40
Sarah	339 69,959	1,070	68,889	203/2	82	17
George	95 18,525	0	18,525	195	1	148
San Quintin ¹	286 57,145	200	56,945	199/1	3	11
Thomas & ² Deborah	220 47,320	0	47,320	215/1	28	61
Europe ³	279 56,855	500	56,355	202	15	35
The Crown	238 52,649	250	52,399	220/1	44	47
Arabella	197 37,179	0	37,179	188/6		15
Totals:	3,060 592,635	2,610/2	590,024/6	192/6	303	500

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1. Contraband carried on the San Quintin, Europe and Thomas and Deborah was sold to two Spanish merchants for 20,000 pesos down and an unspecified sum to be paid later.
 2. Over one-half of the cargoes of the Thomas and Deborah and Europe were female, which, according to the factors, "effectually contributes to the Sale of them, otherwise there would be very little demand of these two Cargoes".
 3. The Europe carried contraband on its second voyage valued at 1,139 pesos 4 reales.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION	DATE OF ARRIVAL	CATTLE HIDES	COST (pesos)	DUTY	TOTAL
William & Sarah	12 December 1715 England	8 March 1716	3,200	5,000	450	5,450
Warwick	3 June 1716 England		11,215	17,523/3½	1,577/7	19,101/2½
Wiltshire	1 January 1716 England	19 April 1716	3,009	4,701/4½	423/1	5,124/5½
Europe	3 March 1716 England	22 May 1716	8,010	12,515/5	1,126/3	13,642
Indian Queen	2 April 1716 England	20 June 1716	6,942	10,846/7	976/1 3/4	11,823/ 3/4
Prince of Wales	15 April 1716 England	22 June 1716	5,800	9,062/4	815/5	9,878/1
Windsor	16 February 1717 England		6,603	10,317/1½	928/4½	11,245/6
Kingston	13 January 1718		4,404	6,881/2	172	7,053/2
Sarah	15 September 1717		6,197	9,862/6½	242	9,924/6½
George	5 April 1718		14,761	23,064/ ½	576/4	23,640/4½
San Quintin	10 May 1718		13,196	20,618/6	515/3½	21,134/1½
Thomas & Deborah	23 September 1718 England		8,496	13,275	331/7	13,606/7
Europe	24 June 1718		10,000	15,625	390/5	16,015/5
The Crown	30 October 1718		7,157	11,182/6½	279/4½	11,462/3
Arabella	16 December 1720		5,000	7,812/4		
Totals:			113,990	178,109/3	8,805/6¼	186,915/1¼

SHIP	MATE (pounds)	(cost) ¹	COCHINEAL (pounds)	(cost)	TALLOW (pounds)	(cost)	WOOL (pounds)	(cost)
William & Sarah	948	75/1						
Kingston	1,220	87/5	1,795½	226/5½	68,114	1,307/5	117	11/5
Sarah	1,508	107/6½	1,840	232/2				
George	1,379	98/6	1,771	223/5	10,114	194	105	10/5
San Quintin Quintin	1,378	98/6	1,760	223/4			81	8/1
Thomas & Deborah	1,385½	99/2	1,947	245/5	28,878	553/7½		
Europe	1,307½	93/6	1,731½	218/5½				
The Crown	1,349	96/5½	1,891½	238/5½				
Totals: ²	10,475	757/6	12,736½	1,609½	107,106	2,055/4½	303	30/3

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1. The cost of the mate returned included 24/7 in duty; that of the cochineal 15/6; and tallow 2,008/7. There was no duty placed on the wool.
 2. Figures are not available for ships returning between 3 June 1716 and 16 February 1717 (the Warwick, Wiltshire, Europe, Indian Queen, Prince of Wales, Windsor and Hope).

Buenos Aires 1714-1718

- Account of slaves introduced since 1715, 27 July 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Cuenta general del trato de negros en Buenos Aires desde su principio en Julio 1715 hasta Junio 1722, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.
- From Monteleón, 16 December 1714, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 24 November 1715, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800.
- Minutes court of directors, 6 June 1716, BM, Add 25,496, f. 126.
- List of South Sea Company ships, 28 June 1716, AGS, Estado 6835.
- Resume of royal officials testimony, 28 November 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 22 February 1717, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Royal officials certificate of Company returns, 11 January 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801.
- Buenos Aires factors to directors, 4 and 28 April 1718, AGS, Estado 7017.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 12 May 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801.
- Buenos Aires factors to directors, 11 and 21 September 1718, AGS, Estado 7017.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 24 September 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801.
- Royal officials visita de salida, 23 December 1720, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801.
- Buenos Aires factors to directors, 2 July 1718, AGS, Estado 7017.
- Various accounts of slave sales, 1718-1722 (part of general account), n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 17 May 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805.
- Accounts of Expenses and Costs of goods returned on Company Ships (part of general account), n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.
- de Studer, La trata de negros, pp. 200, 212, 236.

BUENOS AIRES 1715 - 1718

General Account¹

CREDIT	AMOUNT IN PESOS
For goods sold	11,545,,2
Sale of Negroes	582,802
War supplies	9,603,,4½
Bills of exchange remitted	40,088,,3½
Received for various salaries	12,885,,½
Various expenses	36
	<hr/>
	656,924,,2½
DEBIT	
Hides remitted (including cost & expenses of 113,990)	186,915,,1½
Horse hides remitted (10 with cost & expenses)	6,,2
Mate remitted	2,366,,6½
165 barrels of tallow remitted	2,550,,4½
grain	22
wool	30,,3
Dead negroes	3,800
Salaries	76,601,,4
Expenses	189,535,,3/4
Debt unpaid	183,751,,5
Cost of factory house & retreat	11,650
	<hr/>
	657,229,,3

1. The same figures have been used in calculating this general account as used by the company. However, the account of expenses has been redone because it was inaccurate. These expenses probably account for the discrepancy of 305,,½ pesos in the credit and debit. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Buenos Aires, 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

BUENOS AIRES 1715 - 1718

Salaries¹

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
31 December 1716	Balthazar García Ros, juez con- servador	19 August 1715 - 31 December 1716 @ 4000 pesos/year	5,466,,5
	Francisco de Salas, lawyer	Same @ 400 pesos/year	543
31 March 1717	Dover, 1st factor	11 July 1715 - 20 March 1717 @ 4000 pesos/year	6,754,,5
	Richard Martyn	December 1716 to present @ 2000 pesos/year	1,033,,2
	Benjamin Thistle- waite	same time @ 1333 1/3 pesos/year	689
	"when he became 2nd factor when Martyn died	to 31 December 1716	1,905,,4½
	Jeremias Mount	to 31 December 1716 @ 1000 pesos/year	1,786,,7
	Joseph Delancy	to 23 August 1716 @ 1000 pesos/year	1,116,,5
	William Phelps, surgeon	to 20 September 1716 when he died @ 800 pesos/year	949
	Francisco Rodríguez, overseer of hides	to 31 December 1716 @ 500 pesos/year	634,,5
24 June 1718	John Thrupp, 1st factor	1 year 3 months 4 days @ 4000	5,043,,6½
	Thistlewaite, 2nd factor	1 year 6 months less 6 days @ 2000 pesos/year	2,967,,1
	Mount, 3rd factor	same time @ 1333 1/3	1,978,,½
	Delanoy, 4th factor	1 year 10 months 1 day @ 1000 pesos/year	1,836,,½

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
24 June 1718	John Mylam, 5th factor	1 year 3 months 4 days @ 800/9133 1/3 pesos/year	1,008,,6
	Fracisco de Salas	1 year	400
	Manuel de Barranco, juez conservador	25 days @2000 pesos/year	132
	Joseph Blanco, overseer	5 months 3 days @ 500 /year	204,,1
	Balthazar Clements, house overseer	15 months 4 days @ 200 / year	252,,1½
	Mathew Baudy, negro overseer	2 years 9 months 14 days @ 180 / year	501,,7
	Frank Gregg, 1st master of boats	13 months 4 days @ 120 / year	131,,2
	Diego de la Playa, guard	22 months 10 days @ 144 / year	268
	Francisco Lampayo, guard	9 months @ 96 / year	72
	Pascual de la Cruz, driver	10 months 24 days @ 96 / year	86,,4
24 June 1719	Balthazar Garcia Ros		1,354,,6
	B. Manuel Zavala	1 year	2,000
	all factors	1 year to 24 June 1719	9,133,,2½
	Balthazar Clements	15 months 4 days @ 300 / year	128,,2
	Same	1 year @ 400 / year	400
	Mathew Baudy	1 year	180
	*For Various under general expenses		238,,4
	*For Various from 24 June 1718 to same 1719		2,189

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
24 June 1720	all factors	1 year to present	9,133,,2½
	*For Various	from 24 June 1719 to same 1720	2,840,,1
24 June 1721	all factors	1 year to present	9,133,,2½
	juez conservador	8 months 5 days	1,360,,7
	*For Various	from 24 June 1720 to same 1721	4,056,,6½
24 June 1722	all factors	1 year to present	9,133,,2½
	*For Various	from 24 June 1721 to same 1722	<u>3,560,,5</u>
			90,603,,1
	Advanced to factors in salaries & expenses		<u>14,001,,5</u>
			76,601,,4

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1. The salaries which are starred (*) are also included on the credit side in the general account. It would appear that money was received for these salaries from outside the factory. Cuenta general de trato de negros en Buenos Aires 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

BUENOS AIRES 1715 - 1718

Expenses¹

DATE	PURPOSE	AMOUNT IN PESOS
31 March 1717	Supplies for negroes July 1715 to present	43,239,,1 3/4
	House expenses for same period	7,657,,5
24 June 1718	Supplies for negroes 31 March 1715 to 24 June 1718	50,143,,5
	Gifts	1,110
	Money owed from the <u>Kingston</u> account	1,473,,3½
	House expenses for same time	4,658,,4½
24 June 1719	Goods for 1 year	31,432,,4
	House expenses	3,178,,3½
24 June 1720	Goods for one year to present	8,808,,1½
	House expenses to present	4,059,,5½
24 June 1721	Goods for one year	8,394,,6½
	House expenses for one year	7,836,,7
	For 311 tanned hides @ 12½ reales	485,,7½
	For 361 tanned hides lost on the <u>Arabella</u>	564,,½
24 June 1722	Goods for one year	10,077
	House expenses for one year	6,166
	TOTAL	<u>189,535,,3/4</u>

1. This account included a number of sold and supplied goods which were subtracted from the total, as well as five salaries. They are listed separately so this account only reflects expenses. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Buenos Aires, 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

CARTAGENA 1715-1718¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL AND ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, BOYS, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA						
22 December 1714 Jamaica	Charles	Robert Benn	174	89	45	25	15	166	3/7
23 March 1715 Barbados	Sarah	John Stevens	293	133	137	13	10	255	3/7
November 1715		Jorge Correz	10	4	4	2	0	9	3/7
29 February 1715 Jamaica	Mercury	William Lake	26	14	5	7	0	25	1/7
February 1716 - November 1718	(indulted slaves)		10	7	2	1	0		
2 April 1716	(indulted slaves)		10					9	3/7
15 April 1716 Jamaica	George Augustus	Richard Farrell	81	76	5	0	0	78	
11 June 1716 Guinea	Resolution	Joseph Hirchear	206	81	83	28	14	191	
13 January 1717 Jamaica	George Augustus	Alexander Gordon	20	20	0	0	0	18	3/7
January 1717	(slaves received from Cuba)		6	6	0	0	0		
5 April 1717 Guinea	Royal African	Samuel Foot	156	57	34	45	20	142	4/7
29 April 1717 Jamaica	Speedwell	Antonio Angel	10	10	0	0	0	9	2/7
13 July 1717 Jamaica	Herbert	David Greenhill	160	70	33	35	22	145	
8 December 1717	Spy ²	Peter Girardeau	80					42	2/7
28 April 1718 Jamaica	Neptune	Alexander Gordon	131	75	25	23	8	111	
16 May 1718 London and Jamaica	London	Paul Lilliwhite	11	11	0	0	0	10	6/7
4 July 1718 Curaçao	Fortune	Albert Moor	42					26	5/7

1. References

2. The Spy, Fortune and Royal Prince all anchored at Maracaibo.

DATE OF ARRIVAL AND ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, BOYS, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA					
4 July 1718 Barbados	Royal Prince	Nathaniel Clark	25					18 3/4
18 July 1718	Dragon		7					6
19 October 1718 Barbados	Sarah	Robert Porter	150	52	62	27	9	138 5/7
February 1719	(indulted slaves)		7	4	2	1	0	
Totals for three years 11 months trade in the first trading period (20 voyages)			1,588 ¹	709	437	207	98	1,394 5/7

1. In addition there were 27 indulted slaves.

SHIP	NO. SLAVES SOLD & SALE PRICE (pesos)	EXPENSES	NET SALE PRICE	AVG./ SLAVE	NO. BUYERS
Charles	158 34,361/4	5,867/1	28,494/3	180/3	61
Sarah	245 47,199	7,791/6	39,407/2	160/7	80
?	10 2,260/4	1,162/2	1,098/2	109/7	9
Mercury	26 6,257	4,078/1	2,178/7	83	23
(indulted slaves)	8 1,512	756/ 1/4	755/7 3/4	94/4	4
(indulted slaves)	9 1,512	756/ 1/4	755/7 3/4	84	
George Augustus	52 14,500	585/5	13,914/3	267/5	23
Resolution	186 39,396	2,269/6	37,126/2	199/5	70
George Augustus	2 472	203/6	268/2	134/1	
(from Cuba)	5 915	121/2 1/2	793/5 1/2	158/6	2
Royal African	153 31,757/4	1,460/6 1/2	30,296/5½	198	25
Speedwell	9 1,870	307/ 1/2	1,562/7½	173/5	4
Herbert	142 30,112	1,561/ 1/2	28,550/7½	201	30
Neptune	129 27,568	535/6	27,032/2	209/4	13
London	11 2,615	252/4 3/4	2,362/3¼	214/6	4
Sarah	143 30,831	1,207/6 1/2	29,623/1½	207/1	13
(indulted slaves)	7 1,640		1,640	234/2	3
Totals:	1,295 274,778/4	28,916/6½	245,861/5¼	189/7	364

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE	PESOS RETURNED	LOGWOOD (pounds	- cost	- expenses)
Anglesea	17 May 1715	20,559/1			
Bedford	3 August 1716	25,009/4 1/2	40,770	305/2 1/2	13
George Augustus	17 January 1717	10,015/4 1/2			
Royal African	30 April 1717		108,875	680/3 1/2	34/6
Speedwell	April 1717		10,000	62/4	3/2
Herbert	8 September 1717	45,585/ 1/2			
Neptune	12 May 1718		60,000	375	16/4
London	31 July 1718	21,936/6 3/4			
Hope	30 September 1719	16,791/2			
Totals:		139,937/3 1/4	219,645	1,423/2	67/4

Cartagena 1714-1718

Cuenta general del tráfico de negros en Cartagena desde el principio del Enero 1715 hasta Junio 1722, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Relación de los navíos despachados el año de 1731 para la introducción de esclavos..., AGI, Contaduría 267.

List of South Sea Company ships, 28 June 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800.

Badillo to Philip V, 25 September 1717, AGI, Santa Fé 436.

Various accounts of slave sales in Cartagena (part of general account), n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1714, 2 June 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

Royal officials to Philip V, 18 April 1721, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2801

Joseph Sánchez et al to Philip V, 16 January 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.

Royal officials account, 31 January 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Royal officials to Philip V, 31 July 1734, Ind. Gen. 2811.

Jorge Palacios Preciado, La trata de negros por Cartagena de Indias, p. 265.

CARTAGENA 1715 - 1718

General Account¹

CREDIT	AMOUNT IN PESOS
Sale of negroes	250,171,,5½
Sale of indulted negroes	2,063,,2 3/4
Cash received from various ship captains	987,,6
From the Santiago de Cuba factors	5,084,,1½
	<hr/>
TOTAL	258,306,,7½
DEBIT	
Gold & Silver remitted to the company	139,937,,3½
Logwood remitted	1,490,,6
From the Panama & Portobelo factory	6,623,,5
Salaries	59,557,,1½
Expenses	24,148,,5½
Debts unpaid	26,443,,4½
Negro provisions (expenses for unloading same)	33,,6
	<hr/>
	258,306,,4½

1. Cuenta general del tráfico de negros en Cartagena desde el principio del hasta 24 Junio 1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

CARTAGENA 1715 - 1718

Salaries¹

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
19 July 1715	Juan Bautista Rivetria, negro guard	6 months @ 6 pesos/day	182
31 July 1715	cook & 2 helpers	9 months	234
	Domingo de Torres, secretary	7 months @ 2 pesos/day	420
17 January 1716	Same	6 months "	360
30 June 1716	Juan Bautista Rivetria	1 year	365
17 July 1716	Domingo de Torres	to complete year	370
17 January 1717	Same	$\frac{1}{2}$ year	365
17 June 1717	Juan Bautista Rivetria	1 year	365
31 January 1718	Domingo de Torres	1 year	730
17 June 1718	Juan Bautista Rivetria	1 year	365
30 November 1718	Frank Pym	$3\frac{1}{2}$ years @ 4000 pesos/year	14000
	Frank Blake	$3\frac{1}{2}$ years @ 1000 pesos/year	3500
	Thomas Bacon	$3\frac{1}{2}$ years @ 800 pesos/year	2800
	John Cumberledgee	$3\frac{1}{2}$ years @ 1000 pesos/year (250 to complete)	3250

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
30 November 1718	William Bumpstead	3½ years @ 1333 $\frac{1}{3}$ pesos/year	4333,,3
	Arthur North	3 $\frac{3}{4}$ years 19 days @ 2000	5604,,3/4
31 December 1718	Arthur North	this month salary	166,,5½
	Frank Blake	" " "	83,,2½
17 January 1719	Domingo de Torres	1 year	730
30 April 1719	Thomas Bacon	5 mos	333,,2
31 December 1721	Edward Garthwaite, secretary	1 April 1720 - 31 December 1721 @ 2 pesos/day	1280
31 January 1722	Frank Pym	3 years 38 days	12416,,3½
	Frank Blake	3 years 7 days	6038,,2 $\frac{3}{4}$
3 May 1722	Juan Bautista Rivetria	1 year 5 months	519
	Domingo de Torres	17 Jan. 1719-31 March 1720	880
		SUB TOTAL	59,690,,4
	Advanced to factor's families		- 133,,2 $\frac{3}{4}$
		TOTAL	59,557,,1 $\frac{1}{4}$

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1. There are no other Spanish officials' salaries included in this account. Cuenta general del tráfico de negros en Cartagena desde el principio hasta 24 Junio 1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

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HAVANA 1715 - 1718

DATE	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PEZAS DE INDIA	
15 July 1715	Three Brothers	William Greenway	50	42- $\frac{3}{4}$ - $\frac{1}{2}$
22 September 1715	Royal Asiento	Thomas Cheesman	140	110
3 December 1715	Betty	William Martindale	48	35
27 February 1716	Royal Prince	Nathaniel Clark	14	9,, $\frac{1}{2}$
4 March 1716	Royal Asiento	Thomas Cheesman	52	43
22 June 1716	Royal Prince	Nathaniel Clark	49	36
26 July 1716	Philip V	Benjamin Clark	60	26,, $\frac{2}{3}$
1 October 1716	George Augustus Adventure	Richard Farrell	139	97
11 November 1716	Royal Prince	Nathaniel Nash	40	40
February 1717 to August 1718		indulted slaves	136	81,, $\frac{1}{3}$
30 March 1717	Royal Prince	Nathaniel Nash	36	30
1 April 1717	Virgin Polly	William Cleland	23	20
11 July 1717	Sacra Familia	Franco Yáñez de la Cruz	2	2
3 August 1717	Tiger	George Lason	137	68,, $\frac{3}{4}$,, $\frac{1}{2}$
28 August 1717	Eagle	Charles Baggs	132	101
18 September 1717	?	Daniel Graves	7	
15 December 1717	Eagle	Charles Baggs	135	122
25 February 1718	Margaret & Mary	Benjamin Clark	70	65,, $\frac{1}{3}$

DATE	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
12 March 1718	Catherine	Pedro Papillon	69	153
April 1718	received from Puerto del Principe		59	
16 August 1718	Neptune	Thomas Cheesman	59	41,, $\frac{1}{2}$
September 1718	confiscated slaves		4	
November 1718	received from Barbados		8	7
November 1718	confiscated slaves		91	?
14 November 1718	John & Elizabeth	Isaac Coleman	120	106,, $\frac{2}{3}$
22 November 1718	Neptune	Thomas Cheesman	30	26,, $\frac{3}{4}$,, $\frac{1}{2}$
January 1719	indulted slaves		3	?
Totals for three years five months trade in the first trading period (23 voyages)			1,479	1,085

1. This does not include 23⁴ indulted slaves.

SHIP	SLAVES SOLD				SALE PRICE (pesos)	EXPENSES	NET	AVG.	NO. BUYERS
	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS					
George Augustus ¹	51	35	39	14	36,784/4	996/4	35,788	257/4	⁷ 35
Royal Prince	40	0	0	0	12,000	231	11,769	294/2	10
indulted	75	24	23	14	8,133/1	1,072	7,071/1	52	35
Royal Prince (2 dead)	36	0	0	0	10,125	231	9,894	291	11
Virgin Polly (2 dead)	23	0	0	0	6,300	236/4	6,063/4	288/6	12
Tiger (3 dead)	91	14	31	1	37,390	20,905/6½	16,484/1½	123	43
Eagle (4 dead)	57	23	21	31	34,642/4	241/6½	33,800/5½	264	83
?	(1 of 7 dead)				1,320	357/6½	962/1½	160/3	2
Eagle	81	15	29	10	34,085	1,602/3½	32,482/4½	240/5	63
Margaret and Mary (5 dead)	47	16	7	0	17,577/4	996/5	16,580/7	255/1	30
Catherine (11 dead)	37	14	13	5	16,040	934/½	15,105/½	260/3	26
from Puerto de Principe	58	1	0	0	10,560	9,535/1½	1,024/6½	22/2	4
Neptune (1 dead)	19	4	14	22	13,660	925/4½	12,744/3½	220/2	37
indulted (1 dead)	4	0	0	0	900	249/4	650/4	216/7	1
from Barbados (2 dead)	6	1	1	0	1,760	908/3½	851/4½	141/7	5
indulted (3 dead)	81	2	8	0	24,205	9,180	15,025	172/6	7
John and Elizabeth (2 dead)	64	32	17	7	33,245	247/4	32,997/4	282	43
Neptune	20	4	0	6	8,510	54/3½	8,455/4½	281/7	14
indulted	2	1	0	0	200		200	66/5	2
Totals:	792	186	203	110	307,437/5	48,906/1½	257,980/4½	207	503

1. Accounts are missing for ships arriving prior to the George Augustus. They were reportedly compiled by ship's supercargoes rather than by resident factors.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION	PESOS	TOBACCO (LBS.)	LOGWOOD (TONS)
George Augustus	30 October 1716 Jamaica	20,321/1		25
Adventure	30 October 1716 Jamaica			
Royal Prince	23 November 1716 Barbados	10,102/4		20
Royal Prince	14 April 1717 Barbados	6,477/4		20
Virgin Polly	Barbados	6,782/3		15
Eagle	8 September 1717 Jamaica	10,205		39
Eagle	13 January 1718 Jamaica			
Catherine	29 March 1718 Barbados	10,185		20
Neptune	28 August 1718 Barbados	10,305		20
John & Elizabeth	8 February 1719 Barbados	21,436/5	10,758 1/2	29 1/8
Neptune	8 February 1719 Barbados	19,394/5	10,740 1/2	28
?	8 February 1719 Barbados	20,409/2	11,951	32
	Totals:	135,622	33,450	248 1/8

Havana 1714-1718

Relación de los navíos despachados el año de 1731 para la introducción de esclavos..., n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana desde Septiembre 1716 hasta Junio 1722..., n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266.

List of South Sea Company ships, 28 June 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800.

Various accounts of slaves in Havana, 1715-1718, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266.

Account of slaves introduced in Havana, 12 April 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Account of slaves introduced from 1715-1736, 25 June 1736, AGI, Ind Gen. 2812.

HAVANA 1715 - 1718

General Account

CREDIT	AMOUNT IN PESOS	
Negroes sold		257,019 ⁰ ,,2
From Debts collected left behind by Cleland & Graves		5,430
Proceeds of 7 negroes entered by Graves		962,,1½
Debt received from Juan Manez		1,438,,2
Negro provisions		17,679,,3
		<u>282,529,,½</u> TOTAL
 DEBIT		
Trip to Barbados by Greyhound:		
merchandise	2,310,,4	
ship expenses	4,528,,	6,838,,4
Tobacco remitted to the company		5,728,,7½
Silver remitted		135,619
Logwood remitted		8,645
Salaries		25,201,,2½
Expenses		11,033,,4
Debts unpaid		89,462,,3½
		<u>282,529,,½</u>

-
1. The actual sale price was 307,437,,5, but the general account does not include the expenses involved in selling which amount to 48,906,,1½. This factory, as is the case with most, often has a variation of several negroes in computing the totals sold. The reasons include clerical errors and unrecorded deaths. Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 266.

HAVANA 1715 - 1718

Salaries¹

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
18 September 1716	Spanish lawyer	55 days @ 500 pesos/year	75,,3½
	Solicitor	55 days @ 260 pesos/year	39,,2
	Adjutant	55 days @ 300 pesos/year	45,,1½
	Notary	55 days @ 500 pesos/year	75,,3½
18 September 1717	Richard Farrill	1 year	2000
	John Paris	1 year	500
	Vicente Rojas, Juez conservador	1 year	2000
	Ambrosio Mendes, lawyer	1 year	500
	Miguel Arturo, notary	1 year	500
	Marcelo Carmona, adjutant	1 year	300
	Andres Montes, solicitor	1 year	260
	Juan Norvaine, surgeon	1 year	500
18 September 1718	(Same as for pre- vious year)	1 year	6560
20 January 1719	Lawyer	4 months 2 days @ 500 pesos/year	169
	Adjutant	4 months 2 days @ 300 pesos/year	101,,5
	Notary	4 months 2 days @ 500 pesos/year	169
	Solicitor	4 months 2 days @ 250 pesos/year	84,,4
	Surgeon	4 months 2 days @ 500 pesos/year	169

1. The factors drew salaries throughout the rupture in trade.

/Cont...next p.

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
29 September 1721	Richard Farrill	2 years 3 months @ 2000 pesos/year	4740,,5
	John Paris	2 years 3 months @ 500 pesos/year	1185,,1
	Wargeant Nicholson	3 years 2 months @ 1200 pesos/year	3853,,2
	Juan Gerardo	3 years 15 days @ 200 pesos/year	608,,2
18 April 1722	W. Nicholson	6 months 20 days @ $1333\frac{1}{3}$ pesos/year	740,,7
	Juan Gerardo	6 months 20 days @ $533\frac{1}{3}$ pesos/year	324,,6
		Sub-Total	25,501,,2½
	Advanced to Nicholson in London		- 300
		TOTAL	25,201,,2½

Footnote 1 continued from previous page

Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana 1715-1722, A61
Contaduría 266.

HAVANA 1715-1718

Expenses¹

DATE	PURPOSE	AMOUNT IN PESOS
	House rent upon arrival	163
	To build a house to replace the one the negroes burned	1370,,1
	House rent for a factor for 2 years	1203,,6½
1718	To build a boat	234
	Reduction in price of two negroes	200
	Tallow to careen the George Augustus	19,,4
	For books, wood & other minor expenses	43,,4
18 July 1719	House rent from 18 September 1718 to present	541,,5
29 September 1721	Various general expenses	841,,2
	To Veronica Hawkins	68,,4
	Factory rent from 18 July 1719 to present	1318,,2
	Money lost during seizure	115
	To Gregorio Bernardo for delivering autos	40
	Expenses in catching fugitive negroes	83
	To cure a sick negro	10
18 April 1722	House expenses from 29 September 1721 to present	2256
	For wine since October last	139,,1½
	Factory rent from 29 September 1721	416,,6
	Expenses in litigation against the French factor, Jonchee, for introducing negroes after 1713	<u>1820</u>
	TOTAL	11,033,,4

1. Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 266.

HAVANA 1715 - 1718

Flour Introduced¹

DATE	SHIP	NUMBER OF BARRELS	AVERAGE PRICE	SALE PRICE
January 1717	George Augustus	68	16.63	1131
	Royal Prince	15	16.62	249,,3
September 1717	Virgin Polly	30	7.40	222,,2
	Royal Prince	30	8.74	262,,2
	Eagle	231	9.67	2234
September 1718	Eagle (2nd trip)	140	12.51	1751,,6
	Margaret & Mary	100	10.86	1086,,4
	Catherine	98	11.66	1143,,4
	Neptune	150	16.62	2493,,6
1720	Neptune	209	9.89	2069
TOTALS		1071	11.88	12,643

1. By article 34 all provisions were to be used at the factory. However it was common practice to import more goods than were needed for resale. The factors did not pay for these supplies. Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 266.

PANAMA AND PORTOBELLO 1715-1718¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL AND ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, BOYS, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA						
18 September 1715 Jamaica	George Augustus	Richard Farrell	150	60	60	17	13	119	3/7
24 October 1713- July 1715/1716	(indulted slaves in Panama)		261						
31 January 1713- 25 May 1715	(indulted slaves in Portobelo)		5						
September 1715- December 1716	(indulted slaves)		245						
16 February 1716 Jamaica	George Augustus	Richard Farrell	131	47	53	22	9	80	9/14
30 March 1716 Guinea	Durwich	Samuel Boyles	349	273	40	29	7	337	1/7
23 July 1716 Guinea	King Solomon	Edward Coward	288	133	65	76	14	217	9/14
16 October 1716 Pearl	Pearl	Edward Tizard	147	73	58	13	3	81	5/7
2 March 1717	Dragon	Matthew Hitching	211	141	68	1	1	172	9/14
21 March 1717 Jamaica	James	Jonathan Dennis	250	158	86	2	4	182	6/7
25 June 1717 Jamaica	Green Bay	Thomas Atkins	186	42	67	59	18	114	1/14
14 September 1717 Jamaica	John	William Lock	208	133	51	14	10	132	6/7
27 October 1717 Jamaica	Indian Queen	William Nabbot	260	110	69	61	20	168	3/7
16 January 1718	Neptune	William Vial	200	130	42	23	5	130	5/14
8 March 1718 Jamaica	John	Edward Coward	287	63	106	76	42	148	1/14
6 April 1718	Eagle	Charles Baggs	135	105	28	2	0	98	7/14

1. References

DATE OF ARRIVAL AND ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, BOYS, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA						
30 June 1718 Guinea	Crown	William Hall	218	69	65	56	28	150	1/14
1 August 1718	Friendship	William Arnold	110	65	45	0	0	80	4/7
14 August 1718 Jamaica	George Augustus	William Owen	266					161	9/14
20 August 1718 Guinea and Jamaica	The Clapham	Edward Nallum	189					112	1/7
8 October 1718 Guinea and Jamaica	John	Thomas Dunckle	182					94	5/7
Totals for three years two months trade in the first trading period (23 voyages)			4,078 ¹	1,602	903	451	174	2,695	5/14

1. Includes 311 indulted slaves.

SHIP	NO. SLAVES SOLD & PRICE (pesos)	EXPENSES	NET SALE PRICE	AVG./ SLAVE	NO. BUYERS & REMARKS
George Augustus	141 37,334	4,104/6	30,229/2	214/3	57 Pablo Freire purchased 28 slaves
indulted slaves			8,186/7		
George Augustus	122 28,898	2,146/5	26,751/3	219/2	44 Captain Balthazar de Ricoba - 45
Dunwich	332 86,075	4,374/2	81,700/6	246	81 Captain Esteban Díaz - 111
King Solomon	275 68,880/4	5,838/6	63,041/6	229/2	116 Geronimo Pacheco de Quiñones & Co. - 55
Pearl	138 35,245	2,412/5	32,832/3	237/7	42
Dragon	209 53,912/4	1,501/5	52,410/7	250/6	5
James	249 63,140	2,056/4	61,083/4	245/3	38 Captain Francisco Morales - 121
Green Bay	185 43,500	1,275/5	42,224/3	228/2	15 Ricoba - 158
John	207 49,225	1,280/3	47,944/5	231/5	25 Captain Joseph de Engui - 97
Indian Queen	259 68,709	1,954/5	66,754/3	257/6	62 Captain Valentín de Aguilar - 122
Neptune	199 52,337	1,213/6	51,123/2	256/7	10 Pedro Carpinteros - 188
John	280 70,583	1,903/5	68,679/3	245/2	17 Juan Baptista Belzunce - 221
Eagle	134 35,239	1,095/3	34,143/5	254/6	7 Bernardo Garze & Co. - 118
Crown	214 58,173	2,122/5	56,150/3	261/7	66 Juan Baptista Asurza & Co. - 106
Friendship	109 29,325	1,391/5	27,933/3	256/2	13 Juan Baptista Asurza & Co. - 90
George Augustus	259 68,370	4,263/5	64,106/3	247/4	51 137 seized and sold by ¹ royal officials
The Clapham	187 48,860	3,082/5	45,777/3	244/6	55 107 seized and sold by royal officials
John	172 30,410	3,354/3	27,055/5	157/2	8 109 seized and sold by royal officials
Totals:	3,671 925,216	45,373/3	888,029/4	239/5	712

1. Unsold slaves introduced on the George Augustus, The Clapham and the John at the time of the first represalia were seized along with other Company effects by royal officials.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE	DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED	EXPENSES
George Augustus	20 February 1716	Jamaica	22,150	1,824
Dunwich	20 August 1716	Jamaica		
Pearl	10 March 1717	Jamaica	50,400	582
Dragon	10 March 1717	Jamaica	25,717 ¹	
Adventure	5 April 1717	Jamaica	75,000	1,008
Winchelsea	14 September 1717	Jamaica	82,669/2 1/2	1,102/5 1/2
Winchelsea	10 May 1718		196,187/4	1,079
Winchelsea	June 1718		6,000	
London	30 September		85,190/4 1/2	416/4
Totals:			517,597/3	6,012/1 1/2

1. The Dragon was seized by pirates.

Panama and Portobelo 1714-1718

Cuenta del trato de negros en Portobelo y Panama desde su principio en Julio 1715 hasta Enero 1722, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Relación de los navíos despachados el año de 1731 para la introducción de esclavos..., n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Hurtado de Amesaga to Philip V, 23 September 1715, AGI, Panama 132.

Thomas F. de Ayala certificate, 20 June 1716, AGI, Panama 142.

List of South Sea Company ships, 28 June 1716, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2800.

Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1715, 16 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

Various accounts of effects remitted from Panama and Portobelo (part of general account), n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Royal officials and governor to Philip V, 25 February 1724, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Various accounts of slave sales 1715-1722 (part of general account), n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

PANAMA & PORTOBELLO 1715-1718

General Account¹

CREDIT	AMOUNT IN REALES
From the Marqués de Villadarias	16,000
Sale of Negroes	6,989,594
Sale of indulted Negroes	63,561,,16 3/4
Sale of seized Negroes	132,171,,26
Negro provisions	48,721
From the Cartagena factory	419,797
	<hr/>
TOTAL	7,669,845,,26 3/4
DEBIT	
Gold and silver remitted to the Company	4,382,532
House rent	97,682,,16
Servants salaries	452,582,,26
Spanish officials' salaries	297,760,,16
Expenses	166,263,,16
Debts unpaid (figured used to balance the books)	2,273,024,,16 3/4
	<hr/>
TOTAL	7,699,845,,26 3/4

1. This is the only factory in which all the accounts were in reales. The amount credited from the Cartagena factory relates to the cargo of the licensed ship Bedford. The details of this amount will be discussed separately. This factory also sold negro provisions in contravention of the asiento treaty. See above Cuenta general del trato de negros en Portobelo y Panama desde Julio 1715 hasta 7 Enero 1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

PANAMA & PORTOBELO 1715 - 1718

House Rent¹

DATE	LOCATION & TIME	AMOUNT IN REALES
22 June 1716	Portobelo 1 year	8000
12 July 1716	Panama 1 year	6400
	Portobelo Negro enclosure to 26 March 1716	3376
26 March 1717	Portobelo Negro enclosure to present	6400
24 June 1717	Portobelo 1 year	8000
	Panama 11 months 12 days (price increase)	9120
26 March 1718	Portobelo Negro enclosure 1 year	6400
22 June 1718	Portobelo 1 year	8000
	Panama 1 year	9600
1 January 1719	Portobelo Negro enclosure 6 months	4800
	Portobelo 6 months	4000
24 June 1719	Panama 1 year	9600
7 January 1720	Panama 6½ months	5200
7 February 1721	Panama 13 months	6066,,16
8 November 1721	Panama 9 months 25 days	4200
7 January 1722	Panama 3 months	<u>1400</u>
	SUB TOTAL	100,562,,16
	Money received for renting Panama house	- <u>2,880</u>
	TOTAL	<u>97,682,,16</u>

1. It appears that the house and Negro enclosure at Portobelo were closed during the war 1719. Expenses at this factory were high because two houses were maintained. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Portobelo y Panama desde Julio 1715 hasta 7 Enero 1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

PANAMA & PORTOBELLO 1715 - 1718

Flour Introduced¹

DATE	SHIP	NUMBER OF BARRELS	AVERAGE PRICE	SALE PRICE PESOS
February 1716	<u>George Augustus</u>	6	12	72
20 August 1716	<u>Dunwich</u>	126	15.60	1,966
10 October 1716	<u>Pearl</u>	8	17.75	142
13 September 1717	<u>John</u>	193	7.80	1,505
21 December 1717	<u>John</u> <u>Queen of India</u>	201	9.58	1,925
9 June 1718	<u>John</u> <u>Eagle</u>	48	10	480
TOTALS		582	10.46	6,090

1. Thomas Geraldino, Philip's representative to the South Sea Company complained that this flour was sold in contravention of the asiento treaty. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Portobelo y Panama desde Julio 1715 hasta Enero 1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

PANAMA & PORTOBELO 1715 - 1718

Expenses of George Augustus¹

DETAILS OF EXPENSES (1715)	AMOUNT IN REALES
For a guard on the ship	16
For the boat which brought the royal officials for their inspection	32
For a canoe to take kitchen equipment to land	8
Fresh meat for the slaves	666
Fresh salad	420
Fresh bananas	336
Candles, salt, wool	270
12 days provisions for guards & a nurse	114
11 days provisions @ 8 reales /day for nurse's assistant	88
For a guard	96
For a doctor	64
Church expenses for a funeral of a girl slave	51
For rum	258
Expenses to take Negroes to Panama	
For 15 mules @ 15	1920
A mule for Mr. Cooke	240
For 15 guides (one for each 10 Negroes), a cook @ 16 pesos and an overseer	2176
For the inns where they stayed 4 nights @ 1 real each	588
For 60 arrobas of salted meat @ 5½ reales	330
9 bundles of bananas	288
For transporting the meat to the inns	200
For candles in the inns & canoes to take the slaves across the rivers	24
Duties on mules	30
Cooke's expenses on the road	86

DETAILS OF EXPENSES (1715)	AMOUNT IN REALES
For a surgeon & barber to shave the slaves	218
For a negro to prepare meals	160
Church expenses for burying 5 men and 2 children @ 5 reales	<u>357</u>
SUB TOTAL	9,036
For keeping Negroes in Panama @ $\frac{1}{2}$ real each / day from 4 October 1715 to June 1717	<u>23,802</u>
TOTAL	32,838

-
- The expenses of this ship are typical of those encountered in selling slaves at this factory. They vary little from expenses incurred at other factories; only the cost of transport from Portobelo to Panama is unique here. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Portobelo y Panama desde Julio 1715 hasta 7 Enero 1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

SANTIAGO 1715-1718¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. SLAVES	MEN	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS
?	?	?	51				
January 1716	Santa Rosa	Nicolas de Bari	40	30	10	0	0
March 1716	Sacrafamilia	Carlos Macourt	6	4	0	1	1
April 1716	?	Juan Jose Cano	2	1	0	1	0
September 1716	Sacrafamilia	Damian de Salas	44	28	9	6	1
October 1716	Newport	William Mustoe	16	9	7	0	0
March 1717	Isabel	Pedro de Acosta Nicto	30	30	0	0	0
March 1717	Endeavour	Nathaniel Vial	75	65	10	0	0
June 1717	Neptune	Nathaniel Vial	86	40	23	19	4
June 1718	Lark	Henry Coley	45	41	3	1	0
September 1718	Prosperity	Houragin	58	27	22	7	2
October 1718	?	Robert Saunders	20				
November 1718	?	Francisco de Rojas	2				
November 1718	Crown	?	3				
? 1718	Prince of Asturias	George Willis	30				
Totals for two years 11 months trade in the first trading period (15 voyages)			508	275	84	35	8

1. References

SHIP	NO. SLAVES SOLD & SALE PRICE (pesos)	EXPENSES	NET SALE PRICE	AVG./ SLAVE	NO. BUYERS
?	51 6,945	4,386/4	2,558/4	50/1	
Santa Rosa	40 9,785	214	9,571	239/2	20
Sacrafamilia	6 1,010	348/4½	661/3½	110/2	5
?	2 340	137/5½	202/2½	101/1	
Sacrafamilia	24 7,900	4,040	3,860	160/7	23
Newport	16 3,535	98	3,437	214/6	13
Isabel	30 7,225	154	7,071	235/6	16
Endeavour	74 17,675	224/4	17,450/4	235/6	38
Neptune	83 18,595	682/1	17,912/7	215/6	63
Larkperity	45 11,000	213/7	10,786/1	239/6	29
Prosperity	54 12,100	149/3	11,950/5	221/2	40
?	17 3,245	359/2	2,885/6	169/6	10
?	5 1,010	380	630	126	
Prince of Asturias	10 2,175	161/1	2,013/7	201/3	8
Totals:	457 102,540	11,549	90,991	199/1	265

RETURNS

DATE OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION	SHIP	PESOS	LOGWOOD (pounds)
4 April 1717 Jamaica	Endeavour		37,100 est.
17 June 1718 Jamaica	?	8,000	
5 November 1718 Barbados	?	8,000	
Totals:		16,000	37,100

Santiago 1714-1718.

Relación de los navíos despachados el año de 1731 para la introducción de esclavos..., n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Quenta general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba desde el principio en Diciembre 1715 hasta Junio 1722, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Various accounts of slave sales in Santiago de Cuba (part of general account), n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

SANTIAGO 1715 - 1718

General Account¹

CREDIT	AMOUNT IN PESOS
From French factors for introducing 25 negroes	1000
For negro supplies	915
Money received for shipwrecked French negroes	1075
Same	628
Sale of negroes	87972,,4
For the balance of Peter Walsh	12046,,6½
TOTAL	<u>103,637,,2½</u>
DEBIT	
Gold and silver remitted to the company	16000
Logwood remitted	399,,4½
For the Cartagena factory	13890,,3½
House & negro expenses	8174,,3
Salaries	11896
Expenses	3871,,6
Existing debts	34461,,2
Account with royal officials	13692,,1½
For Angel de la Gala de Campeche	1251,,6
TOTAL	<u>103,637,,2½</u>

1. Most of the entries, except those which are self-explanatory or consist of long lists of names such as the category of existing debts, are further expanded in the following pages. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba, A61 Contaduría 267.

SANTIAGO 1715 - 1718

Salaries¹

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
31 December 1716	Juez Conservador	1 year	800
	Overseer	1 year	180
	Cook	1 year	100
31 December 1717	Juez Conservador, Overseer, cook	1 year	1080
31 December 1718	Juez Conservador, Overseer, cook	1 year	1080
	Nicolas Adams, surgeon	3 years @ 80 pesos/year 3½ years @ 40 pesos/year	380
	Diego de Fuentes, barber	3 years @ 30 pesos/year 3½ years @ 20 pesos/year	160
	Nicolas Ossorio, lawyer	3 years @ 100 pesos/year & some expenses	343
	Luis Gerbert, doctor	hired in time of need	120
	Thomas Mediazeja, clerk		100
	Joseph Harwood, secretary	5½ years @ 200 pesos/year	1053
	Peter Walsh, factor	6½ years @ 1000 pesos/year	6500
		TOTAL	11,896

1. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba, 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

SANTIAGO 1715 - 1718

Expenses¹

DATE	PURPOSE	AMOUNT IN PESOS
December 1715	Silver seal of company coat of arms	9,,2
February 1715	Hire of a negro for house- keeping	12,,6
May 1716	Presentation of a negro to the governor	200
	To a doctor	12
	Hire of a negro for house- keeping	24,,4
	To the negro Santiago	6
November 1716	Hire of a negro for house- keeping	29,,6
August 1717	To Thomas Noble for writing letters	20
	For paper and ink	7
December 1717	To Peter Walsh for expenses in Bayamas	40
March & May 1718	Paper	6,,5
June 1718	For certificates	13,,2
	For debts in Havana	61,,6
	Charity	12
	Expenses for a trip from Cartagena	30,,4
December 1718	Mail	10
	To Simon Nunez, notary, for expenses of seizure	62
	Expenses of adjusting seizure account	146
	Expenses of the cargo of the ship <u>Barbara</u>	24
	To the counsellor	26,,2

DATE	PURPOSE	AMOUNT IN PESOS
December 1718	To Thomas Noble	100
	To Peter Walsh for odd expenses	3000
		<hr/>
	TOTAL	3,871,,6

1. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba,
1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

SANTIAGO 1715 - 1718
House & Negro Expenses¹

DATE	PURPOSE	AMOUNT IN PESOS
3 December 1715	House furniture	18,,6
	House expenses	60
	Maintenance of negroes until sold	16,,4
January 1716	House expenses	59,,4½
February 1716	House expenses	60,,7½
	Maintenance of negroes until sold	20,,6
April 1717	House expenses	111,,3½
	Maintenance of negroes until sold	70,,3½
December 1718	House expenses (last entry before seizure)	122
	TOTAL	5,266,,1
EXPENSES DURING SEIZURE		
1 January 1719-22 October 1721	General maintenance of factory for 1025 days @ 29 reales/day	3715,,4
22 October 1721-1 June 1722	General maintenance of factory for 223 days @ 34 reales/day	947,,6
	TOTAL	4,662,,2
22 October 1721	Received from royal officials for the expenses of maintenance during seizure	-1,755
	TOTAL	2,908,,2
	Add in the above general expenses before the seizure	+ 5,266,,1
	TOTAL	8,174,,3

1. Only selected examples and the total amount of this account are entered for the purpose of demonstrating cost. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba, 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

SANTIAGO 1715 - 1718

Account with Royal Officials¹

PURCHASES	AMOUNT IN PESOS
4417,,1½ arrobas of white sugar @ 12 reales	6625
260 boxes of unrefined sugar @ 8 reales	4809,,1½
16 boxes of unrefined sugar @ 8 reales	272
142 bales of tobacco with 6750 bundles @ 2 reales	1687,,4
40 bales of tobacco	250
powdered tobacco	1058
806 tanned hides @ 5 reales	503,,8
32 bars of iron	150
86 bars of lead	150
weights	100
2 mules	76
1 sawfish	6
2 copper kettles	25
2 pairs of iron for kitchen cookers	4
2 barrels of irons	80
Money captured from a factor during the seizure 1718-1719	55
Various things lost	500
1 negro	250
Money received from various accounts	3042,,4
	<hr/>
	19,644,,5½
Funds reintegrated	- 5,952,,4
	<hr/>
TOTAL	13,692,,1½

1. There are no dates for any of these entries. Cuenta general del trato de negros en Santiago de Cuba, 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 267.

VERA CRUZ 1715-1718¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
6 April 1716	St. George ²	Richard Ashford	74	73-2½
2 May 1716	Catherine	Josiah Nixon	42	38-6½
5 March 1717	George Augustus	Alexander Gordon	130	119-3½
1 June 1717	London	Paul Lilliwhite	150	135
25 June 1718	Endeavour ³	Alexander Duncan	96	87-5½
2 October 1718	Jasper ⁴	William Cleland	1	
1 January 1719	Neptune	Alexander Gordon	30	28 ½
Totals for two years 10 months trade in the first trading period (7 voyages)			523	482-5

SHIP	NO. SLAVES SOLD & SALE PRICE (pesos)		EXPENSES	NET SALE PRICE	AVG./SLAVE	NO. BUYERS
St. George ⁵	72	19,413/3	2,932/3	16,481	228/7	24
Catherine	39	12,159/2	7,848/5	4,310/5	110/4	21
George Augustus	130	29,914	2,564	27,350	210/3	
London	148	31,566	2,124/6	29,441/2	198/7	57
Totals:	389	93,052/5	15,469/6	77,582/7	199	102

1. References

- The St. George sailed from Vera Cruz on 4 August 1716 carrying 10,006 pesos 4 reales.
- The Endeavour sailed from Vera Cruz on 31 August 1718 for Jamaica with 96,435 pounds of logwood acquired for 1,022 pesos 7 reales.
- Contraband worth 612 pesos was seized by royal officials in Vera Cruz from the Jasper. The vessel carried 211,120 pounds of cacao on the return voyage.

Vera Cruz 1714-1718

Relación de los navíos despachados el año de 1731 para la introducción de esclavos..., n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Cuenta corriente de la factoría de Vera Cruz y México, 1715, 1722, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266.

Lezeaga to Philip V, 13 April 1713, AGI, México 856.

Various accounts of slave sales in Vera Cruz (part of general account), n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Royal officials account, 8 November 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.

Account of slaves introduced since 1716, 12 April 1735, AGI, Contaduría 268.

VERA CRUZ 1715 - 1718

General Account¹

CREDIT	AMOUNT IN PESOS
Sale of negroes	73,091
Import of 127 negroes @ 200 pesos each	25,400
Seized slaves	1,141,,3½
Merchandise on the <u>Herbert</u> seized by the royal officials	73,647
Goods seized from the <u>Isabel</u> by royal officials	70,000
Estimated cargo of the <u>Royal Prince</u>	<u>1,589,119,,2½</u>
TOTAL	1,832,398,,6
DEBIT	
Factory expenses from 1 November 1715 to 19 November 1719	
House expenses (mostly food which the factors were obliged to pay from their salaries)	42,702,,½
Salaries	10,484,,4
House rent (15 November 1715 - 31 October 1717)	5,500
Expenses	3,402,,2½
Salaries to royal officials (the entire amount went to the juez conservador)	1,700
Remitted goods	278,513,,7,,6
Debts	1,390,338,,6,,8
Unaccountable, but probably in house maintenance & salaries for other Spanish officials, expenses, etc.	<u>99,757,,1,,1</u>
TOTAL	1,832,398,,6

1. The factors sent no books after November 1717. All subsequent accounts, except those of the royal officials during the seizure of 1719, were calculated from letters. In balancing the books an attempt has been made to include goods sold on the licensed and annual ships. The debts are high because they include goods seized during the war of 1719; these debts will be considered in the section of seizures. Cuenta corriente de la factoría de la Vera Cruz y México 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 266.

VERA CRUZ 1715 - 1718

Salaries¹

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
31 January 1716	Catalen Thorowgood	1/4 year @ 2666 2/3 pesos/year	666,,5½
	Thomas Bedell	½ year @ 1333 1/3 pesos/year	333,,2½
	William Clark	½ year @ 889 pesos/year	222,,2
	John Newton	½ year @ 666 2/3 pesos/year	166,,5½
	John Strode	" "	166,,5½
	David Patton	½ year @ 533½ pesos/year	133,,2½
31 July 1716	Salaries as above	½ year	3338
30 September 1716	Salaries as above	15 days	281,,1
15 February 1717	Thomas Bedell	½ year @ 2666 2/3 pesos/year	1333,,3
	William Clark	½ year @ 1333 1/3 pesos/year	666,,4
	John Newton	½ year @ 889 pesos/year	444,,4
	John Strode	½ year @ 666 2/3 pesos/year	333,,3
	David Patton	" "	333,,3

DATE	PAYEE	PERIOD & SALARY	AMOUNT IN PESOS
18 November 1717	Salaries as above	9 months 3 days	4718,,4
5 September 1716	Money paid to Thomas Clark to the overseer	9 months 15 days @ 500/year	396
27 September 1717	Same		400
19 November 1717	Same		229,,2
			<hr/>
			14,203
	Money advanced to factors in London		- 3,718,,4
			<hr/>
		TOTAL	10,484,,4

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1. These salaries only include the factors and not the supercargoes who came out on the annual ships. Cuenta corriente de la factoría de la Vera Cruz y México 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 266.

VERA CRUZ 1715 - 1718

Expenses ¹

DATE	PURPOSE	AMOUNT IN PESOS
1 July 1716	For two canoes and freight	66
5 August 1716	For three horses	130
7 March 1717	For goats, mules and mutton	560,,1
14 March 1717	For 6 silver plates weighing 168 ozs. and a silver basin	168
24 August 1717	For 12 silver spoons & 2 large silver spoons	76,,4
6 September 1717	For a gift to the parish	100
19 November 1717	For goods purchased from the <u>Isabel</u> for use in the house	1677,,5½
4 December 1715	Hire of a mule for Thorow- good's trip to Mexico	100
3 February 1716	Expenses of mules	525
	TOTAL	<u>3,402,,2½</u>

1. This account is incomplete. The silver plates and spoons must have been purchased as gifts and the large amount of goods purchased for house use is suspicious considering that goods were already supplied from London. Cuenta corriente de la factoría de la Vera Cruz y México, 1715-1722, A61 Contaduría 166.

Caracas 1715-1718 ¹

DATE	ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES	PIEZAS	NO. OF BARRELS FLOUR
February 1715	Barbados	3 Brothers	Wm.Genosay	125	97-4	
April 1715	Barbados	Elizabeth	Nath.Owen	117	101-6	
May 1715	Barbados	3 Brothers	Wm.Genosay	7	7	
September 1716	Barbados	Royal George	Thos.Bardel	30	16-2	c.280
October 1716	Curacao	Royal George	Thos.Bardel	12	8	c.411
June 1717	Curacao	Royal George	Thos. Bardel	19	16-1	
September 1717	Curacao	La Fortuna	Arman Borrain	13	11	
January 1718	Curacao	Royal Prince	Nath.Claque	2	1	
April 1718	Curacao	Royal George	Quarter Mor	50	37-1	
May 1718	Curacao	Sarah	Alex Kerney	22	14-2	
June 1718	Barbados	Jasper	Wm.Cleland	60	42	
June 1718	Barbados	Catharina	Roberto de Garcia	18	13-3½	
December 1718	Barbados	Benjamin	Dennis Daly	13	10½	
Totals						
3 years 11 months trade 13 Voyages				488	376	691

1. From Jonathan Sisson, 30 October 1716, A61 Caracas 63.
 Gov. Bētacourt to Philip V, 7 February 1717, A61 Caracas 63.
 Lezeaga to Philip V, 13 April 1719, A61 México 856.
 Caracas Royal Officials to Philip V, 18 April 1718, A61 Ind.
 Gen. 2801.
 Caracas Royal Officials to Azana, 18 April 1721, A61 Ind. Gen. 2801.
 Abreu to Governor of Caracas, 30 October 1716, A61 Caracas 63.

SANTO DOMINGO 1715-1718¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. SLAVES	SALE PRICE
1718	?	?	100	30,000

1. These slaves were purchased from the South Sea Company to work on Spanish fortifications in Santo Domingo. Junta del asiento de negros, 25 May 1718, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2773; Minutes committee of correspondence, 31 January 1715, BM, Add 25,550, f. 42.

Second Trading period slave introductions and returns, 1722-1728

Factory or Licensed Trade	Years of Trade	Number of Voyages	Number of Slaves	Number of Piezas	Ratio Pieza to Slave
Buenos Aires	5 years 1 month	17	5,834	4,541 1/3	.78
Cartagena	5 years 4 months	24	4,122	3,952-2 1/2	.96
Havana	5 years 2 months	26	2,026	1,747 1/7	.86
Panama & Portobelo	4 years 8 months	30	6,481	4,275-3	.66
Vera Cruz	5 years 1 month	15	1,027	950 5/28	.93
Campeche	6 months	2	46	24.589 est.	.53 est.
Caracas	1 year 7 months	50	221	138 2/4	.62
Maracaibo	2 years 6 months	5	123	58	.47
Rio de la Hacha	1 month	1	24	12.82 est.	.53 est.
Santa Marta	5 months	3	148	66 1/2	.45
Santo Domingo	7 months	4	61	23 2/3	.39
Totals	5 years 4 months	177	20,113	15,800	.79

Factory or Licensed Trade	Avg. No. Slaves per Voyage	Avg. No. Slaves per Month	Known Contraband (pesos)	Indulted Slaves
Buenos Aires	343.18	95.64	35,159/5	
Cartagena	171.75	64.41		2 est.
Havana	77.92	32.68	34,811	87
Panama & Portobelo	216.03	115.73		
Vera Cruz	68.46	16.84	15,837 plus 3 barrels of goods and 17,000 pounds of iron	
Campeche	23	7.66	4,954	
Caracas	4.42	11.63	estimate between 300,000 and 800,000	
Maracaibo	24.6	4.1	6,185	
Río de la Hacha	24	24		
Santa Marta	49.33	29.6		
Santo Domingo	15.25	8.71	3,474 est.	
Totals:	113.63	314.27	estimate between 400,421 and 900,421	89

Factory	Pesos Returned	Cattle Hides	Cacao (pounds)	Logwood (pounds)	Brazilwood (pounds)	Sarsaparilla (pounds)
Buenos Aires	87,035	149,711				17 tercios
Havana	32,000	624		624,700		1,250
Panama & Portobelo	1,087,675			33,072		454,500
Maracaibo		419	84		22,000	
La Guaira & Coro		267,444	267,444			
Totals:	1,206,710	150,754	267,528	657,772	22,000	455,750 17 tercios

Factory	Snuff (pounds)	Leaf Tobacco (bundles)	Sugar (pounds)	Red Peppers (pounds)	Mate
Buenos Aires					164 tercios 21 serones
Havana	1,061,354	3,000	198,975	2,325	
Maracaibo	2,975				
Totals:	1,064,329	3,000	198,975	2,325	164 tercios 21 serones

BUENOS AIRES 1722-1728¹

DATE OF LONDON DEPARTURE	DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES CONTRACTED FOR
March 1722	27 January 1723		Assiento	Edward Tizard	375
November 1722	17 March 1723	London	Tendrin (200 tons)	Giles Lone	supply ship
June 1722	April 1723		King William	William Hamilton	600
October 1722	August 1723		San Quintin	John Bird	300
March 1723	11 January 1724	Guinea	Carteret	John Opie	400
June 1723	2 April 1724		Sea Horse	Moore White	325
November 1723	8 April 1724	London	John (159 tons)	Frank Pearse	supply ship
February 1724	27 October 1724	Angola	Essex	Nathaniel Smith	400
March 1724	December 1724	Angola	Syria	Francis Williams	500
April 1724	26 December 1724		Levantine	John Thomas	380
April 1724 ²⁵	March 1725	Guinea	Assiento	Edward Tizard	375
January 1724	November 1725	Angola	Bonita	Samuel Roberts	520
May 1725	18 December 1725	Angola	Duke of Cambridge	Thomas King	480
February 1725	March 1726	Angola	Boothe	Nicholas Webb	434
December 1724	September 1726		Cariffe	William Goldsborough	444
	September 1726	London	Bristow	Mathew Kent	supply ship

1. References

DATE OF LONDON DEPARTURE	DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES CONTRACTED FOR
December 1725	27 September 1726	Guinea	Essex	Nathaniel Smith	350
January 1726	17 May 1727		King William	Jeremiah Winter	500
July 1726	29 August 1727	Madagascar	St. Michael	Charles Burnham	500
July 1726	11 January 1728	Madagascar	Sea Horse	Moore White	400
Totals for five years trade in the second trading period (17 voyages)					7,283

SHIP	NO. OF SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN & PIEZAS DE INDIA				CONTRABAND (value in pesos)	REMARKS
Assiento	370	309	70	283	520	
Tendrin	supply ship					Carried contraband including watches, mirrors, books and carriage ornaments.
King William	555	357	198	390	723/6	Captain Hamilton drowned during the voyage.
San Quintin	288			255/8	3,400/2	Two Spaniards and their effects traveled to England on this ship.
Carteret	327	261	66	259		Two Jesuits traveling to Rome returned on this ship.
Sea Horse	304	251	53	259	11/12	
John	supply ship					
Essex	376	222	154	273	1/2	
Syriatine	443	283	160	325	6/7	250/6
Levantine	366	276	190	285	1/6	250/6
Assiento	282	171	111	193		184/4, all in hats
Bonita	444			396		6,203/1
Duke of Cambridge	442			352		2,000
Boothe	403			306	1/2	7,058/3
Cariffe	360	235	125	286		
Bristow	supply ship					14,818/7
Essex	256	164	42	156		
King William	234			201		
St. Michael	282	191	91	234	3/4	
Sea Horse	102			84	1/3	All slaves from this ship were seized and sold by the Spanish during the last <u>represalia</u> .
Totals:	5,834			4,541 1/3		

SHIP	DATE RETURNED	PESOS RETURNED	HIDES	MATE	PESOS DUTY
Assiento		59,500 ¹	8,000	21 serones	
Tendrin	11 August 1723	25,000	7,100		
San Quentin			15,056	20 tercios	
Carteret ²			20,264	20 tercios	
Sea Horse	24 May 1725		12,500	20 tercios	492/6 1/2
John	5 September 1724	2,535	10,800		
Essex	24 May 1725		5,000	20 tercios	199/6 1/2
Syria	31 May 1726		12,051	24 tercios	
Levantine	30 October 1725		8,430	20 tercios	334
Assiento	20 May 1726		8,000	20 tercios	
Bonita	7 July 1727		15,710		
Cariffe	15 January 1727		13,000		
Essex	11 June 1727		3,310		
Totals:		87,035	149,711	164 tercios 21 serones	

1. The Assiento also returned 6,000 pesos belonging to a Frenchman.

2. The Carteret also returned 17 tercios of sarsaparilla.

Buenos Aires 1722-1728

- List of South Sea Company ships sent to Buenos Aires, c. 1729, AGS, Estado 7017.
- Account of slaves introduced, 7 and 27 July 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 7 July 1727, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- List of South Sea Company ships which left England, n.d., AGS, Estado 6878.
- Directors to Buenos Aires factors, 23 January 1723, BM, Add 25,564, f. 3.
- Royal officials testimony, 17 March 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804.
- Governor and royal officials to Eon, 9 May 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2802.
- Eon to Grimaldo, 28 October 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
- Royal officials testimony, 11 January 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805.
- Directors to Stratford, 4 February 1724, BM, Add 25,564, f. 99.
- Fiscal's report, 23 July 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
- Royal officials to the crown, 5 September 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804.
- Blanco to Corobarrutia, 12 October 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
- To Buenos Aires factors, 23 December 1725, BM, Add 25,564, f. 86.
- List of South Sea Company ships, n.d., AGS, Estado 6878.
- Eon to Corobarrutia, 4 January 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
- Tijano to the crown, 15 February 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804.
- Royal officials to the crown, 24 May 1725, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Royal officials to Eon, 2 July 1724, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.
- Royal officials certificates, 24 July 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2776.
- Royal officials to the crown, 30 October 1725, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 31 May 1726, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Royal officials certificate, 15 January 1727, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 17 May 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 11 June and 7 July 1727, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Junta del asiento de negros, 11 September 1728, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2774.
- Extract of anon. letter, 29 September 1728, Historical Register, xiv (1729), p. 15.

Statement by Nathaniel Smith, 3 October 1728, BM, Add 25,562, f. 112.

Royal officials to Philip V, 31 October 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2806 (several letters).

Royal officials to Philip V, 4 and 5 November 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807.

Account of slaves introduced since 1715, 27 July 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.

de Studer, La trata de negros, pp. 200-201.

CARTAGENA 1722-1728¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP ²	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
March 1722	Assiento	David Greenhill	60	56 4/7
3 May 1722	Virgin Polly		26 ³	
23 June 1722	Chinston	John Masters	170	159 6/4
2 September 1722	Assiento	David Greenhill	100	94 6/4
26 November 1722	Assiento	David Greenhill	150	142
22 February 1723	Prince of Asturias	David Greenhill	236	230 3/4
8 October 1723	Don Carlos	John Touron	299	287
30 December 1723	Don Carlos	John Touron	254	240
7 February 1724	Assiento	Alexander Gordon	140	136
20 April 1724	Assiento	Alexander Gordon	149	144 3/4 2/4
22 May 1724	Assiento	Alexander Gordon	150	147
8 June 1724	Luis I	Samuel Loft	150	143
8 July 1724				2 (indulted slaves)
28 November 1724	Queen of Spain ⁴	Frank Dufay	200	190

1. References

2. All ships originated in Jamaica.

3. The sale price for these slaves was 5,765 pesos 2 reales (an average per slave of 221 pesos 6 reales).

4. One hundred ninety barrels of flour were introduced on the Queen of Spain. One hundred were seized by royal officials as contraband, but later released for sale.

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
16 January 1725	Don Carlos	John Touron	299	287
12 March 1725	Queen of Spain	Frank Dufay	299	289
15 June 1725	Luis I	Charles Gipson	300	291
5 September 1725	Luis I	Charles Gipson	200	195
2 November 1725	Luis I	Charles Gipson	200	197 1/4
14 January 1726	Luis I	Charles Gipson	150	146 3/4 2/4
12 March 1726	Luis I	Charles Gipson	150	145 3/4 2/4
13 July 1726	Elizabeth	Thomas Porter	120	118
13 January 1727	Luis I	Charles Gipson	120	118
20 March 1727	St. James	Benjamin White	100	97
9 June 1727	Queen of Spain	Frank Dufay	100	97
Totals for five years four months trade in the second trading period (24 voyages)			4,122 ¹	3,952-2 1/2

1. In addition there were at least two indulted slaves.

Cartagena 1722-1728

Royal officials account, 2 June 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

Governor and royal officials report, 4 June 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Pim to governor of Cartagena, c. 28 November 1724, AGI, Santa Fé 439.

Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1714, 2 June 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

HAVANA 1722-1728¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
18 April 1722	Jamaica ²	Samuel Colet	170	166
June - November 1722			28 (indulted slaves)	
13 April 1723	Assiento	Alexander Gordon	60	44
16 July 1723	Assiento ³	Alexander Gordon	60	39 2/3
February - September 1723			7 (indulted slaves)	
28 July 1723	San Francisco Xavier	Mauricio Escusart	24	19
29 September 1723	Sirena	Joseph Bloodworth	60	47 1/2
25 February 1724	St. George	Rupert Waring	60	47 1/3
16 April 1724	Content	William Mailes	50	46 2/3
23 May 1724	The George	Thomas Hedges	60	52 1/2
19 August 1724	Marta	Isaac Senior	60	56 2/3
5 October 1724	Jacob	Jacob Phoenix	59	53
14 January 1725	Royal	William Aires	100	92 1/2
5 February 1725	Elizabeth	Charles Forrestal	20	15
March - May 1724			43 (indulted slaves)	
February 1725			9 (indulted slaves)	

1. References

2. Contraband goods, including 120 barrels of flour, worth 16,889 pesos were seized on the Jamaica by royal officials.
3. Contraband goods worth 17,922 pesos were seized on the Assiento by royal officials.

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
21 March 1725	Fantasy	Jonathan Thruston	60	47
28 April 1725	Treasure	William Maden	60	53 2/3
22 July 1725	Success	William Neybeler	100	86
25 August 1725	Watson	Joseph Wilton	97	76
14 November 1725	Assiento	Alexander Gordon	100	82 1/2
24 December 1725	Devonshire	Abraham Estorhuz	100	86 1/2
30 January 1726	Francis Catherine	John Young	60	52 2/3
14 May 1726	Mariscal	Robert James	98	97
5 June 1726	Abigail	Linthorn	60	50 2/3
8 July 1726	Belmont	John Bennett	119	98
23 August 1726	Phoenix	Richard Durfeet	139	120
30 December 1726	Europe	Perint Spoferst	100	87
7 January 1727	Charlotte	Joseph Boswell	100	80 2/3
7 May 1727	Don Luis	Charles Wilson	50	49 2/3
Totals for five years and two months trade in, the second trading period (26 voyages)			2,026 ¹	1,747 1/7

1. In addition there were 87 indulted slaves.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED	SNUFF (pounds)	TOBACCO (LEAF, SMOKING, ETC.) (pounds)	LOGWOOD (pounds)
Jamaica	July 1722 Jamaica		52,500		
Assiento	April 1723 Jamaica		70,000		
Assiento	September 1723 Jamaica	2,000			73,000
Sireña Xavier	October 1723 New York				100,000
Hope (Captain Santiago Novaimo)	November 1723 Jamaica		40,000		
Louise (John Paris)	January 1724 Carolina		4,000		
St. George	May 1724				
Content	May 1724 New York	2,000			50,000
Jacob	October 1724 New York				60,000
Royal	March 1725 Cadiz and Portsmouth		257,729	5,500 bundles	
Elizabeth	February 1725 Carolina		35,000		30,000
Hamilton (Andrew Bisset)	August 1725 New York		42,500		40,000
Success	August 1725 Portsmouth		87,500		12,000
Assiento	December 1725 Jamaica		42,500		
Devonshire		30,000			
Francis Catherine	March 1726 New York			21,750	47,300
Hamilton	May 1726 New York		22,125		40,500
Abigail	June 1726 New York				88,000

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED	SNUFF (pounds)	TOBACCO (LEAF, SMOKING, ETC.) (pounds)	LOGWOOD (pounds)
Belmont	February 1727 Portsmouth		157,500		
Europe	February 1727 Jamaica				70,000
Success	March 1727 Portsmouth and Amsterdam		100,000		4,900
Don Luis	May 1727 CADIZ Cadiz and Portsmouth		150,000		9,000
	Totals:	32,0000	1,061,354	21,750 and 5,500 bundles	624,700

SHIP	SUGAR (pounds)	CATTLE HIDES	RED PEPPER (pounds)	SARSAPARILLA (pounds)
Jamaica		200		
Hope		300		
Elizabeth				1,250
Hamilton		20		
Success		80		
Francis Catherine	90,400	24		
Hamilton	63,075		2,325	
Belmont	45,500			
Totals:	198,975	624	2,325	1,250

Havana 1722-1728

Account of slaves introduced in Havana, 12 April 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Royal officials certificate, 2 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

Royal officials account, 25 June and 7 July 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

Royal officials to Philip V, 17 May 1723, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Cuenta general del trato de negros en la Havana, 1715-1722, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266.

Royal officials to the crown, 17 June 1724, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Account of slaves introduced from 1715 to 1736, 25 June 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

Royal officials certificate of returns, 7 July 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

Royal officials certificate of indulted slaves, 23 July 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

PANAMA AND PORTOBELO 1722-1728¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP ²	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA
8 April 1722			2 (indulted slaves)
9 May 1722			1 (indulted slave)
29 May 1722			1 (indulted slave)
6 June 1722			1 (indulted slave)
14 June 1722	Assiento	David Greenhill	173 117-2 1/2
9 July 1722	La Fama	William Marchant	189 110 1/2
21 July 1722			5 (indulted slaves)
19 August 1722	Flor de la Mar	Matthew Pauzi	98 73-5 1/2
21 October 1722	Prince of Asturias	Peter Homes	231 123 1/2
10 December 1722			44 (indulted slaves)
24 December 1722	St. George ³	Rupert Waring	199 135-2 1/2
8 January 1723	Don Carlos	George Beson	270 178-6
26 January 1723	Assiento	Alexander Gordon	170 116-6
14 April 1723	Don Carlos	John Tournon	279 202-4 5/6
5 June 1723	Prince of Asturias	David Greenhill	300 176-2 1/2
7 June 1723			29 (indulted slaves)
12 July 1723	Prince of Asturias	David Greenhill	162 100-2 1/2
5 October 1723	Prince of Asturias	David Greenhill	198 124-6

1. ¹References to Prince of Asturias

2. Most or all of the ships listed below originated in Jamaica.

3. The St. George stopped in Cartagena after leaving Portobelo for water and supplies.—Royal officials inspected the cargo and seized 4,000 pesos unregistered in the ship's manifest. Account of the St. George, 17 February 1723, AGI, Escribania de Camara 583A.

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
27 March 1724	Prince of Asturias	David Greenhill	126	82-3
30 April 1724	Don Carlos	John Touron	280	188-3
26 June 1724	Don Carlos	John Touron	280	173-1
1 September 1724	Queen of Spain	Frank Dufay	220	122-2
27 September 1724	Don Carlos	John Touron	279	164
20 December 1724	Assiento	Alexander Gordon	169	114-3
30 December 1724	La Franco	Humphrey Abraham	322	209-6
10 March 1725	St. George	Thomas Kedges	365	238-3 1/2
31 March 1725	Don Carlos	John Touron	296	217-1
25 May 1725	Queen of Spain	Frank Dufay	279	188-1 2/3
17 July 1725	Sicilian Galley	Frank Peacock	329	220-6
28 August 1725	Queen of Spain	Frank Dufay	80	52 1/6
28 December 1725	Queen of Spain	Frank Dufay	299	210-3
26 February 1726	Queen of Spain	Frank Dufay	99	65-4 1/2
16 May 1726	Queen of Spain	Frank Dufay	98	72-2 1/2
6 July 1726	Don Luis I ¹	Charles Gipson	100	70-3
5 August 1726	Don Carlos	John Touron	97	72-2 1/3
26 September 1726	El Pie	Samuel Webster	195	132 1/6
16 January 1727	Queen of Spain	Frank Dufay	299	221 1/3
Totals for four years eight months trade in the second trading period (30 voyages) ³			6,481 ²	4,275-3

1. This is probably the same vessel as the one listed as the Luis I in the shipping chart for Cartagena in the second trading period, and the Don Luis, King of Spain in the chart for Vera Cruz in the same period.

2. In addition there were at least 83 indulted slaves.

3. Returns for the period February 1724 - August 1727 included 33,072 pounds of cacao, 454,500 pounds of sarsaparilla and 1,087,675 pesos.

Panama and Portobelo 1722-1728

Governor and royal officials to the crown, 25 February 1724, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Royal officials account of slaves, 16 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

Relación de los navíos despachados el año de 1731-1732..., n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Relación de los navíos despachados desde 30 Septiembre 1733 hasta 9 Septiembre 1734, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 266.

Royal officials to Philip V, 5 August 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805.

Royal officials certificate of returns from 5 February 1724 to 19 June 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805.

Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1715, 16 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

VERA CRUZ 1722-1728¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL & ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
26 April 1722	St. George	Rupert Waring	72	66 3/4
12 May 1723 Jamaica	St. George ¹	Rupert Waring	109	100-2 1/2
9 August 1723	Sarah	Thomas Dillon	8	7-2 1/2
29 November 1723	Don Carlos	John Touron	155	149-4 1/2
24 May 1724	Prince of Asturias	David Greenhill	160	149-5
26 September 1724 Jamaica	Don Luis, ² King of Spain	Samuel Loft	200	180-2 1/2
30 June 1725 Jamaica	Assiento	Alexander Gordon	100	87 1/4
25 October 25 October 1725	Prince of Asturias	John Cleland	50	44 1/4
30 January 1726 Jamaica	Assiento	Alexander Gordon	29	27-3 1/2
29 April 1726 Jamaica	Prince of Asturias	John Cleland	30	28-6 1/2
7 August 1726 Jamaica	Samuel	Isaac Samuel	29	26-6 1/2
14 January 1727 Jamaica	St. George	John Rogers	60	57-1 1/2
23 April 1727 Jamaica	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	15	14-2 1/2
28 April 1727	St. George	John Rogers	10	10
Totals for five years 1 month trade in the second trading period (14 voyages)			1,027	950 5/28

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1. Several items of contraband were introduced on the St. George, including 10,700 pounds of iron.
 2. Contraband worth 15,837 pesos 3 reales were introduced on the Don Luis, King of Spain.

Vera Cruz 1722-1728

Account of slaves introduced, 12 April 1735, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Royal officials account, 8 November 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.

Casafuerte to Philip V, 25 May 1723, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2803.

Royal officials to the crown, 19 May 1725, AGI, México 858 (several letters).

Account of slaves introduced since 1716,³ 12 April 1735, AGI, Contaduría 268.

CAMPECHE 1722-1728¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL AND ORIGIN	SHIP AND TONNAGE	CAPTAIN	NO. SLAVES	WOMEN	BOYS	GIRLS	CONTRABAND (in pesos)
4 January 1726 Jamaica	Prince of Wales (200)	M. Lilly	19	9	10		4,515/6
8 June 1726	Fama (300)	William Lea	27		15	12	439
Totals for six months trade in the second trading period (2 voyages)			46	9	25	12	4,954/6

1. References

RIO DE LA HACHA 1722-1728¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL AND ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. SLAVES	BOYS	GIRLS
c. March 1727 Caracas			24	18	6

1. Collett and Perrie to Moriate, March 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2808.

CARACAS 1722-1728¹

PERIOD OF TRADE	SHIPS	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	CACAO RETURNED (pounds)
May 1724- November 1725	24 at La Guaira ² 26 at Coro	221	138 2/4
			267,444

1. Portales Meneses to Philip V, 24 November 1725, AGI, Santo Domingo 700.
2. Estimates of total contraband trade introduced on the 50 ships at La Guaira and Coro range from 200,000 to 800,000 pesos in value.

Campeche 1722-1728

Figueroa to Philip V, 3 April 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804.

Aguirre to Philip V, 3 October 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804.

Aguirre to Philip V, 21 January 1727, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Figueroa to Philip V, 5 July 1728, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807.

MARACAIBO 1722-1728¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL & ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
23 October 1724 Jamaica	St. George	Thomas Hedges	53	24
4 January 1726 Curaçao	Desafio ²	Peter Kerney		
19 January 1726 Curaçao	La Sara ³	Ignacio del Valle		
17 September 1726 Jamaica	Fredsuel	Bent. Brown	20	9 1/3
17 March 1727 Curaçao	Santa Marta ⁴	Crispin Hill	50	24 2/3
Totals for two years and six months trade in the second trading period (5 voyages)			123	58

 1. References

2. The Desafio introduced contraband goods worth 4,184 pesos.
3. The La Sara introduced contraband goods worth 2,001 pesos.
4. The entire return cargo of the Santa Marta was seized during the second represalia and sold for 1,667 pesos 7 reales. It included 22,000 pounds of Brazilwood, 84 pounds of cacao, 2,975 pounds of tobacco and 419 cattle hides.

Maracaibo 1722-1728

Jonathan Sisson certificate, 25 April 1726, AGI, Santo Domingo 654.

Governor of Maracaibo to Philip V, 10 December 1726, AGI, Santo Domingo 654.

De la Casa to Philip V, 13 June 1726, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804.

Royal officials testimony, 10 August 1727, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2805.

Royal officials account of slaves introduced, 31 July 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Account by Joseph Sánchez Mosquera et al, 16 January 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.

Royal officials to Philip V, 31 July 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.

SANTA MARTA 1722-1728¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL AND ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
26 March 1725 Jamaica	Sarah	Thomas Litterdale	35	18
4 June 1725 Jamaica	Sarah	Thomas Litterdale	29	10
c. July 1725			84	38 1/2
Total for five months trade in the second trading period (3 voyages)			148	66 1/2

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1. Royale officials to Philip V, 23 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813;
 Royal officials to Philip V, 23 August 1735, AGI, Contaduría 268;
 Pazo to Philip V, 10 July 1725, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2804.

SANTO DOMINGO 1722-1728¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL SHIP AND ORIGIN	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	FLOUR INTRODUCED (barrels)
December 1726 Curaçao	Loyal Thomas	29 ²	120 ³
8 May 1727 Curaçao	Maria (50 tons) Sporfort	7 ⁴	4 1/6 100
18 June 1727	Leonora Thomas Roit		
24 June 1727 St. Christopher	Loyal Thomas Ball	25 ⁵	19 1/2
Totals for seven months trade in the second trading period (4 voyages)		61	23 2/3 220 ⁶

1. References

2. This includes 18 men and 11 women.

3. This flour was seized as being contraband, and sold for an average of 15 pesos 7 reales per barrel.

4. The net sale price of these slaves was 1,170 pesos, an average of 167/1 per slave.

5. The net sale price of these slaves was 3,012 pesos 4 reales, and average of 125/4 per slave.

6. Seized flour was sold

Santo Domingo 1722-1728

Royal officials certificate, 22 and 29 July 1727, AGI, Estado 9, Ramo 1.

Testimony, 8 May 1727, AGI, Estado 9, Ramo 1.

Visita of the Loyal Thomas, 29 December 1726, AGI, Estado 9, Ramo 1.

Visita, 24 June 1727, AGI, Estado 9, Ramo 1.

Third Trading period slave introductions and returns, 1729-1739

Factory or Licensed Trade	Years of Trade	Number of Voyages	Number of Slaves	Number of Piezas	Ratio Pieza to Slave
Buenos Aires	8 years 1 month	16	5,824	4,686 11/15	.80
Cartagena	6 years 7 months	33	5,238	4,956 3/4 1/2	.95
Havana	8 years 10 months	38	2,931	2,503 1/3	.85
Panama & Portobelo	9 years 2 months	44	10,224	7,604-4	.74
Santiago	5 years 9 months	18	615	523 est. ¹	.85
Vera Cruz	10 years 5 months	19	1,252	1,141-4 1/4	.91
Campeche	5 years 3 months	20	622	459 3/20	.74
Caracas	10 years 3 months	32	3,422	2,609 1/4	.76
Guatemala	1 year 7 months	2	159	127 3/10	.80
Maracaibo	4 years 1 month	9	276	158	.57
Puerto Rico	2 years 5 months	6	115	70 3/4	.62
Santa Marta	1 year 3 months	3	299	269 2/4 1/2	.90
Santo Domingo	2 years 6 months	4	103	59 3/7	.57
Totals	10 years 5 months	244	31,080	25,330	.81

1. This estimate is based on the ratio of pieza de india to slave in Havana, where slaves were similarly employed.

Factory or Licensed Trade	Avg. No. Slaves per Voyage	Avg. No. Slaves per Month	Known Contraband (pesos)	Indulted Slaves & Piezas de India	
Buenos Aires	364	60.04			
Cartagena	158.73	66.30	7,097/5	7	
Havana	77.39	27.65	15,048	41	
Panama & Portobelo	232.36	92.95		423	289-5 5/6
Santiago	34.17	7.59			
Vera Cruz	65.89	10.02	4,271/3	55	47-2 5/6
Campeche	31.1	9.87		6	
Caracas	106.94	27.82			
Guatemala	79.5	8.37	473/7 1/2		
Maracaibo	30.67	5.63			
Puerto Rico	19.17	3.97			
Santa Marta	99.67	19.93			
Santo Domingo	25.75	3.43	4,636/5		
Totals	127.38	252.68	31,527/4 1/2	532	337-1 2/3

Factory	Pesos Returned	Cattle Hides	Cacao (pounds)	Logwood (pounds)	Sarsaparilla (pounds)	Snuff (pounds)
Buenos Aires	752,438 + 17 ingots 269 marcos 8 ounces	72,474				
Caracas	5,700		757,578			
Cartagena	972,118/5½					
Havana	332,747/7 4,604 ounces silver	786		231,359	375	6,701,693
Panama & Portobelo	1,526,449/4		137,003		239,521	
Santiago	8,222	4,659	3,662 + 75 serones	56,170		
Vera Cruz	149,577/1 140 marcos 7 1/2 ounces					
Campeche	23,000		9,000	3,736,500	2,250	
La Guaira	12,563		732,754			
Totals	3,782,816/1½ 986 marcos 3½ ounces 17 ingots	77,919	1,639,997 75 serones	4,024,029	242,146	6,701,693

Factory	Leaf Tobacco (bundles)	Sugar (pounds)	Cochineal (pounds)	Indigo (pounds)	Contrayerva (pounds)	Copal (pounds)
Buenos Aires						
Havana	764,466¼ 8,033 bales	711,123				1,182
Santiago	34,191 + 249 tercios	1,418,155 + 294 boxes		1,975		
Vera Cruz			5,099	4oz.		
Campeche			100	7,750	4,000	950
Totals	798,657¼ + 8,281 bales & tercios	2,129,278 + 294 boxes	5,199	4 oz. 9,725	4,000	2,132

Factory	Castor Oil (pounds)	Achiote (pounds)	Copra	Wool (pounds)	Vicuña Wool (pounds)	Dye root (roots)
Buenos Aires	36			650	4,271	50
Panama & Portobelo					66,409	
Santiago			1 box			
Campeche		667				
Totals	36	667	1 box	650	70,680	50

Factory	Bindweed (pounds)	Tallow (pounds)	Rice (pounds)	Chamois skins
Buenos Aires	113	10,891		
Havana			1,875	598
Totals	113	10,891	1,875	598

BUENOS AIRES 1729 - 1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	TONS	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
2 January 1730	Angola	Sirene ²	420	Frank Pearse	579	401 1/3
11 March 1730	Angola	Essex	240	John Pinkethman	287	225 1/2
12 July 1730	Madagascar	St. Michael	370	Charles Burnham	267	225
20 August 1730	Madagascar	Rudge	290	Francis Williams	204	180
9 October 1730	London	Assiento ³		William Goldsborough	storeship	
6 January 1731	London	Bonita		Daniel West	423	358
30 January 1731	Guinea	San Lorenzo		Abraham Dumanesque	384	313
29 June 1731	Guinea	City of London		Frank Kettle	364	287
21 July 1731	Angola	Eaton		Arthur Upton	226	191 1/3
30 November 1732		Princess Emilia		Henry Fisher	534	437 2/3
1 December 1732		Sirene		John Butler	551	457 2/5
	London	Assiento		Frank Pearse	storeship	
17 February 1734	Angola	Rudge		John Pinkethman	444	386
8 March 1735	Guinea	Anna Galley ³		Thomas Hill	399	345

1. References

2. This ship was often referred to as the Mermaid.

3. The Anna Galley and the Assiento were not owned by the Company. Geraldino was particularly concerned that they were carrying large quantities of merchandise.

DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	TONS	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
1 April 1736	Guinea	Hitchcock		John Butler	243	182
2 March 1737	Angola	Galera de Genova ¹	270	Abraham Dumanesque	347	287
25 January 1738		Assiento		John Bennett	289	203 2/3
25 January 1738		Asia		Henry Fisher	283	206 2/3
Totals for eight years and one month trade in the third trading period (16 voyages)					5,824	4,686 11/15

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1. Two slaves, one from the Galera de Genova and the other from either the Assiento or the Asia, purchased their freedom. The circumstances surrounding this extremely unusual event are unknown.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE	PESOS RETURNED	CATTLE HIDES	COSTS (PESOS)	DUTY (PESOS)	VICUÑA WOOL (POUNDS)
Sirene	9 June 1730		12,183		429	300
Essex	14 August 1730		8,788		302/1	
St. Michael	6 May 1731		8,463	12,790/2½	330/4½	
Rudge	6 May 1731		7,000	10,579/2	273/3½	
Assiento	6 May 1731		3,048	4,606/4	118/7½	
Bonita	4 July 1731		3,960	5,964/7	154/6	391
San Lorenzo	13 June 1731	17 ingots, 269 marks, 6 ounces	5,896	8,910/6½	230/2½	
City of London	3 October 1731		5,129	7,751/4½	200/3	
Eaton	14 March 1732		1,511	2,275/7	59/1	426
Princess Emilia	22 May 1733	18,000 in factors' salaries				
Sirene						
Assiento	21 May 1733	40,000	513	737/3½	20/1	240
Rudge	27 July 1734	252,000	5,218		263	2,914
Anna Galley	1 February 1737	180,341	700			
Hitchcock	4 October 1736	70,000	700			
Galera de Genova			9,000			
Assiento						
Asia						
Totals: ¹		560,341 + 17 ingots, 269 marks, 6 ounces	72,109			4,271

1. The returns also included very minor amounts of wool, castor oil and dye root, plus 10,891 pounds of tallow returned on the Assiento.

Buenos Aires 1729-1739

- To Varas y Valdés, 12 December 1729, AGI, Contaduría 5145.
- Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos de Buenos Aires, en los años de 1731-1733, account made by T. Geraldino on 24 March 1734, AGI, Contaduría 267.
- Wescomb to Newcastle, 29 March 1729, PRO, S.P. 36/10 part ii, f. 73.
- Royal officials testimony, 9 June 1730, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 14 August 1730, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 12 July and 9 October 1731, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 15 March 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2809.
- Smith to Geraldino, 16 June 1732, AGS, Estado 7010.
- From Spackman & Faure, 6 May 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen 2790.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 21 and 22 May 1733, AGS, Ind. Gen. 2809.
- Account of slaves introduced at Buenos Aires since 1715, 27 July 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Quintana to Philip V, 27 July 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794.
- Geraldino to Patiño, 18 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790.
- Informe de la Contaduría, n.d., AGI, Santo Domingo 382.
- Factory accounts by Messrs. Spackman & Faure, 18 February 1735, AGI, Contaduría 266.
- Account of slaves introduced between 30 September 1733 and 9 September 1734, 18 February 1735, AGI, Contaduría 266.
- Geraldino to Quintana, 4 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 28 July 1735, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Geraldino to Patiño, 26 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792.
- Quintana to Philip V, 8 October 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.
- Quintana to Geraldino, 22 October 1736, AGS, Estado 7006.
- Royal officials certificate, 27 October 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.
- Geraldino to de la Quadra, 24 January 1737, AGS, Estado 6902.
- Geraldino to Torrenueva, 24 January and 7 February 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Quintana to Philip V, 10 March 1738, AGI, Buenos Aires 591.

Quintana to Philip V, 20 August 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

Junta del asiento de negros, 8 March 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2771.

From Castro and Miranda, 11 June 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817.

de Studer, La trata de negros, pp. 200-201.

CARTAGENA 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA		DATE OF DEPARTURE
23 March 1730	Don Carlos	Alex. Gordon	182	176	
28 July 1730	St. James	Samuel Hearne	150	146-3/4-2/4	
9 December 1730	St. George	John Rogers	199	193	5 January 1731
28 December 1730	Don Carlos 1730	Edward Fennell	200	193-6/4	25 January 1731
4 February 1731	St. George	John Rogers	270	260	13 April 1731
4 May 1731	Prince of Asturias	William Blackburn	198	194	12 May 1731
30 June 1731	Prince of Asturias	William Blackburn	200	195	14 July 1731
6 August 1731	Prince of Asturias	William Blackburn	240	230	25 August 1731
12 November 1731	San Felipe	John Cleland	169	163	27 November 1731
4 January 1732	San Felipe	John Cleland	150	145	15 May 1732
10 March 1732	The Sarah (provision ship)	John Paris	7 ²	6-2/4	
19 April 1732	San Felipe	John Cleland	100	95-3/4-2/4	
9 July 1732	Providence	Thomas Weir	150	144-3/4-2/4	15 July 1732
16 August 1732	Providence	Thomas Weir	200	195	5 September 1732
5 November 1732	St. George	Thomas Butcher	118	112-3/4-2/4	11 December 1732
16 January 1733	St. George	Thomas Butcher	250	242-3/4-2/4	8 February 1733

1. References

2. These seven slaves, all children, were seized and sold by royal officials.

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA		DATE OF DEPARTURE
4 April 1733	St. George	Thomas Butcher	230	222	28 April 1733
10 July 1733	Pearl	Thomas Weir	100	96	13 November 1733
24 October 1733	Prosperity	Thomas Weir	120	115-3/4-2/4	
10 January 1734	The Beecher	George Blake	120	117-3/4-2/4	20 March 1734
4 May 1734	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	120	116-3/4-2/4	18 May 1734
6 May 1734	Pearl	Thomas Weir	140	135	21 July 1734
5 October 1734	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	260	255-3/4-2/4	13 October 1734
15 November 1734	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	200	193-1/2	December 1734
4 December 1734	Don Carlos	Richard Asthisse	200	193-3/4-2/4	February 1735
12 February 1735	Don Carlos	Thomas Lombard	99	95-3/4-1/2	April 1735
2 April 1735	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	90	87	
27 June 1735	Union	Robert MacCullough	152	147-3/4-1/2	July 1735
1 October 1735	St. George	Thomas Quay	60	57-3/4-1/2	November 1735
17 January 1736	Union	Robert MacCullough	164	158	January 1736
18 February 1736	Union	Robert MacCullough	149	142	April 1736
27 February 1736	St. George	Thomas Quay	138	132-3/4-1/2	March 1736

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	DATE OF DEPARTURE
17 June 1736	Union	Robert MacCullough	60	
4 September 1736	San Fernando	Jack Renton	60	October 1736
Totals for six years and seven months trade in the third trading period (33 voyages)			5,238	4,956-3/4-1/2

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE	DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED
Don Carlos			
St. James			
St. George	5 January 1731	Jamaica	24,720/5½
Don Carlos	25 January 1731	Jamaica	20,723/4
St. George	13 April 1731	Jamaica	21,218
Prince of Asturias	12 May 1731	Jamaica	22,773/3 3/4
Prince of ¹ Asturias	14 July 1731	Jamaica	38,377/5½
Prince of Asturias	25 August 1731	Jamaica	24,093/1 3/4
San Felipe	27 th Cle November 1731	Jamaica	42,363/5 3/4
San Felipe	15 May 1732	Jamaica	38,032
The Sarah			
San Felipe			
Providence	15 July 1732	Jamaica	34,481
Providence	5 September 1732	Jamaica	38,982/5½
St. George	11 December 1732	Jamaica	55,570/4
St. George	8 February 1733	Jamaica	38,625/6 3/4
St. George	28 April 1733	Jamaica	37,420
Pearl	13 November 1733		51,584/ 3/4

1. Spanish officials seized 5,195 in contraband pesos on the Prince of Asturias.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE	DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED
Prosperity ¹			32,568/2 3/4
The Beecher	20 March 1734		38,351/5 1/2
Don Carlos ²	18 May 1734		30,700/3 1/2
Pearl	21 July 1734		20,530/6 3/4
Don Carlos	13 October 1734		65,958/1 3/4
Don Carlos	December 1734		48,989/7 1/4
Don Carlos	February 1735		47,307/5 1/2
Don Carlos ³	April 1735		26,632/4 3/4
Don Carlos			
Union	July 1735		25,474/4
St. George	November 1735		33,006/3 1/4
Union	January 1736		25,000/ 3/4
Union	April 1736		26,007/ 1/2
St. George	March 1736		30,063/3 3/4
Union			
San Fernando	October 1736		32,561/4 1/2
Totals:			972,118/5 1/2

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1. The returns from the sale of the slaves introduced on the Prosperity were actually shipped on the Pretty Sarah, Captain Benjamin Fisher, which left Cartagena on 21 November 1733.
 2. Spanish officials seized 1,902/5 in contraband pesos on the Don Carlos.
 3. On this trip a medical chest was introduced illegally on the Don Carlos.

Cartagena 1729-1739

Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos de Cartagena en los años de 1731-1733, AGI, Contaduría 267.

Salas to Philip V, 13 May 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794.

Royal officials to Philip V, 26 May 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794.

Philip V to governor and royal officials, 22 February 1734, AGI, Santa Fé 432.

Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1714, 2 June 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

Accounts of Messrs. Crowe and Ord, 18 February 1735, AGI, Contaduría 266.

Royal officials to Philip V, 18 May 1735, AGI, Santa Fé 1088.

Philip V to the governor and royal officials, 20 August 1735, AGI, Santa Fé 432.

Royal officials to Philip V, 1 September 1735, AGI, Contaduría 1440.

Vaamonde y Favuada to Philip V, 28 February and 19 March 1736, AGI, Santa Fé 442.

Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies from 9 September 1734, 25 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and September 1735, 3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Salas to Philip V, 11 June 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Vaamonde y Favuada to Philip V, 27 October 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814.

HAVANA 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
11 July 1729	William	James Phelps	69	67
23 January 1730	John	Andrew Bissett	68	65 1/3
10 February 1730				1 (indulted slave)
6 May 1730	Virgin	Samuel Webster	200	173 1/2
17 July 1730	John	Andrew Bissett	15	15
10 November 1730	Prince of Asturias	William Blackburn	147	126
27 November 1730	Granada	John Gibson	200	176 2/3
13 March 1731	Hannibal	Robert Turner	199	162 1/2
4 April 1731	John ²	Andrew Bissett	10	10
18 April 1731				1 (indulted slave)
27 May 1731	William	Alexander Innes	14	12 1/3
1 June 1731				8 (indulted slaves)
16 June 1731	Charles	John Seymour	98	81 2/3
16 July 1731	St. George	Edward Fennell	232	201 1/2
9 August 1731	Adventure	Peter Kearney	60	52

1. References

2. The John carried three Spanish passengers illegally on its return voyage.

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
18 September 1731	Belmont ¹	George Eaves	263	221 1/2
26 October 1731	Elizabeth	James Phelps	180	164 2/3
7 December 1731				1 (indulted slave)
12 December 1731	Adventure	Peter Kearney	30	28 2/3
19 December 1731	Catherine	Matthew Wolfe	27	27
23 January 1732	Mary	Thomas Poynter	80	73 1/3
28 March 1732	Samuel and Mary	Robert Pearson	118	111
15 May 1732	John and Mary	John Wood	113	98 1/3
20 June 1732	Adventure	Peter Kearney	40	37 2/3
13 July 1732	St. James	Samuel Kearne	247	227 1/3
12 September 1732	Rochester	Robert Turner	25	25
1 December 1732	Adventure	Peter Kearney	13	13
28 May 1733	John	Andrew Bissett	20	15
15 & 30 July 1733				2 (indulted slaves)
11 August 1733				1 (indulted slave)
1, 15 & 17 September 1733				6 (indulted slaves)
23 September 1733	St. James	Robert Warring	46	32 2/3

1. Captain Eaves was discharged for carrying 1,201 pesos in contraband.

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA
29 October 1733			1 (indulted slave)
16 December 1733			1 (indulted slave)
30 December 1733	Union	William Williams	100 7
January 1734			2 (indulted slaves)
March 1734			3 (indulted slaves)
April 1734			10 (indulted slaves)
19 April 1734	Lion ¹	Evan Bowen	12 8
May 1734			5 (indulted slaves)
June 1734			3 (indulted slaves)
12 July 1734	St. George	Jack Renton	10 6 2/3
October 1734			1 (indulted slave)
January 1735			1 (indulted slave)
20 December 1735	Armstrong	Andrew Armstrong	
20 December 1735	Charles	Edward Fennell	100 89 2/3 ²
14 January 1736	Constant	Edward Phillips	

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1. Three hundred ninety two barrels of flour were introduced illegally on the Lion, and an illegal sale of ship's stores made 4,636 pesos.
 2. These figures represent the combined totals of the Armstrong, Charles and Constant, a breakdown for each ship being unavailable.

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
27 July 1736	Cork Sally	Domingo Verdon	6	
27 July 1736	Adventure	Peter Kearney	114	110 2/3 ¹
5 January 1737	Prince of Asturias	Robert Sutcliffe	15	
13 February 1737	Armstrong ²	Andrew Armstrong	20	
7 June 1737	Lovely Betty	George Wane	30	
12 July 1737	James	Edward Nelson	30	
13 April 1737	Sea Horse ³	James Welleys	70	57

Totals for eight years and ten months trade in the third trading period (38 voyages) 2,931 2,503 1/3 (plus 41 indulted slaves)

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1. This figure represents the total of piezas de india introduced on the Cork Sally and Adventure. The Cork Sally carried 9,013 pesos in co contraband on the return voyage.
 2. The Armstrong carried 198 pesos in contraband on the return voyage.
 3. The Sea Horse, James and Lovely Betty were all detained in Buenos Aires when war broke out in 1739.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED	SNUFF (pounds)	TOBACCO (LEAF, SMOKING, ETC.) ¹	LOGWOOD (pounds)
John	February 1730 New York		100,000		12,000
William	February 1730 Portsmouth	4,000	262,500	25 tercios	
Virgin	July 1730 Portsmouth	6,500	307,125		
Charmin	August 1730 Jamaica		30,000	37,500	
Palmito	October 1730 Jamaica	100	11,250		
John	November 1730 Curaçao		138,700	3,000	
Virgin	December 1730 Jamaica	1,000	51,250		
Prince of Asturias	January 1731 Jamaica	11,000	112,500		
La Granada	14 February 1731 Portsmouth	13,000	309,000	930	
Adventure	April 1731 Kingston		33,000		
John	May 1731 Campeche			8 bales	
Hannibal	24 June 1731 Portsmouth	38,000 & 2,380 oz. silver	536,660		9,575
Don Carlos	15 July 1731 Portsmouth	18,000 & 2,224 oz. silver	134,000		
St. George	26 August 1731 Portsmouth	12,000	127,134		9,134
La Ventura	September 1731 Jamaica		50,000		6,000
John	December 1731 Portsmouth		100,000	55,000 & 2,800 bundles	8,000
Bellamont	1 November 1731 Portsmouth	80,000	278,447		13,050
La Ventura	February 1732 Isla de Baruda		43,750	5,625	5,000

1. In pounds unless shown otherwise.

SHIP	CATTLE HIDES	BROWN SUGAR (pounds)	WHITE SUGAR (pounds)	MOLASSES (pounds)	TOTAL COST OF CARGO (pesos)
John					
William					
Virgin		72,300	37,800		
Charmin					
Palmito	100				
John	100				
Virgin	200				
Prince of Asturia					
La Granada		63,299	42,154		34,701/ 3 1/4
Adventure	82				
John ¹		8,750	1,375		
Hannibal ²					50,874/ 7 1/4
Don Carlos					11,819/ 4 1/2
St. George					11,721/4
La Ventura					
John	200				
Bellamont				1,400	25,356/ 6 1/4
La Ventura					
Catherine	58				
William					
Maria		3,785	4,509	3,200	45,409/2
Betty					12,824/7
St. James					11,410/ 3 1/2
John and Mary		41,504	29,665	2,650	40,570/ 1

1. The John also returned 1,875 pounds of rice.

2. The Hannibal also returned 375 pounds of sarsaparilla and 598 chamois skins. The cost of the cargo does not include these items.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED	SNUFF (pounds)	TOBACCO (LEAF, SMOKING, ETC.)	LOGWOOD (pounds)
Catherine	February 1732 Kingston				120,000
William	April 1732 Portsmouth	2,000	317,500		17,400
María	20 March 1732 Portsmouth	2,000	486,000	45,000 700 <u>manojos</u>	11,200
Betty	15 March 1732 Portsmouth	23,000	148,752½		
St. James	4 August 1732 Portsmouth	15,000	121,600		
John and Mary	16 August 1732 Portsmouth	10,000	383,854		
Rochester	18 November 1732	18,000	348,091½	158,045	20,000
Success	April 1733 Portsmouth (?)	40,000			
John	September 1733 Portsmouth	23,000		125,000	
La Ventura	October 1733 Jamaica	1,500			
San Diego	15 November 1733 Portsmouth		225,488½	14,127	
Union	June 1734 Portsmouth	8,000	366,650	4,500 <u>manojos</u>	
St. George	July 1735 Portsmouth		126,750		
Lion	November 1735 Portsmouth	1,647/7	275,053		
Armstrong	March 1736 Portsmouth		308,875	121,700	
Constant	May 1736 Portsmouth		458,795	97,679	
Cork	1 October 1736 London	5,000	63,100		
Armstrong	August 1737		171,878		
Armstrong	August 1737		171,878		
Nuestra Señora del Carmen	12 July 1733 Cadiz		273,989½	78,582	
Nuestra Señora de los Dolores	12 July 1733 Cadiz			22,278 1/4	
		Totals: 332,747/7 + 4,604 oz. silver	6,701,693	764,466 1/4 + 8,033 in bales of various sizes	231,359

SHIP	CATTLE HIDES	BROWN SUGAR (pounds)	WHITE SUGAR (pounds)	MOLASSES (pounds)	TOTAL COST OF CARGO (pesos)
Rochester ¹	46	43,711	64,358		60,284/ 1 1/2
Success					
John					
La Ventura					
San Diego					22,298/ 1 1/4
Union		28,900	23,850		
St. George					
Lion ²		18,445	17,807		
Armstrong					
Constant		19,762	19,762		
Cork		23,709	47,152		
Armstrong		22,865	35,551		
Nuestra ³ Señora del Carmen		20,003	20,107		36,284/ 6
Nuestra ³ Señora de los Dolores					1,537/ 3
Totals:	Totals: 786	367,033	344,090	7,250	365,092/ 1 1/2 ⁴

1. The Rochester carried cigars, snuff and various other types of tobacco as gifts for the directors and for Benjamin Keene in Sevilla.
2. The Lion also returned 11,182 pounds of copal.
3. The Nuestra Señora del Carmen and Nuestra Señora de los Dolores were consigned by Company factors in Havana to William Cayley in Cadiz on the Company account.
4. The cost of 3,424,895 pounds of snuff returned was 324,287 pesos 7 reales (3/4 real per pound) and the duty paid 4,169 pesos 1 real.

The cost of 62,959 pounds of logwood returned was 806 pesos 2 1/2 reales (1/10 real per pound) and the duty paid 17 pesos 7 reales.

The cost of 172,302 pounds of brown sugar returned was 11,086 pesos 7 reales (1/2 real per pound) and the duty paid 226 pesos 6 1/2 reales.

The cost of 160,793 pounds of white sugar returned was 15,233 pesos 7 reales (3/4 real per pound) and the duty paid 323 pesos 7 1/2 reales.

Havana 1729-1739

Royal officials account of returns, 7 July 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos de la Havana en los años 1731-1733, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.

Royal officials to Philip V, 6 July 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

Minute committee of correspondence, 19 March 1733, BM, Add. 25,554, f. 10.

Benjamin Woolley account, 15 November 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790.

Benjamin Woolley invoice, 10 March 1734, AGS, Estado 7008.

Account of slaves introduced in Havana, 12 April 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Sequeira to Patiño, 29 April and 12 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

Geraldino to Patiño, 18 May 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790.

Governor and royal officials to Philip V, 6 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2826.

Sequeira to Patiño, 25 February 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and September 1735, 3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Geraldino to Patiño, 3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792.

Account of slaves introduced from 1715 to 1736, 25 June 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

Royal officials certificate of returns, 7 July 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

Royal officials certificate of seized slaves, 23 July 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2812.

Account of goods loaded on the Armstrong, 1 October 1736, AGS, Estado 7013.

Messrs. Welden and Lambert certificate, 1 October 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814.

Lambert to Geraldino, 8 October 1736, AGS, Estado 7006.

Royal officials certificate, 9 October 1736, AGS, Ind. Gen. 2813.

Sequeira to Patiño, 22 October 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813.

Geraldino to Torrenueva, 20 December 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Güemes y Horcasitas to Torrenueva, 24 June 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Royal officials to Philip V, 26 June 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814.

Anthony Welden account, 6 August 1737, AGS, Estado 7013.

Certificate of the Armstrong, 6 August 1737, AGS, Estado 7010.

Sequeira to Geraldino, 6 August 1737, AGS, Estado 7006.

Sequeira to Torrenueva, 25 May 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

Extract, Welden to directors, 6 August 1738, BM, Add. 32,800, f. 86.

Tyrry to Torrenueva, 22 January 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851.

PANAMA AND PORTOBELO 1729-1739¹

DATE	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
9 November 1729	St. James	Samuel Hearne	115	75
13 November 1729	Don Carlos	Alex. Gordon	99	74-2
16 January 1730	St. George	John Rogers	231	144-1
11 March 1730	St. James	Samuel Hearne	299	244-4 1/2
24 May 1730	St. James	Samuel Hearne	250	201-5
8 July 1730	Don Carlos	Alex. Gordon	300	211
19 October 1730	St. James	Samuel Hearne	248	175-4
10 January 1731	St. James	Samuel Hearne	299	232-6
13 March 1731	Prince of Asturias	William Blackburn	145	92-5 2/3
12 April 1731	San Felipe	John Cleland	134	96-4 5/6
26 April 1731	St. James	Samuel Hearne	100	71-5 1/2
11 June 1731	San Felipe	John Cleland	221	153-6
19 June 1731	St. James	Samuel Hearne	167	132-5 1/3
27 August 1731	San Felipe	John Cleland	399	293-2 1/2
22 September 1731	St. James	Samuel Hearne	299	236-1 2/3

1. References

DATE	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	INDULTED SLAVES & PIEZAS
16 November 1731	Prince of Asturias	William Blackburn	300	229-4 1/2
21 February 1732	Prince of Asturias	William Blackburn	298	210-2
26 April 1732	Prince of Asturias	William Blackburn	284	211-2 5/6
28 June 1732	San Felipe	John Cleland	350	276-2 1/6
5 August 1732	St. George	Thomas Butcher	287	214-3 1/3
20 November 1732	San Felipe	John Cleland	299	228-2
10 February 1733	San Felipe	George Stevens	300	246-4
4 March 1733	St. George	Jack Renton	71	
18 April 1733	San Felipe	George Stevens	300	231-3 1/3
13 July 1733	St. George	Jack Renton	298	215-5 1/2
10 September 1733	St. George	Thomas Butcher	300	207-6 1/2
3 December 1733	St. George	Jack Renton	15	10-2 1/2
1715-1733				342 235-5
24 March 1734	St. George	Jack Renton	71	48-2
13 August 1734	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	200	149-3 1/2
12 September 1734	St. Thomas	Thomas Pitts	99	75-3
May 1713 - September 1734				63 45-5
19 December 1734	St. Thomas	Thomas Pitts	198	166-1/7

DATE	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	INDULTED SLAVES & PIEZAS
4 April 1735	St. Thomas	Thomas Pitts	400	367-1/2
30 June 1735	St. Thomas	Thomas Pitts	300	234-5/7
15 August 1735	Union	Robert MacCullough	50	38-3/7
3 September 1735				2 1-1/3
7 January 1736	St. Thomas	Thomas Pitts	299	231-3 1/2
22 April 1736	San Felipe	George Stevens	250	183-5
10 July 1736	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	149	109
15 September 1736	San Felipe	George Stevens	200	146-2 1/2
29 October 1736	San Felipe	George Stevens		1
22 December 1736	San Felipe	George Stevens	200	132-1/2
26 March 1737	San Felipe	George Stevens	250	162-2
7 August 1737	San Felipe	George Stevens	300	212-5 1/2
18 December 1737	San Felipe	George Stevens	400	287-4 1/2
6 December 1738	La Bretaña	John Davison	150	129-1/2
14 December 1738	St. Thomas	Thomas Pitts	300	215-3
6 and 12 March and 4 April 1739				15 8-2 5/6
Totals for nine years and one month trade in the third trading period (44 voyages)			10,224	7,607-4 423 289-5 5/6

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE	PESOS RETURNED	VICUÑA WOOL (pounds)	SARSAPARILLA (pounds)	CACAO (pounds)
St. James					
Don Carlos					
St. George	28 March 1731	22,000			
St. James					
St. James					
Don Carlos					
St. James					
St. James					
Prince of Asturias	30 April 1731	44,000			
San Felipe	30 April 1731	41,300			
St. James	30 April 1731	27,902/2			
San Felipe	July 1731	20,000			
Prince William	11 July 1731			95,157	
St. James					
San Felipe	20 September 1731	60,000		8,898 ¹	
St. James	11 October 1731	31,000			
Prince of Asturias	5 January 1732	50,682/3 1/2			
Prince of Asturias	6 March 1732	41,250			
Prince of Asturias	31 May 1732	30,937/4			
San Felipe	15 July 1732	14,437/4			
St. George	22 September 1732		1,382		

1. The actual inventory figure is 60 serones (often spelled "zurron" in the eighteenth century). The seron is not an exact measure. An average of 148.3 pounds per seron of sarsaparilla was calculated from examples where both serones and pounds were known.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE	PESOS RETURNED	VICUÑA WOOL (pounds)	SARSAPARILLA (pounds)	CACAO (pounds)
San Felipe	8 December 1732	63,937/4			
San Felipe	20 February 1733	33,299/3			
San Felipe	12 May 1733	46,577/6			
St. George	30 July 1733	38,776/3			
St. George	12 October 1733	30,000			
St. George	30 July 1733	37,216			
St. George	14 January 1733	65,166/6	12,900 ¹		
St. George	16 May 1734	50,600 plus 13 marcos de plata labrada	1,652	40,000	
Don Carlos		39,600 plus 2 boxes of plata labrada	6,434		
St. Thomas	November 1734	33,000 plus 160 marcos de plata labrada			
St. Thomas	February 1735	39,140/2	24,025 est.	24,025 est.	
St. Thomas	June 1735	153,095/4	12,100	35,150	21,750
St. Thomas	October 1735	32,478	1,250	10,000	59,750
Union					
St. Thomas	26 February 1736	56,016/6 1/2	10,950 est.	4,004 est.	
San Felipe	June 1736	34,360/ 1/2	4,200 est.		
San Felipe	November 1736	61,666	6,276	7,227	
San Felipe	January 1737	40,718 plus 400 marcos 6 1/4 oz. de plata labrada			
San Felipe	4 July 1737	94,600 plus 57 marcos de plata labrada	9,265	6,024 est.	

1. An average of 150 pounds per sack of vicuña wool was calculated from examples where both sacks and pounds were known.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE	PESOS RETURNED	VICUÑA WOOL (pounds)	SARSAPARILLA (pounds)	CACAO (pounds)
San Felipe	7 November 1737	18,068/2 1/2		9,036	52,072
San Felipe	28 February 1738	77,356/3 1/2			3,431
La Bretaña		29,875/6 1/2			
St. Thomas	7 March 1739	67,390			
Totals:		1,526,449/4	66,409	239,521	137,003

Panama and Portobelo 1729-1739

Manuel de Alderete to Philip V, 9 February 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2749.

Royal officials account of slaves introduced since 1715, 16 April 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.

Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos en Portobelo 1730-1731, AGI, Contaduría 267.

Royal officials account, 25 June and 17 September 1734, AGI, Panama 364.

Juan Aguirre certificates, 6 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Pedro de Urriola certificates, 28 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Juan Aguirre certificates, 16 January 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

Juan Aguirre certificates, 22 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813.

Aguirre to Philip V, 22 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813.

Bernardino Calvo certificate, 6 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Juan Aguirre certificates, 16 January, 31 May and 12 September 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies from 9 September 1734, 25 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and September 1735, 3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Summary of Bernardino Calvo letter, 27 April 1736, AGI, Panama 364.

Juan Aguirre certificates, 31 May and 12 September 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

Juan Aguirre certificate, 22 September 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Royal officials certificates of returns, 7 November 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Luis de Paz certificate, 30 January and 4 July 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814.

Juan de Berroa certificate, 1 April 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Francisco Vicente García certificate, 22 August 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

Isidro de Alva certificate, 11 November 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

Francisco Vicente García certificates, 2 January and 15 April 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

- Isidro de Alva certificate, 24 February 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.
- Isidro de Alva certificate, 21 May 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.
- Francisco Vicente García certificate, 12 January 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2818.
- Calvo to Philip V, 1 June 1739, AGI, Panama 364.
- John Read copy of accounts, 18 February 1735, AGI, Contaduría 266.
- Royal officials account, 19 January 1735, AGI, Panama 364.
- Geraldino to Patiño, 11 February 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790.
- Royal officials certificate, 4 September 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2810.
- Relación de los navíos despachados los años de 1731, 1732, AGI, Contaduría 267.
- Relación de los navíos despachados el año 1733-1734, AGI, Contaduría 267.

SANTIAGO 1729-1739¹

DATE	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
February 1731	Don Carlos	Gordon	70	
May 1731	Virgin Polly	Toll	12	
October 1731	Fellows	Archibald Paterson	177	
December 1731	Catherine	Kirksted	80	
January 1732	Virgin Polly	Toll	20	
February 1732	Paradox	Reynolds	99	
June 1732	Prince of Asturias	William Blackburn	40	
May 1733	San Felipe	George Stevens	12	
17 November 1733	Betty	Samuel Phelps	10	
3 May 1734	Beautiful Sarah	Benjamin Fisher	10	
23 October 1734	Nassau	John Bradshaw	10	5
24 December 1734	Warwick	Leonard Arnold	8	4 1/2
19 March 1735	Warwick	Leonard Arnold	12	6 1/2 1/3
18 April 1735	Union	Robert MacCullough	6	3
9 June 1735	Triton	John Racket	6	6
25 August 1735	Constant	Samuel Vincent	7	
July 1736	Trampose	Deal	6	
October 1736	Kingston	Robert MacCullough	30	
Totals for five years and nine months in the third trading period (18 voyages)			615	incomplete

SHIP	CAPTAIN	DATE OF DEPARTURE	DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED
Don Carlos	Gordon			
The Argyle	George Hamilton	20 - February 1731	Portsmouth	
Virgin Polly	Toll			
Fellows	Archibald Paterson	30 April 1732	"for company account"	
Catherine	Kirksted			
Virgin Polly	Toll			
Paradox	Reynolds			
St. Michael	John Cavannagh	4 April 1732	Cartagena	
Prince of Asturia	William Blackburn			
San Felipe	George Stevens	18 July 1733	"for company account"	
Betty	Samuel Phelps	12 February 1734	"for company account"	4,000
Beautiful Sarah	Benjamin Fisher	Arrived in London in ¹ October 1734		1,492
Triton	John Racket	20 August 1735	London	
Constant	Samuel Vincent			
Nassau	John Bradshaw	20 January 1735		1,000
Warwick	Leonard Arnold			
Warwick	Leonard Arnold			
Union	Robert MacCullough			
Trampose	Deal	August 1736		1,250
Kingston	Robert MacCullough			
Hibernica ²	Comerford	30 May 1739	Portsmouth	480
-	-	-	Total:	8,222

1. The Beautiful Sarah's return cargo was sold in Amsterdam.

2. Records for returns only were found for The Argyle, the St. Michael and the Hibernica.

SHIP	WHITE SUGAR (pounds)	COST (pesos)	BROWN SUGAR (pounds)	COST (pesos)	TOBACCO (bundles)	COST (pesos)
The Argyle ¹	91,325	5,507/1	136,402	5,493/2 1/2	5,133	817/2 1/2
Fellows	78,228	4,693/7 1/2	158,348	6,333/7 3/4	16,743	5,437/6 1/2
St. Michael	16,083	1,286/4	23,975	1,439/ 1/2	6,949	1,550/2
San Felipe	69,172	4,150	117,561	4,702/3 1/2		
Betty	65,562	3,934/3 1/2	101,870	4,074/6 1/4	5,366	959/2
Beautiful Sarah	113,752 (est.)	6,949/1 (est.)				
Triton	196,763 (est.)	12,020/2			249 tercios	
Nassau	228,889 (est.)	13,982/7				
Hibernica	111,550 (est.)	6,814/6 (est.)	107,878 (est.)	4,315 (est.)		
Totals: ²	879,999	53,831/7	646,034	26,358/4 1/2	34,191 & 249 tercios	8,764/2 1/2

SHIP	TANNED HIDES	COST (pesos)	CACAO (pounds)	COST (pesos)	LOGWOOD (pounds)	COST (pesos)
The Argyle	852	543/1				
Fellows	1,128	2,392	2,369	1,381/7		
San Felipe	655	409/3				
Betty	193	120/5	1,293	517/1 1/2	12,834	120/5
Beautiful Sarah	624					
Triton	180					
Nassau ³	836					
Hibernica	1,043		11,122 (est.)		43,336	
Totals:	4,659	3,465/1	14,784	1,899/ 1/2	56,170	120/5

1. The Argyle was the only vessel with indigo on its manifest. It carried 1,975 pounds which cost 624 pesos 1 1/2 reales.

2. There were no returns, or records were not found for them, on the Don Carlos, Paradox, Prince of Asturias, Constant, Warwick (two voyages), Virgin Polly (two voyages), Union, or Kingston.

3. The Nassau also carried one box of copra, weight and cost unknown.

Santiago 1729-1739

Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos de Santiago de Cuba en los años 1731-1734, AGI, Contaduría 267.

Geraldino to Patiño, 8 October 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2790.

Geraldino to Patiño, 27 October 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792.

Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies from 9 September 1734, 25 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and September 1735, 3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

From Patiño, April 1736, AGS, Estado 7010.

Tyrry to Quintana, 13 August 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851.

VERA CRUZ 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
9 March 1729	Jamaica	Ratliffe	John Cleland	30	28 4/4
5 July 1729	Jamaica	Assiento	Nathaniel Uring	79	74
5 May 1730	Jamaica	Assiento	Nathaniel Uring	117	108 1/4 1/2
8 November 1730	Campeche	Soledad	Joseph Martinez	16	12 1/2
15 January 1731	Jamaica	Assiento	Nathaniel Uring	100	91 3/4 1/2
2 January 1732	Campeche	San Antonio de Padua	Simon Joseph de Mateos	5	4 3/4
16 January 1732	Jamaica	St. James	Samuel Hearne	130	109 2/4
12 July 1732	Jamaica	Pearl	Alexander Gordon	109	99-5 1/2
18 January 1733	Jamaica	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	30	27-3 1/2
3 June 1733	Jamaica	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	50	47-4
17 July 1733	Jamaica	Charming Betty	Henry Bennett	15	13-4 1/2
12 December 1733	Caracas	Blandon		35 ²	33 1/3
9 November 1734		Charming Betty	Peter Quarrell	100 ³	90 2/4

1. References

2. Indulted slaves

3. The sale price for 94 slaves from the Charming Betty was 25,470 pesos.

DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN & PIEZAS DE INDIA			
21 July 1735	Jamaica	Don Carlos	Edward Fennell	101	59	42	91-2 1/2
30 July 1735		Blandon	Antonio Andrade	3 ¹			
2 August 1736	Jamaica	St. George (50 tons)	Thomas Quay	50			44-6 1/2
22 November 1736	Jamaica	St. George	Thomas Quay	50			44-3 1/2
22 May 1737	Jamaica	St. George	Thomas Quay	50			49 1/2
17 January 1738	Jamaica	St. George	Thomas Quay	60	20	40	58 4/1 1/4
4 March 1738		Goleta Inglesa Inglesa		9 ¹			7-6 1/2
16 April 1738		El Triunfo	Joseph Campuzano	8 ¹			6-3
12 July 1738	Jamaica	San Fernando	Frank Renton	60	35	25	55-2 1/2
27 July 1739	Jamaica	Britania (150 tons)	John Davison	100	66	34	93 1/2
Totals for ten years and five months in the third trading period (19 voyages)				1,252	180	141	1,141-4 1/4

1. Indulted slaves. The totals for indulted slaves are 55 and 47-2 5/6 piezas de india.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED	COCHINEAL (pounds)	REMARKS
Ratliffe				Relief ship for the <u>Prince Frederick</u> . See above p.
Assiento	22 September 1730 Jamaica	9,000		
Assiento	February 1731			232 pesos in unmarked silver seized from the <u>Assiento</u>
St. James	17 March 1732 Jamaica	15,000	1,183 1/2	
Pearl	20 December 1732 Jamaica	9,000	2,690	
Don Carlos	November 1733 Jamaica	6,006		
Charming Betty	26 December 1734 Jamaica	17,685/4	1,237 3/4	The <u>Charming Betty</u> also returned one box of Company books and accounts.
Don Carlos	13 September 1735 Jamaica	35,444		Returned one Company book of accounts
St. George	15 September 1736 Jamaica	15,486/6		
St. George	24 January 1737 Jamaica	6,781/1		Returned three Company books of accounts
St. George	20 July 1737 Jamaica	10,606/3		Returned three Company books of accounts
St. George	24 March 1738 Jamaica	10,822/7 + 140 marcos 7 1/2 ounces of silver		Returned several Company books of accounts
San Fernando	26 April 1739 Jamaica	13,744		
Britania				Carried contraband worth 4,271 pesos 3 reales
Totals:		149,576/5	5,111 1/4	
		and		
		140 marcos		
		7 1/2 ounces		

Vera Cruz 1729-1739

- From the royal officials, 9 February 1731, AGI, Contratación 4729.
- Frias to Geraldino, 15 September 1736, AGS, Estado 7006.
- Davila to Geraldino, 30 January 1733, AGS, Estado 7006.
- From Messrs. Avila and Alarcon y Ocaño, 3 February 1733, AGS, Estado 7006.
- Lista de las facturas de retornos hechos de la Vera Cruz, n.d., AGI, Contaduría 267.
- Royal officials account, 8 November 1732, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.
- Juan de Avila et al certificate, 3 February 1733, AGS, Estado 7006.
- Royal officials certificate, 11 May 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2785.
- Royal officials certificates, 12 April and 9 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789.
- Royal officials certificate, 23 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2794.
- Account of slaves introduced since 1716, 12 April 1735, AGI, Contaduría 268.
- Ochoa to Philip V, 26 April 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789.
- Pedro Foral Valdés certificates, 22 July and 13 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813.
- Pedro Foral Valdés certificate, 24 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.
- Governor and royal officials to Philip V, 13 August 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.
- Messrs. Hays and Butler account, 16 September 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789.
- Pedro Foral Valdés account, 22 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2789.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 22 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.
- Royal officials certificate, 29 December 1735, AGI, México 861.
- Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies from 9 September 1734, 25 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.
- Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and September 1735, 3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.
- Royal officials certificate, 18 September 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.
- Royal officials certificate, 15 March 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814.

- Frias to Philip V, 31 March and 28 September 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.
- Royal officials to Philip V, 3 August 1737, AGI, México 861.
- Extract of returns on the St. George, 24 March 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817.
- Royal officials certificate, 16 July 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.
- Frias to Philip V, 28 December 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2818 (several letters).
- Frias to Philip V, 30 December 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2818.
- Royal officials certificate, 30 July 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817.
- Frias to Philip V, 1 September 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2818 (several letters).
- From Castelfuerte, n.d., c. 1729, AGI, Contaduría 812.

CAMPECHE 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
February 1731	Winifred	Smith	20	13 9/10
May 1731	Essex	Burn	15	10
July 1731	Eagle	Chambers	20	11 3/8
August 1731	Tortola	Robert Cathcart	20	12
October 1731	Derby	Dalrymple	20	15 7/8
June 1732	Firtree	Areskin	20	12 4/8
July 1732	Five Brothers		20	8 1/4
August 1732	San Quintin	Brown	20	11 3/8
March 1733	Derby	Robert Cathcart	12	9 1/8
9 September 1734	Derby (170 tons)	Robert Cathcart	40	32 2/8
14 December 1734	San Quintin (300 tons)	John Hamilton	80	65 3/8
March 1735	Eagle (300 tons)	George Haynes	150	112 3/8
April 1735	Drake (360 tons)	Edward Oliver	150	119 3/4
9 July 1735	George & Mary	Edward Heller		
July 1735	Sea Horse	Edward Harris		
July 1735	Duchess of Portman	Jacob Vera		
July 1735	Revolution	William Pringle		
25 April 1736	Beautiful Sally	Benjamin Fisher	35	25
22 May 1736				6 (indulted slaves)
Totals for five years and three months trade in the third trading period (20 voyages)			622 ²	459 3/20

1. References

2. In addition there were six indulted slaves.

SHIP	DATE OF DEPARTURE	DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED	LOGWOOD (pounds)	COPAL (pounds)	DYEWOOD (pounds)
Derby	January 1735	London	5,000	416,000		
George & Mary	9 July 1735			240,000		
Sea Horse	July 1735		1,000	320,000		
Duchess of Portman	July 1735			280,000		
Revolution	July 1735			400,000		
Drake	9 August 1735	London	2,000	650,000	550	
Eagle	October 1735		3,000	614,000		
Linn ¹	October 1735					
Beautiful Sally	27 June 1736	London				
San Quintin ²	February 1737	London	6,000	816,500	400	1,750
San Francisco ³	February 1737		6,000			6,000
Totals:			23,000	3,736,500	950	7,750

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1. The Linn returned 9,000 pounds of cacao and 4,000 pounds of contra-yerba.
 2. The San Quintin also returned 2,250 pounds of sarsaparilla.
 3. The San Francisco also returned 100 pounds of cochineal and 667 pounds of anatta.

Campeche 1729-1739

Joseph de Saravia certificate, 24 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813.

Campeche accounts between 1730-1733, n.d., CL Shel. vol. 43, f. 267.

Navíos despachados de Jamaica con permiso, 1731-1733, AGI, Contaduría 266.

Navíos despachados de Jamaica con licencias, 1733-1734, AGI, Contaduría 266.

Passes for the Drake and Eagle signed by Smith, 8 November 1734, AGS, Estado 7006.

Tyrry to Torrenueva, 26 February 1739, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2851.

Anon. letter, 8 December 1732, AGS, Estado 6884.

From Campeche royal officials, 4 January 1735, AGS, Estado 7006.

Auto, 7 February 1735, AGS, Estado 7006.

Joseph de Saravia to Philip V, 2 September and 21 October 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2813.

Geraldino to Patiño, 20 October 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2792.

Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies from 9 September 1734, 25 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Miguel de Lastiri certificate, 25 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814.

Melchor de la Rosa certificate, 27 June 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814.

Melchor de la Rosa certificate, 14 February 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814.

CARACAS 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, BOYS, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA					
8 February 1729	Curaçao	Hermosa Ana	Frank Travers	20	8	12	0	0	14 2/4
27 May 1729		Caesar	Thomas Somers	50					
8 June 1729	Curaçao	Charlotte	Robert Galbraith	25					
January 1731		Witch of Lancashire	Spaffer	24					20 3/8
February 1731		Caesar	Thomas Somers	151					111 9/14
June 1731		Prince Ferdinand	Thomas Somers	142					103 15/28
August 1731		Prince Ferdinand	Thomas Somers	145					122 11/14
November 1731		Suzanna	Areskin	90					70 3/7
December 1731		Suzanna	Areskin	34					25
February 1732		Don Carlos	Thomas Somers	148					115 6/7
March 1732		Adventure	Peter Kearney	40					31 4/7
May 1732		Courier	Areskin	64					48 2/7
July 1732		Don Carlos	Thomas Somers	134					97 4/7
September 1732		Suzanna	H. Ogilvie	75					56 5/7
December 1732		Suzanna	H. Ogilvie	51					36 3/7
January 1733		Don Carlos	Thomas Somers	121					86 6/7
April 1733		Suzanna	H. Ogilvie	100					72 1/2

1. References

DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES, MEN WOMEN, BOYS, GIRLS & PIEZAS DE INDIA					
19 June 1733		Don Carlos	Thomas Somers	198					154 5/7
1 July 1733	Curaçao	Empress	Jeremiah Burch	10					6
5 September 1733	St. Christopher	Suzanna	H. Ogilvie	70					65 6/4
19 November 1733		Caesar		61					46
2 April 1734	Curaçao	Don Carlos	Thomas Somers	92	53	39			76 2/4
August 1734	Barbados	Elizabeth	Benjamin Dick	147	47	51	21	29	
30 March 1735	Santo Domingo	St. Andrew	Robert Brown	22	16	6			
26 May 1735	Barbados	Mermaid	Thomas Gilbert	100	51	49			92 3/4
July 1735		Caesar		22					22
15 December 1735	Barbados	Elizabeth	Benjamin Dick	200					167 3/4 1/2
June 1736	Barbados	Elizabeth	Benjamin Dick	256					226 2/4 1/2
22 November 1736	Barbados	Caesar	Thomas Somers	139	69	70			127 6/4
20 July 1737	Barbados	Elizabeth	Benjamin Dick	236					214 2/4 1/2
28 February 1738	St. Christopher	Triton	Alexander Adair	232					195 1/4
17 April 1739	Barbados	El Fuerzo	Juan Caulei	223					194 1/2
Totals for ten years and three months trade in the third trading period (32 voyages)				3,422	244	227	21	29	2,609 1/4

SHIP	SALE PRICE OF SLAVES (pesos)	FLOUR INTRO. (barrels)	DATE OF DEPARTURE & DESTINATION	PESOS RETURNED	CACAO (pounds)
Hermosa Ana		206 ¹			
Caesar		200			
Charlotte		193			
Don Carlos	6,863 for 27 slaves		19 April 1734 London	6,863	104,168 (received for 65 slaves)
Elizabeth			29 February 1736 Barbados		
St. Andrew	5,700 for 20 slaves			5,700	2,900 (received for 2 slaves)
Mermaid	23,490 for 100 slaves		16 July 1736 Barbados		130,366
Elizabeth			March 1736		269,120
Elizabeth	66,052 for 250 slaves		September 1736		358,672
Caesar	37,270				226,200
Totals:	139,375	599		12,563	1,091,426

1. Duty was paid on only 156 barrels of flour introduced.

Caracas 1729-1739

Certificate of Measurement of slaves, 8 February 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807.

Autos, 27 May and 8 June 1729, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807.

Royal officials certificate, 8 May 1730, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2807.

Navíos despachados de Jamaica con permisos, 1731-1732, AGI, Contaduría 267.

Navíos despachados de Jamaica con licencias, 1733, AGI, Contaduría 267.

Navíos despachados de Jamaica con licencias, 1733-1734, AGI, Contaduría 266.

Royal officials certificate, 27 July 1731, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Alvarez certificate, 31 May and 2 June 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Account of slaves introduced in the West Indies from 9 September 1734,
25 April 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Royal officials to Philip V, 29 November 1734, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Alvarez certificate, 21 April 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

From Phelipe Romero, 16 July 1735, AGS, Estado 7006.

Alvarez to Patiño, 27 July 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Alvarez to Philip V, 23 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2814.

Alvarez certificate, 30 December 1735, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817.

Account of returns from several factories between September 1734 and
September 1735, 3 May 1736, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2793.

Joseph de Armas certificate, 5 July 1736, AGI, Contaduría 268.

Royal officials to Philip V, 16 November 1736, AGI, Contaduría 1633A.

Domingo López certificate, 24 April 1737, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2815.

Royal officials certificate, 24 April 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

Royal officials to Díaz, 30 April 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2816.

Fernández to Philip V, 7 July 1738, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817.

Royal officials certificate, 5 January 1740, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817.

GUATEMALA 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES, MEN, WOMEN, BOYS & PIEZAS DE INDIA				
5 September 1731	Guatemala (25 tons)		66	4	35	27	45 11/20
5 March 1733	Fitzroy ² (40 tons)	Roger Paxton	93				81 6/8
Totals for one year and six months in the third trading period (2 voyages)			159				127 3/10

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- References: From Juan de Guzmán, 18 March 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; from Castellano, 5 March 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811; Royal officials to Philip V, 1 December 1740, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2817; Navíos despachados de Jamaica con permiso, 1731 and 1733, AGI, Contaduría 267.
 - The Fitzroy, which sailed from Jamaica, carried contraband goods of unspecified value including pewter, plates, mirrors, silk hats, meat, bread, rum, wine and rifles. Goods embargoed from the Fitzroy, 28 March 1733, AGI, Ind. Gen. 2811.

MARACAIBO 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA
28 June 1729	Caracas	Catherine	Frank Berry	27 12 1/2
21 February	St. Christopher	Don Carlos	Robert Cathcart	25 12 6/4
21 June 1730	St. Christopher	Don Carlos	George Cunningham	19 10 2/4
20 November 1730	St. Christopher	Don Carlos	George Cunningham	20 15 2/4
24 April 1731	St. Christopher	Success	George Cunningham	24 15 3/4
22 June 1732	St. Christopher	Don Felipe	George Cunningham	49 30
28 December 1732	St. Christopher	Don Felipe	George Cunningham	57 29
13 March 1733	St. Christopher	Golondrina	Hambal Savage	3 2 2/4
18 June 1733	St. Christopher	Don Felipe	George Cunningham	52 29
Totals for four years and one month in the third trading period (9 voyages)				276 158

1. References: Royal officials account, 31 July 1734, AGI, Contaduría 268; Account by Joseph Sanchez et al, 16 January 1733, Ind. Gen. 2811; Navíos despachados de Jamaica con permiso, 1731, AGI, Contaduría 267; Razón de los negros introducidos en Maracaibo hasta 18 Junio 1733, AGI, Contaduría 268.

PUERTO RICO 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA	
February 1731	Success	William Williams	18	10
September 1731	St. Phillip	William Williams	15	10
November 1731	St. Phillip	William Williams	12	6 3/4
March 1732	St. Phillip	William Williams	15	9
3 May 1733	San Juan	William Williams	22	14
28 June 1733	Santo Domingo	William Williams	33	21
Totals for two years and five months in the third trading period (6 voyages)			115	70 3/4

1. References: Navíos despachados de Jamaica con licencias, AGI, Contaduría 266; Navíos despachados de Jamaica con permisos, 1731, AGI, Contaduría 267.

SANTA MARTA 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	ORIGIN	SHIP	CAPTAIN	TOTAL NO. OF SLAVES, ADULTS, CHILDREN & PIEZAS DE INDIA			
17 June 1734		Beautiful Sally	Thomas Quay	140			129 3/4
9 July 1735	Jamaica	Hermosa Peggy		140			129 3/4 2/4
23 August 1735		Sarah		19	8	11	10
Totals for one year and three months in the third trading period (3 voyages)				299			269 2/4 1/2

1. Reference: Royal officials to Philip V, 23 August 1735, AGI, Contaduría 268.

SANTO DOMINGO 1729-1739¹

DATE OF ARRIVAL	SHIP	CAPTAIN	NO. OF SLAVES & PIEZAS DE INDIA		CONTRABAND (in pesos)
June 1732	Elizabeth	William Williams	36	19 3/7	
November 1732	Ann	William Williams	30	14	
30 August 1733	Santo Domingo	William Williams	37	26	4,636/5
November 1734	Lion	Eban Barber			
Totals for two years and six months in the third trading period (4 voyages)			103	59 3/7	4,636/5

1. References: Navíos despachados de Jamaica con permiso, 1732, AGI, Contaduría 267; Navíos despachados de Jamaica con licencia, 1733-1734, AGI, Contaduría 266.

Total Number of Slaves Introduced
at each Factory or Licensed Trading Post

Factory or Licensed Trading post	1714 - 1718		1722-1728	
	No. of slaves	No. of Piezas	No. of Slaves	No. of Piezas
Buenos Aires	3,560	2,385,,1/6	5,834	4,541,,1/3 ¹
Cartagena	1,588	1,394,,5/7	4,122	3,952,,2½
Havana	1,479	1,085	2,026	1,747,,1/7
Panama & Portobelo	3,767	2,583,,½	6,481	4,275,,3
Santiago de Cuba	508	est. 373	-	-
Vera Cruz	523	482,,5	1,027	950,,5/28
Campeche			46	est. 24,58
Caracas	488	376	221	138,,2/4
Guatemala				
Maracaibo			123	58
Puerto Rico				
Río de la Hacha			24	est. 12.82
Santa Marta			148	66½
Santo Domingo	100		61	23,,2/3

1. Fractions are rounded off for purposes of calculation.

Factory of Licensed Trading post	1729-1740		TOTALS		Average Ratio of Pieza to Slave
	No. of Slaves	No. of Piezas	No. of Slaves	No. of Piezas	
Buenos Aires	5,238	4,686 $\frac{11}{15}$	15,218	11,613	.76
Cartagena	5,238	4,956 $\frac{3}{4}-\frac{1}{2}$	10,941	10,304	.94
Havana	2,941	2,503 $\frac{1}{3}$	6,446	5,335	.83
Panama & Portobelo	10,224	7,607-4	20,472	14,467	.71
Santiago de Cuba	615	est. 523	1,123	896	.80
Vera Cruz	1,252	1,141-4 $\frac{1}{2}$	2,802	2,575	.92
Campeche	622	459 $\frac{3}{20}$	668	484	.72
Guatemala	159	127 $\frac{3}{10}$	159	127	.80
Maracaibo	276	158	399	216	.54
Puerto Rico	115	70 $\frac{3}{4}$	115	71	.62
Río de la Hacha			24	13	.54
Santa Marta	299	269 $\frac{2}{4}-\frac{1}{2}$	447	337	.75
Santo Domingo	103	59 $\frac{3}{7}$	264	92	.35 ¹

1. This figure is not realistic. The 100 slaves introduced during the first trading period were all men in prime condition destined to work on construction. Therefore the ratio of pieza to slave would have been high, but no figures are available and there were no similar circumstances from which figures could be estimated.

Number of Slaves Introduced Per Year¹

First Trading Period

Year	1714	1715	1716	1717	1718	1719	<u>Total</u>
Number of Slaves	174	1,808	2,603	3,121	4,065	242	12,013

Second Trading Period

Year	1722	1723	1724	1725	1726	1727	1728	<u>Total</u>
Number of Slaves	1,638	3,857	5,076	5,177	2,787	1,476	102	20,113

Third Trading Period

Year	1729	1730	1731	1732	1733	1734	<u>Total</u>
Number of Slaves	514	4,223	6,906	5,119	2,989	2,701	22,452

Year	1735	1736	1737	1738	1739	<u>Total</u>
Number of Slaves	2,535	2,648	1,678	1,444	323	8,628

Grand Total 63,206

1. Indulted slaves are not included.

Chapter XIII

Conclusion

With the Acquisition of the asiento contract in 1713 England acquired an advantage over the French and the Dutch in trade to the Spanish colonies. The vehicle for the conduct of this trade was the South Sea Company. Despite its favoured position, the Company's trade was not particularly profitable. There are several reasons for this.

Theoretically, because of its location Jamaica was an ideal place for an entrepôt from which slaves could be supplied to Spanish merchants in the Indies. However this advantage was not fully exploited. No attempt was made to assess the relative demand in the various Spanish colonies according to regional economic activities or slave profitability. Slaves were made available at random, leaving the market alternately glutted or inadequately supplied, thus encouraging contraband trade. Secondly, the selection of Company personnel was haphazard; few factors or agents demonstrated particular allegiance to the Company, and many robbed it of revenue by their own illicit activities. Thirdly, during the Anglo-Spanish wars of 1718, 1727 and 1739 considerable Company property was seized, little of which was ever restored. Fourthly, trade ceased during these wars, greatly limiting profits. Fifthly, contraband trade by Company employees was never eliminated, thus the Company and the Spanish crown were both defrauded of revenue throughout the period of the contract.

Spanish officials in Madrid were suspicious of the Company's intentions from the beginning. These suspicions were confirmed when Mathew Plowes and Dr. Burnett furnished proof implicating Company personnel and Spanish officials in extensive contraband trade. Although Spanish factors were appointed to monitor the trade, and diplomatic measures were taken for the same purpose, contraband continued mainly through the cooperation of pliable Spanish colonial officials.

The economic impact on the Spanish colonies of the South Sea Company's

various activities is difficult to quantify, not only because Company accounts are incomplete, but also because comparative figures for other foreign and Spanish trade are unavailable. For the 17 years between 1715 and 1732, the Company introduced into Spanish America on seven annual and two licensed ships registered merchandise worth approximately £2,101,487 , an average of £123,617 annually. These figures are based on the actual cost of the merchandise purchased by the Company.¹

Figures for the quantity and value of British exports to Spain and the West Indies during this period are based primarily on the Ledgers of Imports and Exports of England and Wales. Actual quantities are listed, but values are based on a predetermined official value which was not necessarily the actual value. The official figures changed little from year to year. Moreover the official British figures for exports to Spain and the West Indies do not indicate the percentage of goods actually sold in Spain's American colonies. Therefore any comparison between the South Sea Company's recorded exports and the total official British exports can only give an approximate percentage of the market possessed by the Company.

The following comparison of Company trade to the Spanish American colonies with the total British exports to Spain and the West Indies during the years in which annual and licensed ships sailed indicates that the Company controlled over 25% of British exports to Spain and the West Indies. Considering various factors: the inadequacies of the available statistics, the extensive and unrecorded contraband shipments made by Company employees as well as by private British merchants, and the unknown quantity of merchandise shipped to Spain and the West Indies which actually reached Spanish colonists, it is likely that the

1. The accounts of the second voyage of the Royal Prince and that of the Prince William listed the total expenses of the voyage including the cost of the cargo, salaries, victualling and other miscellaneous expenses. The approximate cost of the cargo was calculated by comparing the total expenses to the ratio of the cost of the cargo to the total expenses incurred on the first voyage of the Royal Prince.

company exported to Spanish American colonists considerably more than 25% of all British exports that eventually were consumed there.

Table I ²

Year	Total British exports to Spain and the West Indies (value in £)	Company Exports (value in £)	Company % of trade
1715	799,000	370,753	46
1717	858,000	233,500	27
1721	1,053,000	252,347	24
1723	1,053,000	274,320 est.	26
1724	1,053,000	264,964	25
1725	1,053,000	290,352	28
1730	1,053,000	234,436 est.	21
1732	1,163,000	180,815	16
Total	8,137,000	2,101,487	25.82

For similar reasons it is possible only to approximate what percentage of the total number of slaves introduced into the Spanish colonies between 1713 and 1739 were Company slaves. Although it is clear that the Company introduced most of the slaves into the Spanish colonies at this time, these figures cannot be compared to the volume of trade carried on by previous asentistas because that trade has not yet been quantified, or to the total number of slaves introduced during the period when the Company traded, because of the large quantity of contraband slave introductions, many by Company employees.

Some idea of the extent of the slave market controlled by the Company can be surmised by looking at the figures for slave exports from Jamaica during the period of the British asiento contract. Between 1715 and 1739, 74,925

2. D.C. Platt, Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914 (London, 1972), p. 34
Elizabeth Booddy Schumpeter, English Overseas Trade Statistics 1697-1808 (Oxford, 1960), pp. 1-4.

slaves were exported from the island. During the same period the Company introduced 63,206 slaves into the Spanish colonies. Thus, most slaves exported from Jamaica, probably about 75%, were Company slaves because Jamaica was the principal Company entrepôt and transshipment centre.³

While it is clear that foreign merchants trading to the Spanish colonies profited from Spain's economic decline from the seventeenth century, it would be illusory to speculate on the economic impact of the South Sea Company's asiento trade until further research is done on Spanish, British and other foreign trade to the colonies during the same period. Nevertheless the impact must have been great. The British asiento contract was the largest contractual arrangement to deliver slaves during the entire colonial period. Moreover with the protection of the British government, the Company changed traditional trading patterns to Spanish America. Resident British merchants seriously threatened the stability of Spain's technical economic monopoly in America by opening small banks, issuing letters of credit and exchange, remitting Spanish money and effects in contravention of Spanish law and avoidance of Spanish taxes.

3. Patterson, The Sociology, p. 289.

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